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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior to 1994, the practice of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa was extremely 
limited. The post-1994 shift to liberal democracy characterised by representativeness and 
constitutionalism brought about significant changes to the state’s civil-military relations. Within the 
paradigm of liberalism, civil-military relations were reshaped to ensure civil-supremacy over the 
military. Parliament, a central feature of representative democracy, emerged as a key institution to 
ensure democratic civil-military relations. 
 
This thesis reviews parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 2014 in 
the context of democratic civil-military relations and the associated characteristics of transparency 
and accountability. Two distinct parliamentary periods characterised the first twenty years of 
democracy. The first ten years focused on Parliament’s legislative function while a shift to its oversight 
function is observed after 2004. Oversight of the military is reviewed separately for these two periods. 
The study compiles a list of criteria for the review of parliamentary oversight of the military and applies 
such criteria to the two identified periods. This criteria include the availability and extensive use of 
oversight tools such as committee hearings, hearings in the plenary, commissions of inquiry, 
parliamentary questions (oral and written) and interpellations. For parliaments to thoroughly oversee 
the military, several focus areas were also identified, including the defence budget, policies, 
procurement, human resources and the deployment of the military. The study aims to enhance these 
criteria by looking at lower-order focus areas, including annual and quarterly departmental 
performance, interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial 
equality, defence morale and defence infrastructure. Furthermore, potential weaknesses for oversight 
of the military are identified, including the constitutional and legal powers to do oversight; resources 
and expertise available to parliaments; the political will to conduct oversight; and, follow-up on 
parliamentary recommendations.  
 
Through the application of the criteria above, the study finds that during the first two parliaments 
(1994 to 2004) efforts were made to define defence policy and legislation within the newfound liberal 
democratic context. After 2004, focus shifted to the institutions’ oversight function. Parliamentary 
processes, structures and oversight-enhancing legislation improved significantly between 2004 and 
2014 to enrich the potential for thorough oversight. Based on these improvements, and the relatively 
elevated levels of oversight already achieved by the defence committees in the First Parliament, a 
continuously improved level of parliamentary oversight of the military could thus be expected. 
However, oversight of the military did not improve in line with the institutional scope offered for 
improvement. There was a shift away from de-politicised, consensus-seeking oversight observed 
during the First Parliament. Oversight tools were not used optimally, focus areas of oversight not 
balanced and risks to effective oversight manifested over time. A declining political will to conduct 
oversight is of specific concern. Low levels of oversight became considerably amplified in the Fourth 
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Parliament. The quality of oversight therefore showed contextual regression, bringing into question 
the standing of parliamentary oversight of the military.  
SAMEVATTING 
Voor 1994 was die praktyk van parlementêre oorsig van die weermag in Suid Afrika uiters beperk. Ná 
1994 het die skuif na ‘n liberale demokrasie, wat deur verteenwoordiging en grondwetlikheid 
gekenmerk is, die land se burgerlik-militêre verhoudinge merkbaar verander. Binne ‘n liberale 
paradigma is burgerlik-militêre verhoudinge omskep om burgerlike beheer van die weermag te 
verseker. Die parlement, wat ‘n sentrale rol speel in ‘n verteenwoordigende demokrasie wat burgerlik-
militêre verhoudinge verseker, het as ‘n belangrike instansie na vore getree.  
Hierdie tesis beoordeel parlementêre oorsig van die weermag in Suid Afrika vanaf 1994 tot 2014 in 
die konteks van demokraties-burgerlik-militêre verhoudinge en daarmee gepaardgaande kenmerke 
soos deursigtigheid en verantwoordbaarheid. Twee duidelike parlementêre periodes het die eerste 
twintig jaar van demokrasie gekenmerk. Gedurende die eerste tien jaar het die Parlement hoofsaaklik 
op sy wetgewende funksie gefokus, terwyl ‘n skuif in fokus na ‘n oorsig-funksie ná 2004 merkbaar is. 
Oorsig van die weermag word in hierdie tesis vir die twee periodes afsonderlik beoordeel. Die studie 
stel ‘n lys kriteria saam wat aangewend kan word om parlementêre oorsig van die weermag te 
beoordeel en hierdie kriteria word toegepas op die twee geïdentifiseerde periodes. Die kriteria sluit 
die beskikbaarheid en uitgebreide gebruik van oorsigmeganismes soos komiteevergaderings, sittings 
in die huise van die Parlement parlementêre vrae (geskrewe en mondelings) en interpellasies in. Vir 
deeglike oorsig van die weermag is verskeie fokusareas ook geïdentifiseer wat die 
verdedigingsbegroting, verdedigingsbeleid, verkryging, menslike hulpbronne en die ontplooïng van 
die weermag insluit. Die studie brei uit op hierdie kriteria deur die insluiting van verskeie laer-vlak 
fokusareas. Hierdie areas sluit departementele jaar- en kwartaalverslae, interdepartementele 
samewerking, weermag opleiding en opvoeding, geslags- en rasgelykheid, die moraal van die 
weermag en verdedigings-infrastruktuur in. Verder word moontlike swakhede van oorsig oor die 
weermag ook geïdentifiseer, insluitend grondwetlike en wetgewende magte om oorsig uit te voer, die 
beskikbaarheid van hulpbronne en kundigheid aan die parlemente, die politieke wil om oorsig uit te 
voer en opvolg op parlementêre aanbevelings.  
Deur die gebruik van bogenoemde kriteria kom die studie tot die bevinding dat gedurende die eerste 
twee parlemente (1994 tot 2004) daar gepoog is om verdedigingswetgewing en -beleid te definieër 
binne die nuutgevonde liberale demokratiese konteks. Ná 2004 het die fokus na die parlement se 
oorsig funksie verskuif. Skuiwe in parlementêre prosesse, -strukture en wetgewing wat daarop gemik 
is om oorsig te verbeter, het die potensiaal vir oorsig tussen 2004 en 2014 merkbaar verbeter. 
Gegewe hierdie vooruitang, asook die relatief hoër vlakke van oorsig wat bereik is deur die 
verdedigingskomitees gedurende die Eerste Parlement, was verdere en voortdurende vooruitgang 
dus te wagte. Oorsig van die weermag het egter nie in lyn met vooruitgang in die instelling verbeter 
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nie. Oorsig het wegbeweeg van die Eerste Parlement se pogings om oorsig van die weermag te 
depolitiseer en konsensus-gesentreerd te wees. Oorsigmeganismes is nie optimaal benut nie, 
fokusareas van oorsig is nie gebalanseer nie en betekenisvolle risikos wat effektiewe oorsig 
ondermyn het oor tyd duidelik geword. ‘n Verminderende politieke wil om oorsig van die weermag uit 
te voer, was spesifiek kommerwekkend. Lae vlakke van oorsig het veral in die Vierde Parlement 
uitgestaan. Die gehalte van oorsig het dus agteruitgang getoon wat die algehele stand van 
parlementêre oorsig van die weermag bevraagteken.  
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CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary forms one of the 
cornerstones of the system of checks and balances characterising liberal democracies (Bellamy, 
2005, p. 257; Mojapelo, 2012, pp. 37–39). Crucial to this system is oversight, through which the 
legislative branch holds the executive to account to ensure “efficiency, economy and effectiveness of 
government operations” (Yamamoto, 2007, p. 9).  
 
As a practical means of executing oversight to ensure accountability, most legislatures1 make use of a 
committee system. Committees are tasked with, inter alia, examining the administration of 
government, which includes oversight of the military (Strøm, 1998). The committee system does, 
however, portray certain weaknesses. In his 1978 publication titled Comparative Legislatures, Michael 
Mezey (1979, p. 91) notes, in the context of reactive legislatures, that the strength of committee 
arenas is often inversely related to the strength of the executive. More recently, this concern was 
highlighted in the context of parliamentary oversight of the military by the Geneva Centre for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) which noted that parliamentary defence and security 
committees are traditionally characterised by a lack of transparency and strong involvement of the 
executive (DCAF, 2006, p. 1). Transparency International raised similar concerns following a 2013 
evaluation of the quality of legislative oversight of the military in 82 countries, concluding that a poor 
transparency in oversight of the military is a global concern. The study revealed that while 
parliamentary oversight of the military is common practice, it has become increasingly “illusionary” 
(Cover & Meran, 2013, p. 3).  
 
With the advent of democracy in South African in 1994, the country’s legislative paradigm shifted, 
aiming to conform to the ideals of democracy, specifically its system of checks and balances.  In 
contrast to the pre-1994 period, post-1994 South Africa placed significant emphasis on the role of 
parliament and its oversight function. This included the rejuvenation of parliamentary oversight of the 
military. The question should thus be raised to what extent South Africa, as a young democracy, was 
able to circumvent the globally recognised challenges to parliamentary oversight of the military?  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Although the term Parliament is preferred for this study, it may be used interchangeably with the terms 
‘assembly’ and/or ‘legislature’. The reason for preferring to use the term ‘parliament’ is twofold. First, it relates 
more directly to the South African case study and, second, it allows for a broader interpretation of the actions 
conducted by such institutions. The term legislature may, for example, presuppose a focus on the legislative 
tasks of parliaments to the exclusion of its oversight role. 
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2. Rationale for the study 
 
Prior to 1994, South Africa´s legislative oversight of the military was relegated to a point of non-
existence. Sylvester (2011a, pp. 11–12) notes a number of factors contributing to this. Firstly, 
recommendations of the 1966 Verster Commission did away with the Defence Secretary and replaced 
him with the Chief of the Defence Force as the primary accounting officer. This resulted in executive 
dominance in terms of civil control of the military. Secondly, during the 1980s, defence expenditure 
escaped parliamentary scrutiny as the majority of defence acquisitions were channelled through the 
Special Defence Account, an account free from parliamentary oversight. The advent of democracy in 
1994 brought about significant changes to the country’s legislature to ensure increased oversight 
capacity in line with that of modern liberal democracies. This was reflected in, for example, legislative 
amendments such as the Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993, Schedule 4) that emphasised the 
separation of powers “with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability.” In practical 
terms, parliament’s oversight role was increasingly executed through the development of a robust 
committee system, often referred to as the ‘engine rooms’ of the institution (Ngculu, 1996, p. 180). 
Although initial teething problems in providing oversight were experienced after 1994, authors like 
Calland (1997, p. 15) noted that certain committees showed immense progress in its interaction with 
the executive. In his 1998 dissertation, Fisher (1998, pp. 78–79) also noted a number of strengths of 
committees during the first years of existence, including that they were often innovative, delivery-
oriented in nature and that they added efficiency to deliberations on legislation. These developments 
formed part of a number of increased legislative and oversight advances during the first and second 
parliaments (1994 to 2004).  
 
Despite the developments around the committee system after 1994, a number of concerns have been 
raised by scholars and Members of Parliament (MP). Hasson (2010) points to ‘a changing tide’ in the 
South African Parliament (hereafter Parliament) mirroring Mezey’s (1979) observation that the 
strength of committee arenas is inversely related to the strength of the executive. Former African 
National Congress (ANC) MP, Johny de Lange, similarly noted in 2006 that “the dynamism of 
committees have disappeared” (Hasson, 2010). This sentiment was also highlighted by another 
former ANC MP, Andrew Feinstein (2007, p. 260), claiming the need for constitutional protection of 
some oversight committees from political influence. Feinstein claims that a number of the advances 
made in the first years of democracy were largely undone by parliament’s handling of the 1999 
Strategic Defence Procurement Package (SDPP) (News24, 2014). He argues that Parliament failed to 
hold the executive to account, raising serious concerns regarding its capacity to sustain effective 
oversight. These views thus raise the question whether South Africa, despite initial advances after 
1994, started to fall victim to what Transparency International refers to as ‘illusionary oversight’ (a 
general lack of transparency in oversight). This question is compounded by two other factors:  
 
 A widely held perception that parliamentary oversight of the military has declined. This is 
reflected in statements by MPs and industry experts alike. 
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 A perceived decline in the literature related to parliamentary oversight of the military in South 
Africa. The majority of studies on civil-military relations in South Africa, including those 
focusing on aspects of parliamentary oversight, stem from the immediate post-1994 era, while 
analytical literature on the third and fourth parliaments is limited.  
 
In addition to questioning general oversight capacity, the question on the quality and standing of 
parliamentary oversight of the military can also be answered by looking outside the realm of 
parliament and focussing on the military. In reviewing the South African military in the post-1994 
period, the most disconcerting summary came in the 2014 Defence Review, which states that “the 
Defence Force is in a critical state of decline” (Defence Review Committee, 2014, p. ix). Parliamentary 
oversight of the military is an essential tool in preventing such decline. The statement in the Defence 
Review thus raises the question whether ‘parliamentary oversight of the military’ remains strongly 
entrenched and effective?  
 
The rationale of the study thus stems from a contrast between the rise and perceived effectiveness of 
parliamentary oversight of the military in the immediate post-1994 period, and the perceived void in 
parliamentary oversight identified by former MPs and deduced from the 2014 Defence Review.  
 
3. Aim of the study 
 
This study aims to provide an analysis of twenty years of parliamentary oversight of the military in 
South Africa by contrasting initial developments in the immediate post-1994 period (1994 to 2004) to 
developments of the third and fourth democratic parliaments (2004 to 2014). The primary aim of this 
analysis is to determine the status of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa between 
1994 and 2014. 
 
4. Formulation and demarcation of research problem and objectives 
 
The primary research problem revolves around the quality and standing of parliamentary oversight of 
the military in the South African Parliament during the first twenty years of democracy. The study is 
guided by the following research questions: 
 
 What are the distinguishing features of successful democratic parliamentary oversight of the 
military? 
 How does South African Parliamentary oversight of the military compare to international 
benchmarks and international best practice? 
 What changes can be observed in relation to the oversight of the military when comparing the 
first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) to the third and fourth parliaments (2004 – 2014)?  
 What are the ‘views from the inside’ on parliamentary oversight of the military? 
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5. Anticipated contribution of the study 
 
Constant review of parliamentary oversight of the military is essential given the important role of the 
institution in ensuring the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations and the optimal functioning of 
military forces (Kotia, 2011, p. 57; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst, & Olson, 2006, p. 6). This study may firstly 
assist in raising the prominence of the debate on parliamentary oversight of the military in South 
Africa. Secondly, the study may assist in internalising international measuring instruments on 
legislative oversight of the military. By viewing oversight of the military in South Africa alongside 
oversight in other countries, the applicability of international measuring instruments becomes 
apparent. Views from former and serving MPs can further provide clarity on the applicability of these 
instruments. Measuring instruments for effective parliamentary oversight of the military can 
subsequently be refined to find applicability to the South African Parliament. Thirdly, on a more 
pragmatic level, the study may be of value to parliamentary officials in determining factors that 
contribute to ineffective parliamentary oversight of the military. Countermeasures to such 
inefficiencies can subsequently be developed. 
 
6. Literature review 
 
The literature review for this study is thematically structured. First, it addresses the political theories 
(theories of democracy and its substructures) that underpin the parliamentary system of governance. 
This includes reference to the principle of parliamentary oversight and civil-military relations. Second, 
a broad range of literature dealing with international best practice of parliamentary oversight of the 
military is consulted. This section of the review refers to both analytical and case-study literature and 
is used to identify traits of successful oversight. Third, the focus shifts to literature dealing specifically 
with the South African Parliament. This last section of the literature review is structured 
chronologically, with an underlying aim of differentiating between oversight of military in the immediate 
post-1994 period (1994 – 2004) and that of subsequent oversight in the third and fourth parliaments 
(2004 – 2014).  
 
6.1 Setting the theoretical framework 
 
The title of this study suggests the study of two separate yet overlapping aspects, namely Parliament 
as an institution and oversight as a practice. It is thus of value to explore theoretical roots that 
underpin both the institution and the practice in order to determine a theoretical framework for the 
study. This should then be viewed along the concept of civil-military relations to highlight the unique 
relationship between democracy and the military. 
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6.1.1 Rooting parliamentary oversight in theory 
 
Parliaments (and other forms of representative legislatures) are a natural outflow of representative 
democracy. Representative democracy is an indirect form of democracy whereby the people elect 
representatives to act on their behalf in government. There is thus a close link between the 
democratic electoral process and the legislative institution (Damgaard, 2000, pp. 7–8; Nijzinkm & 
Piombo, 2004, p. 2). The pluralist view of democracy is of particular importance in explaining 
parliaments. This relevance stems from the focus of pluralist thinkers such as John Locke and 
Charles-Louis Montesquieu whose writings are linked to the concept of the ‘separation of powers’ 
(Fisher, 1998, p. 44; Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 9–10). The aim of the separation of powers is to create a 
system of checks and balances in government (Adar, 2009, p. 6; Bellamy, 2005, p. 257). Montesquieu 
(1748) expanded on Locke’s two-tier separation of powers and defined the modern day trias politica 
that refers to a separation between three independent powers, namely the legislature, the judiciary 
and the executive. The pluralist view holds that legislatures play a crucial role in stabilising 
democracies and reflect one of the most crucial organisational instruments of democracies, namely 
‘an elected government’ (Alford & Friedland, 1992, pp. 72–73). The concept of the separation of 
powers thus underscores the creation and functioning of parliaments. Closely linked to the focus on 
representative democracy is the rise of constitutionalism during the eighteenth century. The rise of 
constitutionalism reflected a link between constitutional democracies and the advocacy of strong 
parliaments (Ziegler, Baranger, & Bradley, 2007). One of the main functions of parliaments in this 
democratic setting is that of oversight. 
 
The practice of oversight also finds its roots in the democratic practices noted above. As already 
stated, the separation of powers aims to create a system of checks and balances in government 
(Adar, 2009, p. 6; Bellamy, 2005, p. 257; Mojapelo, 2012, pp. 37–39). It is thus unsurprising that the 
role of parliaments has expanded beyond merely legislating to include various tasks such as oversight 
of the executive branch of government (Johnson, 2005, p. 3; Strøm, 1998, pp. 29–30). The link 
between oversight and democracy is further highlighted through the values portrayed in the concept 
of liberal democracy, including freedom, civil liberties, human rights, equality and constitutionalism 
(Alford & Friedland, 1992, p. 42; Hudson, 1999). Through oversight of the executive, parliament 
strengthens adherence to these values. 
 
From the above it is clear that there is a very strong link between parliaments and democracy. 
Similarly, the practice of oversight is linked to democratic practices and values. It thus follows 
naturally that the roots of a study on parliamentary oversight be found in theories of democracy. 
Theories of democracy include a number of opposing views and interpretations. Of specific value to 
this study is the pluralist view of democracy. The reason for this is the already stated link between 
parliaments and the ‘separation of powers’, a concept stemming from early pluralist thinkers such as 
Locke and Montesquieu (Adar, 2009, pp. 6–8; Alford & Friedland, 1992, pp. 113–135; Bellamy, 2005). 
The pluralist view of democracy ties with this study as it is closely linked to liberal democracy, the 
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latter which also emphasises checks and balances. The evolution of the pluralist interpretation 
warrants specific attention in this study, notably Dahl’s reference to ‘polyarchies’ that refers to a 
democratic system of governance (rule by the many). Dahl sought to separate polyarchies from the 
classic interpretation of democracy (rule by all citizens) (Dahl, 1956, pp. 63–90, 1982; Krouse, 1982, 
p. 442). There is also a link between polyarchies and liberalist values, specifically in relation to 
Western polyarchies. This link is essential to the study as polyarchies place significant emphasis on 
the institutions that enforce accountability (including parliaments).  
 
In his work on polyarchies, Lijphart also focuses on the differentiation between majoritarian and 
consensus democracies. Majoritarian democracies are closely linked to the parliamentary system 
(Lijphart, 1999, pp. 9–47). The value of a focus on the majoritarian democracy to this study is that it 
allows for the utilisation of Lijphart’s research on central features of majoritarian democracies. This 
proves valuable in the study’s comparative element whereby various majoritarian characteristics can 
be compared across the cases (parliaments) to be studied. 
 
6.1.2 Civil-military relations: Defence and democracy 
 
Given the theoretical foundations of the study in theories of democracy, the link between democracy 
and the military should also be explored in terms of its theoretic underpinnings. In terms of theoretical 
roots, the work of Samuel Huntington (1957) on civil-military relations serves as an authoritative point 
of departure as it highlights the concept of civil control of the military within the scope of democracy. 
Civil control of the military primarily refers to the subordination of the armed forces to the executive 
branch of government (Aldis & Drent, 2008; Feaver, 1996). Huntington notes that, after the Second 
World War, a number of aspects characterised civil-military relations, specifically the subordination of 
the military to civilian political leadership and minimal involvement of the military in politics. For 
effective civil control of the military, there needs to be a high degree of relative autonomy of the 
military. Huntington notes that new democracies (states that shifted towards democracy between the 
1970s and 1990s) have, in general, been successful in maintaining effective civil-military relations 
(Huntington, 1995). Janowitz (1960), however, observes a closer relationship between politics and the 
military brought about by changing security and political dynamics. In the post-Cold War period there 
has been further expansion on the closer relationship between the military and civil powers. This is 
reflected in Schiff’s model of concordance that refers to a ‘partnership’ between role players (Schiff, 
2009). The debate has thus shifted to finding the optimal balance between the military and civil 
powers. What has remained constant, however, is the principle that the military serves the state.  
 
The dynamics and development of the concept of civil-military relations as noted above should also 
be viewed within the context of the unit of analysis (the Parliament of South Africa), given the intrinsic 
post-1994 link between democracy and civil-military relations. Prior to 1994 South Africa was 
characterised by a the lack of accountability to Parliament and significant military influence on the 
executive (Ferreira, 2007; Griffiths, 1995). To fully understand changes in civil-military relations after 
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1994, it is crucial to focus on the democratisation of the country. First, the shifting concept of national 
security should be considered. Until the end of the Cold War, national security was largely viewed 
through the realist focus on state-power and a specific inter-state perspective of security matters. As 
such, the state was central to security thinking prior to 1994 (Williams, 2002: 213). Thereafter, the 
scope of national security expanded to become more inclusive of human security (Buzan, 1991; 
Cawthra, du Pisani, & Omari, 2007, pp. 15–20; Hough, 2003). This theoretical shift is essential for the 
study as South Africa’s security architecture clearly aligned itself with the international trend of 
focusing on human security (Ferreira, 2007; Nathan, 1998). Second, principles of democracy 
underpinned South Africa’s approach to civil-military relations in the post-1994 period, in line with the 
guidelines of ‘objective civilian control’ as put forth by Huntington (1995, p. 9). This was particularly 
evident in the 1996 White Paper on Defence (RSA, 1996b), fittingly titled ‘Defence in a Democracy’. 
The White Paper was drafted through a highly inclusive process and based on the inflexible principle 
of stable civil-military relations (Williams, 2002, p. 205–207).  
 
There are, however, factors that impact negatively on general civil-military relations, specifically the 
paradox between political and military leaders (Gray, 1999, pp. 58–68). Gray notes aspects such as 
‘distinctly different responsibilities’, ‘variances in culture or ethos’, and ‘reciprocal ignorance’ as factors 
dividing political leaders from their military counterparts. It is thus evident that military-minded MPs are 
required to enhance effective civil-military relations. Kotia (2011, p. 66) also notes a lack of expertise 
and information on defence matters by political leaders as a factor inhibiting civil-military relations. 
These factors indicate that while civil-military relations observed in democracies relate closely to 
objective civilian control, it is not without challenges. 
 
Given the link between democracy and developments in civil-military relations as well as the 
applicability thereof to the unit of analysis, it is of value to review other cases within this parameter. 
 
6.2 Parliamentary oversight of the military and determining international best practice  
 
This section is presented in two phases. First, literature aimed at defining and expanding on the 
concept of parliamentary oversight of the military is presented and, second, a range of literature 
dealing with international best practice is provided.  
 
6.2.1 Conceptualising parliamentary oversight of the military 
 
While the previous section explored literature related to the theoretical underpinnings of oversight, it is 
essential to also conceptualise the broader concept of parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary 
oversight joins two core concepts, namely accountability and transparency (Bucur-marcu, 2009; 
Hänggi, 2003; Yamamoto, 2007). These concepts represent the desired natural outflows of oversight. 
Given the focus of the study on parliament, the concept of oversight should be placed in the sphere of 
public accountability (Lastra & Shams, 2000; Scott, 2000). The aim of parliamentary oversight is to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
ensure transparency in governance and to keep government accountable to the electorate (Fisher, 
1998). The question then arises as to why a parliament, in particular, assumes such a prominent role 
in effecting oversight and public accountability? 
 
While a number of institutions such as ombudspersons and audit institutions fulfil the function of 
oversight, discussion on public accountability often highlights the central role of legislatures (Olson, 
Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, & von Trapp, 2008; Yamamoto, 2007). It is argued that parliaments are effective 
oversight institutions because it has a unique set of tools available to assist in fulfilling this task. 
These include, inter alia, parliament’s ability to express views on the public sector and its policies; 
parliament’s powers to remove certain office bearers; inquests through committees of inquiry; 
inquests through specialised parliamentary committees; and, public hearings (Damgaard, 2000; 
Yamamoto, 2007). Pellizo (in Olson et al., 2008, p. 30) points to a differentiation in the grouping of 
such tools. While some authors organise oversight tools according to its place in the policy-oversight 
process, others group it according to the form it takes, be it a procedural tool or a specific body. One 
specific set of tools, parliamentary committees, manages to transcend this differentiation. It therefore 
forms a crucial part of the parliamentary oversight capacity and deserves special focus in any study 
related to parliamentary oversight. 
 
Parliamentary committees are an essential oversight tool as it plays a specific and continuous role in 
the oversight process. Committees are well suited to ensure oversight due to the fact that they receive 
information and explanations from the executive and review their performance and practice (Fisher, 
1998, pp. 20–22; Griffith, 2005). It is commonly held that committees are the ‘engine rooms’ of 
parliaments and contributes substantially to its effectiveness (Ngculu, 1996, p. 180). Malcolm (Shaw, 
1998, p. 225), also points to “the universality of committees” and the value of having an issue-focused 
oversight capacity. However, both Malcolm (Shaw, 1998, pp. 238-239) and Yamamoto (2007, pp. 16-
17) caution that committees are not universally effective. There thus seems to be consensus that 
committees play central oversight roles, but its success is not guaranteed. 
 
The sections above highlight the link between oversight, transparency and accountability. They also 
highlight parliamentary tools, notably the committee system, as a valuable means to attain such 
oversight. However, oversight of the military falls within the broader scope of security sector 
governance that presents unique features separate to general oversight. Hanggi (2003, p. 10) notes, 
for example, the need to evaluate the balance between statutory armed forces; civil management and 
oversight bodies; non-statutory security forces; and non-statutory civil-society groups, to determine 
the level of governance of the security sector. On military-specific aspects requiring oversight, 
Huntington (1957) focuses on the operating issues of the military that includes quantitative issues 
such as the size, recruitment and supply of forces; the qualitative issues such as organisation, 
composition and deployment of forces; and, dynamic issues such as the utilisation of the military. 
Oversight of the security sector and military in particular thus has to take into account a unique and 
widely differential set of variables. Additional variables that form part of parliamentary oversight of the 
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military include, inter alia, the need to evaluate defence budgets, procurement, military deployments 
and defence policy (Cover & Meran, 2013a; DCAF, 2006b, 2006a).2 A lack of transparency, the 
complexity of oversight of the military and strong executive involvement are often highlighted as 
challenges to oversight of the military (Cover & Meran, 2013a; DCAF, 2006).  
 
The mentioned variables reflect that oversight of the military is a complex and multi-faceted 
enterprise. While thorough oversight of all these variables is desirable, the real-world application 
thereof requires analysis. 
 
6.2.2 International comparison and best practice 
 
Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (2006, p. 23) note John Stuart Mill’s 1872 focus on the 
importance of comparative research as a key element in all social sciences research. Babbie (2013, 
pp. 314, 318) notes the link between comparative and historical research whereby historical methods 
and data are used for comparative purposes. The study of institutions and organisations lend 
themselves very well to this form of research given that their history is often well documented. Mouton 
(2013, p. 154) claims that the value of comparison lies in the identification of similarities and 
differences among various units. This allows for the identification of “ideal types: conceptual models 
composed of the essential characteristics of social phenomena” (Babbie, 2013, p. 318). Although not 
the primary research method to be used in this study (See Section 7), the value of comparison in the 
study of an organisation such as Parliament is evident. By reviewing other cases of parliamentary 
oversight of the military around the world, it is possible to determine best practice and identify pitfalls 
against which to compare the South African case.  
For the purpose of this study, legislative oversight of the military in five specific countries is utilised to 
identify best practice. The countries to be reviewed include, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, 
Canada, India and Zambia (See Figure 1.1). The rationale behind the selection of cases relates to 
them being based on Westminster systems comparable to South Africa’s Parliament.3 The countries 
selected reflect various levels of democratic maturity, with some rated stronger democracies than 
others and therefore reflect various levels of parliamentary oversight. This allows for a review of 
countries rated stronger and weaker in terms of oversight of the military by various international 
institutions such as Transparency International, the World Bank and the IPU (Cover & Meran, 2013b; 
Olson et al., 2008; Yamamoto, 2007). The selection of cases was further influenced by the 
accessibility of data on parliamentary activity, completeness of data as well as restrictions due to 
language. 
                                                          
2 Further reference to tools of oversight of the military is made in the Research Approach (Data collection) 
section. 
3 The South African parliamentary system do not fully conform to traditional Westminster parliaments, notably 
due to its use of a proportional representative system. Nonetheless, the South African Parliament was heavily 
influenced and shares a long history with the Westminster model. This is particularly relevant in terms of the 
South African Parliament’s approach to oversight and the use of committee systems (Parliament of South Africa, 
2009: Chapter 4).  As such, in terms of its oversight function, comparison to other Westminster-styled parliaments 
is warranted. 
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Figure 1: Deducing international best practice of parliamentary oversight of the 
military 
 
 
 
The UK Parliament has an extensive history related to the development of oversight mechanisms 
(Kotia, 2011, p. 61). Using the UK Parliament as a measure of more effective oversight of the military 
is justified by a number of international studies on the matter. The World Bank (Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 
12) as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (Yamamoto, 2007) rate the UK very high on the 
number of parliamentary oversight tools at its disposal (tools include aspects such as committee 
hearings, plenary hearings and parliamentary questions). Committees, for example, have played a 
central role in the UK Parliament since the mid-sixteenth century (Marleau & Montpetit, 2000). With 
specific reference to oversight of the military, Cover and Meran (2013a, p. 8) point to the UK’s very 
low defence-related parliamentary corruption risk. This is closely linked to the high levels of defence 
budget transparency (Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011a). Rozenberg et al. (2011) highlight the UK’s high 
rate of parliamentary defence questions as a success. The UK Parliament’s military oversight is, 
however, not free from criticism. It is cautioned that the frequency of parliamentary questions on 
defence in itself is not an effective measurement of successful oversight. Furthermore, the impact of 
party-influence, the low level of parliamentary control over the deployment of the Defence Force, and 
weaknesses of the UK’s ‘talking parliament’ versus the advantages of a ‘working parliament’ are 
noted as possible pitfalls (Griffith, 2005, p. 17; Rozenberg et al., 2011, p. 349; Wagner, 2006, p. 54). 
The UK often rates higher in terms of parliamentary oversight of the military than other parliaments 
utilised in this study. For this reason as well as the quality and quantity of information available on the 
UK Parliament’s defence-related work, it is thus used as a basis for best practice against which other 
parliaments can be matched.  
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The parliaments of Australia and Canada share a number of institutional similarities with the UK 
Parliament. Of specific importance to this study is the utilisation of the committee system. Australia 
has a Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that was established in 1949 
and information on its inquiries are readily available (Parliament of Australia, 2014). The Parliament of 
Canada’s Standing Committee on National Defence enjoys a wide-ranging mandate that includes 
oversight over “all matters” related to the Department of Defence (DOD) and the military itself. It 
further makes use of the Senate’s Standing Committee on National Security, thus reflecting active 
oversight of defence in both houses of a bicameral system (Parliament of Canada, 2013). Both the 
Australian and Canadian Parliaments are considered to have highly transparent defence budgets 
(Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011a, pp. 6, 15). Australia also reflects extremely low risks of defence-related 
parliamentary corruption (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 8). However, both these institutions seem to 
share the UK parliament’s limitations of influence over military deployments (Bland & Rempel, 2004, 
pp. 8-18; Sabhlok, 2011; Wagner, 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, in Australia, it is argued that not enough 
parliamentary oversight of the role of the defence industry is in place (Wylie, 2006). While this is not 
reflected as a major concern in Canada, the problem of the underutilisation of defence oversight 
mechanisms is highlighted (Bland & Rempel, 2004, pp. 19-27). Based on the same ranking criteria 
(Cover & Meran, 2013a; Yamamoto, 2007), South Africa is generally rated slightly lower than 
Australia and Canada in terms of parliamentary oversight of the military. The closeness in ratings 
does, however, assist in providing effective contextual comparison. 
 
While the cases above refer to parliaments rated higher than South Africa in terms of oversight of the 
military, it is of value to look at opposing cases as well. India and Zambia represent relevant cases to 
study as they rate lower than South Africa in many aspects. In terms of transparent defence budgets, 
both these countries score relatively low with moderately transparent budgets (Gorbanova & Wawro, 
2011a, p. 6). Zambia has shown a significant increase in its general parliamentary oversight capability 
since 1991 (P. J. Burnell, 2002, p. 23). However, its parliamentary oversight capacity of the military 
remains in its infancy. Slaa (in le Roux, Rupiya, & Ngoma, 2012, pp. 17–29) notes that a number of 
factors contributing to ineffective oversight of the military in Zambia are present throughout the SADC 
region, including weak committee systems and heavy executive involvement. India has a longer 
history of parliamentary oversight of the military and its structures are more deeply entrenched. As 
such, some aspects such as oversight of oversight are better developed. For example, in contrast to 
its 2011 study, by 2013 Transparency International noted wide-ranging powers of the parliamentary 
committee on defence to review the defence budget. Transparency International further notes 
moderate to low levels of oversight of defence procurement and defence policy. Significant concerns 
identified in India include the high risk in terms of defence-related corruption, which is an indictment 
on parliamentary oversight (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 8). An evaluation of factors contributing to India 
and Zambia’s lower rating is of value for confirming potential weaknesses in oversight.  
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6.3 Parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa since 1994 
 
Parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa may be analysed over two separate yet 
contextually overlapping periods. The study analyses oversight according to this division, namely the 
first ten years of democracy (1994 to 2004)4 and, developments over the subsequent ten years (2004 
to 2014)5. This division rests upon three central revelations from existing literature. First, a distinction 
can be made between the focus of parliament in the two periods. The first ten years of parliament 
focussed more on the legislative task of parliament with a high number of bills passed. The 
subsequent ten years (2004 to 2014) saw the focus of parliament shift increasingly to the oversight 
function (Nijzinkm & Piombo, 2004, pp. 2-5; Parliament of South Africa, 2008a). Although some 
element of this progression is already evident in the Second Parliament (1999 to 2004), it only 
reached maturity in the second and third parliaments (2004 to 2014). Second, the first ten years of 
democracy saw the development of a number of defence-related policies and legislation. These 
included, inter alia, the 1996 Constitution, the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence 
Review and the 2002 Defence Act. These documents lay the foundation for the growth and utilisation 
of the military in a democratic setting. Parliamentary oversight according to these principles would 
thus only have reached maturity by the beginning of the Third Parliament (2004). Third, Parliament’s 
oversight capacity was increasingly prioritised and actively developed through special seminars, 
assistance to committees and increased training during the third and fourth parliaments (2004 to 
2014) (Govender et al., 2009; Parliament of South Africa, 2008a, 2011; Rustin & Nel, 2011).  
 
Based on this division, literature for the two periods of analysis can be viewed separately to further 
explore the systematic development of parliament’s oversight function over a twenty-year period. 
 
6.3.1 Parliamentary oversight of the military: 1994 to 2004  
 
The democratisation of South Africa marked a significant turning point for the country both in terms of 
parliamentary oversight of the military and civil-military relations. Prior to 1994, parliamentary 
oversight of the military was underdeveloped and had little impact. By 1992, Williams (in Perk, 2011, 
p. 10) referred to the Defence Parliamentary Study Group as a ‘toothless watchdog’. To strengthen 
civil-military relations, Williams suggested constitutional amendments that can strengthen the civilian 
leadership of the military. This is in line with Sylvester’s (2011a, pp. 11–12) notion that the removal of 
the Defence Secretary as the primary accounting officer and the channelling of the military budget 
through the Special Defence Account dented civil oversight of the military. Poor oversight of the 
military should be viewed in the context of generally ineffective oversight prior to 1994 (February, 
2006, pp. 127–128; Sylvester, 2006, p. 39; Town, 2002, pp. 78–79). Legislative amendments in the 
post-1994 period thus set out to correct this imbalance in the trias politica.  
 
                                                          
4 This period includes the First Parliament (1994 – 1999) and Second Parliament (1999 – 2004). 
5 This period includes the Third Parliament (2004 – 2009) and Fourth Parliament (2009 – 2014). 
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The Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993, Chapter 4) was first to urge increased oversight of the 
executive. Parliament’s oversight role was further cemented in the 1996 Constitution (RSA, 1996a 
Section 42 (3)) which states that “[t]he National Assembly is elected to… ensure government by the 
people under the Constitution… passing legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive 
action.” Part of the process to ensure increased oversight included the expansion of parliament’s 
committee system. Calland (1997, p. 6) notes a shift from committees’ limited pre-1994 role to a more 
robust and open system in the post-1994 period. He does, however, highlight certain challenges 
identified in the immediate post-1994 period, including limited resources and political constraints. 
Fisher (1998, pp. 78-80) in The new South African Parliamentary Committee System: Its role and 
effectiveness concurs with the view that committees in the immediate post-1994 period were 
innovative and delivery-oriented. However, early pitfalls identified included the number of committees, 
scheduling of committee meetings, support mechanisms, and the internal functioning of committees 
(Corder, Jagwanth, & Soltau, 1999, pp. 22-23; Fisher, 1998, pp 80-83; Parliament of South Africa, 
2002). Despite some shortcomings, it is clear that there was a shift away from the pre-1994 inhibiting 
of oversight structures to a more pronounced focus on parliament’s general oversight role after 1994.  
 
Post-1994 changes in civil-military relations were closely linked to legislative changes. A number of 
legislative and policy amendments sought to increase civilian control of the military, including the 
Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993), the Constitution (RSA, 1996a), the  White Paper on National 
Defence for the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996b), the 1998 Defence Review (RSA, 1998) and 
the Defence Act of 2002 (RSA, 2002a). Le Roux (2005, p. 235) notes the importance of transparency 
as a feature of improved civil-military relations after 1994. He notes, for example, the importance of 
the establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat and the role of legislation (such as the Public 
Financial Management Act) in ensuring financial transparency in the DOD. Cawthra (2005) and Perk 
(2011), however, note a number of challenges including a lack of oversight by the Secretary of 
Defence, one-party dominance, challenges related to the SDPP and resulting practical challenges 
within the SANDF such as a drop in morale and decreasing operational readiness. These challenges 
had the potential to undermine the post-1994 improvements in civil-military relations.  
 
Parliament played a crucial role in merging the two concepts addressed above, namely increased 
oversight over the executive and the country’s changing civil-military relations. Le Roux (2005, p. 254) 
states that democratic civil-military relations were ensured by, inter alia, the functioning of 
parliamentary defence committees during the first ten years of democracy. Modise (le Roux et al., 
2012, pp. 45–53), in an  overview of parliamentary oversight of defence between 1994 and 2003, 
concurs with le Roux and states that the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) conducted its 
work effectively and truly held the executive to account by not merely becoming a ‘rubber-stamp’ 
committee. Besides the parliamentary committees on defence, other aspects also contributed to 
oversight of the military. These included parliamentary questions on military matters as well as the 
work of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) which dealt with defence-related 
matters on an ad hoc basis (R. E. Obiyo, 2006; Sylvester & Seegers, 2011).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
 
Positive developments regarding the defence committees noted by le Roux and Modise are, however, 
contrasted by a number of authors. Cawthra (2005, p. 105) notes a need to enhance the oversight 
scope of the committees. Ngculu (Ngculu, 2002, pp. 184-186), notes specific challenges faced by 
defence committees, including limited oversight visits and problems related to the maintenance of 
party-discipline in committees. Jordaan (2004, p. 116) points directly to the impact of one-party 
dominance on the committee-system, including the defence committees. Perk (2011, p. 3) further 
states that committees were “insufficiently equipped” to hold the military to account. Finally, Griffiths 
(in O’Brien, Johnston, & Stapenhurst, 2008, pp. 93–102) points specifically to the SDPP as a 
significant moment in the history of parliamentary oversight of the military. Obiyo (2006, pp. 343-348) 
highlights the failure of SCOPA to deal effectively with the SDPP. The SDPP arguably brought one of 
the biggest challenges to the post-1994 legislature and significantly undermined effective 
parliamentary oversight, including that of the military (Feinstein, 2007; Sylvester, 2006; Sylvester & 
Seegers, 2011).6 
 
From the above it is clear that significant strides were made in ensuring civil oversight of the military in 
the immediate post-1994 period. Parliamentary oversight represented one of the main drivers in 
executing the principle of civil control of the military. Focus can again be placed on the various 
parliamentary committees that played a leading role in ensuring oversight. However, since challenges 
were already identified in the first and second parliaments, it highlights the need to evaluate 
developments in parliamentary oversight of the military after 2004 (in the third and fourth parliament) 
in order to ascertain whether these challenges remained or were successfully addressed. 
 
6.3.2 Parliamentary oversight of the military: 2004 to 2014 
 
Parliamentary activities seemed to follow a natural progression from its legislative duties to that of 
oversight after its first ten years. Nijzink and Piombo (2004, pp. 2-5) note that this was already 
apparent during the shift from the first to the second parliaments. This shift in focus was, however, 
only formalised by the start of the third parliament, as summarised in the Strategic Plan for the Third 
Parliament. The Plan (Parliament of South Africa, 2004, p. 15) stated that “Parliament’s focus in the 
first decade of democracy was on ensuring the transformation of South Africa’s legislative 
landscape… With the tempering down of Parliament’s legislative workload in the Second and Third 
Parliaments, and the increased challenge to ensure sound governance and effective service delivery 
by the executive, the imperative arose to improve Parliament’s oversight capacity.” 
 
A number of measures were subsequently developed to refine parliamentary oversight. Internal 
parliamentary structures, such as the Independent Assessment Panel of Parliament (Govender et al., 
2009) and the Joint Rules Committee (2008b), put forward ways of maximising the capacity of 
                                                          
6 For the purpose of this study, it is important to avoid excessive focus on the SDPP, but rather to view it as part 
of parliament’s overall oversight function of defence acquisition. 
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existing oversight structures. The central role of parliamentary committees featured prominently in 
such reports. A number of improvements to committees were made, including training for new 
members and the availing of support staff. The focus on enhancing committee skills were also clear 
since 2004, including increased exposure for members of committees to best practices in oversight 
(Parliament of South Africa, 2008a); familiarising committee members with procedures, ethics and 
process of parliamentary committees (Parliament of South Africa, 2011); and, deepening committee 
member’s budget analysis competencies (Rustin & Nel, 2011). Despite these measures, committee-
specific analyses highlight ongoing concerns, including a lack of adequate human resources and 
research capabilities (Dlomo, 2004, p. 108). Bullen (2005, pp. 34-43) points to the poor use of 
information in committees. A lack of human and financial resources, expertise and performance 
evaluation were also highlighted as impacting negatively on committees (Makhado, Masehela, & 
Mokhari, 2012, pp. 8-10; Masualle, 2007, p. 24). Many of these concerns relate to a ‘lack of capacity’ 
in Parliament that, along with concerns over party-loyalty, has been identified as a lingering challenge 
to effective oversight (Nomdo, 2013).   
 
In terms of defence committees, the JSCD7 and the PCDMV8 remained the essential drivers of 
parliamentary oversight of the military, while SCOPA also dealt with defence matters on an ad hoc 
basis. An overview of committee minutes from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) between 
2004 and 2014 reveals that both the JSCD and the PCDMV dealt with a wide variety of issues 
pertaining to the military. The committees regularly scrutinised a number of documents considered 
essential to parliamentary oversight (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). These include, inter alia, the 
DOD’s annual performance plans, budgets, annual reports, and quarterly reports. The committees 
also focussed on other military matters, including oversight of defence entities, the Military Ombud, 
the implementation of international treaties, briefings on SANDF operations, and operational 
readiness to name a few.  
 
The literature consulted above highlights the aim and efforts to increase the standing of parliamentary 
oversight from 2004, including in the defence committees. However, literature also reveals an some 
critical views on parliament’s oversight of the military. Sylvester (2011a, pp. 18–19) notes that 
committee capacity is continuously undermined by a lack of support, a lack of access to information, 
and executive dominance. Perk (2011, p. 3) states directly that “[t]he parliamentary committee 
responsible for civil oversight showed itself insufficiently equipped in knowledge capacity, objectivity 
and its public activities to monitor the armed forces.” These views are underscored by statements of 
serving members of parliament’s defence committees, notably opposition members, critical of the 
workings of the committees and their lack of investigative vigour (Hartley, 2013b). Critical views of 
                                                          
7 The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) was established by the 1993 Constitution, but remained in 
place with a specific mandate to oversee the DOD. Its functions overlap with that of the Portfolio Committee on 
Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV).  
8 The Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) was initially only referred to as the 
Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD). 
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parliamentary oversight are also accompanied by increased inquiry into the effective functioning of the 
SANDF. 
 
The critical views on parliamentary oversight of the military should be read in conjunction with the 
general state of affairs of the SANDF. Ensuring the effective functioning of the Defence Force is, in 
part, the aim of parliament’s oversight role over the DOD. Louw (2013, p. ii) indicates that the 
SANDF’s operational effectiveness is increasingly being compromised, as was also apparent in the 
2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014). On a practical level, problems at military 
bases, a protest march by SANDF members in 2009, the underutilisation of primary battle equipment, 
and concerns regarding the SANDF’s involvement in the ‘Battle of Bangui’ in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) raise further concerns (Dodds, 2013; Hartley, 2013a; Heitman, 2013). These factors 
thus bring into question the quality of parliamentary oversight of the military, despite efforts by the 
institution to enhance its oversight role.  
 
From the above it is evident that while parliamentary oversight was prioritised in the third and fourth 
parliaments, criticism thereof continued. This criticism correlates with a rise of concerns in the military 
domain. Literature also suggests that there is an increasingly critical outlook towards the functioning 
of the SANDF that reflects negatively on parliament’s oversight role. Such criticism therefore creates 
a space for inquiry. Contrasting the first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) with the third and fourth 
parliament (2004 to 2014) assists in determining whether such criticism is valid.  
 
7. Research Approach 
 
Mouton et al. (2013, p. 13) differentiate between three dimensions of a study, namely the ‘world of 
everyday life’, ‘the world of science’, and ‘the world of metascience’. While the real-world application 
of this study relates to parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa, it is essential to provide 
the correct metascience and methodological paradigms to ensure a thorough scientific approach.  
 
In terms of the metascience, the study is closely linked to the ontological and epistemological 
parameters of the interpretivist paradigm due to its link to qualitative research methods, the concept of 
verstehen and the link between the object of research and the researcher. However, some elements 
of the post-positivism, for example the need for objectivity by the researcher, are also applicable. 
Similarly, elements of critical theory, such as the value of historical context, are relevant to the study.  
 
Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 74) stress the importance of constructing both a research methodology 
and research design for an efficient study. The research methodology of this study finds correlation 
with interpretivism through the link with the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research suits 
the study as it holds relevance to the study of institutions through the use of non-quantifiable sources 
and where an ‘insider’s perspective’ is required. Research design focuses on the type of study and its 
proposed results and logically commences with a set of research questions. It further involves the 
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choice conceptualisation and operationalisation of the study. This study makes use of a case study as 
the research design as it effectively aids in the studying of a single unit of analysis where rich data 
sources are available and where existing theories are validated.  
 
7.1 Selecting the research paradigm 
 
Babbie (2013, p. 58) highlights the importance of identifying the correct research paradigm as  it 
allows the researcher to view his/her own analysis against other researchers operating in the context 
of a different paradigm. The paradigm will thus provide a framework through which the unit of analysis 
can be observed and analysed. Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 108) claim that the selection of the 
appropriate paradigm is informed by three questions, namely the (1) ontological questions, (2) the 
epistemological question, and (3) the methodological question. Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 20) state 
that while various paradigms exist, the social sciences are dominated by three traditions, namely 
positivism, the interpretivist (phonomenological) tradition and critical theory. In order to determine the 
most appropriate research paradigm for the study, the dominant social sciences paradigms should be 
analysed in terms of the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions.   
 
Mouton’s (2013, pp. 138–142) three-world framework holds relevance to the selection of the research 
paradigm. World 1 refers to “everyday life and lay knowledge” which is acquired through “learning, 
experience and self-reflection” (Mouton, 2013, p. 138). World 2 is of epistemic value and elevates 
problems/inquiries found in World 1 to a scientific level of inquiry. At a research level, World 2 thus 
revolves around “the search for ‘truth’ or ‘truthful knowledge’” (Mouton, 2013, p. 138). World 3, in turn, 
relates to the world of Metascience and the self-correcting nature of science. World 3 is of particular 
importance as it relates directly to the research paradigm which is informed by practical and scientific 
aspects of Worlds 1 and 2. Thus, the selection of an appropriate paradigm is further informed by 
considering epistemological and practical elements of Worlds 1 and 2. 
 
7.1.1 The ontological question  
 
The ontological question refers broadly to the nature of reality, or, put differently, the nature of the 
social world which is being studied (Creswell, 2007, p. 16; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). positivism, 
interpretivism and critical theory have divergent ontological approaches. 
 
The positivist paradigm is closely linked to the natural sciences where a ‘cause and effect’ approach 
to conduct social inquiry is used. In this paradigm, social sciences are closely linked to the natural 
sciences in terms of methods of inquiry. It is also assumed that sufficient correlation exist between the 
worlds of natural science and social science to allow for such an overlapping system of inquiry. It is 
for this reason that positivism’s ontological approach to reality is often referred to as ‘naïve realism’. 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2011, p. 21; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). The post-positivist paradigm, which 
developed from the positivist tradition, places similar focus on the link between the natural sciences 
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and social sciences. In terms of ontology, however, it is critical of the assumed reality based on the 
human inability of perfectly apprehending the nature of phenomena. It is therefore often referred to as 
“critical realism” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). In terms of Mouton’s world views, positivism is 
informed by an ‘outsider perspective’ in World 1 and is studied through structured scientific methods 
linked to the natural sciences in World 2 (Mouton, 2013, pp. 141–142). 
 
The interpretivist paradigm9 steers away from the research approach found in the natural sciences. 
Creswell (2007, p. 20) notes that in this paradigm, “individuals seek understanding of the world in 
which they live and work [and that] the goal of research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the 
participants' views of the situation.” Unlike the positivist paradigm, the interpretivist paradigm focuses 
not on explaining social actors, but rather on understanding them. This is closely linked to the concept 
of Verstehen (understanding) that refers not only to people’s understanding of their own world, but 
also to the social scientist’ interpretations of aspects that bring about specific behaviour (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2011, p. 33; Lee, 1991, p. 348). In terms of Mouton’s world views, interpretivism is informed 
by an ‘insider perspective’ in World 1 and is studied through qualitative methods linked to the social 
sciences in World 2 (Mouton, 2013, pp. 141–142). 
 
Finally, critical theory, which stems from the writings of Karl Marx, has its ontological connotation to 
historical realism. Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 110) note that, in critical theory, “a reality is assumed to 
be apprehendable that was once plastic, but that was, over time, shaped by a congeries of social, 
political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender factors, and then crystalli[s]ed into a series of 
structures that are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real’, that is, natural and immutable.” Critical theory 
then aims to transcend these congeries through the empowering of human beings. Essentially, the 
theory calls for transformation of humans and their environment. In terms of social sciences research, 
critical theory goes beyond the mere analytical scope of research to practical means of enabling 
change (Babbie & Mouton, 2011, pp. 33–36; Creswell, 2007, pp. 27–28). In terms of Mouton’s world 
views, critical theory is informed by a ‘participatory perspective’ in World 1 and is studied through 
action research in World 2 (Mouton, 2013, pp. 141–142). 
 
The question then arises as to which paradigm’s ontology fits best with a study on parliamentary 
oversight of the military. Firstly, noting the link between positivism and the natural sciences, it is 
evident that this paradigm lacks application to this study. Positivism’s ontological underpinnings “is 
conventionally summarised in the form of time- and context-free generali[s]ations” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 109). This view on reality fits poorly with a study on parliamentary oversight, where context is 
crucial and generalisation difficult. Post-positivism’s critical views hold more relevance as it assumes 
that reality cannot be perfectly apprehended (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). However, the link 
between post-positivism and the natural sciences still brings into question the paradigm’s relevance to 
this study. A paradigm more suited to the social sciences is thus required. 
                                                          
9 The interpretivist paradigm is also known as the Phenomenological tradition and is often combined with 
Constructivism (Creswell, 2007, p. 20).  
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The link between the interpretivist paradigm and this study is evident in the paradigm’s link to the 
social sciences (and qualitative research). In terms of Ontology, the interpretivist paradigm also links 
well to this study. In explaining the ontological underpinnings of Constructivism (linked to 
interpretivism), Guba and Lincoln (1994, pp. 110–111) note that “realities are apprehendable in the 
form of multiple, intangible, mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific 
in nature, and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the 
constructions.” This links to Cresswell’s (2007) focus on the participants view in constructing reality. 
Constructivism is applicable to the study as it relies heavily on participant’s views to determine reality 
(See for example Chapter 6). Reality is further determined by what Guba and Lincoln refer to as 
‘socially and experientially’-based determinants. In this study, the determinants are addressed 
through the inclusion of, for example, a comparative element on parliamentary oversight of the 
military. By including an overview of cases of parliamentary oversight of the military around the world, 
it assists in shaping the reality thereof. While this is not a perfect take on reality (as observed in the 
ontology of the post-positivist paradigm), it assists in creating a reality that is more true by being more 
informed and sophisticated (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111).  
 
The ontology of critical theory is linked to what Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 110) term “historical 
realism” and the link thereof to this study is questionable. This study’s approach/reality is not primarily 
shaped through historic determinants. However, Cresswell (2007, p. 27) notes that “central themes 
that a critical researcher might explore include the scientific study of social institutions and their 
transformations through interpreting the meanings of social life; the historical problems of domination, 
alienation, and social struggles; and a critique of society and the envisioning of new possibilities.” It 
would be irresponsible for any study on parliamentary oversight to study the phenomenon in isolation 
and without reference to, for example, historical problems and social struggles. This is of specific 
relevance in the case of South Africa where current political determinants were significantly influenced 
by historical events. Elements of critical theory’s ontological underpinnings may thus apply to this 
study, notably the importance of providing some historical context. The study does not, however, aim 
to bring about change as proposed by Marx (Babbie & Mouton, 2011, p. 36). At most, it highlights 
areas for improvement to be considered by MPs (as noted in the Section 5 of this chapter). 
 
From the above it is clear that, ontologically speaking, placing this study on parliamentary oversight of 
the military firmly into one paradigm proves difficult. The study falls outside the scope of positivism, 
but elements of ‘critical realism’ as proposed in post-positivism hold relevance. Similarly, critical 
theory proves less applicable as its ontology is linked to historical realism. However, some historical 
context is key to the ontology of the study. Besides these elements of post-positivism and critical 
theory, the study finds broader correlation with the ontology of the interpretivist paradigm due to its 
shaping of reality through the participants view and socially and experientially-based determinants.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
 
7.1.2 The Epistemological question 
 
Bryman (2012, p. 27) states that the epistemological question relates to “the question of what is (or 
what should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline.” Of particular relevance, he notes, 
is whether the social realm should be studied using the same methods and approaches as the natural 
sciences. This immediately highlights the variation between the positivist and interpretivist paradigms 
as noted in the section above. The epistemological difference between positivism and interpretivism 
(and critical theory for that matter) holds reference to the relationship between the object of research 
and the researcher (Creswell, 2007, pp. 17, 247). Guba and Lincoln (1994, pp. 110–111) summarise 
the epistemology of the three main paradigms10 of social sciences as follows: 
 
 Positivism: The object of research and the researcher are independent of each other and 
neither influence nor are influenced by one another. There is thus a high level of objectivity 
and the findings accepted and true. 
 Post-positivism: Objectivity is still sought, but less stringently so than in terms of positivism. 
Findings are accepted, but open to ‘falsification’ and the role of the critical (scientific) 
community is valued to ensure acceptance/rejection of findings. 
 Interpretivism11: Greater link between the object of research and the researcher. “Findings are 
literally created as the investigation proceeds.” 
 Critical theory: The object of research and the researcher are intrinsically linked. The values 
of the researcher therefore have a high level of influence on the object of the study. 
 
In terms of the study’s epistemological approach, neither the positivist paradigm nor critical theory 
relate directly to the study. The researcher and the object of research (Parliament) cannot be 
completely separated as with positivism. This is evident from the positionality of the researcher in his 
employment as parliamentary defence researcher with the Parliament of South Africa12. Despite this 
position, the other extreme whereby the values of the researcher impacts on the object of the study 
(critical theory), is also not applicable as ‘change’ is not the primary aim of the study. Rather, the 
notion that findings are created amid the course of the investigation, as per the interpretivist 
paradigm, holds relevance to this study. This is reflected in, for example, the determining of 
international best practice of parliamentary oversight of the military, and through the process of semi-
structured interviews that provide an internal perspective of parliamentary oversight of the military in 
South Africa.  
 
                                                          
10 The three main paradigms refer to positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. Due to expansion on the 
concept in Section 7.1.1, post-positivism is also included in this list. 
11 Guba and Lincoln’s (1994, p. 110) description refers to the epistemology of Constructivism, but given the 
overlap between Constructivism and interpretivism, the description was used interchangeably. 
12 The researcher served as a parliamentary defence researcher from October 2012. His period of employment 
with Parliament therefore overlaps with the timeframe of this study for 19 months.  
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The concept of Verstehen (which is linked to interpretivism) also finds applicability. This is due to the 
aim of the researcher being that of ‘understanding’ rather than ‘explaining’ parliamentary oversight of 
the military in South Africa since 1994 (Babbie & Mouton, 2011, p. 31; Lee, 1991, p. 348). An 
epistemological approach linked to the interpretivist paradigm also links to the choosing of a 
descriptive study (to be discussed). In addition, elements of the epistemological approach of post-
positivism also hold true to this study, given that a certain degree of objectivity is sought from the 
researcher. Research is thus not conducted along the lines of, for example, an ethnographic study. 
 
7.1.3 The methodological question 
 
According to Mouton’s theory on the three worlds, World 2 holds specific relevance to the 
methodological question. While World 1 relates to the meta-theoretical imperatives, World 2 revolves 
around “the search for ‘truth’ or ‘truthful knowledge’” (Mouton, 2013, p. 138). Given the findings that 
the study is more aligned with interpretivism, it is essential to locate the study within a methodological 
approach suited to that metatheory. 
 
Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 49) note three methodological paradigms that dominate the research 
milieu, namely the qualitative, quantitative and participatory action research paradigms. In terms of 
metatheory, the qualitative paradigm is linked to interpretivism, the quantitative paradigm to positivism 
and the participatory action paradigm to critical theory. The participatory research paradigm is 
characterised by, inter alia, an extremely high level of participation and an intentional involvement 
of/in the political arena. (Babbie & Mouton, 2011, pp. 58–62). Given, for example, the limited levels of 
participation and a stated aim not to enter the political arena, it is clear that a research method other 
than the participatory action research paradigm applies to the study. Rather, it should be rooted in 
one of the more traditional methodological approaches. 
 
Babbie (2013, p. 24) simplifies the distinction between qualitative and quantitative data by noting that 
it is “essentially the distinction between numerical and non-numerical data.” However, the variance 
between the qualitative and quantitative research paradigm is more complex. For the purpose of this 
study, a number of varying factors needs to be considered (see Table 1.1).  
 
The study’s methodological approach, based on the variables in Table 1.1, falls within the qualitative 
research design for a number of reasons. First, the focus of the study on Parliament requires a 
research methodology linked to the effective study of an institution. Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 56) 
note Ernest Burgess, a key role player in the development of a qualitative research paradigm in the 
1920s, who highlighted the importance of studying the objects of social research, including 
institutions, outside the realm of the natural sciences, thus outside the quantitative paradigm. Second, 
the development of qualitative research is underscored by the use of various non-quantifiable sources 
including, inter alia, personal documents, first-hand observations and interviews. In this regard, 
Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 53) note the use of qualitative research where an “insider’s perspective” 
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of human behaviour is required. Ritchie et al. (2013:5) also note that qualitative research is 
characterised by detailed and rich data sources and that it captures complexity and individuality of 
each study unit. While Burgess notes the importance of studying institutions in the qualitative 
paradigm, it is the type of detailed and rich data sources available from an institution like the 
Parliament (such as minutes of meetings, the Hansard and parliamentary questions) that entrenches 
this study in this research paradigm.  
 
Table 1.1: Differentiating between the qualitative and quantitative research paradigm13 
 Qualitative Research Quantitative Research 
Scientific method Bottom-up. Hypotheses genera-
ted through theory from data 
collected. Close relation between 
theory and methods. 
Top-down. Data used to test 
hypotheses and theory. Methods and 
theory remain separated. 
Type of data collection Qualitative data. Direct and 
observation-based techniques. 
Examples include interviews, 
field notes and open-ended 
questions.  
Quantitative data. Precise 
measurement through validated data 
collection instruments. Surveys and 
formula-based techniques. 
Data analysis Use descriptive data, search for 
patterns, themes and holistic 
features; Focus on context 
specific meanings. 
Identify statistical relationships 
among variables. Highlighting 
universal cause and effect 
relationships. 
Final reporting Narrative report with 
particularistic findings; Including 
of insider viewpoints. 
Formal/statistical report with general 
findings. Objective outsider viewpoint 
achieved.    
Locating the researcher While qualitative research prompts a more involved role for the 
researcher than quantitative studies, it has been widely established that 
the observed will always have some influence on the research.  
 
7.2 Research design 
 
This study is designed as a case study. A case study represents the most applicable approach as it 
allows for the study of a single unit of analysis (Parliament) with multiple variables (Yin in Babbie & 
Mouton, 2011, p. 281). Yin (2009, p. 47) also notes that single case-study designs are appropriate in 
a number of instances, including when a single case is representative of many other cases and/or in 
the case of longitudinal cases. This study finds applicability to both these rationales. First, 
                                                          
13 Table 1.1 is adapted from similar comparisons presented by Lichtman (2013, pp. 14–15) and Marvasti (2004, 
p. 12). 
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parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa can be viewed in the context of broader 
parliamentary oversight and can also be representative of oversight of the military in other parliaments 
around the world. Second, this study’s focus on a twenty- year period of oversight allows for the 
reviewing thereof at different intervals within this period. Furthermore, in practical terms, Gerring’s 
(2007, p. 57) focus on data availability validates the choice of a case study as the appropriate 
research design. This is due to the fact that data on parliamentary oversight of the military in South 
Africa is not only available, but it is often contained in official records that contribute to the accuracy 
thereof.  
 
Given that only one unit of analysis is studied, this study can further be demarcated as a holistic case 
study rather than an embedded case study that focuses on multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009, pp. 
50–51). Due to its inclusion of multiple units of analysis, a multiple case study design is often 
regarded as more robust. While adhering to the design of a holistic case study, this study borrows 
from the strength of a multiple case study design by briefly reviewing other cases. This is achieved 
through its analysis of parliamentary oversight of the military in selected parliaments around the world 
and by highlighting international best practice from comparable parliaments. The scope of countries 
used is limited to countries making use of the Westminster system. This facilitates comparison to the 
South African Parliament within the parameters of a single legislative system/approach. However, 
diversity is reflected in the selection of cases through the inclusion of parliaments from countries with 
different socio-economic statuses, different developmental determinants (developed West versus 
Developing South), and different post-colonial developmental trajectories. This approach aims to 
address the concern raised by Lijphart that comparison is often undermined by the high number of 
variables in a small number of available cases. He notes, however, that this concern can be 
circumvented by comparing ‘comparable’ cases which are “similar in a large number of important 
characteristics (variable) which one wants to treat as constants” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 687).  
 
In keeping with the characteristics of case studies, this study focuses on validating existing theory 
rather than aiming to discover new theories (Yin, 2009, p. 47). This stems from the fact that the study 
compares parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa to existing protocols and conventions 
of good practice and within the parameters of established theory. The principle of parliamentary 
oversight is deeply rooted in theories of democracy, notably the liberalist, pluralist principle of the 
separation of powers (Adar, 2009; Montesquieu, 1748). Since the study is based on such historic and 
entrenched theories, it validates the decision on a single unit of analysis case study design. In 
addition, the study is diachronic in nature in that it evaluates the process of parliamentary oversight of 
the military over an extended period of twenty years. Given this timeframe of the study, it thus 
embodies a retrospective case study, which also alludes to the purpose of the study.  
 
Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 79) highlight three broad purposes for research namely exploration, 
explanation and description. This study is descriptive in purpose as it describes parliamentary 
oversight of the military in South Africa retrospectively over a set period of time (historical analysis). 
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The advantages of a scientific descriptive study is that it is characterised by accuracy (Babbie, 2013, 
p. 91). It is expected that the research methods (notably the use of official parliamentary 
documentation and interviews with parliamentary and other role players) contribute to the accuracy of 
the description. It would, however, do injustice to the study not to include some element of 
explanation. Although not the main aim of the study, the impact of political, structural and other 
challenges to oversight of the military in South Africa will become apparent. This explanatory element 
of the study does not aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact (idiographic 
explanation), but is rather nomothetic in nature (Babbie, 2013, pp. 92–94). In this sense, the 
descriptive elements of the study point to variables that account for the relationship between the 
quality of oversight and the military, political, structural and other challenges at Parliament.  
 
7.3 Data collection 
 
While the qualitative approach and the structure of the study as a case study explains the nature of 
the study, it is also important to determine which data is available for the study and how it will be 
utilised. Babbie and Mouton (2011, p. 281) notes that case studies are commonly characterised by 
the examination of multiple variables. It is therefore appropriate for case studies to make use of 
multiple sources of data as it “is based on replication and convergence” (Babbie & Mouton, 2011, p. 
282). Data from multiple sources should thus be obtained, but it is also essential to direct the 
collection of data to ensure the relevance of information obtained. 
 
7.3.1 Obtaining the data 
 
Data collection methods for this study adhere to the requirement of case studies (to make use of 
multiple sources of data) and fall within the qualitative research paradigm. The following aligned 
research methods are used:  
 
 Primary data sources. These include official parliamentary documentation such as the 
Hansard, official Committee Reports and the Announcements, Tablings and Committee (ATC) 
Reports. Official government documentation such as Acts, policies, quarterly and annual 
reports, and speeches by government officials are also included.  
 Secondary data sources. This plays a key role in filling information gaps where primary 
sources may be lacking. For example, official minutes from Committees are not readily 
available and information from quality secondary sources such as the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (PMG) are used to fill the void as it often represents the second most 
accurate source of committee discussions. Secondary sources also allow for alternate 
perspectives on parliamentary oversight of the military, specifically in providing analysed 
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information on foreign parliaments. This includes the use of books, journals, newspaper and 
other online news articles as well as defence-specific websites and journals.14 
 Qualitative interviews. Such unstructured interviews focus primarily on three groups of people. 
Firstly, MPs with intimate knowledge of the institution’s defence committees are included. 
Secondly, academics and other defence analysts are interviewed to allow for a more holistic 
approach. Third, input from parliamentary staff is obtained to reflect on institutional 
development around oversight. 
 
With reference to the qualitative interviews, a number of aspects require clarification. The aim of 
conducting these interviews is twofold. First, it forms the basis of Chapter 6 that examines views on 
parliamentary oversight of the military from inside Parliament. Second, the interviews assist in 
confirming/dispelling analysis from other sources on the standing of parliamentary oversight of the 
military in South Africa since 1994. By addressing these two facets, it contributes directly to the 
primary aim of the study. The main advantage of using unstructured qualitative interviews is ‘flexibility’ 
(Babbie, 2013, pp. 345–348). Greef (in de Vos, Strydom, Fouche, & Delport, 2002, p. 293) equates 
this flexible approach to a conversation with the advantage lying in description and reflection. The 
researcher thus has a general line of inquiry which is flexible and can be adjusted during the interview 
itself. This is in line with the “guided interview” approach whereby a checklist is used to cover all 
relevant aspects of the interview, but the structure remains loose/conversational (Berry in de Vos et 
al., 2002, p. 297). Open-ended questions provide the most suitable questioning approach (Babbie, 
2013, p. 231). This flexibility is paramount to a study set within the complex and politically sensitive 
parliamentary environment. The researcher may not, for example, be aware of political nuances that 
shape the workings of the defence committees. Through flexible questioning, such nuances can be 
explored and, to a certain extent, direct the flow of the interview. At the very least it circumvents the 
shortfall of, for example, a set questionnaire that would not have been flexible enough to capture 
subtle nuances or shifts in the interview direction.  
 
To achieve effective primary data gathering, 14 semi-structured face-to-face interviews and one email 
interview were conducted. Interviewees included MPs, parliamentary officials, as well as academia 
with a focus on civil-military relations and parliamentary oversight in South Africa. The interviews are 
sufficient in that they stemmed from the generally small pool of direct role players in Parliament that 
deals with oversight of the military (Greeff in de Vos et al., 2002, p. 300).15 The interviews also reflect 
a wide array of political and independent role players as to maintain a balance of the various political 
viewpoints portrayed by participants.  
 
                                                          
14 The role of secondary sources, notably PMG, is of particular importance given that primary Parliamentary 
sources are often not available, not regularly updated, or poorly categorised/organised (See for example Merten, 
2018).  
15 While the two parliamentary Defence Committees (the PCDMV and JSCD) changed in membership numbers 
regularly since 1994, it generally consists of 11 members on the PCDMV and 15 on the JSCD. While other 
committees also deal with Defence matters on an ad hoc basis, these members carry the primary responsibility of 
providing parliamentary oversight of the military. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
The selection of interviews draws on a combination of ‘non-probability sampling’ approaches. 
Primarily, purposive/judgemental sampling was utilised whereby the respondents “are selected on the 
basis of the researcher’s judgement about which ones will be most useful or representative” (Babbie, 
2013, p. 128). In the case of this study, the approach stems from the researcher’s personal 
knowledge and interaction with the defence committees of Parliament. As such, the researcher was 
able to access a core group of current and former MPs. However, to compensate for a lack of historic 
expansion, snowball sampling was also used. This refers to a system “whereby each person 
interviewed may be asked to suggest additional people for interviewing” (Babbie, 2013, p. 129). The 
value of this approach already became clear in the initial phases whereby informal discussions with 
MPs revealed other possible interviewees with knowledge of the defence/parliamentary environment, 
but which were not known to the researcher. 
 
Ethical considerations are crucial when conducting interviews. Primarily, consent was sought and 
obtained from the Parliament of South Africa itself which allowed for the interviewing of MPs and 
parliamentary staff. Furthermore, consent was obtained from all those participants interviewed for the 
study. All participants were informed that participation is voluntary, what the goal of the research is 
and what procedures will be followed (Greeff in de Vos et al., 2002, p. 65). Privacy was also valued 
during the interview phase and confidentiality maintained where requested. This implied that only the 
researcher was aware of who the respondents were (Greeff in de Vos et al., 2002, p. 68). Data 
capturing and safeguarding also goes hand in hand. Interviews were recorded and safely kept in 
electronic format.   
 
While the section above notes how the relevant information was obtained, it is important to also 
highlight what should be obtained. 
 
7.3.2 Directing data collection 
 
The primary research problem revolves around the quality and standing of parliamentary oversight of 
the military in Parliament during the first twenty years of democracy. The study’s main approach in 
evaluating the quality and standing of oversight in South Africa is informed by, inter alia, the work of 
several international institutions that have identified tools and focus areas for measuring of 
parliamentary oversight of the military.  
 
The DCAF and the IPU (Born, 2003) note the importance of clearly defined constitutional powers, 
customary practices, resources and expertise, and political will as factors underpinning effective 
oversight. While these factors are analysed, more practical tools used to measure oversight include 
the number of, consistency and content of (a) parliamentary debates on security, (b) parliamentary 
questions, (c) special defence inquiries, (d) reviews of the defence budget, (e) reviews of defence 
policy, (f) reviews of defence procurement, (g) reviews of human resources, (h) reviews of the 
deployment of the military, (i) oversight visits and study tours. Transparency International (Cover & 
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Meran, 2013a), in its analysis of the quality of defence oversight in 82 countries, repeats many of the 
tools noted above, but also highlighted (a) the use of external audit and (b) budget transparency as 
tools. The latter can be read together with ‘reviews of the defence budget’ as a tool of measurement. 
 
The ten tools and focus areas mentioned above form the basis for measurement of the quality of 
parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa. However, the study does not aim to merely 
replicate these measurements but rather to expand on and contextualise it. The expansion on these 
tools of measurement is done through considering international best practice that may highlight 
additional means of measurement. Furthermore, the richness of the measurement data is expanded 
by utilising both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Tools and focus areas are also used to 
inform the structure of interviews for the study. 
 
8. Limitations of the study 
 
Limitations to the study are mostly centred on the availability of formal parliamentary documents. 
Request to officials at Parliament revealed that official parliamentary minutes on committee meetings 
are not readily available or have been lost, especially in the first two parliaments. As such, committee-
meeting minutes from the PMG were utilised. However, PMG only commenced with the recording of 
minutes in January 1998 and limited data was available on committee meetings before this date. 
Similar challenges arose in analysis of the parliament of Zambia. In this case, secondary sources 
such as analytical and academic articles on parliamentary oversight of the military were used in 
conjunction with official parliamentary reports, where available. The latter limitation also highlights a 
broader limitation in the identifying of appropriate comparative cases for study within the African 
continent. Several Westminster-styled African parliaments, including those in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Nigeria were considered for this study, but documentation related to their 
parliamentary defence committees was not sufficient. As such, detailed data against which to test 
internationally recognised tools and focus areas of oversight was not available. The lack of 
information on these parliaments contributed to the decision to include India as an additional 
comparable case. A study of India’s parliamentary oversight of the military thus provided an additional 
case that was often ranked lower than South Africa’s Parliament in terms of oversight of the military. 
In addition to limitations stemming from parliamentary sources, another limitation relates to the fact 
that interviews with relevant role players were subject to the willingness of identified individuals to 
partake. Where possible, efforts were made to circumvent the noted limitations. 
 
9. Chapter delineation  
 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an outline for the thesis. It includes the 
rationale for the study and the derived primary and secondary research questions. A general review of 
applicable literature is included to emphasise matters raised in the research questions. The chapter 
also provides a discussion on the relevant research approach by placing the study within an 
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appropriate metascientific research paradigm as well as methodological paradigm. An appropriate 
research design in the form of a case study is explained. Finally, the chapter presents relevant 
limitations to the study. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical grounding for the study. The chapter commences by locating the 
institution of parliament and the practice of oversight within theories of democracy. Theories of 
democracy are expanded upon by looking at the various views thereof and its relation to the 
parliamentary system. Given the intrinsic link between the parliamentary system and the liberalist 
view of democracy, liberalism as paradigm is explored along with other related theories linked to 
liberalism. These include liberal democracy, the link between pluralism and democracy, 
representative democracy and constitutionalism. The practical link between these theoretical 
frameworks and the case study, South Africa, is also briefly examined. A second major discussion 
revolves around the expanding concept of civil-military relations and the growing need for civil-
supremacy over the military. Changes in theory regarding civil-military relations are explained before 
exploring the link with democracy. Finally, the chapter addresses the characteristics of democratic 
control of the military, the structures supporting such control and possible challenges to democratic 
civil-military relations. 
 
Chapter 3 commences by conseptualising ‘parliamentary oversight’ and ‘parliamentary oversight of 
the military’. In essence, it aims to establish the link between parliamentary oversight and the ideals of 
accountability and transparency. Thereafter the chapter identifies, from existing literature, a number of 
generally accepted tools for parliamentary oversight. Several specific focus areas for oversight of the 
military are also identified from existing literature. The chapter expands on existing tools and focus 
areas by identifying several lower-order focus areas for oversight. Furthermore, several potential 
weaknesses for parliamentary oversight of the military are identified. To test the application of these 
oversight tools, focus areas, lower-order focus areas and potential weaknesses, the criteria are 
applied to various international cases. Oversight of the military in the parliaments of the UK, Canada, 
Australia, India and Zambia are reviewed.  
 
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from international cases to South Africa. The chapter commences with a 
brief overview of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa prior to 1994 as a means of 
providing context. Chapter 4 then notes several post-1994 changes that impacted on the conduct of 
parliamentary oversight of the military. These include changes in the state’s security approach, 
legislative changes, policy changes and various structural changes within the institution of Parliament. 
Thereafter the chapter explores parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa during the first 
two parliaments (1994 to 2004) according to the criteria identified in Chapter 3. The use of oversight 
tools and oversight of specific focus areas of the military during this ten-year period are explored, 
largely based on information from Parliamentary documents, defence committee minutes and 
parliamentary questions. Lastly, potential weaknesses in oversight of the military during this period 
are reviewed. 
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Chapter 5 focuses on the subsequent ten years of democracy during the third and fourth parliaments 
(2004 to 2014). The chapter commences with a brief discussion on the changing focus of parliament 
from that of legislating to oversight. The announced shift to a focus on oversight by the Third 
Parliament (2004) also informs the division of analysis between chapters 4 and 5 in this study. 
Chapter 5 further reviews efforts to broaden oversight, including how these impacted on oversight of 
the military. Specific emphasis is placed on how these measures affected the parliamentary defence 
committees. In maintaining the structure of the previous chapter, Chapter 5 utilises the tools, focus 
areas and potential weaknesses identified in Chapter 3 to review parliamentary oversight of the 
military between 2004 and 2014. This review, utilising the same criteria, allows for a comparison of 
oversight activities between the first and second parliaments (1994 to 2004) and the third and fourth 
parliaments (2004 to 2014) in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 compares parliamentary oversight between the first and second parliaments (1994 to 2004) 
and the third and fourth parliaments (2004 to 2014). The findings in chapters 4 and 5 are reviewed 
here to identify broad trends in oversight over a twenty-year period. Of specific importance to Chapter 
6 is the addition of information obtained from primary sources. This is based on interviews with MPs, 
parliamentary officials and academics. Information from interviews serves a dual purpose. First, it 
confirms or refutes findings based on other sources made in chapters 4 and 5. Second, new 
perspective can be gained from primary sources on the general trends in parliamentary oversight of 
the military. Interviews therefore provide context to other findings and accounts for the finer political 
nuances within a parliamentary setting. The chapter concludes with a review of central trends 
identified through the study which allows for a return to the study’s main research questions in the 
subsequent chapter.     
 
Chapter 7 provides a conclusion through returning to the research questions posed. It provides a 
summary of the main findings of the study where after the original research questions are answered. 
The chapter concludes by addressing possible criticism to the study as well as contributions of the 
thesis. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The disconnect between positive observations regarding parliamentary oversight of the military in 
South Africa in the immediate post-1994 period and the alleged ‘critical state of decline’ of the military 
by 2014 brings into question the broader oversight of the military over this twenty-year period. A 
detailed study of parliamentary oversight activity of the military affairs can contribute to an 
understanding of the role the institution played in addressing rising concerns. A review of legislative 
changes in the country and practical changes at parliament in the post-1994 period is essential in 
conceptualising and understanding the practice of parliamentary oversight in the country. Notably, the 
shift towards democracy impacted on parliamentary oversight and civil-military relations. It is thus 
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essential to further expand on this shift and the theoretical underpinnings thereof as it shaped the 
South African parliamentary oversight process. The next chapter evaluates these theoretical bases, 
primarily by reviewing theories of democracy and changing civil-military relations. 
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CHAPTER 2   THEORISING ON PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND ITS RELATION  
                                       TO THE MILITARY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Theory can be loosely defined as “a statement of relations among concepts within a set of boundary 
assumptions and constraints” (Bacharac in Haugh, 2012, p. 7). In terms of academic inquiry, Abend 
(2014, pp. 177–182) argues that there is an array of interpretations of the use of the term ‘theory’ and 
that scholars differ on the definition. However, the principle that theory is about ‘exploring the relations 
between concepts’ is a common thread through Abend’s reference to eight different interpretations of 
‘theory’. For the purpose of academic inquiry, the question should rather shift to the aim of theory. In 
this regard, theory is comprised of four explanatory components, namely (1) definitions of the 
variables in the theory, (2) a set of constraints for the theory, (3) the relationship of variables and, (4) 
predictions or factual claims (Wacker, 1998, p. 363). Wacker (1998, p. 364) further states that ‘good 
theory’ aims at providing a thorough explanation of the relationship between concepts that result in 
specific events. Established theories therefore provide a set of relationships with proven outcomes or 
results. Within this explanatory notion of theory lies the value of grounding a new study in established 
theory. Theoretical grounding is important because it provides a “framework for analysis” (Wacker, 
1998, p. 361).   
 
The process of locating the study in an appropriate theoretical setting is closely linked to the title of 
the study as will be explored in this chapter. First, the chapter seeks a political theory relevant to the 
case study and its South African context. Second, the chapter frames an appropriate political theory 
for the subjects of the study, namely the institution of parliament and the practice of oversight. The 
chapter then expands on the relevant theory by discussing its various levels of conceptual analysis. 
This discussion includes the relevant paradigm, macro-theory and applicable micro-theories. The 
study is, however, based on more than purely the political realm, given its inherent focus on the 
military. Theories should thus be able to explain the relation between the two realms. This approach 
allows for the study to be centred on sound and established political theory, cognisant of the 
distinctions regarding the political and military domains.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework (for analysis) through which the entire 
study is viewed. Existing theory is used to determine the study’s theoretical grounding. There is no 
implicit aim to generate new or alternative theories.  
 
2. Finding the theoretical setting relevant to the case study 
 
It was Aristotle who claimed that the “end of politics is not knowledge, but action” (Ball & Peters, 2005, 
p. 21). This statement captures the close link between theory (knowledge) and practice within the field 
of politics. Since the definition of politics refers to activities associated with governance (Grant, 2003, 
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p. 140), practical aspects of governance provide useful guidance in determining the correct theoretical 
setting for this study. Governance relates to the coordination of social systems and the role that the 
state fulfils in that process (coordinating adherence between an array of actors). Governance 
addresses the role of the state in economic and social guidance and, importantly for this study, 
emphasises the role of the state in terms of “public-private interaction, most prominently the role of 
policy networks” (Pierre, 2002, p. 3). When considering governance, the classification of governments 
and government types is important. Through the process of classification, political activity is 
compartmentalised into analysable groups. Each grouping reflects a specific political approach and 
set of underlying theories. Given Aristotle’s link between theory and practice, the search for an 
appropriate theoretical setting should thus start with identifying the suitable classification of 
government. By reviewing various classifications of governments, the most appropriate setting for a 
South African case study can be identified.  
 
2.1 A synopsis of existing theory: The classification of governance 
 
Aristotle’s differentiation between the various forms of governments serves as a natural starting point 
for the classifications of government types. Aristotle differentiated between governments by one, such 
as royalty, government by a few such as an aristocracy, and governments of many such as 
constitutional governments. He further noted that when these arrangements become perverted, 
royalty transforms to tyranny, aristocracy to an oligarchy, and constitutional governments to 
democracy (Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 6–9). Aristotle’s focus on who rules and who benefits also 
provided the foundation for further expansion on the classification of governments. Montesquieu’s 
classification, for example, focused on only three types of governments, namely republican, 
monarchical and despotic (Montesquieu, 1748, p. 21). Ball and Peters (2005, pp. 44–46) differentiates 
between a monarchy and despotism. In both cases governing powers lies with an individual, but while 
a monarch’s power is regulated by laws and other powerful societal groups, a despot’s powers remain 
uncontrolled. For Montesquieu (1748, p. 21), republican government is where the population as a 
whole, or certain families or groups in the population, have sovereign power. Montesquieu therefore 
considered both aristocracy and democracy as part of the republican government classification.  
 
While the works of authors such as Aristotle and Montesquieu lay the foundation for modern theory on 
governance, contemporary classification had to adapt to modern-day requirements (Ball & Peters, 
2005, p. 45; Carter & Herz, 1961, pp. 4–6; Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 6–7). The twentieth century in 
particular saw a shift towards a three-tier world, consisting of the first (capitalist), second (communist) 
and third (developing) worlds. During this period, new forms of government classification arose, such 
as classification by “the specific level of analytical interest” (Abcarian & Masannar, 1970, p. 20). This 
classification differentiated between the means through which governments are elected, punting 
monarchies on the one extreme and republics on the other. Governments also became classified 
according to the distribution of authority, differentiating between federal and unitary governments. Yet 
another classification of governments was made according to the ‘real’ sources of influence and 
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power, in line with Aristotle’s work. Most significantly, the advance of democracy in the late twentieth 
century and the disintegration of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the three-tier world 
approach and the relevance of the way which governments are classified. 
 
With several modern government classifications put forward in the sections above, there seem to be 
an overlap of focus on three fundamental systems namely (1) liberal democracies, (2) illiberal 
democracies (which includes examples such as post-military states and post-communist states) and 
(3) authoritarian governments. 
 
Liberal democracies are founded in the liberalist ideology and stem from revolt against 
authoritarianism in the eighteenth century. It is characterised by, inter alia, a multiparty political 
environment; regular elections with universal franchise; civil liberties; liberal means and 
constitutionalism; varying forms of a separation of power between the executive, judiciary and 
legislature; and, it generally focuses on limited government (Ball & Peters, 2005, pp. 52–54; Blondel, 
1972, pp. 167–185; Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 8). A crucial addition to the liberal democratic 
classification of government is that of polyarchies. Robert Dahl (1956, 1971) conceptualised the term 
‘polyarchy’ to encapsulate modern liberal democracy’s focus on institutions that ensure popular 
sentiment is carried out and elected leaders and officials remain accountable to the electorate.16  
 
Illiberal democracies are generally founded in the socialist ideology. Illiberal democracies may include 
an array of government types. Communism, encapsulating socialist governance, is based on the 
writings of Karl Marx and one-party dominance may be included in this category. In the post-1945 
period, communism posed the most vibrant alternative to liberal democracy (Abcarian & Masannar, 
1970, pp. 80–82; Ball & Peters, 2005, pp. 55–57). However, following the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the displacement of communism in a number of former communist states, the value thereof as a 
relevant modern category for analysis depreciated. Rather, transitional governments find more 
relevance in modern government classifications as part of illiberal democracies. Transitional 
governments refer mostly to states in a post-communist transitional phase. These are characterised 
by a generally weak state and party system. Counter to liberal democracies, the state still plays a 
central role and civil liberties are limited. There is thus a lack of balance of power in favour of the state 
while civil groups, the media and even the market have a limited impact (Ball & Peters, 2005, pp. 56–
57; Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 8–9). Transitional government systems also refer to post-military 
states, which are in a process of transformation from military rule. The characteristics of these states 
are often in line with post-communist states (Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 8–9). Generally, illiberal 
democracies are poorly structured in terms of ensuring individual rights and are often characterised 
by excessive or abused executive power.  
 
The final government classification, authoritarian government, includes several sub-categories (Ball & 
Peters, 2005, pp. 56–58; Blondel, 1972, pp. 219–230). Carter and Herz (1961, p. 13) differentiate 
                                                          
16 Polyarchies are expanded on in Section 4.3 
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between autocracy and totalitarianism by noting that totalitarianism aims at “the total transformation of 
life and society” while authoritarianism is “a system and regime which strives to maintain control in a 
community without basically changing its structure.” Most sub-categories of authoritarianism continue 
to find application in contemporary world systems. Monarchies are based on traditional rulers and 
although some have become ceremonial in nature, executive power remains in the hands of an 
individual. Monarchical power may, however, be checked by some laws and the influence of other 
societal groups (Abcarian & Masannar, 1970, p. 20; Ball & Peters, 2005, pp. 45, 57). Dictatorships, 
including military dictatorships, present another form of authoritarian government and is often 
characterised by the dominant personality of a central figure. Little institutional checks and balances 
of power exist (Ball & Peters, 2005, p. 57; Heywood, 1997, p. 363). Finally, theocracies may be 
considered as part of authoritarian governments. Theocracies are based on religious authority with 
little separation of church and state (politics and religion). It is further characterised by a high level of 
executive autonomy as executive power is linked to spiritual directives and not popular consent (Ball 
& Peters, 2005, p. 57; Heywood, 1997, p. 35). The relevant ideological framework for authoritarian 
governments thus includes, for example, fascism and religious fundamentalism. 
 
The classification of governments noted above highlights several theoretical approaches through 
which governance can be studied. However, only two sets of theories remain particularly relevant to 
modern times. Theories of democracy with liberalist ideological foundations seem to be dominant in 
the post-Cold War period. Socialist theories, rooted in the socialist ideology, have become less 
prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but remain a valuable alternative theoretical 
approach to theories of democracy and hold relevance to transitional states. Determining the relevant 
government classification for South Africa represents the first step in ensuring that the study is rooted 
in a relevant theoretical framework. South Africa’s well known transition to democracy and 
constitutionalism in the post-1994 period highlights the link to democratic theories. The following 
section explores governance in South Africa within this democratic context to ensure the relevance of 
basing the study on democratic theories and a liberalist ideological foundation.  
 
2.2 South Africa’s governance classification: Linking the case study to a democratic 
theoretical setting  
 
South Africa’s government classification was altered significantly through the political changes around 
1994. Prior to 1994, South Africa conformed to the characteristics of a limited democracy. Since the 
Dutch settlements in the Cape, constitutionalism was present and developed along with numerous 
other democratic characteristics and institutions, including the implementation of a parliamentary 
system, democratic elections and the separation of powers. These democratic principles were, 
however, not extended to the entire population with varying forms of democratic institutional 
arrangements allocated to the various racial groups in the country (see for example Nieuwoudt, 
Olivier, & Hough, 1981).  
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After 1994, universal suffrage shifted South Africa’s political landscape to reflect a more mature 
democracy characterised by a number of democratic traits. First, both South Africa’s Interim 
Constitution (1993) and Constitution (1996a) lay claim to a number of principles guiding the country. 
This included freedom, civil liberties, human rights, equality and constitutionalism. Second, regular 
multiparty elections commenced through which the distribution of power is determined. This is one of 
the key features of democracies which are characterised by “regular, periodic and peaceful change of 
leaders and by organs of effective popular representation” (Carter & Herz, 1961, p. 10). Third, post-
1994 South Africa’s political structure consists of a presidential republic with a bicameral parliament 
and an independent judiciary (Schlager & Weisblatt, 2006, pp. 1229–1231). The application of the 
principle of the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary is therefore 
evident. It further alludes to institutional checks and balances on executive power. The three points 
noted above, namely South Africa’s political structure, the means of power distribution through 
elections and constitutional imperatives, all coincide with the fundamental building blocks of liberal 
democracy (Alford & Friedland, 1992, p. 42; Ball & Peters, 2005, pp. 52–53; Blondel, 1972, pp. 167–
185; Carter & Herz, 1961, pp. 10–11; Hudson, 1999). As such, it is evident that South Africa set itself 
the objective of functioning as a liberal democracy through constitutional means.  
 
Section 2.1 noted a number of government classifications that may be utilised to find an appropriate 
theoretical framework for a case study on South Africa. However, of the contemporary classifications, 
only the liberal democratic classifications hold true application to South Africa. South Africa’s 
government system cannot be classified as authoritarian as clear democratic principles are at play. 
The government system can also not be classified as an illiberal democracy where executive power 
often remains unchallenged. Despite South Africa being in a transition from a pre-1994 oligarchical 
system17, the 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 Constitution clearly provide for liberal democratic 
principles to guide governance. Given the deduction that South Africa falls into the contemporary 
category of liberal democracies, it is thus prudent to root the study in theories related to liberal 
democracy.  
 
While a study relating to South Africa’s political environment can be rooted in theories linked to 
democracy, this study deals specifically with an institution of state, namely parliament. Linking this 
institution and its function of oversight to a specific government classification will further assist in 
determining the relevant theoretical grounding for the study. 
 
3. Parliaments and oversight: A theoretical approach 
 
The previous section highlighted the relevance of a liberal democratic foundation to an analytic study 
of governance in South Africa after 1994. This section moves beyond the case study and focuses on 
the theoretical framework guiding parliaments as institutions, as well as the process of oversight. 
                                                          
17 An oligarchy is defined as “the rule by and for the few” (Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 234). Prior to 1994, South 
Africa was widely considered a racial oligarchy (Giliomee, 1995, pp. 83–85). 
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3.1 Linking parliaments and political theory 
 
The theoretical foundations of parliaments can be traced back to the origins of these institutions. 
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in England, for example, the King would summon 
knights and noblemen for discussions on raising additional taxes. By the fourteenth century, this 
system became more entrenched with a formal parliamentary establishment and voting by parliament 
on the provision of funds (Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 305; Mahiuddin, 2009, p. 4; Olson et al., 2008, p. 
51). Two key aspects of this process should be noted. First, parliaments came about through the 
need for a consultative process in governance and, second, those serving in parliaments acted as 
representatives of the people. Olson (as quoted in Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 305) notes, on the 
concept of popular representation, that “legislatures join society to the legal structure of authority in 
the state. Legislatures are representative bodies: they reflect the sentiment and opinions of citizens.”  
 
Blondel (1972, p. 26) states that merely referring to ‘representativeness’ when discussing assemblies 
may lead to a conclusion that no regime has ever existed without some form of assembly. A more 
definitive approach is required when reviewing modern parliaments. Loewenberg (in Damgaard, 2000, 
p. 3) highlights two structural traits of parliaments. First, there is equality among MPs and, second, 
members gain authority from their claim to representing some part of the population. 
Representativeness therefore refers to a system where representatives truly have the interest of the 
population at heart. Kramnick (as quoted in Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 311) notes that 
“representatives should have the same views and interest with the people at large. They should 
be…the whole body politic.” This is in line with Pitkin’s formalistic theory which notes that MPs are 
‘authorised’ to represent communities and to act on their behalf (Damgaard, 2000, p. 3).  
 
The provision of authority from the population to MPs to act on their behalf provides a clear indication 
as to the theoretical foundations of parliaments. This process of authorisation is most commonly 
achieved through voting, a defining characteristic of liberal democracies.18 This process (ideally) 
ensures popular consent for the system of governance as the population has a means of influencing 
decision-making through the election of representatives. The will of the people thus transpires on 
governmental level, albeit mostly a majoritarian will (Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 305–311; Lijphart, 
1999, p. 30; Russet and Oneal in Roff, 2007, p. 9). The process of popular representation is, 
inherently, limited in authoritarian regimes. While parliaments (or an equivalent thereof) may exist in 
an authoritarian regime, it is mostly used as a façade for popular support (Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 
324–325). True representativeness thus highlights the link between parliaments and democracy. 
 
In addition to representativeness linking parliaments to democracy, theories of democracy also link to 
the institution. Montesquieu and Locke highlighted the separation of powers that shows the 
                                                          
18 The idea of popular representation through voting is challenged by, for example, Immanuel Kant who claims 
that the will of the people can be represented under a rule of law and not necessarily through general elections. 
He claims that through a process of general elections, the notion of the ‘general will’ is in contradiction with itself 
as decisions are made by ‘the entire population’ and yet not by the entire population. 
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importance of parliaments as a means of attaining a balance of power. This pluralist view of 
democracy also holds that legislatures play a crucial role in stabilising democracies (Alford & 
Friedland, 1992, pp. 72–73). The rise of constitutionalism further reflects a link between constitutional 
democracies and the advocacy of strong parliaments (Ziegler et al., 2007). Finally, although not 
explicitly noted by Dahl, one of the characteristics of polyarchies is that the institutions that make 
government policies are dependent on votes and other expressions of preference (Lijphart, 1984, p. 
2). Polyarchies therefore also link democracy to government institutions that include parliaments. The 
aforementioned examples highlight the fact that throughout the development of democracy, 
parliaments remained relevant and highly prioritised. Any analysis on parliaments can thus hardly be 
separated from theories of democracy. 
 
3.2 Linking the process of oversight and political theory 
 
Stemming from the principle of representativeness discussed above, Blondel (1972, p. 126) 
concludes that representatives of the population should be responsible for drafting laws guiding a 
country. However, in modern democracies, the role of developing legislation has increasingly shifted 
from parliament to the executive19 (Blondel, 1972, p. 126; Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 312–313). As 
such, the focus of modern parliaments increasingly falls on verification of the implementation of laws. 
This is mainly achieved through the process of oversight. 
 
The oversight process flowed from the development of the parliamentary system. A primary example 
can be found in the parliament in England in the fourteenth century, which started to attach conditions 
to the raising of additional taxes by the monarchy. By 1340, the English Parliament appointed auditors 
to review tax collection and by the sixteenth century this role expanded to include parliamentary 
voting on expenditure (Olson et al., 2008, pp. 51–52). Since its inception, parliaments thus performed 
a ‘power-of-the-purse’ function. This growth in the power-of-the-purse role can subsequently also 
observed around the world, including the Unites States and France by the early nineteenth (Wehner, 
2006). The growth of parliaments’ power-of-the-purse function provided the foundation for further 
expansion of its oversight role. As noted in Section 3.1, parliaments also developed as outflows of the 
concepts of ‘popular will’ and ‘popular representation’. The concept of popular will is closely related to 
the principle of oversight. Obiyo (2006, p. 4) claims that parliaments20 “enable the People to acquire a 
perception of itself, of how ‘it’ qua represented in the executive branch, is carrying out its Will.” 
Oversight is thus an essential component of ensuring effective rule by the people. This form of 
governance that focuses on ensuring popular will, is an indication that the principle of oversight links 
to democratic imperatives. 
 
                                                          
19 Although the drafting of laws is shifting increasingly to the executive, parliaments largely maintain the role of 
deliberating on and ultimately approving legislation (Born, 2003: 29).  
20 Obiyo’s quote relates directly to parliamentary committees, but given the intrinsic link between parliament as a 
whole and parliamentary committees, this quote was extrapolated to apply to parliaments in general. 
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The principle of oversight is further rooted in the model of the separation of powers. For John Locke 
and Charles Montesquieu, the separation of powers aims to create a system of checks and balances 
in government (Adar, 2009, p. 6; Bellamy, 2005, p. 257; Mojapelo, 2012, pp. 37–39). Yamamoto 
(2007, p. 9) notes that in this system of checks and balances, legislation sets rules and prescribes 
how such rules should be executed. This, in turn, determines the relationship between the executive 
and the legislature where the executive remains accountable to parliament. The question then arises 
as to how such accountability is ensured? Oversight of the executive by parliament is one means of 
achieving accountability and a responsive executive (February, 2006, p. 123; Ogul & Rockman, 1990, 
pp. 6–7). John Stuart Mill (1861, p. 104) describes the importance of oversight by stating that “the 
proper role of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of 
publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers 
questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government 
abuse their trust . . . to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their 
successors.” Evident from Mill’s description is that oversight aims not only to ensure accountable 
governance, but also transparent governance.21 Both these attributes fall within the characteristics of 
the liberal democratic view (Bucur-marcu, 2009, pp. 25–26; Olson et al., 2008, pp. 17–18). A study 
focusing on oversight thus ought to be rooted, at least partially, in theories related to democracy. 
 
The sections above reveal that both the institution of parliament and one of its primary functions 
(oversight) fall predominantly within the ambit of democracy. Given that the focus of this study falls on 
‘parliamentary oversight’, it is clear that the study should be rooted in theories of democracy. This 
conclusion should be read together with Section 2 that provided further reasoning for rooting a study 
on South African parliamentary oversight in theories of democracy. 
 
4. Theories of Democracy 
 
Beitz (1989, p. ix) states that political theories can be ‘democratic’ in two ways. Firstly, in the more 
traditional sense linked to the Greek origins22 of the concept, it refers to the form of governance. 
Secondly, in a more elaborate sense, it holds reference to societal rather than governmental features. 
This study’s focus is closer to the traditional framework of democratic theories due to the focus on a 
branch of government. To a limited extent it also relates to societal features by incorporating aspects 
of pluralism and the effect thereof on government features. Modern interpretations of democracy are 
complex and there is no agreed upon definition of the concept (Graham, 2013, p. 19). It is thus 
essential to find a definition of democracy that finds application to this study and adds value to its 
theoretical grounding. 
 
Graham (2013, p. 19) highlights the need to clarify the concept or definition of democracy before 
applying it to an evaluative study. She further notes the need to differentiate between minimal and 
                                                          
21 The differentiation between accountability and transparency is addressed in Chapter 3. 
22 The Greek origin of democracy is linked to governance through the concept of ‘rule by the people’. This literal 
interpretation of democracy has little modern value beyond, for example, referendums. 
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maximal definitions of the concept of democracy with the former attaching a disproportionate amount 
of focus on the elective process. As such, minimalist democracies may neglect thoroughly entrenched 
democratic principles and be rather authoritarian in nature, but still be deemed democracies simply 
due to the presence of elections (Graham, 2013, pp. 20–23). As was noted in Section 2.2, the 
minimalist interpretation offers little applicability to this study, especially in the post-1994 South 
African governance environment. Rather, this study proposes linkage to the maximal interpretation of 
democracy that combines the principle of regular elections with liberal elements of individual rights, 
the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.  
 
The question then remains as to which specific theories of democracy finds application to this study. 
Cunningham (2002, pp. 27–29) notes that any modern discussion on democratic theories is 
dominated by liberal democracy. Discussions on liberal democracy overarch the differences in opinion 
on the application of democracy to provide a substantive theory thereof. The historic development of 
liberal democracy further demonstrates an important link between democracy and its liberalist 
philosophical underpinnings. From the previous sections it was also established that a study 
regarding parliament is closely related to representativeness. Theories around representative 
democracy thus need to be evaluated. Representativeness also includes reference to the 
representation of various interest groups, which relates to theories around pluralism (Cunningham, 
2002, pp. 73–75). Finally, liberal democracy and its links to individual freedoms require certain 
guarantees, which are often ensured through constitutionalism. Managing these guarantees in 
essence requires both the enabling and constraining of democracy which Hardin (1999, p. 83) claims 
is central to democratic constitutionalism. Discussion on liberal democracy, pluralism and 
representativeness, as well as constitutionalism falls not only in the framework of established 
democratic theories, but also finds application to a case study dealing with an institution of democracy 
(parliament) within a constitutional liberal democracy (South Africa). 
 
The sections below address the relevant democratic theories through the various levels of conceptual 
analysis that has relevance to this study. Firstly, liberalism as a paradigm and its link to liberal 
democracy are highlighted. Secondly, pluralism as a macro-theory and its link to democracy are 
discussed. Finally, representative democracy and constitutionalism as micro-theories are briefly 
discussed.  
 
4.1 Liberalism as paradigm 
 
Liberalism in its classic form relates largely to developments around the principle of individualism. The 
writings of John Locke and his focus on natural rights are essential to the understanding of liberalism. 
Natural rights include the right to life, liberty and property. This is captured in Locke’s reference to 
political right where he notes that “to understand political power right…we must consider what state all 
men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature…” (Locke, 1690, p. 
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167). These rights are further captured by a number of characterising elements of liberalism that 
include freedoms (such as the freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom to 
protests), reason, equality, toleration, consent and constitutionalism (Blondel, 1972, pp. 34–35; 
Heywood, 1997, pp. 41–43; Terchek & Conte, 2001, pp. 3–7). Classical liberalism’s focus on 
individualism and individual rights also had implications for governance as it stood opposed to the 
monarchical and aristocratic influenced systems of governance at the time. Liberalism thus sought a 
shift to self-governance, as per John Stuart Mill (Terchek & Conte, 2001, pp. 6–7).    
 
While early liberalists criticised the state for its perceived negative impact on individual rights, it did 
not completely dismiss the value of the state. In his 1776 publication Common Sense, Thomas Paine 
(see Terchek & Conte, 2001, p. 17) described the state as a “necessary evil.” The state, in essence, 
is required to ensure the individual rights put forward by liberalists without infringing on it, thus 
exercising a form of limited government (Plattner, 1999, p. 121). More recent liberalist such as 
Leonard Hobhouse and Thomas Hill Green refer to an even bigger role for the state in ensuring basic 
rights such as welfare, which is somewhat in contrast with early liberalist focusing on an extreme form 
of limited government. Despite the evolvement of liberalism to allow for an increasing degree of state 
involvement, the key question that remained is how to ensure limited government that will ensure 
individual rights through popular consensus?  
 
One way of ensuring limited government and popular consensus is through the electoral process. 
Liberalists were, however, divided on this as some scholars claimed that it will result in systems where 
governments are only responsive to majorities which infringes on the rights of minorities (Plattner, 
1999, p. 122). Nonetheless, the notion of an elected government was already evident in the earliest 
liberal writings, including Locke, who placed significant focus on governance through majoritarian 
consent (Locke 1690, Chapter VIII). Thomas Paine also contrasted monarchical rule, which he 
referred to as "founded on usurpation", with the electoral process which is "founded on the rights of 
the people" (Paine, 1856, p. 7). These liberal underpinnings provide the footing for representative 
governance that is linked to the democratic electoral system. Although the debate regarding universal 
suffrage continued in liberal circles, Thomas Paine’s notion of the individual’s (equal) right of choice to 
a representative23 increasingly became the norm (Paine, 1795, p. 33). This plausibly ushered in the 
spread of liberal democracy from Western Europe and North America to other parts of the world 
(Blondel, 1972, pp. 168–170).  
 
4.2 Liberal democracy 
 
While liberalism as ideology set the scene for political change in the 1700’s, it is the transformation of 
the ideology into liberal democracy as regime form that gave rise to contemporary government 
structures. Macridis (1983, pp. 23–46) notes the close correlation between liberalism’s focus on 
individual rights and the system of governance that forms in liberal societies. He also notes three 
                                                          
23 Representative democracy is further explained in Section 4.2 
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elements of liberalism in need of evaluation, namely moral, economic and political, the latter of which 
relates more closely to governance structures. The political element of liberalism is characterised by 
individual consent to political authority, representation, constitutionalism and popular sovereignty. For 
early liberal democratic thinkers, the ideal structure of government was therefore a representative 
assembly (Blondel, 1972, pp. 173–174). This system allowed an incorporation of the characteristics of 
liberalism into the government structure. However, modern liberal democracies developed beyond 
this simplistic view. 
 
Modern liberal democratic regimes became characterised by a number of factors related to liberalism, 
including constitutionalism with a focus on the protection of individual rights; frequent elections based 
on universal suffrage; political pluralism; independent interest functioning alongside government, 
including the media; and, a market-driven economy and the separation of  powers between branches 
of government (Beitz, 1989, pp. 32–33; Hänggi, 2003, p. 4; Macridis, 1983, pp. 23–40). The focus 
placed on elections when referring to democracy has, however, become less relevant in comparison 
to the liberal ideals noted above. Blondel (1972) notes that “liberal democracies may then be more 
liberal, in that they allow for a variety of views, than democratic, as the participation of the mass of 
citizens is quite limited, occurring perhaps once every few years.” There was thus a need to review 
the definition of liberal democracies to apply to modern cases, but doing so without detracting from 
both liberal and democratic values. 
 
One of the most significant modern interpretations related to liberal democracy is Robert Dahl’s 
development of the term ‘polyarchy’. Through his exploration of Madisonian and populistic theories of 
democracy, he concluded that traditional theories on democracy do not provide an appropriate 
theoretical review of modern democracies (Dahl, 1956; Chapters 1 and 2). Dahl’s polyarchies differ 
from ideal democracies in that they are (a) characterised by a high (but not perfect) level of 
responsiveness, and (b) governments that are “in relatively close correspondence with the wishes of 
relatively many of the citizens for a long period of time” (Lijphart, 1984, p. 2). Dahl (1989, p. 221) 
further notes seven qualifying criteria for polyarchies that include (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair 
elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative 
information (various sources of political information exist and are legally protected); and, (7) 
associated autonomy relating to the right of citizens to form independent organisations or institutions. 
These characteristics of polyarchies are required for any modern liberal democracy, even though Dahl 
argues that they may not be sufficient. 
 
Although the concept of liberal democracy went through developmental changes, two traditional 
elements remain highly visible in modern liberal democracies. First, representation remains relevant 
and, second, constitutionalism continues to form part of many modern liberal democracies. 
Furthermore, through recent developments such as Dahl’s construct of polyarchies, it is evident that 
various interest groups also play a significant role, thus highlighting the role of pluralism in modern 
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liberal democracies. The following sections look at pluralism, representation and constitutionalism in 
the context of liberal democracies. 
 
4.3 Pluralism and democracy 
 
While liberalism is known to focus on individual rights, group-rights also carry value in liberalism 
(Macridis, 1983, p. 41). Societal interest groups can have a significant impact on public opinion, 
political parties and other aspects of governance (Almond in Macridis & Brown, 1972, pp. 198–205). 
The evolution of such interest groups are what underscores the development of pluralist democracies 
(Blondel, 1972, p. 174).24 Susser (1995, p. 281) identifies pluralism as a means of political 
organisation and defines it as a system “which believes that a multiplicity of ideologies, ethnic groups, 
religions etc., within a state is beneficial to its health and democratic character.” According to this 
theory, there is thus an intrinsic link between pluralistic societies and democracy. 
 
Kuper differentiates between two models of pluralism, namely the ‘conflict’ and ‘equilibrium’ models. 
The conflict model applies to pluralistic societies where there is limited integration between the 
various interest groups (Kuper & Smith, 1969, pp. 10–13). Free-market forces largely re-shaped the 
construct of pluralistic societies and this model, it can be argued, has become less relevant in modern 
pluralist states. Rather, the equilibrium model finds applicability. Kuper notes a number of authors in 
the equilibrium model that directly links pluralism with democracy. This is also evident in the 
development of pluralism where initial focus (by Hobbes and Madison) was on the threat of factional 
conflicts by interest groups over power (Cunningham, 2002, pp. 74–78). Modern pluralist thinking is in 
line with the equilibrium model that takes a benign approach to factional conflict. Nonetheless, in 
pluralist terms, the manifestation of some form of conflict between interest groups remains 
unavoidable. 
 
In addressing conflict, an important subset of pluralism is Lijphart’s (1977, pp. 1–2) theory on 
consociational democracy which argues that, despite challenges, it is possible to have a stable 
democratic state with a multitude of interest groups. Lijphart (1977, p. 1) argues that in plural 
societies, consociational democracy is dependent on a significant degree of cooperation among 
interest groups, notably among the leaders of these groups. Consociational democracies are further 
dependent on a number of circumstances that aid stability in pluralist societies. These include, inter 
alia, the multiple balance of power, cross-cutting loyalties between interest groups and leaders willing 
to engage.25 He further notes that consociational democracies are more compatible with 
parliamentary systems than with presidential or majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1977, pp.54–103, 224). 
Lijphart also notes that the consociational democracies he studied in Europe are characterised by the 
separation of powers (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 34–35). This ties with Kuper’s notion that the pluralist nature 
                                                          
24 Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 213) defines pluralism as “a political system in which numerous competing 
interest groups exert strong influence over a responsive government…[where] each interest group concentrates 
on its own area so that no single elite dominates all sectors.” 
25 Brian Barry criticized consociational democracy’s application to deeply divided countries as he states that 
ensuring engagement between leaders in such countries is near impossible (Cunningham, 2002, p. 84). 
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of a pluralist society translates directly to its form of political control. For example, the division of 
power between the executive, legislature and judiciary, a characteristic of liberal democracies, is a 
manifestation of the plurality of society (Kuper & Smith, 1969, pp. 8–10).  
 
Although not unique to pluralist societies, the principle of separation of powers finds clear application 
in pluralism and it would be fitting to briefly expand on that. As noted, the principle of the separation of 
powers is based largely on the writings of John Locke and Charles Montesquieu. While the principle 
of the separation of powers forms an integral part of liberal democracies, a true (pure) separation of 
powers between the executive and legislature is unmanageable. The true aim of a separation of 
powers is rather to prevent an eschewed balance of power where one sphere of government has 
disproportionate levels of power to the others (Fisher, 1998, pp. 44–45). This also prevents a 
centralisation of power (Alford & Friedland, 1992, p. 114).  
 
In modern liberal democracies, the principle of separation of powers find more literal application in 
presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (Peters in von Metterheim, 1997, pp. 67–69). 
However, the principle still holds true in parliamentary systems in that a diffusion of responsibility 
between the executive and legislature aims at establishing a system of checks and balances. Within 
these systems of checks and balances is then found a key purpose of parliaments, namely ‘oversight’ 
(‘Yinka Fashagba, 2009, pp. 441–442). Montesquieu (1748, p. 162) highlights this by noting that “in a 
free state, legislative power…has the right and should have the faculty to examine the manner in 
which the laws it has made have been executed.” The principle of oversight, it can be argued, is also 
pluralist in nature. Obiyo (2007, pp. 61–62) argues that popular sovereignty requires transparent 
governance. This requires an independent organ of state to review the actions of another organ of 
state to ensure that the will of the people remains executed.   
 
The sections above indicate a link between pluralism and liberal democracy. Of specific importance to 
this study is the fact that even within pluralism, the principles of the separation of powers and 
oversight hold true. The following two sections move from pluralism as macro-theory to representative 
democracy and constitutionalism as micro-theories.  
 
4.4 Representative democracy 
 
It was already established in section 3.1 that there is a link between parliaments and 
representativeness. It is, however, necessary to look further into representativeness and its relation to 
democracy. Representative democracy is a form of indirect democracy where citizens vote for 
individuals to represent them when it comes to policy decisions. This should be set apart from direct 
democracy (as was practiced in ancient Greece) where a state’s citizens are able to vote on all major 
decisions through processes such as discussions or referendums (Clarke & Foweraker, 2001, p. 124). 
Representative democracy thus embodies a development in democracy itself. Russell Hardin (1999, 
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p. 143) captures this development by noting that “democratic theory started perhaps as a theory of 
direct participation, but is now almost entirely about representative government.”  
 
John Stuart Mill states that “there is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is 
that in which the sovereignty…is vested in the entire aggregate of the community” (Mill, 1861, p. 53). 
This statement of active citizen involvement does, however, fall more in line with direct democracy. It 
echoes the sentiment of, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau who argued that the utilisation of 
representatives falls outside the original desired outcomes of democracy whereby the people truly 
govern themselves (Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 48). However, there is a practical difficulty in the 
original democratic systems as it is hardly implementable outside the confines of a small community 
(Mill, 1861; Montesquieu, 1748, p. 159). As such, Mill notes a form of representative government as 
the only practically achievable form of government that can garner the advantages associated with 
direct democracy. This built on the concept of Thomas Paine who noted the inability of democracy to 
extend beyond its original setup and apply to modern population and territorial prerogatives (Paine, 
1856).  
 
Modern representative democracy developed strongly in the twentieth century and, according to 
Castiglione and Warren, is based on four cornerstones (see Urbinati & Warren, 2008, p. 389). First, it 
is based on a “principal agent relationship” whereby the principles (constituencies) are territorially 
based and elect representatives accordingly. Second, representative democracy provides a clear link 
between the sovereignty of the citizens and state power. Third, the process provides at least some 
form of responsiveness by representatives and, fourthly, it brings about improved political equality. 
These cornerstones are largely aligned to the liberal democratic theories of representation. Such 
theories focus on individual rights, rational voter behaviour and the sovereignty of the people (Ball & 
Peters, 2005, pp. 163–164). Urbinati and Warren (2008) do, however, find limitations in the 
Rousseauian notion of principle-agent relationships based on a system of representation that is linked 
to territorially-determined constituencies. Representativeness in modern states faces a number of 
challenges that are non-territorial in nature. As such, the modern state gave rise to other pressure and 
advocacy groups that represent individuals on these (non-territorial) issues including, inter alia, 
pressure groups, political parties, self-authorised representatives and the media (Ball & Peters, 2005; 
Sartori, 1976; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). It is thus clear that contemporary representative democracy 
is characterised by the presence of various representative institutions, but that these function 
alongside traditional institutions of representative democracy such as parliaments. 
 
A further question affecting contemporary interpretations of representative democracy relates to the 
‘majority rule’ concept. John Stuart Mill (1861, p. 133) postulates the concern by asking: “Because the 
majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes and the minority 
none?” In liberal democratic terms, this poses a danger to individual rights and sovereignty. Dahl 
(1956, p. 4) identifies this problem through his revision of Madisonian democracy that highlighted the 
need to find “a compromise between the power of majorities and the power of minorities.” Although 
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Dahl’s (1956, pp. 84–85) subsequent development of polyarchal democracy places focus on 
majoritarian rule (majoritarian decision-making), it does ensure a system of checks and balances 
which will, in turn, ensure minority representation. Lijphart (1977, pp. 38–41) argues that minority 
representation can be ensured through a system of proportional representation. Although governance 
decisions will most likely still be based on majority approval (as per Dahl), proportional representation 
ensures a form of minority input.  
 
From the above it is clear that the traditional underpinnings of representative democracy have faded 
and that new institutions or forms of representation have emerged. The problem of majoritarian 
dominance further threatens to eschew representative democracy. Should representative democracy 
then be discarded along with its associated institutions? Urbinati and Warren (2008, p. 391) disagree 
and note that “electoral representation remains crucial in constituting the will of the people, but the 
claims of elected officials to act in the name of the people are increasingly segmented by issues and 
subject to broader contestation and deliberation by actors and entities that likewise make 
representative claims.” This threat to the system of electoral representation can, partly, be solved 
through a system of checks and balances. 
 
While the value of representation is clear, Ball and Peters (2005, p. 164) argue that the same applies 
to institutions of representative democracy. Importantly they note that a representative assembly is 
key to protect the population from the disproportionate use of power by the executive. As such it can 
be argued that an institution like parliament, although now functioning as part of a broader spectrum 
of representative institutions, still has relevance in ensuring responsive governance. Sartori (1976, p. 
17) argues that political parties, for example, are an outflow of responsible governance as it requires 
government ministers responsible to parliament. Parliaments as institutions also have the potential to 
address the Madisonian need for majority-minority balance through proportional representation. The 
crucial role of parliaments in ensuring responsible governance is thus not negated by the 
developments of modern representative democracy.  
 
4.5 Constitutionalism 
 
John Locke (1690, pp. 331–332) noted the importance of a constitution in his publication ‘Two 
Treatises’ by indicating that it is the one “Act of Society” which confines power of legislating and 
restricts powers of individuals to make laws binding to others without being duly authorised to do so. 
This captures one of the primary purposes of constitutionalism, namely the attempt to restrict political 
power. Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 260) note, however, that constitutionalism can also be seen as 
providing a “power map” that determines the structural arrangements of government. For example, 
constitutions tend to include in its governmental structure a judicial body that maintains the integrity 
of, and ensures adherence to, the constitution. The link between constitutionalism and the separation 
of powers is therefore apparent. Finally, it also provides the executive with guidelines on the 
implementation of the constitution (Macridis, 1983, pp. 35–36).  
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Blondel (1972, p. 111) notes three crucial problems that are addressed through constitutionalism (with 
varying degrees of earnest and success around the world). First, constitutions aid in determining the 
division of labour of government through a process of decentralisation. Second, it aids in divulging 
power away from an individual in the executive to various role players in the executive. Third, 
constitutions aid in directing interaction between the executive and the population. One of the threats 
to modern liberal democracies is that, over time, interaction between the executive and the leadership 
decreases, resulting in a passive citizenry (Alford & Friedland, 1992, p. 65). Constitutions, through the 
establishment of institutions such as assemblies, assist in maintaining a link between the executive 
and the citizenry. 
 
Constitutions further guide the relationship between the assembly and the executive, and determine 
the influence they can exert on each other. In most modern liberal democracies, assemblies are 
considered sovereign under the constitution, providing them with considerable power. Traditionally, 
constitutions also provided assemblies with the mandate of drafting laws. However, in contemporary 
assemblies, this role is increasingly shifting to the executive (Blondel, 1972, p. 126; Olson et al., 2008, 
pp. 201–202). Therefore, constitutions in modern liberal democracies provide assemblies with two 
major functions outside its traditional law-making role. First, assemblies still deliberate on laws 
proposed by the executive and can add value to the process of law-making. Second, assemblies 
focus increasingly on their oversight role, ensuring the verification of the implementation of laws 
(Blondel, 1972, pp. 128–129). This is mainly achieved through the process of oversight. Thus, 
constitutionalism in modern liberal democracies not only links to the principle of the separation of 
powers, but also to the oversight and accountability principles.  
 
Democratic constitutionalism’s focus on the division of labour and balance of power has direct 
implications for the military domain. This relates to roles that are constitutionally prescribed for the 
armed force and, more importantly, the roles prescribed to other branches of government in its 
controlling function of the military (see for example Born, 2003; Hänggi, 2003, pp. 15–16). 
Constitutionalism therefore plays a role in defining civil-military relations, especially in modern liberal 
democracies. The following sections provide a theoretical overview of civil-military relations in a 
democratic context. 
 
5. Civil-military relations 
 
This study’s focus on political oversight of the military takes place at the intersection between the polis 
and the military. It forms part of the broader question of the distribution of social and political power, 
generally referred to as civil-military relations (Glisik in Aldis & Drent, 2008, p. 83) . Civil-military 
relations struggles with the dichotomy of the necessity for military power to protect against external 
threat and the potential internal threat posed by the presence of the said military. Established theory 
on civil-military relations focuses on how the military should be controlled to limit that risk (Cottey, 
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Edmunds, & Forster, 2002, p. 35). Parliamentary oversight of the military is one form of ‘control’. As 
such, any study on parliamentary control of the military needs (also) to be rooted in civil-military 
relations theory. Furthermore, there is an intrinsic link between established theory on civil-military 
relations and democracy. Original works of Huntington and Janowitz developed in a democratic 
setting and, specifically Huntington’s approach, is closely linked to the liberal paradigm (Burk, 2002, 
pp. 9–11). This study’s setting within theories of democracy thus highlights the need to include 
reference to democratic civil-military relations.  
 
It should be noted that linking this study to the civil-military relations theory comes at the exclusion of 
another potential underpinning theory, namely security sector reform (SSR). Two main reasons for the 
exclusion of this approach can be put forward. First, at a theoretical level, the intrinsic link between 
SSR and Civil-Military Relations largely reduces the need for significant focus on SSR. Civil-military 
relations relates to the relationship between the military and the civis. Similarly, SSR also reflects this 
relationship, but has a wide and more practical focus of analysis. Williams (2001, p. 5) notes various 
clusters of transformation, including cultural, human, political and organisational that form part of 
SSR. As such, in a study focusing on parliamentary oversight, the viewing of Civil-Military Relations 
arguably finds more application than SSR and its more practical approach with a particular focus on 
the reform of the military itself. Second, it can be argued that the SSR approach is better suited for a 
study on the South African transition to democracy and the accompanying SSR. An array of literature 
in this regard exists that reviewed the transition period through a SSR perspective (See for example 
Nathan, 2004; Williamson, 2001). This study views a longer-term overview within a 
maturing/established democratic setting. 
 
The subsections below provide a brief overview of the societal role of the military where after civil-
military relations is defined. Civil-military relations and its link to democracy are also explained where 
after the structures supporting democratic civil-military relations are discussed. Finally, a number of 
practical challenges to democratic civil-military relations are highlighted that provides the foundation 
for further exploration in the study. 
 
5.1 The military and society 
 
Prior to delving into civil-military relations as a concept, it is necessary to briefly refer to the 
importance of the military in society as it lies at the heart of civil-military relations. This importance is 
noted by Ngoma (2004, p. 3) stating that “[t]he relationship between the military, political leadership 
and society at large has always been one of intense intrigue and is as old as humanity itself, evolving, 
as would be expected, from the moment society had to depend on part of its population to fight 
aggression.” Huntington (1957, p. 72) highlights this relationship by noting three responsibilities of the 
military towards the state. First, the military needs to keep the state informed of the minimum required 
levels of security. Second, the military advises on the impact of state discourse from a military point of 
view. Third, the military exists to execute state decisions. These responsibilities underscore the 
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relationship between civil and military role players and tensions around the relationship in turn 
determine civil-military relations in a country.  
 
In order to minimise tensions regarding the relationship between civil and military role players, it 
should be ensured that proper civil functions are ascribed to the military. Chuter (2000) notes some of 
these functions to include, for example, (1) a sufficient role in policy-making; (2) military engagement 
with parliaments; (3) collaboration between the military and the executive in policy-making and the 
presentation of such policy; and, (4) briefing the media on military affairs. These examples of 
appropriate civil functions for the military highlight the constant need for interaction between civil and 
military role players as well as engagement with civil society. If and when these roles are fulfilled 
correctly, it decreases tensions related to the civil-military relationship and contributes to the 
legitimisation of the role of the military. Naidoo (2006, p. 34) notes that the cementing of sound civil-
military relations is a necessity, specifically in democracies. 
 
While the link between civil-military relations and democracy is discussed in Section 5.3, it should be 
noted that civil-military relations can be defined in political systems other than democracies. 
Essentially, the term ‘civil control’ should not be confused with ‘democratic control’. Civil control can 
be achieved in non-democratic states, as was the case in the former Soviet Union (Cottey et al., 
2002). However, the role of the military in democratic societies is far more nuanced and dependent on 
balanced relationships.  
5.2 Civil-military relations: An evolving definition  
 
From the earliest writings on civil-military relations through to modern theory, civil-military relations 
seems to focus extensively on one key question, the maintenance of civilian control of the military. 
Carl von Clausewitz (1989, p. 607) stated that “subordinating the political point of view to the military 
would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only 
the instrument, not vice versa.” The subjecting of the military to civilian leaders thus underscores his 
theorising.  
 
The founders of modern-day civil-military relations are widely agreed to be Samuel Huntington and 
Morris Janowitz. Huntington (1957, pp. 1–2) identified civil-military relations as “one aspect of national 
security policy” and that it “is the principal institutional component of military security policy.” The aim 
of military security policy, Huntington notes, “is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will 
maximi[s]e military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.” In essence, Huntington’s 
focus for civil-military relations lies in obtaining a balance between military and civilian role players in 
a state. Crucial to the establishment of this balance is the existence of a professional standing military 
and a professional officer corps (Huntington, 1957, pp. 7–18). For Huntington (1957, pp. 80-84), 
however, the balance is somewhat skewed as it focuses extensively on means of minimising military 
power vis-à-vis civilian power. 
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Janowitz similarly focused on the aspect of a professional military as a key to understanding civil-
military relations as well as the need for the subjecting of the military to civil control26. Faever (1996, 
p. 164) notes, however, that Janowitz differs from Huntington on the nature of the relationship 
between military and civilian role players within the context of the Cold War. While Huntington refers 
to an “ideal-type division of labour” between the role players, Janowitz highlights the “unavoidable 
politici[s]ation” of the military and the tensions that this may bring in terms of civil control (Feaver, 
1996, pp. 164–165).  
 
The end of the Cold War saw the demise of the threat of total war, which had implications for the 
theoretical grounding of civil-military relations. The post-Cold War period saw decreased levels of 
prestige enjoyed by the military, decreased levels of trust in the military and decreased defence 
commitments. The political effect of smaller standing armed forces is also significant. Smaller forces 
are likely to be more single-minded (and pro-military) in nature, decreasing the risk for political 
intervention (Kummel & von Bredow, 2000, pp. 18–21). Yet, despite the comparative decreased risk 
for military intervention in politics, the need for a balance between military and civilian power 
remained for modern theorists. Feaver (1996, p. 149) notes that this balance requires a sufficient 
military power to deter and act against external threats, but that this military power should not be so 
strong as to rise above its subordination to civilian power.       
 
The focus on civil-military relations presented by Clausewitz, Huntington, Janowitz and Feaver all 
focused to some degree on the subjecting of the military to civilian power. It thus pushed for a 
separation between military and civilian power. However, this notion of separation has been 
increasingly challenged, notably by Rebecca Schiff, through the postulating of a concordance theory 
for civil-military relations. The concordance theory of civil-military relations “highlights dialogue, 
accommodation and shared values or objective among the military, the political elites, and society” 
(Schiff, 1995, p. 12). Rather than a separation of military and civilian powers, the concordance theory 
focuses on cooperation among the role players. It further argues that through such cooperation, the 
unnecessary intervention of the military in political affairs (including coups) can be avoided. The shift 
in literature thus presupposes a move away from a narrow view of executive dominance of the military 
towards broader co-operative democratic control thereof (Burk, 2002; Cottey et al., 2002). However, 
this shift is challenged by Cohen whose claims point to civil-military relations rather being based on 
tension between political and military elites. Cohen (2002: 51) therefore puts forth ‘active control’ of 
the military which he terms “an unequal dialogue between civilian politicians and senior officers.” 
Through constant inquiry and probing by political role players, tension remains. Cohen argues that 
such tension is necessary due to the political nature of war, uncertainties within the military domain 
and the need to constantly evaluate the quality of military role players. Through such active civil-
military control, an effective and efficient military can be achieved. 
 
                                                          
26 Chuter argues that the concepts ‘civil control’ and ‘civilian control’ are interrelated but that the latter does not 
add real value. Rather ‘civil control’ reminds of the subjecting of the military to the state in terms of duty and 
obedience. (For more, see Chapter 2 of Chuter, 2000). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
61 
 
Despite this evolution in the understanding of civil-military relations, further inquiry has also been 
prompted. Matei (Bruneau and Matei, 2012: 27), for example, calls for better understanding of the 
military’s role in periods of democratic consolidation. Matei thus developed a means to determine the 
level of civil control of the military through an analysis of “[i]nstitutional control mechanisms, oversight, 
and the inculcation of professional norms” (Bruneau and Matei, 2012: 30). This, the author argues, 
reveals that contemporary civil-military relations are constituted by control, effectiveness and 
efficiency that transcend the divide between democratic and non-democratic societies. Similarly, 
Croissant and Kuehn (2017: 1-2) also postulate the challenges of control and effectiveness as the 
dual pillars of effective civil-military relations in democracies. The authors note the need to evaluate 
these criteria, especially in new democracies based on two key questions. The first questions centres 
on the development of institutions, actors and defence policy-making after democratic transitions. The 
second question revolves around civil-military dynamics and military effectiveness. The work of Matei, 
Croissant and Keuhn illustrates a need to move civil-military relations theory beyond Huntington’s 
narrow view thereof towards a theory that finds universal application.  
 
The sections above clearly highlight the ongoing evolution of theory on civil-military relations and that 
significant strides have been made since the narrow interpretation thereof by Huntington. 
Nonetheless, whether adherence to Huntington’s subjecting of the military to civil control, Schiff’s 
concordance theory, Cohen´s theory of active control or Matei, Croissant and Keuhn’s focus on 
control, effectiveness and efficiency, the essence of civil-military relations is clear in that it relates to 
the management of the relationship between civilian and military role players.  
 
5.3 Civil-military relations and democracy 
 
The link between the military, which is in its very nature a non-democratic institution, and democracy 
may not seem apparent at first (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003, p. 305). However, Burk (2002, pp. 9–11) 
highlights the link between civil-military relations and liberalism by noting security of individual rights 
as one of the cornerstones of liberalism. The provision of security or protection from external threats 
falls within this ambit of rights and generally requires some form of military force. This requirement 
must, however, be balanced with another liberal requirement, that power is not abused and 
sovereignty remains. There is thus a need to ensure that the military is powerful enough to fulfill its 
protection function, but not too powerful as to override democratic civilian control of the country (the 
will of the people).  
 
Huntington traces the solution to this liberal requirement back to the seventeenth century when 
military forces (in England and the United States) were still largely controlled by the Crown. This 
period saw the rise in prominence of parliaments and a parallel rise in parliamentary efforts to curb 
the power of the Crown, including its control of the armed forces (Huntington, 1957, p. 81). This 
period in history saw the development of a link between parliament (as an institution of representative 
democracy) and control of the armed forces. However, after the seventeenth century, control of the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
armed forces in democracies did not always result in stable civil-military relations. Similarly, the rise of 
civilian control in a democratic context did not contribute to stable civil-military relations. Civilian 
control of the armed forces in a democratic setting may be characterised by inefficiency and the 
misuse of democratic processes by the military to obtain disproportional power (Huntington, 1957, pp. 
80–83). As noted, Huntington and Janowitz believe this changed with the advent of the professional 
officer, because the professional officer is an “expert in the management of violence and willing to 
swap loyalty to civilian authority in return for professional autonomy” (Burk, 2002, p. 10). 
 
One of the ways in which to link democracy and civil-military relations in the period of the professional 
soldier is through Huntington’s differentiation between objective and subjective control of the military. 
Objective control of the military focuses primarily on enhancing military professionalism and the 
distribution of power between civilian and military groupings in a country. This lessens the risk of 
military involvement in politics. Subjective control of the military aims to change the military structures 
to those similar to the state, which almost assumes military involvement in politics. Simply put, 
subjective control infers the disappearance of the distinction between the armed forces and 
government (Huntington, 1957, pp. 83–84). Subjective control thus undermines an independent 
military domain, notably in the appointment of military leaders through political elites. As such, in a 
democratic setting, objective civil control is considered more desirable as it limits conflict between the 
political and military spheres. It allows for a separation of military and government with the former 
executing policy developed by the latter (S. Naidoo, 2006, pp. 35–37).  
 
Two key links to liberal democracy (and the liberal paradigm) can be identified in objective civil 
control. First, the aim of objective control to distribute power relates directly to the liberal democratic 
principle of separation of powers. Second, the distribution of power presupposes an acceptance of 
pluralism, that there are a number of role players or actors in the context of civil control of the military 
(Ngoma, 2004; Rupiya, 2004). The link between civil-military relations and democracy can further be 
found in the principle of checks and balances. As noted, the subjecting of the military to civilian 
leaders underscores civil-military relations. This assumes the acceptance by the military of the 
systems of checks and balances placed over them. This acceptance is in line with modern civil-
military relations and liberal democratic practices (Williams, 1998, p. 26). It can then be argued that 
modern militaries are also acceptant of the democratic principle of oversight over its activities (le Roux 
et al., 2012; S. Naidoo, 2006, pp. 37–40; Williams, 1998, pp. 31–36). It is, however, not only the 
military that must accept such oversight, but in a democratic context, it is also the populace that 
expect such oversight by elected representatives (Burk, 2002, p. 8).   
 
The sections above linked civil-military relations and democracy based on traditional theory. This 
approach has, however, come under increased scrutiny and its applicability to modern-day civil-
military relations questioned (Burk, 2002; Cottey et al., 2002). Schiff’s (1995) concordance theory, for 
example, focuses on dialogue, accommodation and shared values between the role players. The 
question then arises whether the link between civil-military relations and democracy will remain 
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apparent under the concordance theory? Schiff aimed to create a theory of civil-military relations that 
finds application outside merely the United States. Subsequently, “concordance theory does not 
require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process” (Schiff, 1995, 
p. 12). It therefore finds applicability inside and out of a democratic context. In fact, Williams (1998, p. 
22) notes the value of the concordance theory for studying civil-military relations in the developing 
world, which would include new democracies. The dominance of linking theories on civil-military 
relations and democracy is, however, apparent in recent developments such as research by Matei 
(2012) and Croissant and Kuehn (2017) that aims to expand the concept in the context of new or 
consolidating democracies. 
 
Given the identification of a strong link between democracy and civil-military relations, it follows that 
democratic institutions and structures will be necessary to uphold democratic civil-military relations. 
The following section reviews a number of these structures.  
5.4 The supporting structures to democratic civil-military relations 
 
What constitutes democratic control of the military? Cottey et al. (2002, p. 40) note that much of the 
assumption of democratic control of the armed forces simply rely on the establishment of institutional 
structures that ensure healthy civil-military relations. They do, however, question this assumption by 
stating that democratic control goes beyond the mere establishment of these structures, but that it is 
about the “democratic substance that fills their institutions” (Lambert, 2006, pp. 4–6; also see 
Williams, 1998, pp. 26–7). Four necessary structures that provide for democratic civil-military relations 
can be unpacked.   
 
First, appropriate constitutional and/or legal parameters are considered important institutional 
structures required for democratic control of the armed forces. Two key issues are identified within 
such legal parameters. Firstly, legal parameters serve to define the exact role and functions of the 
military (Hänggi, 2003, p. 16). The principle of ‘role definition’ through constitutionality is also 
enshrined in, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Code of 
Conduct (1994, Section VII). It can be argued that the value of constitutional role definition aids in 
preventing conflict between civilian and military leaders (see for example Cawthra & Luckham, 2003, 
pp. 312–314). Secondly, Hänggi (2003, p. 16) notes that constitutional parameters allow for the 
separation of powers between the various branches of government. This ensures effective checks 
and balances on the powers of these branches and oversight of the military. It further preserves the 
notion of a separation of responsibility between the military and civil sectors (Cottey et al., 2002, pp. 
32–35; Huntington, 1957, pp. 83–85). Such seperation of powers through legal means is evident in, 
for example, Canada’s National Defence Act of 1985 that allocates executive functions in terms of the 
control of the Canadian armed forces. 
 
Second, a structure of civil control of the armed forces is necessary for democratic civil-military 
relations. For Hänggi (2003, p. 16), this refers to civil servants holding the policy-making 
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responsibility. Even though the policy and legislation formulation responsibility has shifted increasingly 
to the executive, Hänggi’s notion holds true as it supports the separation of responsibility between 
military and civilian role players (Blondel, 1972, p. 126). This separation of responsibilities is of such 
importance that in some cases, such as in Australia, a Defence Secretary is established to work with 
policy formulation rather than the military commanders themselves, thus ensuring an additonal layer 
of civil control (Cameron, 1974, p. 94). Hänggi’s notion is further in line with traditional thinking on civil 
supremacy over the military as put forth by, for example, Huntington. Despite a shift in theory towards 
a cooperative approach between military and civilian role players, the principle of civil control remains. 
Cawthra and Luckham (2003, pp. 322–323) argues that the focus should therefore be on democratic 
control, rather than civil control. As such, the presence and optimal functioning of democratic 
institutions will ensure adherence to the principle of civil control (Lambert, 2006, pp. 4–5).  
 
Third, linked to the principle of separation of powers, judicial control is a structure providing for 
democratic control of the military (Hänggi, 2003, p. 16). This refers to the fact that the military should 
remain subservient to the judicial system and not function outside its realm. The importance of judicial 
control is reflected in, for example, a 2006 review of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe’s Code of Conduct. The review by Lambert (2006, p. 20) notes that the Code fails to reflect on 
judicial control when referring to the democratic control of the military. Legislative directives are 
imperative when dealing with the use of armed forces. 
 
Fourth, Parliaments and other forms of assembly provide a structure necessary for democratic civil-
military relations.27 In line with the notion of maintaining balance between military and civilian role 
players, the major contribution of parliaments is through oversight (Aldis & Drent, 2008, pp. 39–61; 
Cottey et al., 2002, pp. 40–46; Hänggi, 2003, p. 16). Parliaments are essential for democratic civil-
military relations as they embody the principle of representative democracy and provides for popular 
accountability. Even though parliaments may not formulate policy and legislation anymore, they 
provide final approval of policy and legislation and uphold civil control of the armed forces. 
Furthermore, civil control is ensured through, inter alia,  parliament’s role in approving defence 
budgets, reviewing military deployments, overseeing defence procurement processes, conducting 
public hearings on defence and ratifying international treaties related to defence (Aldis & Drent, 2008, 
pp. 44–48; Hänggi, 2003, p. 16; le Roux et al., 2012).  
 
While the establishment of the above-mentioned structures are essential for democratic civil-military 
relations, this is only the first step in a two-tier developmental process. The second step relates to 
“democratic substance” and looks at issues such as state capacity and the role of civil society (Cottey 
et al., 2002, p. 40). First, in terms of state capacity, there is a clear need for those in leadership 
positions to be well informed and vested with civil-military relations dynamics. Bennett (2010, pp. 4–7) 
argues that this requires civilian leaders with some form of military experience or a high level of 
                                                          
27 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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understanding and military leaders with political expertise.28 The democratic substance should also 
run deeper than simply top-level management and should be well vested in the civil servants on lower 
levels (Cottey et al., 2002, pp. 41–42). Volten and Drent (in Aldis & Drent, 2008, pp. 15–16) note, for 
example, the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) which states the importance of 
parliamentary oversight of the military aided by “knowledgeable parliamentary staff and ‘outside’ 
expertise.” It can therefore be argued that democratic substance of civil-military relations is, in terms 
of state capacity, directly related to the level of expertise at both macro- and micro-level in state and 
military structures.  
 
Second, the role of civil society is equally important to democratic substance. For Hänggi (2003, p. 
17), this role can most adequatly be fulfilled by interest groups in socieity with a special interest and/or 
expertise in military matters. Cawthra and Luckham (2003, p. 313) state that such interest groups can 
form a “useful counter weight to security establishments.” They note the value of such groups during 
periods of transition to democracy and the proces of security sector reform. Aldis and Drent (2008, p. 
140) refer to the civil-society component (interest group) as the “fourth dimension of civil-military 
relations.” These groups play a similar role as bureaucratic structures (such as parliaments) in 
shaping civil-military relations. As per Aldis and Drent, they thus add an ‘extra layer’ to the democratic 
process which entrenches the democratic principle of governance by the people. 
 
The role of civil society also goes beyond the mere impact of interest groups. The Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (1994 Chapter VII) Code of Conduct notes the integration of the 
armed forces with civil society as crucial to democracy. This link between the military and civil society 
is imperative as it demonstrates the confluence between democracy and civil-military relations. 
Pressures from civil society will, in part, result in effective democratic civil control of the military and 
without effective democratic control, there will be no effective integration of the armed forces with civil 
society. In essence, without democratic civil-military relations, the gap between the military and civil 
society will constantly widen which is an undesired outcome in any democracy (Lambert, 2006, pp. 
45–47) 
 
Democratic civil-military relations is dependent on a number of bureaucratic and civil structures to 
ensure its maintenance. The following section provides an overview of theoretical and practical 
challenges to the maintenance of democratic civil-military relations.  
 
5.5 Challenges to democratic civil-military relations 
 
Huntington’s work on civil-military relations focused on the subjecting of the military to civil authority 
and it is, to a large extent, this notion that lies at the core of theory-based challenges to democratic 
civil-military relations. The first major challenge to democratic civil-military relations is semantic in 
nature. Huntington (and Janowitz) derived their theories based on the experiences of mature 
                                                          
28 This will be expanded on in the next section. 
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democracies. There was an intrinsic link between their theorising and the system and structures of 
democracy. Cottey et al. (2002, p. 35) note that “democratic control is often used interchangeably with 
civilian control.” Civil control can, however, be achieved outside the parameters of democracy. The 
challenge to democratic control of the armed forces is thus that it not only requires a theoretic scope 
broader than just civil control of the military, but a form of control that is democratic in nature. 
 
Second, traditional civil-military relations presupposes a focus on control of the military by the 
executive (or political elites) (Burk, 2002, p. 7). Cottey et al. (2002, pp. 35–36) argue that this is 
problematic in a number of ways. Firstly, it creates the assumption that there is a constant conflict for 
power between the executive and the military. This stands in contrast to, for example, the 
concordance theory that moves away from this hostile relationship to viewing it as a relationship of 
dialogue and common purpose (Schiff, 1995, p. 12). Secondly, the focus placed on the role of the 
executive in controlling the military detracts from a multi-layered approach to civil-military relations. It 
excludes other democratic institutions, such as parliaments, that play a crucial role in ensuring 
democratic oversight of the military (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 35). Thirdly, an excessive focus on the 
executive detracts from the role of civil society in democratising control of the armed forces (Lambert, 
2006, pp. 45–47). Not considering civil society in civil-military relations is in contrast with the very core 
of democracy which requires that “the governed should govern” (Feaver, 1996, p. 153). Parliament 
also has a role to play in terms of civil society’s role in civil-military relations as it is through parliament 
that the civil control is best achieved by the form of it reflecting the will of society through elected 
representatives. 
 
Third, shifts in theory that highlight cooperation and dialogue between military and civil role players 
also present a challenge. The question can be asked whether this cooperative arrangement does not 
blur the distinction between civilian and military spheres. This question is, however, implicitly 
answered by recently developed theory itself. Despite the evolution of the defining principles of civil-
military relations, there seems to be consensus that the distinction between the two spheres should 
remain. Feaver (1996, p. 168) notes the necessity of analytically distinct civilian and military spheres 
as the foundation for any new theory on civil-military relations. Concordance theory also upholds this 
distinction by describing the military, political and civil society leadership as “partners” (Schiff, 1995, 
pp. 12–13). Burk (2002, pp. 22–23) similarly argues for “collegial relations” between civilian and 
military elites, which highlights the need for collaboration, but the maintenance of differentiation.   
 
A fourth challenge to democratic civil-military relations lies in the ‘democratic’ notion thereof. For a 
state to be democratic, it is requires more than simply a popularly elected executive, but the 
institutions of democracy as well. Civil-military relations should thus function in an environment 
characterised by the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. This 
principle must be respected and promoted by both the military and civilian role players (Cottey et al., 
2002, pp. 38–39). A balance of powers is also important to ensure that no branch of government 
accrues disproportional power vis-à-vis others. A balance of powers will ensure that the executive’s 
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control of the military is kept in check, and creates alternative checks (through parliaments for 
example) on military power. The democratic landscape within which civil-military relations function is 
rather large. Kummer and von Bredow (2000, p. 126) summarise the extent of democratic control of 
the armed forces then as “all formal norms and rules, laws and regulations which are designed to 
integrate the organi[s]ation of the armed forces into the democratic political system and the soldiers, 
especially the officer corps, into the democratic political culture.” Ultimately, the democratic extent of 
civil-military relations relies on the institutionalisation of democratic control. 
 
Finally, traditional civil-military relations theory, notably the work of Huntington, developed from the 
point of view of established mature western democracies (Burk, 2002, p. 7; Cottey et al., 2002, p. 35). 
This has, to a large extent contributed to the need for the reconceptualisation of civil-military relations. 
Schiff (1995, p. 10) highlights the bias in traditional civil-military relations theory by noting its 
dependence on the United States case study and its development from a setting characterised by 
high levels of institutional professionalism and political neutrality. The theoretical problem to 
democratic civil-military relations is thus that there is no universally-applicable civil-military relations 
theory.29 Any approach to democratic civil-military relations will thus require careful construct, 
cognisant of the fact that existing theory leaves some gaps in application.  
 
While the paragraphs above reviewed some theoretical challenges to democratic civil-military 
relations, four of the practical challenges related to these theoretical contestations should also be 
noted. First, it was established that democratic control of the military cannot be equated to civilian 
control of the military. The practical challenge lies in the establishment of democratic institutions that 
will ensure the actual implementation of democratic civil-military relations (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003, 
p. 322; Cottey et al., 2002, p. 39). 
 
Second, while the establishment of democratic institutions are imperative, the functioning of these 
institutions and structures are crucial. Parliaments are prime examples that relate to civil-military 
relations as they function as institutions representing popular will through ensuring accountability. 
Failure to function effectively will detract from the democratic nature of the state. Furthermore, in 
terms of civil-military relations, parliaments are required to effectively engage on defence matters, 
including legislation and budget votes (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 44). Regular engagement on military 
matters underscores the democratic principle of accountability (Wagner, 2006b, pp. 7–9). The 
functioning of democratic institutions also reflects state capacity. Cottey et al. (2002, p. 41) argues 
that state capacity is crucial for policy-making and requires “the state to provide political leaders with 
the necessary information and analyses; a realistic assessment of the resources that can be made 
available for a particular policy area and the relationship between resources and policy choices.”   
 
                                                          
29 The need for a civil-military relations approach outside the United States framework is highlighted through, for 
example, efforts at establishing a civil-military relations theory with an African bias (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; 
Ngoma, 2004; Williams, 1998). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
 
Third, the level of expertise in engagement between the military and political spheres can pose a 
challenge to democratic civil-military relations. Kotia (2011, p. 66) notes, for example, a lack of 
expertise and information on defence matters by political leaders as a factor inhibiting civil-military 
relations. This is linked to the need for regular interaction between military experts and government 
decision-makers (Bennett, 2010, p. 30). The challenge is, however, not only on the side of civilian role 
players, but refers to a lack of political comprehension on the side of military role players as well. Gray 
(1999, pp. 58–68) captures this by referring to aspects such as ‘distinctly different responsibilities’, 
‘variances in culture or ethos’, and ‘reciprocal ignorance’ as factors dividing political leaders from their 
military counterparts. Central to this practical challenge is finding a balance between military and 
civilian role players that can be enhanced by the utilisation of defence experts (for civilian role 
players) and civic education (for military role players) (Williams, 1998, pp. 39–40). 
 
Fourth, the relationship between the military and the citizenry poses a potential practical challenge to 
democratic civil-military relations. It was previously explained that, in the context of pluralism, civil 
society plays a crucial role in providing civil-military relations with a democratic nature. Regular 
engagement between the military and civil society, and among civil society themselves on military 
matters, is crucial to sound civil-military relations (Schiff, 1995, p. 13). The value of engagement 
between the military and civil society lies in the fact that it goes beyond institutionalism and can even 
serve as a counter balance thereto (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 46). However, a lack of regular interaction 
between the military and civil-society can undermine democratic civil-military relations.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections aimed at finding a political theoretical grounding that is both rooted in 
accepted theory and relevant to the study. The search commenced with an overview of South Africa’s 
post-1994 political posturing. It was found that through its Constitution and the nature of its 
government structures, South Africa declared itself (and aims to function as) a liberal democracy. It 
was also found that both the institution of parliament and the action of oversight have its theoretical 
roots in liberalism and theories related to democracy. These theories are therefore the most relevant 
political theories to a study that examines the standing of parliamentary oversight of defence in South 
Africa.  
 
By evaluating liberalism as paradigm, pluralism as macro-theory and representative democracy and 
constitutionalism as micro-theories, a constant practical theme that emerged was the need to bring 
balance to government structure. This structure is characterised by transparent governance and 
accountability. Liberal democracies are very well suited to ensure balanced and accountable 
governance as they ensure a high degree of checks and balances between the branches of 
government and are able to function in a pluralist setting. Parliaments, the central theme of this study, 
find application in all the levels of conceptual analysis of democratic theories. Parliaments are central 
to the system of checks and balances and play a key role in ensuring accountable governance. 
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Theories of democracy, through their focus on balanced and accountable governance, thus form the 
appropriate theoretical foundation for this study. Its principles and institutions provide an analytic 
framework that will guide the study and will ensure that government accountability remains a central 
theme.  
 
Any study on oversight of the military also implies a fundamental need to include aspects of civil-
military relations. Although civil-military relations can be defined outside democratic settings, there is 
an established link between civil-military relations and liberalism. Modern theories on civil-military 
relations, notably since the advent of the ‘professional soldier’, have focused increasingly on civil-
military relations in a democratic context. Democratic civil-military relations thus emerged where the 
focus is on the nature and balance of power between military and civilian role players. Despite the 
evolution of the concept to focus on cooperation between these role players, the notion that the 
military be subjected to the executive and controlled by civil powers remains. In essence, democratic 
civil-military relations require a system where democratic principles are provided for and maintained 
by both these sets of role players. 
 
In a liberal democratic setting, where the principle of ‘the governed should govern’ applies, civil-
military relations should reflect the principle of accountability. In this sense, democratic principles and 
structures are crucial to ensure accountability. Constitutionalism and the principle of the separation of 
powers allow for a democratic system where abuse of power is minimalised, including by the military. 
It also allows for structures such as parliament that enforces accountability of the military. There are, 
however, a number of conceptual and practical challenges to democratic civil-military relations. 
Extrapolated from these, several key aspects can be determined that will inform further analysis in 
this study: 
 
 While cooperative civil-military relations have become prominent, the principle of civil-
supremacy over the military remains.  
 Although the study will focus on the role of parliament in providing oversight of the military, 
this is but one element that underscores democratic civil-military relations (other being, inter 
alia, the executive, the judiciary, the constitution and civil society). Although not the study’s 
primary aim, it must be noted that its parliamentary focus places a limitation on the value of 
this study in terms of its analysis of civil-military relations in South Africa.  
 Any case study of democratic civil-military relations should remain sensitive to political context 
and, notably, democratic maturity. 
 Democratic institutions, adherence to democratic principles, and the maintenance of these by 
both the military and civilian role players are key to maintaining not only democracy, but also 
democratic civil-military relations. Within this context, state capacity can be a major concern. 
By analysing possible shortcomings in terms of state capacity (such as a lack of expertise, the 
lack of an optimally functioning parliament, and a disinterested civil society), the quality and 
standing of democracy and its impact on civil-military relations can be determined.  
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The next chapter conceptualises parliamentary oversight of the military. It provides an overview of 
tools available to parliaments to ensure efficiency in its oversight role of the military, notably the role 
of parliamentary committees. With clarity on parliamentary oversight established, an analysis of the 
application thereof is of value in order to determine international norms and best practice. For this 
purpose, parliamentary oversight of the military in the UK, Australia, Canada, India and Zambia is 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3  OUTLINING PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the context of modern liberal democracies, the functions of parliaments have largely shifted to 
oversight while the executive increasingly takes responsibility for drafting legislation (Blondel, 1972, p. 
126; Olson et al., 2008, pp. 201–202). As noted in the previous chapter, the focus on oversight links 
to the concepts of the separation of powers as well as representative democracy. It was further 
established that parliamentary oversight should, in principle, extend to oversight of the military given 
the contextual links to liberal democracy, pluralism and representative democracy. As Born (2003, p. 
7) notes, “[w]hen it comes to civilian supremacy and democratic governance, parliaments fulfil a 
crucial role. Due to parliamentary involvement and debates, civilian oversight becomes democratic 
oversight.” The increasingly acceptable requirement for parliaments to conduct oversight raises a 
number of questions. What exactly is oversight, what are the goals of oversight, how is oversight 
conducted by parliaments and what are the characteristics of ‘good’ oversight? For relevance to this 
study, these questions can be reformulated to review defence-specific oversight in Parliaments.  
 
Based on the established theoretical underpinnings that guide the concept of parliamentary oversight 
in liberal democracies, this chapter commences by outlining the broader concept of parliamentary 
oversight. It is necessary to define the concept of oversight and outline its aims to ensure an 
analytically valuable understanding thereof. Rockman (1984, p. 418) notes, “how much evidence 
there is of oversight as well as how one evaluates the quality of it is contingent on how oversight is 
defined.” The general principles of oversight can then be applied more specifically to parliamentary 
oversight of the military. However, the main challenge that remains is to identify characteristics of 
‘good’ oversight of the military. This chapter consults a number of international institutions and 
scholars to identify generally accepted tools for efficient oversight as well as key focus areas that 
parliaments should focus on to ensure improved oversight. The chapter expands on these tools and 
oversight focus areas by identifying possible further focus areas that may warrant attention in an effort 
to improve oversight. A number of potential weaknesses in oversight are also identified that may 
impact on the quality of defence oversight by parliaments. 
 
In addition to the identification of oversight tools, focus areas and potential weaknesses, the need 
remains to verify these. The chapter therefore identifies five comparable parliaments, namely those of 
the UK, Canada, Australia, Zambia and India, in which to review oversight of the military. The aim of 
reviewing oversight of the military in these countries is to determine which tools, focus areas and 
potential weaknesses play out across these parliaments. This broad review serves to verify or dismiss 
the selected oversight tools, focus areas and potential weaknesses.  
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2. Outlining parliamentary oversight 
 
Determining a general definition for oversight presents a challenge as it is highly dependent on the 
individual’s perception of oversight (Ogul, 1976, p. 6). Ogul (1976, p. 11) defines oversight as 
“behaviour by legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively, which results in an impact, 
intended or not, on bureaucratic behaviour.” A potential pitfall in this definition is that it only focuses 
on outcome-based oversight and fails to appreciate the finer, non-measurable, nuances thereof. In 
1990, Aberbach (Sharpe, 2013, p. 184) defined oversight as a “review after the fact, … [including] 
inquiries about policies that are or have been in effect, investigations of past administrative actions, 
and the calling of executive officers to account for their financial transactions.” This definition is 
narrow in the sense that it excludes all foresight that forms part of oversight. Pelizzo (in Olson et al., 
2008, p. 30), defines oversight as a “set of activities that a legislature performs to evaluate the 
implementation of policies.” This may also be considered a narrow interpretation of oversight and fails 
to adequately address the complexity of oversight focus areas. Many factors beyond policy 
implementation should ideally form part of oversight. The snapshot of definitions above, developed 
over the last few decades, highlight an ongoing lack of consensus among scholars on the definition of 
oversight (Madue, 2012; Ogul, 1976; Ogul & Rockman, 1990).  
 
Despite the absence of consensus on the definition of oversight, there seems to be broader 
consensus on the goals of oversight. In simple terms, Shija (2012, p. 5) notes that in most states, 
legal and other checks and balances are set to ensure that a state’s national resources are used to 
the benefit of all citizens and that parliamentary oversight is essential to effect this. This statement 
highlights an underlying goal of oversight, namely the need to ensure that citizens benefit from state 
activity. This observation on oversight is closely linked to the concept of representativeness. Given 
that legislators are representatives of the public, it follows naturally that oversight will aim to ensure 
the public interest (Madue, 2012, p. 433; Rockman, 1984, p. 415). MacMahonn developed four goals 
of oversight that continues to find relevance (Rockman, 1984, p. 415). First, oversight aims to limit 
deceitfulness and waste. Second, it aims to prevent callous administration. Third, it aims to measure 
compliance of the executive and its alignment with legislative objectives. Fourth, it aims to set 
administrative actions in line with the initial intention of legislation. The use of a similar set of goals by 
the IPU in a 2007 study on parliamentary oversight enhances the contemporary relevance of these 
oversight goals (Yamamoto, 2007, p. 9). Recognising these goals is an important step in determining 
the parameters of parliamentary oversight.  
 
The mentioned goals of oversight postulate a broad scope of activities and possible outcomes. It is 
therefore best to allow for a definition of oversight cognisant of such a broad scope. Ogul and 
Rockland (1990, p. 5) provide such a definition by stating that oversight refers to “legislative 
supervision and monitoring of the executive, whether overt or covert.” This broad definition allows for 
a linear timeline of oversight in that it can be performed ex ante and ex post. If oversight is conducted 
prior to policy implementation, it is considered ex ante while oversight after policy implementation is 
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considered ex post (Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 13). Ogul and Rockland’s definition also allows for an 
evaluation of oversight that is not only dependent on measurable results.30 The key point derived from 
the definitions and goals set out above is that oversight embodies the principle of the separation of 
powers and the system of checks and balances that accompanies it (Madue, 2012, p. 434). 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, oversight is rooted in theories of democracy and, by virtue of that 
connection, aims at ensuring accountability and transparency of the executive through the separation 
of powers. In the context of democracy, oversight is viewed as critical as it improves government 
programmes and, through ensuring transparency, increases the legitimacy of such programmes 
(Madue, 2012, pp. 433–435; Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 8). In a democratic context, oversight is further 
justified by the need to ‘rule the rulers’. Democracy strives to achieve popular control of the 
administrative branch of government, hence the focus on representative governance (Rockman, 
1984, p. 414). Parliamentary oversight further underpins numerous democratic values, including 
accountability and transparency, and plays an important part in cementing representative governance. 
In an entrenched democratic setting, the function of oversight can be performed by various institutions 
including, for example, parliaments, the office of the Auditor-General, ombudspersons, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO) and the media (Olson et al., 2008; Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 9). 
Parliamentary oversight thus represents only one means of oversight. It is, however, the link to 
representative governance and the tools at its disposal that sets parliamentary oversight apart.  
 
3. Parliamentary oversight of defence 
 
The section above highlighted the link between parliamentary oversight of the executive and the 
concept of representative governance. The question then arises whether a government’s defence 
portfolio should also be subjected to such oversight? Former French Prime Minister, Georges 
Clémenceau, claimed that “war is a much too serious matter to be entrusted to the military” (As 
quoted by Louw, 2013, p. v). This observation reflects the need for the public, through the 
representative democratic process, to have some degree of influence over military affairs (See 
Section 5, Chapter 2). Born (2003, p. 19) lists several concrete reasons for the need for parliamentary 
oversight over the military. First, for the principle of the separation of powers to hold, the military 
should be subject to some degree of parliamentary oversight as a means of curbing executive power. 
Second, parliaments play an important role in controlling a state’s budgetary affairs. Since the military 
is dependent on funding from the state, it follows that parliament should have influence over the 
budgetary allocation to the military. Third, parliaments are responsible for the legislative framework of 
the state and this also pertains to legislation relevant to the military.  
  
                                                          
30 A definition that focuses only on the measurable impact of oversight on the functioning of the executive (and 
governance) is severely limited by the difficulty in determining such impact. Pelizzo (Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 8) 
notes limited scholarly inquest into the impact of oversight. In a study on Parliamentary Oversight and 
Government Accountability, they were unable “to test whether and to what extent effective oversight affects the 
functioning of a political regime” (Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 9). 
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Parliamentary oversight of the military is also essential given the role it plays in maintaining healthy 
civil-military relations (See Chapter 2). Born (2003, p. 19) notes that parliamentary oversight ensures 
“a bridge to the public” as MPs are in contact with the population and can establish a contact point 
with the military. The establishment of this “bridge” is in line with Huntington’s (1957, pp. 83–84) 
notion of ‘objective control of the military’ that includes the distribution of power between civilian and 
military groupings. For example, parliaments conduct public hearings on defence matters that 
contribute to the building of a bridge between the military and the public (Aldis & Drent, 2008, pp. 44–
48; Hänggi, 2003, p. 16; le Roux et al., 2012). Parliaments thus play a central role in establishing 
democratic civil-military relations as they embody the principle of representative democracy and 
provide for popular accountability. It is therefore evident that the defence portfolio cannot fall outside 
the scope of parliamentary oversight in a democratic system. The maintenance of civil-military 
relations as a function of parliamentary oversight of the military is also indirectly confirmed by Betts 
(1997, pp. 7-9) in discussions on the need to maintain high levels of military expertise during times of 
peace. Such expertise ensures political, strategic and military logic in the defence budget and bridges 
the divide of declining expertise about the military among policymakers. Constant parliamentary 
oversight therefore presents a potential means of overcoming a growing gap between civil and 
military roleplayers.  
 
Given the relevance of parliamentary oversight of the military in a democratic setting, the question 
should then shift to how defence-specific oversight is conducted? The first chapter of this study 
referred to widely used tools of parliamentary oversight that forms the basis of the study. It is 
necessary to elaborate on these tools and contextualise it not only within the parliamentary setting, 
but in the context of oversight of the military.  
 
3.1 Finding common ground: Generally accepted tools for parliamentary oversight of 
defence 
 
Tools for parliamentary oversight seem to have found general consensus among scholars. Such tools 
include, most commonly, committee hearings; hearings in the plenary (chamber); commissions of 
inquiry (including ad hoc committees); parliamentary questions; question time (in the plenary); and, 
interpellations31 (Izah, 2013, p. 6; Olson et al., 2008, p. 10; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004, p. 4; 
Yamamoto, 2007, p. 11). The identification of these general parliamentary oversight tools provides for 
parameters within which to locate tools for parliamentary oversight of the military. Three reputable 
international institutions, the IPU, the DCAF and Transparency International embarked on research on 
parliamentary oversight of the military. When read together, these institutions identified five specific 
means (tools) of oversight and five specific focus areas of oversight that are key to oversight of the 
military. These tools and focus areas correlate with not only the generally accepted tools for oversight 
mentioned above, but also falls within the context of the general goals of oversight noted in Section 2.  
                                                          
31 Interpellations differ from normal parliamentary questions in that it relates strongly to a vote of no confidence. 
Whereas normal parliamentary questions require separate motions of a vote of no confidence, interpellations 
have, as an immediate subsequent step, a vote of no confidence (Döring, 1995, p. 199). 
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The five specific tools for parliamentary oversight of defence include: 
 
Parliamentary debates. Debates on defence and security can occur at plenary or committee level. 
The aim is to impact the plenary or committee’s collective decision on a specific aspect of defence 
governance. Such debates allow a unique opportunity for obtaining facts on military affairs from the 
executive or addressing defence-related aspects of major concern. It is usually characterised by a 
presentation from officials, policy statements, or other planning initiatives from the executive (Born, 
2003, p. 77; Yamamoto, 2007, p. 62). Debates, when done publicly, also enhance public interest in 
specific aspects of defence and security. 
 
Parliamentary questions. Questions from MPs to the executive can either be submitted orally or in 
written form. Its significance lies in the opportunity it affords individual members to raise military-
related concerns and receive timely responses. Given the public availability of responses, it also 
allows for public interest in defence matters (Born, 2003, p. 79; Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 49–59).  
 
Special defence inquiries. Inquiries refer mostly to the work of parliamentary committees and their 
individual or collective inquiry into defence governance. Special inquiries are generally open to the 
public and is characterised by in-depth engagement on specific defence-related aspects. During 
special inquiries, committees often engage expert opinions and may subpoena certain role players. 
Following the inquiry, a formal report is published. Defence inquiries of this nature can be done by 
parliamentary defence committees, multiple committees, subcommittees or ad hoc committees. In the 
case of the latter, special powers of inquiry can be allocated to committees (Born, 2003, p. 80; 
Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 39–42).  
 
Oversight visits and study tours. Oversight visits for defence-purposes relates to visits by MPs (often 
as a committee) to military units and/or operational deployment areas in an effort to familiarise 
themselves with matters at ground-level (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 43). Study tours, also mostly 
conducted at committee-level, often include foreign or local tours to study examples of policy 
implementation and sharing of best practice (Agnihotri, 2011, p. 7; Sisulu, 2012).  
 
The use of external audit. External audit may be outside the scope of parliaments, but can play an 
important role in effective oversight. Transparency International (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 10) notes 
that parliaments can assist in lowering the corruption risk by including external audit analysis in their 
oversight. Practically, this would include calling external auditors (or state auditors) to appear before 
parliamentary committees or requesting in-depth analysis from such auditors. 
 
The five tools highlighted above can be used individually or collectively to oversee the military. 
However, the IPU, DCAF and Transparency International also note five key focus areas of defence 
oversight that are necessary for comprehensive oversight: 
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Reviews of the defence budget. Budgetary review forms part of the broader need for accountability of 
public funds. Parliamentary oversight fulfils the dual function of ensuring financial accountability 
(preventing waste) and ensuring that finances are spent in such a way that the country is provided 
with a properly resourced military. Crucial to the execution of this form of oversight is the need for the 
executive to present parliament with sufficient budgetary information (Born, 2003, p. 131; Cover & 
Meran, 2013a, p. 28). The impact of parliaments on the budget varies from one parliament to the next. 
In some cases parliaments play a limited role in affecting the budget while in others they may even 
alter the executive’s planned budget. This is closely related to the historic ‘power of the purse’ 
function that first characterised parliaments. Budgetary oversights can take place ex ante or ex post. 
Olsen et al. (2008, pp. 53–55) note a debate regarding whether ex ante parliamentary oversight of the 
budget is appropriate as it may impact on fiscal discipline. Others argue that ex ante oversight is 
essential to ensure public interest in budgetary affairs. Regardless of the approach, budgetary 
reviews by parliaments represent one of the most important parliamentary functions in terms of 
oversight. 
 
Reviews of defence policy. Transparency International defines defence policy as “the laws, strategies, 
and approaches used by governments to decide on the scope and activities of the military and 
national security agencies” (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 40). Parliamentary committees, as an outflow 
of representative government, serve as a valuable platform for debate on defence policy. Through 
committee engagement, a ‘second viewing’ of defence policy outside the ambit of the executive takes 
place. Depending on the legislative powers of a committee, such defence policy may then be altered, 
repealed or accepted in full by parliament. Where the capacity exists, in-depth scrutiny of defence 
policy will take place. In addition, government officials, experts, other interested parties and even the 
general public can be called to provide further opinion to inform a committee’s policy review (Cover & 
Meran, 2013a, p. 40; Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 31–32). 
 
Reviews of defence procurement. Overseeing defence-related procurement is an essential 
component of parliamentary oversight as this is an area with an elevated risk of corruption and fraud 
(Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 52).32 The primary role for parliaments is to ensure transparency of 
defence procurement. Furthermore, it ensures a link between the actual procurement and broader 
defence planning, including defence policy and strategic plans. There is a further requirement for 
parliaments to ensure that arms procurements and transfers are in line with international requirements 
(Born, 2003, p. 162). Parliaments may also formalise the procurement cycle and ensure sufficient 
space for committees to have scrutiny of procurement. The use of external audit as a tool of oversight 
has particular relevance in this case (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 52; Yamamoto, 2007, p. 76). 
 
Reviews of human resources. Oversight of military human resources is closely related to the 
advancement of military professionalism. The aim would be to ensure that soldiers remain loyal to the 
                                                          
32 The realm of defence procurement also includes arms transfers (Born, 2003, p. 162).  
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state and constitution (where applicable) which inherently lessens the risk of coups and ensures 
healthy civil-military relations.33 Furthermore, oversight of human resources ensures fair treatment of 
military personnel and thus requires regular overview of the functionality of the military justice system. 
Military leaders should be held accountable for the treatment and conduct of Defence Forces (Born, 
2003, pp. 141–152). Oversight of human resources also includes oversight of the size of the military 
(although this factor can be viewed as part of oversight of defence policy) (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 
11). 
 
Reviews of the deployment of the military. Oversight of the deployment of the military is a contentious 
sector of oversight as it may obfuscate the separation of powers. The IPU and DCAF notes that the 
oversight capacity of military deployment varies between states. In some states, parliaments have the 
power to reverse or significantly impact decisions to deploy the armed forces while in other states it 
has no legal role to play in this regard. The IPU and DCAF notes that when parliaments have no role 
to play, it represents a significant limitation to oversight of the military (Born, 2003, pp. 119–120). In 
such cases, parliaments will, for example, not be able to determine whether external deployments 
align with the established foreign policy goals. In addition, this focus area includes oversight of the 
state of preparedness/readiness of the military. 
 
In addition to focus areas identified above, two more areas of parliamentary oversight of the military 
have been identified by Transparency International (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 6). These include 
oversight of secret budgets as well as intelligence structures. While acknowledging the need for 
oversight of these two focus areas, they fall outside the framework of this study. The military may 
have its own intelligence structures, but these normally report either to a parliament’s intelligence 
committees or to closed meetings of defence committees. A similar approach is likely to apply to 
secret budgets and projects. Beyond analysing whether a parliamentary capacity exists to analyse 
secret budgets and intelligence, no substantial analysis of these oversight areas can be done (except 
through classified studies).  
 
3.2 Elements of critique: Is there room for expansion of oversight focus areas in the 
defence context?  
 
The five tools and five focus areas noted by Transparency International, the IPU, and the DCAF (and 
to an extent by the World Bank) provide an authoritative base on which to build an analysis of 
parliamentary oversight of the military. However, it should be asked whether additional tools and 
focus areas, or modifications to existing tools and focus areas, may not assist in enhancing analysis 
of parliamentary oversight of the military? Literature reveals some additional aspects to consider.  
 
                                                          
33 This focus area correlates with Huntington’s focus on the rise of the professional officer that is able to 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate political roles for the military (see Huntington, 1957). 
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In its review of legislative oversight of defence around the world, Transparency International notes the 
key role of committees in overseeing defence budgets, defence policy and defence-related 
procurement (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 6). In its discussion on parliamentary oversight of the security 
sector, the IPU and DCAF emphasise similar focus areas for committees. It primarily highlights 
procurement, personnel, budgetary aspects and peace missions as areas of focus for committees 
(Born, 2003, p. 75). It further alludes to a focus on defence policy, legislation, expenditure (similar to 
budgetary aspects) and management of the military (referring to appointments of senior military 
leaders and general management) (Born, 2003, pp. 85–86). The World Bank, in its overview of tools 
for parliamentary oversight, notes that committees should focus on the military budget, long-term 
planning, gender issues, the implementation of laws and legislation (Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 19–28). All 
these identified focus areas are arguably contained in the major focus areas for oversight discussed 
in Section 3.1 of this chapter. What seems to be missing is a focus on ‘normal’ committee work that 
focuses on the general management of the military. The focus areas highlighted by the institutions 
above do not necessarily make adequate provision for general oversight, with the exception of the 
World Bank that highlights some lower-order oversight matters such as a focus on gender. To 
comprehensively view parliamentary oversight of the military, lower-order focus areas for committee 
oversight should also be considered.  
 
A number of lower-order focus areas that require continuous attention by parliamentary defence 
committees can be found in literature: 
 
Annual reports and quarterly reports. These reports are submitted on an annual/quarterly basis by the 
defence departments to parliaments for scrutiny. While these reports have a strong budgetary focus, 
they often include aspects related to non-financial performance and performance targets. If required, 
committees can request defence departments to report on a quarterly basis so that they can track 
performance throughout the year against annual performance plans. Annual reports in turn allows for 
a retrospective view of departmental performance and allows for parliament to review management of 
such performance areas. Annual reports also allow committees to review set departmental priorities 
(Louw, 2013, p. 66; N. Naidoo, 2012, pp. 31, 38–40). A 2004 study on the perceived importance of 
oversight confirms that although the actual value of annual reports vary among recipients thereof, it 
has become an increasingly valuable tool in ensuring accountability and, at the least, a significant 
source of information (Mack & Ryan, 2004).  
 
Aspects of interdepartmental cooperation. Government departments seldom operate in isolation and 
often require assistance from other departments or render such assistance themselves. 
Interdepartmental cooperation can also be essential to the achievement of broader government goals. 
Oversight is a valuable means of ensuring high levels of interdepartmental cooperation and of 
addressing areas where cooperation is lacking (Aldis & Drent, 2008, p. 36; Dlomo, 2004, p. 59).  
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Military training and education. Transparency International focuses on the need for oversight of the 
budget for training, but actual training outputs and finer details of training are not generally identified 
for oversight (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 33). The IPU and DCAF make reference to a need for 
parliamentary focus on military training, specifically in the context of training for peace missions (Born, 
2003, pp. 123–124). Parliamentary oversight should, however, also look at ongoing training and 
education within the military and identify concerns in this regard. Training and education is highlighted 
as an essential aspect of military culture and general security sector reform (Esterhuyse & Heinecken, 
2012, p. 2; Nathan, 2004, p. 2). 
 
Gender and racial equality. The World Bank urges parliamentary committees to focus on matters of 
gender equality and gender mainstreaming (Yamamoto, 2007, pp. 22–23). The IPU and DCAF also 
note the need for a gender perspective on security policy (Born, 2003, p. Chapter 7). In some cases, 
aspects such as racial and gender representation in the armed forces are lumped together in terms of 
an oversight requirement (Modise in le Roux et al., 2012, p. 46). While this lower-order focus area can 
be linked to an overall oversight focus on human resources, the regular reference to matters of 
gender and race in literature related to defence oversight highlights the need for specific attention. 
Focus on gender and race is also in line with Rebecca Shiff’s Concordance Theory that highlights the 
importance for military and political leadership as well as citizens to agree on, inter alia, the social 
composition of the officer corps. It can be argued that a representative officer corps in terms of race 
and gender may find broader and easier agreement than a corps consisting exclusively of a specific 
gender and/or racial group. 
 
Defence morale. Morale may also be considered a subsection of focus on human resources, but it is 
an essential area for lower-order oversight. Mucur-Marcu (2009, p. 99) notes, for example, the 
importance of the “development of realistic measures of performance and maintaining a high level of 
morale of the entire personnel” as essential to manpower management. The 1993 South African 
Interim Constitution made specific provision for parliamentary oversight of defence morale (RSA, 
1993). The DCAF also notes the value of, for example, Auditor-General Reports in assisting 
parliaments to evaluate defence morale (DCAF, 2010, p. 58). Oversight of this aspect is crucial to 
ensure that levels of morale are adequately addressed and regularly assessed. 
 
Defence infrastructure. The IPU and the DCAF make brief reference to oversight of defence 
infrastructure, but place focus on the budgetary aspects thereof (Born, 2003, p. 134,157). Countries 
such as the US has, in the past, established a Base Realignment and Closure Commission that 
conducts effectiveness reviews of defence infrastructure (Tagarev, 2010, p. 105). Similarly, South 
Africa has established an Interim National Defence Force Service Commission whose tasks include 
the evaluation of defence infrastructure (Louw, 2013, p. 68). Oversight of infrastructure can be linked 
to that of interdepartmental cooperation as other government departments are often responsible for 
the development and maintenance of defence infrastructure.  
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A further matter of clarification regarding the application of oversight tools should be noted. 
Parliamentary debates, questions, special defence inquiries, oversight visits, the use of external audit 
and lower-order oversight often take place at various locations within parliaments. Debates, for 
example, are conducted at plenary and committee level (Born, 2003, p. 77; Cover & Meran, 2013a). 
In turn, oversight visits and study tours are predominantly conducted by committees (Agnihotri, 2011, 
p. 6; N. Naidoo, 2012, p. 43). Parliamentary questions again fall outside both the parliamentary 
committee system and the plenary, except in cases of oral questioning or where ministers respond 
verbally to questions during a plenary (Pelizzo, Stapenhurst, & Olson, 2004, p. 43; Rozenberg et al., 
2011). The focus areas for oversight can similarly be addressed in various locations within a 
parliament, including committees, a multi-committee platform and the plenary. While noting that 
committees play the leading role in oversight as the ‘engine rooms’ of parliaments, a holistic approach 
is required when analysing oversight of the military, cognisant of all locations of oversight within 
parliament. In the development of its oversight tools, Transparency International, the IPU and DCAF 
clearly followed such a holistic approach. However, when studying the quality and standing of 
oversight of the military, it would be of value to treat the various ‘locations of oversight’ separately in 
an effort to ascertain the contributory value of each location.  
 
4. Weaknesses of oversight of the military 
 
Reasons for weak oversight can be multiple and vary among parliaments. Nonetheless, for an 
evaluative study on parliamentary oversight, general factors that may undermine effective oversight 
should be determined. The IPU and the DCAF (Born, 2003, pp. 71–76) provide four security-sector 
specific conditions for effective oversight including clearly defined legal powers, customary practices, 
resources and expertise, and political will. These conditions can be used as a broad framework to 
determine factors contributing to weak oversight.34 
 
Clearly defined constitutional and legal powers for oversight would be a natural assumption in a 
democratic setting that emphasises the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. 
However, security-related aspects are, in some countries, considered purely in the domain of the 
executive. Therefore, for effective oversight, constitutional and/or other legal requirements for 
executive accountability to parliament regarding defence matters are essential (Born, 2003, p. 71).  
 
Customary practices refer to oversight that falls outside the scope of legislated oversight 
requirements. It includes “parliamentary oversight backed by social norms” (Born, 2003, p. 74). While 
this aspect of oversight is difficult to measure, it can be argued that a democratic setting lends itself to 
increased levels of oversight as a social norm. For example, the World Bank found that countries with 
a higher level of democracy tend to utilise more oversight tools (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004, pp. 19–
                                                          
34 The conditions affecting oversight effectiveness in the security sector presented by the IPU and the DCAF 
correlates broadly with factors highlighted by Ogul and Aberbach in Rockman (1984, p. 425). Ogul and 
Aberbach’s factors include, in addition to that of the IPU and DCAF, a focus on committee relations with the 
agency (department), the roles of individuals on a committee, and the nature of the subject matter and its 
newsworthiness.   
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20). The availability of oversight tools to a parliament therefore serves as a logical starting point for 
reviewing factors that might contribute to weak oversight. A lack of utilisation of oversight tools is 
therefore a contributing factor to weak oversight. Furthermore, the optimal use of oversight tools, 
rather than its mere availability to parliaments, represents an additional measure of effectiveness.   
 
Resources and expertise has specific bearing on parliamentary committees. Committees are 
considered the ‘engine rooms’ of parliaments and their strength is imperative to prevent weak 
oversight. Yet, Malcolm (in Shaw, 1998, pp. 238-239) and Yamamoto (2007) caution that committees 
are not universally effective. Several factors can contribute to this. First, MPs are not necessarily 
content experts and may not possess the necessary knowledge of the defence sector to perform 
adequate oversight. As such, knowledgeable researchers or other forms of content advisors are 
necessary to prevent weak oversight (Born, 2003, pp. 74-75). Second, a lack of frequency in 
considering policy or current issue reports from government departments may contribute to weak 
oversight. While frequent engagement itself does not ensure quality oversight, regular engagements 
are nonetheless essential. In essence, oversight is both about quantity and quality (Corder et al., 
1999, p. 20; Rockman, 1984, pp. 418–419). Third, and linked to frequent engagement, Born (2003, 
pp. 73–74) refers to it as the “time factor.” This includes the need for timely briefs to parliaments on 
defence matters that allows for thorough engagement by MPs.  
 
Political will is a necessary parliamentary feature for the prevention of weak oversight. Although 
difficult to measure political will, the World Bank (Born, 2003, p. 76) notes three possible indicators of 
a lack of political will. First, due to party discipline, parliamentarians from the governing political party 
may be unwilling to effectively hold the executive to account (also see Power in Pelizzo et al., 2004, 
pp. 47–58). This is, for example, often reflected in “sweetheart questions” by MPs of the governing 
party that do not effectively scrutinise executive activity (Graham, 2013, p. 191; Nomdo, 2013, p. 4). 
Party discipline can also be linked to the notion of executive dominance. Executive dominance 
“describes governments that have the political and the legislative initiative, along with the resources, 
competence, information, and know-how, necessary to analyse pressing problems and formulate 
policies and solutions” (Olson et al., 2008, p. 118). In such cases, executive capacity often outweighs 
that of a parliament. Both the concepts of party discipline and executive dominance are undesirable in 
a democratic setting where the separation of powers aims to bring about a system of checks and 
balances. Second, a dearth of political will may be enhanced due to a lack of public interest in 
defence matters. In this sense, the inclusion of external role players such as NGOs, the media and 
other specialists with an interest in defence is essential. Committees, for example, can add to the 
effectiveness of oversight by inviting such interest groups to brief parliament on selected defence 
matters (Ogul & Rockman, 1990, p. 9; Pelizzo et al., 2004, p. 18). Third, parliamentary findings on 
defence may not be disclosed due to security considerations.   
 
Finally, in addition to the four security-sector specific conditions for effective oversight discussed 
above, literature on parliamentary oversight suggests that the impact of oversight should be 
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considered. Simply put, when oversight does not have impact on executive behaviour it can be 
considered as weak. However, the exact impact of oversight is difficult to measure and analyse. Ogul 
and Rockman (1990, p. 6) note that it is necessary to differentiate between formal and informal forms 
of oversight by parliament over the executive. Formal oversight refers to structured and open 
parliamentary oversight while informal oversight is often more subtle in nature and the effects thereof 
cannot be easily observed and/or analysed. One means of determining a committee’s commitment to 
oversight is to observe the follow-up on recommendations made by parliaments. In practical terms, 
this refers to follow-up debates by committees on recommendations made or requesting government 
officials to report on progress made (Agnihotri, 2011, p. 9; Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 44). Limited follow-
up on recommendations can thus be considered a clear indicator of weak oversight. 
 
The sections above provided a broad overview of the concept of oversight, the tools available to 
parliaments for effective oversight of the military, key focus areas for oversight, and several 
weaknesses that may impact negatively on oversight of the military. The following sections provide an 
overview of how these tools, focus areas and potential weaknesses in oversight of the military play 
out in selected countries.  
 
5. International comparison: Oversight of the military in selected countries  
 
Chapter 1 outlined the need for a comparative element to the study to assists in shaping the reality of 
parliamentary oversight of the military around the world. The rationale behind the selection of the 
Parliaments of the UK, Canada, Australia, Zambia and India as comparative cases was also provided, 
mainly due to them being based on Westminster systems comparable to South Africa’s Parliament. 
Given the demarcation of the study as a holistic case study, the comparative element presented here 
does not represent an exhaustive in-depth study of oversight of the military in the selected countries. 
Rather, the aim is merely to determine which tools and focus areas are utilised in these parliaments 
as per the findings in the previous sections and according to international rankings where available. 
Potential weaknesses of oversight are also highlighted.  
 
The cases selected present an array of democracies, ranging from established democracies to 
relatively new democracies, all with similar parliamentary systems. The countries selected reflect 
various levels of democratic maturity, with some rated stronger democracies than others (Freedom 
House, 2015a; Kekic, 2007). The selected countries also reflect various levels of success in the 
utilisation of parliamentary oversight tools and oversight of defence-related focus areas, as per 
existing studies (Cover & Meran, 2013b; Olson et al., 2008; Yamamoto, 2007). The section 
commences with an overview of the UK Parliamentary oversight of the military, which is discussed in 
a somewhat more comprehensive manner than the other cases. The reason for this is twofold. The 
UK represents a generally accepted good case study for oversight of the military (to be discussed). It 
also allows for the section to commence with a thorough practical application of the identified tools 
and focus areas for oversight. In the following sections, each case was analysed over the period of 
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one complete parliamentary period between two elections (normally a four to five year period). The 
selection of the parliamentary periods for review was based on availability of data and a desire the 
intention more recent data comparable to later developments around South Arica’s Fourth Parliament. 
A comparative summary of the findings is presented in Addendum A to the study that can be read in 
conjunction with the sections below.  
 
5.1 Parliamentary oversight of the military in the United Kingdom Parliament 
 
Oversight of the military in the UK Parliament plays out both in the plenary and at committee level. 
The Common’s Select Committee on Defence is primarily responsible for examining “expenditure, 
administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies” (UK Parliament, 
n.d.). The UK Parliament achieves high levels of general oversight of the military according to the 
DCAF, IPU and World Bank (to be discussed) (Born, 2003; Olson et al., 2008; Yamamoto, 2007). 
These ratings should thus reflect an elevated use of oversight tools, coverage of various focus areas 
including lower-order oversight, and limited weaknesses in the oversight process.  
 
5.1.1 Oversight tools utilised in the UK Parliament 
 
The tools identified as crucial to effective oversight are widely available and utilised in the UK 
Parliament. Debates on defence matters are common in the UK Parliament, both at plenary and 
committee level, notably in the House of Commons. In the plenary, debates stem from oral questions 
and answers, written statements and petitions. Between 2010 and 2015, for example, major plenary 
debates included the Strategic Defence and Security Review, spending priorities of the military, 
defence and cyber-security, defence equipment and support as well as defence acquisition, etc. 
(House of Commons, 2016). Committee work further results in (informs) plenary debates, as is often 
the case with debates on defence expenditure where the committees analyse expenditure and 
produce reports that are tabled and debated in the plenary (see for example House of Commons, 
2015). Committee engagement on defence is also frequent. Between 2010 and 2015, the Select 
Committee on Defence held a total of 198 meeting on various defence-related matters (White, 2015, 
p. 9).  
 
Parliamentary questions as an oversight tool is widely used in the UK Parliament. In terms of oral 
questions, Rozenberg et al. (2011, p. 342) ascribe the utilisation of the tool to the “greater time 
devoted to that procedure – one hour a day for four days of the week, representing about 8% of the 
sitting time of the House.” They note, for example, that between 2004 and 2005, 897 oral questions 
were put the Ministry of Defence (Rozenberg et al., 2011, p. 343). Written questions to the Ministry of 
Defence reflect even higher levels than oral questions. Between 4 June 2014 and 30 June 2015, for 
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example, 2 567 written questions were answered by the Ministry of Defence while 3 048 written 
questions were answered between June 2015 and June 2016.35 36  
 
Special defence inquiries as an oversight tool in the UK Parliament are frequently used. These 
inquiries are carried out by the Select Committee on Defence on a variety of aspects and “results of 
these inquiries are public and many require a response from the Government” (House of Commons 
Defence Committee, 2016b). In the 2015/16 financial year, for example, the Select Committee on 
Defence announced four special inquiries, dealing with matters including military exercises and 
defence expenditure (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2016b). 
 
Oversight visits are often conducted by the Select Committee on Defence. The Committee seems to 
place focus on visiting British military missions abroad. For example, on 24 November 2009, the 
Committee resolved to visit British Forces in the Falkland Islands. On 13 July 2010, the Committee 
resolved to visit Afghanistan to assist MPs with an inquiry into British military operations in that 
country (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010). On 16 February 2011, the committee 
resolved to visit the United States as part of the inquiry into the war in Afghanistan (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2012). Domestic oversight visits are also conducted. On 18 June 
2013, a resolution to visit the Royal Air Force in Waddington for discussion on the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review was made. On 5 November 2013, a resolution was taken to visit the National 
Army Recruitment Centre in Uphaven. The Committee further provides individuals with the power of 
representation to conduct domestic and international oversight visits. For example, on 8 April 2014, 
the Committee resolved that two members visit the Fleet Diving Squadron at Havant as 
representatives of the Committee. On 4 June 2013, it was resolved that the chairperson and one 
member visit France to attend the Summer Defence University (House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2014b). A brief review of oversight visits between 2010 and 2014 reveals significant focus 
on operational matters. While international visits are conducted, study tours on best practice to other 
countries are limited. 
 
In terms of the utilisation of external audit, the UK National Audit Office (NAO) completes auditing of 
all government departments and reports to the House of Commons’ Committee on Public Accounts 
(Born, 2003, pp. 139–140). In 2015, for example, the NAO completed eight independent reports on 
defence-related aspects including, inter alia, defence acquisition, defence equipment as well as 
strategic financial management in the Ministry of Defence. In 2014, five such reports were compiled. 
Importantly, the NAO also includes an annual audit report of the Ministry of Defence’s accounts and 
provides an audit opinion (National Audit Office, 2016). Information compiled by the NAO is 
extensively used in Parliament. Minutes from the Public Accounts Committee’s 2014/15 engagements 
revealed several inquiries on defence matters based on the work of the NAO. This includes a 
                                                          
35 Information based on the UK House of Commons search function on written questions available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-questions-answers/ 
36 To align information of the House of Commons and its Select Committee on Defence, written questions by 
Members of the House of Lords to the Ministry of Defence have been excluded. 
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resolution to inquire on the Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report and Equipment Plan as well as 
the need for reforming defence acquisition (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 
2015). 
 
5.1.2 Focus areas of defence oversight in the UK Parliament 
 
Given the regular use of a wide range of tools, it is not surprising that the UK Parliament covers a 
range of focus areas of oversight. Defence budgets are debated frequently, both ex post and ex ante. 
In its 2013 study, Transparency International allocated the UK parliament a score of 83/100 in terms 
of its defence budgetary oversight. This score reflects “a defence committee with strong powers of 
scrutiny over the defence budget, and is independent and adequately resourced… [it also has]… the 
facility for robust parliamentary scrutiny of the defence budget’s internal audit procedures and 
outcomes” (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 29). Engagement on defence budgetary matters is reflected in, 
for example, the Defence Committee’s April 2016 Report on Defence Expenditure. This holistic 
overview focused not only on medium term expenditure, but also on long term planning and called for 
the allocation of at least 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards defence (House 
of Commons Defence Committee, 2016d). Furthermore, as noted, the NAO’s engagement with the 
Committee on Public Accounts adds value in terms of analysing defence expenditure and ensuring 
value for money spent. 
 
Engagement on defence policy can be considered a strong point for the UK Parliament, largely due to 
a strong committee that has the power to “veto, amend and approve proposals, including arms 
exports” (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 41). Policy matters are regularly and thoroughly discussed, 
notably by the Select Committee on Defence. For example, in July 2012, the British Armed Forces 
introduced the Future Army 2020 policy document with the aim of reorganising the Army. The 
Committee held several engagements with the Ministry of Defence and independent experts on this 
policy document between 2012 and 2014. Four evidence sessions were held and 13 pieces of written 
evidence were received while oversight visits by the Committee were also conducted. A forum was 
set up that received 494 comments from at least 171 contributors. On 9 January 2014, the Committee 
released an official report with findings to government (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
2014a, pp. 14–15). In addition, the NAO compiled a report on the Army 2020 vision that was 
published and made available to Parliament (National Audit Office, 2014). Given the thorough 
engagement on such policy matters, it is unsurprising that Transparency International notes the UK 
Parliament as a good practice case study and allocates it a score of 95/100 in terms of oversight of 
defence policy (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 41). 
 
Oversight of defence procurement is an area in which the UK Parliament has made significant 
advances. During the 1990s, Parliament received widespread criticism for its apparent failure to 
provide effective oversight over what was known as the Al-Yamamah procurement contract (Cover & 
Meran, 2013a, p. 42; Tagarev, 2010, p. 288). However, by 2013, Transparency International allocated 
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the UK Parliament a 95/100 score in terms of oversight of defence procurement. This score is strongly 
related to a higher level of legislation covering defence procurement and transparent procurement 
oversight processes (Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 53). Furthermore, approval by Parliament’s Select 
Committee on Defence is required for defence procurement of significant value (Toornstra, 2013, p. 
31). The Committee also engages regularly on matters of acquisition and publishes reports 
demanding government responses when needed. For example, the Committee’s Seventh Report for 
2013 focused on re-evaluating acquisition principles and the acquisition process (House of Commons 
Defence Committee, 2013b).   
 
Oversight of human resources, specifically in terms of the size of the military, often overlaps with the 
focus area of defence policy. This overlap was evident in the UK Parliament’s handling of the Future 
Army 2020 Report noted earlier. Other personnel issues discussed at committee level related to the 
fair treatment of members of the armed forces. For example, the 12th Report of 2014 dealt with the 
Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations. The Fourth Report of 2013 
also considered the education of children of members of the armed forces (House of Commons 
Defence Committee, n.d.). 
 
The UK Parliament is not required by law to approve the foreign deployment of the military (Toornstra, 
2013, p. 30). However, the constitutional imperatives in the UK are moulded over time and this 
convention has been increasingly challenged. The participation of the UK armed forces in the 2003 
war in Iraq was a turning point that brought about gradual change in Parliament’s oversight of military 
deployments. Parliament gained increasing input and by 2011 it became widely accepted through 
convention that the institution has a significant role to play in controlling deployments (Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, 2013). This was formalised in two documents. First, in 2011, the 
Cabinet Manual noted that Parliament would have the opportunity to debate the deployment of 
military forces, prior to doing so, except in the event of an emergency (Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, 2013). Second, by July 2013, the House of Lords’ Constitutional Committee noted 
that “save in exceptional circumstances, the House of Commons is given the opportunity to debate 
and vote on the deployment of armed forces overseas” (Lagasse, 2013). In August 2013, the 
convention was tested and confirmed as UK Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, brought a 
potential deployment before Parliament. The potential deployment of the UK military to Syria was 
rejected through a vote in the House of Commons (Watt & Hopkins, 2013).  
 
5.1.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight in the UK Parliament 
 
Lower-order focus areas for oversight of the military were added to this study as a potential expansion 
in an effort to broaden the criteria for determining the quality and standing of parliamentary oversight 
of the military. In order to review oversight of lower-order focus areas in the UK Parliament, activities 
of the Select Committee on Defence over a period of five years, from 2010 to 2015, were selected. 
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This allows a view of these lower-order focus areas in the UK Parliament over a full parliamentary 
term, which will assist in determining the relevance of such focus areas. 
 
For the period under review, annual reports of the Defence Department were considered every year 
by the Select Committee. In addition, the Committee produced its own report following deliberations 
on the Departments’ annual reports. These committee reports included findings on both departmental 
expenditure and performance (House of Commons Defence Committee, n.d.). Formal minutes of the 
committee, however, do not reveal any consideration of departmental expenditure and performance 
on a quarterly basis. Only quarterly reports on arms exports were considered by the Committee 
(House of Commons Defence Committee, 2016c).37 
 
Interdepartmental cooperation did not often serve as a stipulated item for discussion of the Select 
Committee on Defence during the period under review. However, during meetings on defence matters 
that may involve other state departments, the Committee often invited evidence from such 
departments. For example, during engagements on the education of children of service personnel, 
evidence was received from the Department of Education (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
2012). Furthermore, in its Report on the Future Army Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Defence, the 
Committee noted that “[t]he smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020 needs to be innovative in the 
ways it works with the other Services. We call on the [Ministry of Defence] to set out in its response to 
our Report how Army 2020 will improve this joint working and how it has tested, or intends to test, the 
proposals” (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2014a, p. 6). The latter pronouncement by the 
Committee highlights the fact that interdepartmental cooperation between the Defence Department 
and other government departments are considered as important at parliamentary level.    
 
Military training and education received sporadic attention in the Select Committee on Defence. 
Between 2010 and 2015, the education of military personnel received some focus, as is evident in a 
Committee meeting on 16 April 2013 where oral evidence on the matter was received (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2013a, p. 33). The Committee also produced a formal report on 
military education in July 2013 (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2013c). Discussions on 
military training were limited at Committee level, but did feature in plenary debates of the House of 
Commons. These were related to, for example, training of the UK armed forces domestically and 
internationally as well as aspects related to training of new recruits and technical training equipment 
(House of Commons, 2010, 2011, 2014). 
 
Discussions on gender and racial equality in a defence context did not feature during the period under 
review. In June 2013, an inquiry was launched by the House of Commons Business, Innovation and 
Skills Committee (2013) on Women in the Workplace. However, no specific reference was made to 
aspects of gender equality in a defence context. Debates in the House of Commons regarding gender 
                                                          
37 This study does not include a focus on oversight of arms exports. Although this is generally conducted by the 
defence committee of a parliament, it does not fall under the realm of oversight of the military as arms exports are 
generally managed by other departments, state-owned enterprises or entities. 
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in the military did arise, although limited. For example, a debate on 3 February 2014 looked 
specifically at the proportion of women in senior military positions (House of Commons, 2014).   
 
Defence morale as a specific concept does not appear in the Select Committee on Defence’s formal 
minutes for the period under review (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2016c). However, 
defence morale did emerge as a feature during some debates in the House of Commons. For 
example, a debate on 26 June 2012 on Defence Reform saw several MPs refer to concerns around 
deteriorating morale in the UKs armed forces (House of Commons, 2012).  
 
Defence infrastructure was discussed occasionally by the Select Committee on Defence. For 
example, on 7 February 2012, the Committee dealt with ‘The Armed Forces Covenant in Action Part 
2: Accommodation’ that included evidence from the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2012). Similarly, on 18 June 2014, the Committee considered aspects 
related to the maintenance of strategic roads infrastructure (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
2015a). Debates in the House of Commons also included aspects related to military infrastructure, 
although it was on a limited scale. One of the most significant debates in this regard took place on 5 
March 2013 and related to the Army Basing Plan (House of Commons, 2013). 
 
5.1.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military in the UK 
Parliament 
 
The UK does not have a set constitution. Rather, the ‘constitution’ comprises sets of treaties, court 
judgments and parliamentary constitutional conventions. Of importance to this study is the convention 
that parliament is the ultimate sovereign authority, thus providing a basis for constitutional and legal 
powers determining oversight. The UK adheres to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which 
means "that Parliament ... has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament” (Dicey in Lijphart, 1999, p. 19). In the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty then lie the ‘legal’ powers for parliament to conduct oversight. These 
powers have also been confirmed through customary developments in parliament since the fourteenth 
century, notably the development of the committee system. The powers of oversight by parliament 
was also confirmed by, for instance, the 1918 Haldane Report that noted the need for committees to 
align with the executive’s departments to ensure effective checks on power (Haldane of Cloan et al., 
1918). Similarly, in June 1979, a review of the parliamentary committee system saw the establishment 
of Select Committees to “scrutinise the expenditure, administration and policy of government 
departments” (Maer, Gay, & Kelly, 2009, p. 1).  
 
Customary practices in terms of oversight refer to the availability and usage of oversight tools in 
parliament. It was already established that the five most significant tools for oversight of the military 
are not only available, but also extensively utilised by the UK Parliament (See Section 5.1). The UK is 
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also characterised by higher levels of democracy, and democratic principles are well entrenched as a 
social norm. Consistency in elevated levels of democracy is reflected in, for example, the UK’s high 
score in the Economists’ Index for Democracy (Kekic, 2007, p. 3) and the Freedom House’s Report 
on Global Freedom (Freedom House, 2015a, p. 3).38 
 
The Select Committee on Defence seems to receive significant support in terms of resources and 
expertise. The Committee has at least ten support staff, including five committee specialists (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2016a). In addition, some Committee Reports reveal the extensive 
use of external specialist advisors to assist the committee with input on specific military matters 
(House of Commons Defence Committee, 2014a, p. 15; 2015b, p. 3).  
 
Political will, in general, is difficult to determine and the case of the UK is no different. There are, 
however, positive indicators. Executive dominance is arguably limited through adherence to the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy (as discussed earlier). The fear that executive capacity will 
outweigh that of parliament is limited through the appointment of a number of specialists to support 
parliament on defence-related matters and the additional utilisation of external advisors. This also 
includes engagements with NGOs and other interest groups which ensure public interest and input 
into the work of the Committee. A 2016 Report on Defence expenditure did, for example, receive 
written evidence from at least ten interest groups, including academics, public campaigns and 
government departments (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2016d). In addition, engagement 
with the public regarding the work of the committee can be considered effective due to the wealth of 
information available on the House of Common’s website and the release of occasional press 
statements by the Committee.39  
 
Following-up on parliamentary recommendations is an essential part of ensuring the impact of 
oversight. The UK Parliament presents a highly structured system that ensures re-engagement with 
the executive following parliamentary scrutiny. Following a committee inquiry, “[t]he Government will 
normally make a response to a select committee report, either publishing it itself (as a Command 
Paper) or sending a memorandum to the committee, which can be published as a special report… 
although the committee can publish the response with further comments or take further evidence” (UK 
Parliament, n.d). The executive in the UK normally undertakes to such a response within two months 
of the release of a committee report. This protocol is generally adhered to in the case of the Select 
Committee on Defence where numerous reports are published and official responses from the 
executive captured. For example, in 2014/15 the executive provided responses to eight of the 11 
                                                          
38 The Economist’ criteria was selected for reference here as it ranks nations according to criteria closely related 
to the definitions of democracy offered in this study (A competitive, multiparty political system; Universal adult 
suffrage; Regularly contested elections; and, significant public access of major political parties to the electorate 
through the media and through generally open campaigning). The inclusion of the Freedom House index was 
prompted for the link between freedom and democracy, the need to have a more recent review of the levels of 
democracy globally, and the fact that this index also informed the World Bank (Pelizzo et al., 2006) study on 
parliamentary oversight which is used in this study. Read together, these scores ought to provide a broad yet 
accurate indication of the level of democracy in a country. 
39 Press statements mostly refer to the release of Committee Reports to the public. However, such statements 
are not formally categorised on the UK Parliaments website after 2010. 
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official Committee Reports (House of Commons Defence Committee, n.d.). The three reports that did 
not receive responses were of an interdepartmental nature or dealt with arms control which is, as a 
norm, not responded to in report format.   
 
5.2 Parliamentary oversight of the military in Canada 
 
The Canadian Parliament represents another Westminster styled parliament within a well-established 
democracy. The Canadian Parliament is widely credited for its extensive use of oversight tools. 
Furthermore, it is noted by Transparency International as having high levels of oversight of defence 
expenditure (Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011a, p. 26; Olson et al., 2008, p. 15).40 It would therefore be of 
value to review the Parliament’s oversight of the military to determine whether the extensive use of 
oversight tools results in sufficient coverage of the focus areas of defence oversight and lower-order 
focus areas. Jointly, the work of the Senate’s Standing Committee on National Security and Defence 
as well as the House of Common’s Standing Committee on National Defence is of specific 
importance. 
 
5.2.1 Oversight tools utilised in the Canadian Parliament 
 
Studies by the World Bank (Olson et al., 2008, p. 10) and by the Canadian Institute for Research on 
Public Policy (Bland & Rempel, 2004) note the extensive use of oversight tools in the Canadian 
Parliament. Parliamentary debates occur regularly both at plenary and committee level. For example, 
the Standing Committee on National Defence held 150 meetings during Canada’s 41st Parliament 
(2011 to 2015). The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence held 80 meetings over the 
same period (Parliament of Canada, 2016d, 2016e). A review of the Hansard of the House of 
Commons over this period also reveal regular debates on defence matters based on parliamentary 
questions, committee reports and other dedicated defence-debates (Parliament of Canada, 2017). 
Several debates in the Senate were also held over this period including, for example, debates on the 
purchasing of fighter aircraft. Parliamentary questions, both oral and written, are used in the Senate 
and House of Commons, but to a limited extent. Oral questions and answers are limited to 35 
seconds each, thus impacting on the depth thereof (Bland & Rempel, 2004, p. 19). In the Senate, oral 
question sessions are limited to 30 minutes during a sitting while the House of Commons allocates 45 
minutes for this purpose (IPU, 2013a, 2013b). In the 41st Parliament, only 55 written questions were 
posed to the Minister of Defence by MPs from the House of Commons (Parliament of Canada, 2013). 
The written questions for the Senate during the 41st Parliament are not available in electronic format. 
However, a review of the Order Papers reveals that despite several motions related to defence being 
introduced, written questions in the Senate were very limited.  
 
                                                          
40 Canada is not ranked in terms of its overall defence oversight by the IPU, Transparency International or the 
World Bank. However, regular reference in other literature to its high standards of broad oversight warrants 
inclusion in this study. 
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Special defence inquiries are regularly conducted, either initiated by the committees themselves or by 
order from the Houses of Parliament. In the 41st Parliament, the Senate’s National Security and 
Defence Committee conducted 17 in-depth studies (excluding legislative studies) while the House of 
Commons’ Standing Committee on National Defence conducted 16 such studies (excluding legislative 
and budgetary studies) (Parliament of Canada, 2016a, 2016g). Domestic and international oversight 
visits and study tours are available as oversight tools to committees. For example, a review of 
committee expenses of the National Security and Defence Committee during the 41st Parliament 
reveals two external tour to the United States and at least eight oversight visits to various defence 
institutions as part of in-depth studies. (Parliament of Canada, 2016b). A review of meetings of the 
Standing Committee on National Defence reveals no oversight visits or study tours during the 41st 
Parliament. Finally, external audit is used extensively by the Canadian Parliament. The regular 
reporting by the Auditor-General of Canada to Parliament should be noted. For example, between 
2011 and 2015, the office of the Auditor-General submitted at least seven reports on various defence-
related matters to Parliament (Auditor-General of Canada, 2016). 
 
5.2.2 Focus areas of defence oversight in the Canadian Parliament 
 
The defence budget receives regular scrutiny by the Canadian Parliament, notably the Standing 
Committee on National Defence that reviews expenditure at more than one occasion per year. These 
reviews ensure the evaluation of the budget both ex post and ex ante. The Auditor-General also 
prepares reports on defence expenditure for Parliament (Auditor-General of Canada, 2016; 
Parliament of Canada, 2016e). However, Bland and Rempel (2004, pp. 25–27) have in the past 
questioned the effectiveness of expenditure oversight and claims that estimates are not reviewed in 
detail. This tendency continues to be reflected in, for example, a review of the meetings of the 
Standing Committee on National Defence that reveals relatively short meetings on defence 
expenditure (Parliament of Canada, 2016e). A similar trend unfolds in terms of defence policy 
oversight. For example, in the 41st Parliament, the Standing Committee on National Defence 
published a number of reports discussing policy matters such as Defence in North America and 
Canada’s Role in International Defence Cooperation (Parliament of Canada, 2016f). However, Bland 
and Rempel (2004, p. 21) note that “neither the Commons committee nor the Senate reports have 
ever been particularly successful in decisively influencing the government’s defence policy. Defence 
policy is ultimately made not by Parliament.” Lagasse (2010, p. 20,24) states that direct parliamentary 
involvement in the setting of defence policy should be addressed cautiously as there are negative 
effects to consider but that other efforts, such as enhancing the committees’ support staff, should 
rather be considered to strengthen oversight of defence policy in Canada. 
 
Between 2009 and 2015, the Auditor-General of Canada produced four reports dealing with defence 
procurement which were submitted to Parliament. The Standing Committee on National Defence did 
arrange meetings related to some of these procurement aspects (such as fighter jet and helicopter 
procurement), but neither this Committee nor the Senate Committee produced reports related to the 
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work of the Auditor-General (Parliament of Canada, 2016d, 2016e). In contrast, matters related to 
human resources are regularly reviewed, notably by the Standing Committee on National Defence. A 
review of meetings during the 41st Parliament reveal engagement on the welfare of the Canadian 
Armed Forces and a number of related human-resources discussions such as the care of injured 
soldiers and sexual assault in the military (Parliament of Canada, 2016d, 2016e).  
 
Defence deployments in Canada remain the prerogative of the executive as per the National Defence 
Act of 1985. Nonetheless, a long tradition of the executive consulting the House of Commons on 
foreign defence deployments exists despite a lack of legal requirements. Lagasse (2013) states that 
“the executive is left with a considerable degree of discretion over how and when the armed forces 
are deployed, as well as how and when parliamentarians can express their views on the decision to 
deploy.” Therefore, parliamentary votes on external defence deployments are rather a show of 
support than an executive decision and have no obligatory impact on the decision of the executive. 
There are signs, though, that the Canadian Parliaments’ impact is increasing. In 2008, the Parliament 
moved that the government of Canada notify the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that 
Canada will end its presence in the Kandahar Province of Afghanistan as of July 2011 (Parliament of 
Canada, 2008). The executive ultimately adhered to this date. 
 
5.2.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight in the Canadian Parliament 
 
Both the defence committees of the House of Commons and Senate address matters of annual and 
quarterly performance. In the 41st Parliament, for example, committee minutes reveal a focus on 
aspects such as the armed forces’ performance in external missions and the implementation of 
defence policies (Parliament of Canada, 2016d, 2016e). Furthermore, the Canadian Parliament notes 
the requirement for the Minster of Defence to table an Annual Report within three months after the 
end of the financial year (Parliament of Canada, 2016a). Canada’s Financial Administration Act 
(Section 65) was amended in 2009 to make provision for quarterly financial reports to be submitted to 
Parliament. The latter does not include quarterly performance, but only financial expenditure. Aspects 
of inter-departmental cooperation do not receive any specific attention by the Standing Committee on 
National Defence. Rather, the Senate’s National Security and Defence Committee has an overarching 
mandate, often dealing with various departments that operate in the realm of national security such as 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Parliament of Canada, 2016d).  
 
Although no dedicated meetings were held by either of the defence committees on military training in 
the 41st Parliament, it did receive attention during meetings on defence expenditure (Parliament of 
Canada, 2016e). The National Security and Defence Committee also focused on training in its in-
depth studies on Canada’s national security and defence policies, circumstances and capabilities 
during the 41st Parliament (Parliament of Canada, 2016d). Matters of gender equality received limited 
attention in the 41st Parliament. The Standing Committee on National Defence, in a meeting on 17 
June 2015, heard evidence on gender inequality, but this was rather in the context of sexual 
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harassment (Parliament of Canada, 2016e). A similar view of discussions on defence morale 
emerges where it is discussed as part of other meetings, but not addressed as a stand-alone aspect. 
No meetings and/or reports dealing specifically with the state of defence infrastructure are reflected in 
an overview of activities of the defence committees in the 41st Parliament. However, spending on 
infrastructure did emerge as part of meetings on the Departments expenditure estimates (Parliament 
of Canada, 2016d, 2016e). In 2012, the Auditor-General of Canada also submitted a report to 
Parliament on Real Property in the defence environment, but this was not discussed by either of the 
committees. 
 
5.2.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military in the Canadian 
Parliament 
 
Section VI of the Canadian Constitution deals extensively with the powers of Parliament, including the 
institution’s right to legislate over defence affairs (Union of Canada, 1867). Set constitutional 
provisions for parliamentary oversight of the military are therefore in place. Furthermore, oversight 
tools are readily available and utilised by the Canadian Parliament and form part of an entrenched 
democratic system, thus reflecting democratic customary practices. Customary practices are 
underpinned by Canada’s maintenance of consistently high levels of democracy and democratic 
principles/practices. This is reflected in high ratings by the Economists’ Index for Democracy (Kekic, 
2007, p. 3) and the Freedom House’s Report on Global Freedom (Freedom House, 2015a, p. 20). 
Despite these achievements, the political will to execute oversight of the military in the Canadian 
Parliament has been questioned in the past. Bland and Rempel (2004, pp. 19–20) argue that 
competition between political parties often impacts negatively on cooperation, which weakens 
oversight. This view is, however, disputed by Lagasse (2010, p. 13) who notes that “[t]he partisan 
adversarial system evolved to guarantee that the government is vigorously held to account.” To 
balance these views, a potential weakness was corrected in 2002 that saw the shift from the Prime 
Minister appointing chairpersons of parliamentary committees to them being nominally elected. Bland 
and Rempel (2004, pp. 20–21) note, however, that this is unlikely to stop chairpersons (and other 
members) from toeing the party line that impacts negatively on broader oversight. They further argue 
that committees cannot reach their full potential and that there is a need to “reduce partisanship and 
party discipline in committee deliberations and recommendations; emphasize the importance of 
examining the annual estimates in detail; increase the experience and knowledge of committee 
members” (Bland & Rempel, 2004, p. 3). The criticism above correlates strongly with signs of 
executive dominance.  
 
Research support to Canadian MPs are provided by the Parliamentary Library (Parliament of Canada, 
2016c). Assistance to the Defence Committees is provided on an ad hoc basis and lack regularity. 
Bland and Rempel (2004, p. 25) as well as Lagasse (2010, p. 19) highlight this as an institutional 
shortfall, noting that defence committees receive limited research capacity and that not all 
researchers are defence experts. Minutes from meetings do, however, reflect a higher utilisation of 
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external defence experts to brief both defence committees. In terms of follow-up on parliamentary 
recommendations to parliamentary oversight of the military, there seems to be limited success. For 
example, the Senate’s National Security and Defence Committee produced eight substantive reports 
(excluding legislative reports) during the 41st Parliament to which four government responses are 
noted in that period (Parliament of Canada, 2016b). The Standing Committee on National Defence, in 
turn, produced 19 reports to which three government responses are noted (Parliament of Canada, 
2016f). In some cases, such as the Committee’s Report on the Defence of North America, the 
Committee made clear recommendations with no official government response noted in relation to the 
report. Therefore, scope for improvement of follow-up arguably exists. 
 
5.3 Parliamentary oversight of the military in Australia 
 
Oversight of the military by the Australian Parliament is highly rated on its efficiency and impact. 
Transparency International, for example, considers Australia (along with Germany) to have the lowest 
corruption risk in the defence sector due to, in part, the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of the 
security sector (Cover & Meran, 2013a, pp. 7–9). A 2011 study by Transparency International also 
found it to have among the world’s most transparent defence budgets (Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011a, 
p. 26). Given this acclaim, it would be expected that the Australian Parliament utilises a high number 
of oversight tools and covers a wide array of defence-related focus areas. 
 
5.3.1 Oversight tools utilised in the Australian Parliament 
 
Defence in the Australian Parliament receives significant attention, notably from the Senate’s 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade as well as the Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Parliamentary debates occur regularly within these committees 
as well as at plenary level. During plenaries, debates are often based on the introduction of committee 
reports while written and oral questions also prompt defence-related debates. Committee meetings 
occur regularly. For example, during the 43rd Parliament (September 2010 to August 2013) the 
Senate Committee met a total of 176 times while the Joint Standing Committee held 30641 meetings 
(Parliament of Australia, 2016d). The difficulty with determining the actual number of committee 
debates regarding defence lies in the multifocal nature of the committees. Given that foreign relations, 
trade and defence all form part of the portfolio of these committees, the exact level of debate on 
defence-specific matters is difficult to determine. However, a review of completed inquiries and 
reports in the 43rd Parliament reveals that that the Senate Committee completed 23 reports of which 
at least 11 related directly to defence. The Joint Standing Committee drafted 19 reports during the 
same period of which six related directly to defence (Parliament of Australia, 2013a, 2013b). It is 
therefore evident that defence matters are considered and debated with relative frequency.  
 
                                                          
41 Statistics of meetings for the Joint Standing Committee combine briefings and inspections with private and 
public meetings. These often overlap, so the actual number of meetings will be less. 
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Parliamentary questions are widely used in the Australian Parliament. During the 44th 
Parliament (November 2013 to April 2016), a total of 199 written questions were posed by MPs of the 
Senate to the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence of which 192 were responded to (The Senate 
of Australia, 2015). Special defence inquiries are used to a lesser extent by both the committees 
dealing with defence. The committees publish reports on in-depth studies, but these stem largely from 
normal committee work and are not necessarily special defence inquiries. Furthermore, given the 
multiple focus areas of the committees, these reports focus moreover on matters related to 
international relations (Parliament of Australia, 2016b; The Senate of Australia, 2016b). Oversight 
visits and study tours are referred to as ‘inspections’ in the Australian Parliament and are conducted 
relatively frequently. In terms of defence-related oversight visits, the Joint Standing Committee 
conducts more frequent visits. During the 43rd Parliament, for example, it conducted nine oversight 
visits, including a visit to the Middle East Area of Operations in March 2012 and a European visit to 
countries that build and maintain equipment for the Australian Defence Force (Parliament of Australia, 
2016c, 2016d). Finally, external audit services are provided by the Australian National Audit Office 
that formulates an array of reports for consideration by Parliament. These reports cover both 
performance and financial audits and are frequently used by the defence committees (Australian 
National Audit Office, 2016).  
 
5.3.2 Focus areas and lower-order focus areas of defence oversight in the Australian 
Parliament 
 
Providing oversight of the defence budget carries priority in the Australian Parliament. The Senate’s 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee takes primary responsibility and reviews 
the defence budget annually. A review of oversight done by the Committee in the 44rd Parliament 
reveals intense rounds of public hearings and stakeholder engagements regarding the budget. 
Following this process, an official Committee Report with budgetary recommendations is published 
(Parliament of Australia, 2016a). 
 
Despite its multidimensional focus, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade produces a yearly review of the DOD’s annual report that covers various aspects of the 
Defence Force. A review of the 2012/13 and 2013/14 Reports reveals oversight of the following focus 
areas and lower-order focus areas: 
 
 Defence policy oversight is included in the scope of activities of the Committee. This is 
evident in, for example, its intention around tracking the 2015 White Paper on Defence 
(Parliament of Australia, 2015, pp. 13–14). 
 Defence procurement as well as procurement processes were reviewed to an extent when 
the Committee addressed asset management and capital investment in 2014 (Parliament of 
Australia, 2014a, pp. 7–15). In 2015, the Committee also reviewed procurement of new fighter 
aircraft (Parliament of Australia, 2015, pp. 42–44).  
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 Human resources was reviewed in 2015, including a focus on recruitment, critical areas of 
employment and the employment of women in the Australian military (Parliament of Australia, 
2015, pp. 15–36). The latter also highlights a focus on gender. However, reports reveal no 
specific reference to advancing opportunities for indigenous Australians in the armed forces, 
but do make reference to enhancing such opportunities in terms of facilities investment 
contracts (Parliament of Australia, 2014a, p. 11). Personnel well-being was reviewed through, 
for example, a focus on mental well-being of the armed forces. Although this has some 
relevance to the morale of the Australian armed forces, no dedicated discussions on force 
morale are reflected in committee minutes.  
 Annual reports submitted to Parliament by the DOD are considered by the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, including an overview of performance. 
This practice has been in place since 2002 and results in the Committee producing its own 
report focusing on specific aspects of performance (Parliament of Australia, 2015, p. vii). No 
quarterly performance or financial reports were considered.  
 Defence infrastructure was reviewed in terms of base rationalisation, the management of 
military assets (including land) and defence housing and accommodation (Parliament of 
Australia, 2014a, pp. 3–11; 2015, pp. 53–56). The Defence Housing Australia budget and 
activities were also reviewed annually. 
 Training in the Australian Defence Force was addressed in committee reports, although in-
depth studies thereof seem to be lacking. Committee recommendations included the need to 
upgrade training facilities and balancing retention with recruitment to lower the cost of training 
(Parliament of Australia, 2014, p. 4; 2015, p. 24). Although reference to military education is 
made, limited engagement on this matter is noted. 
 
While the above focus areas and lower-order focus areas enjoy some degree of parliamentary 
attention, two other focus areas generally receive limited attention. The scope for parliamentary 
oversight of defence deployments remain ambiguous. Section 51K (2)(f) of the Australian Defence Act 
of 1903 states that “[w]hen a general security area is declared (within the Australian territories), the 
Minister must forward, within 24 hours after the declaration is made, a statement to the Presiding 
Officer of each House of the Parliament for tabling in that House declaring the content of the order 
and the area affected.” Section 51X (1)(d) of the Act further notes that the Minister must report any 
utilisation of the Defence Force that occurred under the order. While the Defence Act provides for 
parliamentary oversight of defence deployments, it does not make any clear pronouncements on the 
powers of Parliament in this regard. In the past, opposition parties have generally concurred with the 
deployment of the armed forces, but in some cases, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the opposition 
parties were against involvement. This resulted in a vote where the majority of the House of 
Representatives voted in favour of deployment (McKeown & Jordan, 2010, pp. 7–23). However, 
regardless of a vote, the deployment prerogative remains with the executive. Furthermore, no clear 
focus is placed on interdepartmental cooperation by the Committees. While reference is made to 
cooperation between the Defence Department and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, no other 
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interdepartmental aspects were reviewed, for example, between 2012 and 2014. However, the nature 
of the Committees (dealing with foreign affairs, trade and defence) does mean some aspects of 
departmental overlap are catered for.  
 
5.3.3 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military in the Australian 
Parliament 
 
As noted, parliamentary oversight in Australia is highly rated by a number of international institutions. 
This notion is reflected in the limited weaknesses to oversight identifiable in Australia. The principle of 
parliamentary oversight is deeply entrenched in the Australian Constitution. This is specifically 
extended to military functions in the country. Section 51(vi) of the Constitution (Parliament of 
Australia, 1990) notes “[t]he Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws 
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to… the naval and 
military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to 
execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth.” Given these legal parameters, it is not 
surprising that oversight tools are widely available and utilised, reflecting enshrined democratic 
customary practices of oversight. This is further amplified by Australia’s consistently high rating in 
terms of democracy and democratic principles/practices as reflected in the Economists’ Index for 
Democracy (Kekic, 2007, p. 3) and the Freedom House Report on Global Freedom (Freedom House, 
2015a, p. 20). 
 
There is, arguably, elevated levels of political will to do oversight. In 1989, a study by the Department 
of the Parliamentary Library and the Australasian Political Studies Association found executive 
dominance of Parliament to be largely in place and that party discipline inhibits the ability of MPs to 
check executive actions (McIntosh, 1989, p. 3). By 2000, however, a study on parliamentary control of 
the executive in countries around the world found Australia to have a balanced share of power 
between the executive and parliament (Pennings, 2000a, p. 7). On a practical level, Yamamoto (2007, 
p. 54) highlights that opposition parties are often prioritised in submitting oral questions and additional 
questions to the executive. There thus seems to be progression over time in ensuring broader 
parliamentary oversight. The Australian Parliament also receives significant institutional support. From 
the official documentation published by the two defence committees, it is evident that an adequate 
research capacity exists to support MPs on defence-related oversight. Annual reports by the Senate’s 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee generally note at least three researchers 
that assist in drafting reports. The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
also make use of researchers as well as military advisors (who appears to be serving members of the 
armed forces). Both committees also have additional administrative staff that can assist them 
(Parliament of Australia, 2015, p. xv). 
 
Finally, the Australian parliament places significant focus on follow-up to Parliamentary 
recommendations. In March 1973, the senate took a resolution that “within six months of the tabling of 
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a committee report, the responsible minister would make a statement in the Parliament outlining the 
action the government proposed to take in relation to the report” (Parliament of Australia, 2014b). This 
was ultimately reduced to a three month response period by 1983 and the practice remains in place 
and has been adhered to as is reflected in recent government responses to parliament.  
 
5.4 Parliamentary oversight of the military in Zambia 
 
Zambia’s parliament underwent an important transition in the early 1990s following years of executive 
dominance and economic decline since the mid-1970s. The introduction of Zambia’s Constitution (Act 
1 of 1991) aimed to bring about a level of executive accountability through defining parliamentary 
powers. Article 51 of the Constitution states that “Cabinet and Deputy Ministers shall be accountable 
collectively to the National Assembly.” Furthermore, Article 86 of the Constitution made provision for 
parliamentary committees to be established, which points to further efforts at enhancing oversight of 
the executive. Given these developments, Burnell (2002, p. 23) notes a perception that oversight in 
the Parliament of Zambia increased markedly in the Third Republic (after 1991). The advent of the 
Third Republic was characterised by positive indicators for parliamentary oversight of the military, 
including sporadic debates on defence expenditure by the Public Accounts Committee and scrutiny by 
the Auditor-General (Haantobolo, 2008, pp. 214–215). It was not until 1999 that the Zambian 
Parliament established a committee to deal specifically with oversight of the military, the National 
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. Despite advances made, parliamentary oversight of the 
military in Zambia should be viewed against the broader context of questionable entrenchment of the 
concept of oversight. The Zambian Parliament and executive are not “mutually independent” and 
Members of the Cabinet are not individually accountable to Parliament. This lack of accountability 
transfers to Committee level that, despite the ability to call the executive to account, has little power to 
enforce change. (Burnell, 2002, pp. 2–4). These observations are in line with a general view that 
democracy in Zambia is not yet fully entrenched (Freedom House, 2015a, p. 26) and that oversight of 
the military, for example the defence budget, is not mature in its transparency (Gorbanova & Wawro, 
2011a, p. 6).  
 
5.4.1 Oversight tools utilised in the Zambian Parliament 
 
Several tools for oversight are available and utilised on the Zambian Parliament, but with varying 
degrees of success. Parliamentary debates on defence occur mostly within the National Security and 
Foreign Affairs Committee. The Committee reports annually on its activities and, between 2010 and 
2014, 70 meetings were held (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). Given the 
broad scope of portfolios covered by the Committee, not all these meetings pertained to defence. 
Similarly, in the plenary, limited debates related to defence were held. Some noteworthy defence-
related debates between 2010 and 2014 include debates on the Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure for the Ministry of Defence, questions related to personnel and Zambian Air Force 
equipment (Parliament of Zambia, 2010, 2011). Debates were limited and, in addition, only one 
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ministerial statement related to defence was made between 2010 and 2014 (Parliament of Zambia, 
2012). This limited scope of activity also resulted in limited special defence inquiries. Between 2010 
and 2014, the Committee conducted no specifically framed special defence inquiries. The Committee 
did, however, continuously review three defence-related aspects over this period, including Zambia’s 
participation in peacekeeping operations, preparedness for terrorist attacks, and aspects of border 
security (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014, 2015). However, these discussions 
should be seen as part of normal committee work and do not truly adhere to the requirements for 
special defence inquiries. Parliamentary questions are also utilised poorly in the Zambian Parliament. 
For example, a review of House debates for 2014 reveal only three oral questions posed to the 
Minister of Defence for the year (Parliament of Zambia, 2014).42 
 
The National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee makes use of oversight visits and study tours, 
but to a very limited extent. Between 2010 and 2015, the Committee visited Rwanda and Angola, but 
these tours focused largely on matters pertaining to immigration. Similarly, local oversight visits were 
conducted and although border security formed part of the focus of these visits, no defence-specific 
oversight visits were conducted (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). Parliament 
also makes use of external audit in its oversight process. The Auditor-General produces an annual 
report on ministerial expenditure, including a focus on defence expenditure. This is considered by 
Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee that oversees public expenditure (Chungu in le Roux et al., 
2012, p. 62). However, reports by the Auditor-General clearly lack depth, limiting its oversight value. 
For example, the 2014 Annual Report by the Auditor-General contained only four pages related to 
defence expenditure that merely covers broad expenditure trends and identified cases of financial 
mismanagement (Auditor-General of Zambia, 2014, pp. 251–255).  
 
5.4.2 Focus areas of defence oversight in the Zambian Parliament 
 
One of the main achievements of the Zambian Third Republic was the introduction of a new 
constitution and multiparty democratic system of governance. Section 63 of the new Constitution 
made clear provision for budgetary oversight by parliament, including defence (Republic of Zambia, 
2016). As was noted, this work is primarily conducted by the Public Accounts Committee in its 
consideration of the Auditor-General’s Report. The Public Accounts Committee does, however, deal 
with all state departments that limits focus on individual departments. The 2015 Report by the 
Committee, for example, considered only eight matters related to defence expenditure highlighted by 
the Auditor-General (Public Accounts Committee, 2015, pp. 203–206). A further major shortfall is that 
no defence “pre-budget consultations” are conducted (Chungu in le Roux et al., 2012, p. 62). In 
addition to budgetary considerations, the official responsibilities of the National Security and Foreign 
Affairs Committee makes provision for the review of existing defence policies and legislation (National 
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015, p. 1). However, a review of Committee Reports 
                                                          
42 No reference to written questions is made in the Zambian Parliament’s Hansard. 
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between 2010 and 2015 reveals no significant inquiries into defence policy (National Security and 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). 
 
Procurement is more frequently scrutinised by the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. A 
review of Committee Reports between 2010 and 2015 reveals several engagements with the Ministry 
on Defence on procurement, specifically specialised equipment for peacekeeping operations. 
However, while the Reports indicate discussions around the procurement and amounts involved, 
actual acquisition procedures and a focus on potential irregularities are not reflected (National 
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). Practical defence aspects such as human resources 
feature occasionally in Committee work. Between 2010 and 2015 such discussions related to 
transport for military personnel, personal equipment and the security of personnel stationed at border 
posts (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012, p. 32,33; 2015, p. 32). The deployment 
of the military received limited consideration by the Committee between 2010 and 2015. Section 195 
of the Constitution requires the President to declare any deployment of military personnel outside the 
republic to Parliament (Republic of Zambia, 2016). Neither the Constitution nor the Defence Act 
reveals any specific action to be taken by Parliament on defence deployments. Committee 
discussions on defence deployments revolved around the deployment of Zambian troops as part of 
the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and deployment to the borders. These discussions did, 
however, focus more on the attainment of domestic security than matters related to the actual 
deployments (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012, p. 33; 2014, p. 9). 
  
5.4.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight in the Zambian Parliament 
 
Given the limited number of meetings by the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, and 
the fact that it has to oversee several departments, little time remains to conduct adequate oversight 
of the military’s lower-order focus areas. The Committee’s formal responsibilities state no reference to 
the evaluation of quarterly reports, only annual reports. The Committee’s own annual reports also 
reveals no review of any Defence Department annual reports between 2010 and 2015 (National 
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). Over the same period, Committee reports further 
reveal no oversight visits to military training units. The only finding on training was for the DOD to 
increase training for peacekeeping operations (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2012, p. 23). Over the same period, no meetings were held on matters of gender and racial equality, 
neither was defence morale discussed (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). 
Some aspects related to defence infrastructure received attention, but this was limited to the need for 
officer accommodation in border areas and was a broader recommendation across departments 
(National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2013, p. 43). Defence infrastructure as a concept 
did not receive specific focus. The Committee does, however, show an ability to address matters of 
interdepartmental cooperation, with aspects such as peacekeeping operations and border security 
being discussed occasionally. This ability most likely stems from the Committee’s multi-departmental 
focus. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
5.4.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military in the Zambian 
Parliament 
 
As noted (See Section 5.4), constitutional provisions for oversight by the Zambian Parliament exist. 
Although no specific provision for oversight of the military are made, general provision for oversight 
extend to the military. Haantobolo (2008, pp. 217–219) notes that parliamentary oversight of the 
military increased in the Zambian Third Republic producing tangible results, including arrests of 
corrupt officials. It can thus be argued that broader political will for oversight exists. However, 
increased oversight should be seen in the context of a country in the process of developing 
democratically. While advances have been made in allowing for oversight of the military, it is in 
execution that the Zambian Parliament falls short. Four indicators substantiate the concerns related to 
the execution of oversight. First, although Haantobolo (2008, pp. 218–220) argues that significant 
parliamentary control of the military was regained, but that executive dominance continues to 
characterise the Zambian Parliament of the Third Republic (Burnell, 2002, p. 27; Chungu in le Roux et 
al., 2012, p. 59). Second, customary practices reveal that oversight tools are not used optimally for 
overseeing the military. A lack of democratic customary practices correlates with Zambia’s relatively 
low score in terms of democracy and democratic principles/practices. Freedom House’s Report on 
Global Freedom (Freedom House, 2015a, p. 20) considers Zambia to be only partly free while the 
Economists’ Index for Democracy provides it with a relatively low score of 5.25/10 in terms of 
democratic indicators (Kekic, 2007, p. 4). Third, a major downfall of parliamentary oversight of the 
military in Zambia is, arguably, a lack of active engagement on defence matters, specifically by the 
National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. This is primarily reflected in the small number of the 
Committee meetings, a limited focus on defence matters, and superficial oversight of the defence 
budget. Fourth, committee minutes reflect no engagement with external experts on military matters, 
thus contributing to a reduced public interest. 
 
Two aspects that have the potential to increase the level of defence oversight are committee support 
and committee follow-up. The Zambian Parliament has a Research Unit that provides institutional 
support to MPs, including those on the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. The library 
also provides research services to MPs (Parliament of Zambia, 2016). The Committee is further 
supported by several staff members, including committee clerks, administrative assistants and a 
stenographer (National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015, p. 56). It remains unclear 
whether any of these staff members are defence specialists. Committee follow-up, in turn, is noted in 
annual reports between 2010 and 2015 that reveal regular consideration on government feedback to 
its recommendations and demands for further action (National Security and Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2016). While such follow-up is a positive indicator, the limited time spent on defence 
matters undermines the impact of oversight. 
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5.5 Parliamentary oversight of the military in India 
 
Similar to Zambia, India offers an opportunity to review oversight of the military in a parliament based 
on the Westminster model within the context of the developing world. The Indian Parliament 
comprises a bicameral system with the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of 
the People). Oversight of the military is primarily conducted through the Standing Committee on 
Defence in the Lok Sabha (Parliament of India, 2017a). Some broad concerns related to the Indian 
Parliament’s oversight of the military are immediately apparent when considering that Transparency 
International, for example, considers India to be at a high risk of corruption in the defence sector 
(Cover & Meran, 2013a, p. 8). However, the same study also found India to be a good case study for 
oversight of defence budgets (Cover & Meran, 2013b, p. 31). A review of Lok Sabha activities related 
to defence will thus assist in understanding where the Indian Parliament does well and where 
concerns exist related to the utilisation of oversight tools and the review of oversight focus areas.  
 
5.5.1 Oversight tools utilised in the Indian Parliament 
 
Debates on defence-related matters in the Lok Sabha plenary occur relatively regularly. Between 
2011 and 2016 (15th and 16th Lok Sabha)43, for example, several plenary debates on military affairs 
were held. Debates often occur as a result of reports submitted by the Standing Committee on 
Defence. Statements by MPs and the Minister of Defence also result in such debates (Parliament of 
India, 2017b). At committee level, regular debates on defence transpire in the meetings of the 
Standing Committee on Defence. Between 2011 and 2016, a total of 82 meetings were held 
(Parliament of India, 2017a). The election year (2013/14) saw the least number of meetings held (11). 
Parliamentary questions were used extensively between 2011 and 2016 with a total of 2 443 
questions posed to the Ministry of Defence. Oral questions reflected a limited number of these, with 
164 oral questions posed over the period (Parliament of India, 2017c). 
 
A review of Committee activities between 2011 and 2016 reveals that a number of special defence 
inquiries were held. These refer to in-depth reviews of selected subjects by the Committee that result 
in a special report being drafted by the Committee and presented to the Lok Sabha. In some cases, 
these reports also include action taken by the government related to committee recommendations. 
Between 2011 and 2016, 32 such reports were submitted to the Lok Sabha (Parliament of India, 
2017a). It should be noted that these special inquiries often correlate with standard committee work, 
but can be considered more in-depth due to the formal submission of a report to the Lok Sabha and 
the in-depth nature thereof. Oversight visits and study tours were relatively well utilised. Between 
2011 and 2016 seven oversight visits were held to Indian defence facilities. No indications of foreign 
study tours reflect in committee activities (Parliament of India, 2017a). Finally, the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of India publish ad hoc reports on the military. Between 2011 and 2016, the entity 
                                                          
43 The 2011 to 2016 period covers the second half of the 15th Lok Sabha and the first half of the 16th Lok Sabha. 
The period was chosen due to the availability of information for this period and the wish to cover a five-year span 
of parliamentary activity on defence oversight. 
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produced at least 24 reports related to Defence and National Security (Comptroller and Auditor-
General of India, 2017). Reports of the Standing Committee on Defence do, however, make limited 
reference to the input of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Between 2011 and 2016, only three 
reports of the committee made reference to the findings of the Comptroller and Auditor-General 
(Parliament of India, 2017c). The use of external audit is, however, more evident in the Parliament’s 
Public Accounts Committee. This Committee comprises a number of subcommittees, including a 
subcommittee dealing with defence matters. The Public Accounts Committee reports between 2011 
and 2016 show regular references to reports tabled by the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
Furthermore, representatives of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are present during deliberations 
by the Public Accounts Committee (Lok Sabha Public Accounts Committee, 2013).  
 
5.5.2 Focus areas and lower-order focus areas of defence oversight in the Indian Parliament 
 
Despite some risks identified by Transparency International (Cover & Meran, 2013b, p. 30), the 
organisation notes India as a case study for good practice in terms of oversight of defence budgets. It 
states that “[a]s part of the wider process of parliamentary approval of the annual budget, the 
‘Demand for Grants’ is placed before the appropriate standing committees. In the case of the defence 
budget, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence is empowered to approve or reject the 
budget demands made [and] reduce the amount of money requested by the government.” This 
oversight is evident in the Standing Committee on Defence’s work between 2011 and 2016, with 
‘Demand for Grants’ being regularly discussed and government responses to Committee findings 
being reviewed (Parliament of India, 2017a). Transparency International does, however, identify 
scope for improvement. Annual reports on Committee decisions related to the defence budget are 
lacking, including reasons for recommendations made by the Committee (Cover & Meran, 2013b, p. 
30). The committee further reviews aspects related to defence policy relatively regularly. This is 
reflected in, for example, discussions on defence procurement policy and defence production policy 
(Standing Committee on Defence, 2013b, 2013c, 2016d).  
 
In 2013, Transparency International provided the Indian Parliament with a rating of only 45/100 in 
terms of defence procurement oversight. However, subsequent years have seen a significant 
increase in the focus on procurement. The increased focus on procurement in the first sessions of the 
16th Lok Sabha could, for example, be attributed to allegations of increased corruption during the 15 th 
Lok Sabha (Kumar, 2012). Engagements on procurement policy in 2016 serve as an example of in-
depth engagement with several recommendations made by the Committee. Human resources matters 
also receive regular references in Committee Reports. Although dedicated meetings on human 
resources are largely lacking, this aspect is regularly referred to as a subset of other discussions. In 
the 15th Lok Sabha, for example, aspects related to the lack of Coast Guard Personnel, issues of 
personnel retirement as well as the transfer of military personnel to the paramilitary forces and the 
police were discussed (Standing Committee on Defence, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). In the 16th Lok 
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Sabha, the welfare of servicemen as well as force strengths and critical personnel shortages were 
discussed among other aspects (Standing Committee on Defence, 2015d, 2016a). 
 
The deployment of the military receives comparatively little attention. The Indian Defence Review  
noted, in 2017, that “it is high time we have a debate as to when and where we need to deploy the 
military, so that checks and balances could be imposed on the executive decision-making process in 
order to ensure greater accountability” (Khanna, 2017). This concern is reflected in, for example, the 
Armed Force Special Powers Act (1958) that hands extraordinary powers to the military in areas 
declared ‘disturbed areas’ (Parliament of India, 1958). The Act makes no direct concession for 
Parliamentary oversight. Similarly, the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution makes provision for the 
deployment of the military, but no direct role is provided for Parliament. Despite the lack of a direct 
provision for Parliamentary oversight, the Standing Committee on Defence received regular briefings 
on deployments in the 15th and 16th Lok Sabha, including border deployments and deployments with 
the State Police (Standing Committee on Defence, 2013d, 2015b). Debates regarding military 
deployments have also been held in the plenary, but the impact of such debates on the actual 
deployments remain limited (The Hindu, 2016).  
 
In terms of lower-order oversight, the Indian Parliament only addresses some of the focus areas 
identified. Burman (2012, p. 48) notes that “the Speaker refers annual reports from all departments to 
the relevant committee. Public hearings should also be conducted to gain inputs regarding the areas 
covered in the annual reports.” However, annual and quarterly reports on defence does not seem to 
be considered regularly as a stand-alone subject by the Standing Committee on Defence. Committee 
reports between 2011 and 2016 reveal that although ad hoc reference is made to the Ministry of 
Defence’s annual report, no dedicated meetings were held (Standing Committee on Defence, 2013c, 
2013b). Similarly, some aspects of quarterly expenditure were reported to the Committee, but no in-
depth meetings related to such expenditure were conducted (Standing Committee on Defence, 
2015c). Quarterly performance was not measured. In terms of interdepartmental cooperation, ad hoc 
meetings were held in this regard. These include, for example, meetings related to the military’s joint 
responsibility for border control, the coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces 
and the integration of some military personnel into the police forces (Standing Committee on Defence, 
2015d, 2016a). Interdepartmental cooperation focused largely on cooperation between the military 
and the police while other instances, such as cooperation with departments of Revenue, Forest, 
Mining, Public Works, Power and meetings related to coastal management, were limited (Standing 
Committee on Defence, 2011, 2015b).  
 
Training and education of the military received more frequent attention throughout 2011 to 2016, 
including dedicated meetings on manpower and training as well as reviews of training aspects during 
discussions on the Demands for Grants (Standing Committee on Defence, 2013d, 2014, 2015a, 
2015b). Discussions on military education were limited. Engagement on gender and racial equality 
were very limited. Between 2011 and 2016, only one discussion was held regarding the admission of 
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girl cadets (Standing Committee on Defence, 2015b). No discussions on racial equality were held. No 
dedicated meetings were held on defence morale and it was only raised on an ad hoc basis during 
standard meetings. No measurement of defence morale was presented during the period 2011 to 
2016. Finally, defence infrastructure received more regular attention by the Standing Committee on 
Defence between 2011 and 2016. Most meetings by the Committee included some reference to 
infrastructure, often related to how well the state of infrastructure supports the functioning of the 
military. More in-depth discussions regarding defence infrastructure were also held, including the 
state of naval infrastructure, the infrastructure of ordinance factories, infrastructure needs of the 
Indian Coast Guard and the modernisation of airfield infrastructure (Standing Committee on Defence, 
2011, 2013d, 2016a, 2016b).  
 
5.5.3 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military in the Indian 
Parliament 
 
Constitutional and legal powers regarding the role of the Indian Parliament vis-à-vis the military are 
not directly stated in the Indian Constitution of 1949. However, Section 53 (2) of the Constitution notes 
that “the supreme command of the Defence Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and 
the exercise thereof shall be regulated by law.” As such, while executive power of the military remains 
with the executive, provision through law is made for Parliamentary oversight. Despite legislative 
provision for parliamentary oversight and supporting parliamentary rules, Burman (2012, pp. 65–66) 
notes some concerns. He claims that oversight is impeded by certain legislative aspects such as the 
Official Secrets Act that limits the powers of committees to call for documents and witnesses. 
Customary practices of oversight refer to the availability and usage of oversight tools in parliament. 
The tools for oversight of the military identified in this study are generally well utilised in the Indian 
Parliament (See Section 5.5.1). India is also characterised by medium to high levels of democracy as 
is reflected in, for example, the Freedom House’s Report on Global Freedom (Freedom House, 
2015a). The Economists’ Index for Democracy further reflects a relatively high score of 7.68/10 
(Kekic, 2007, p. 3), albeit lower than those provided for the UK, Canada and Australia.  
 
Significant concerns are evident in the resources and expertise available to the Indian Parliament 
(Madhukar, 2011; Rajiv, 2010, p. 15). Burman (2012, p. 31) notes that “[n]ot only do committees not 
have their own research staff, individual Parliamentarians also do not get any personnel, or allowance 
for personnel for conducting research. As a result, there is a huge asymmetry of information between 
the executive and Members of Parliament.” Outside experts are used to make briefings to the 
committee, but committee reports reflect a limited use of such expertise between 2011 and 2016 
(Standing Committee on Defence, 2011, 2013a). Political will has been identified as a concern in 
terms of parliamentary oversight in India. A key indicator is the decrease in parliamentary activity. 
Madhukar (2011) notes, for example, that “[t]he number of sitting days has come down from about 
140 days a year in the 1950s to an average of sixty-five days over the past five years.” Burman (2012, 
p. 75) notes, as is the case in many other parliaments, there is a lack of incentive for the governing 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
party MPs to do in-depth oversight, notably on matters that may reflect negatively on the party. A 
number of authors also point to a high level of executive dominance in India, limiting the scope of 
parliamentary oversight in general (Pennings, 2000a; Sing & Saxena, 2011, p. 145). Finally, the 
Standing Committee on Defence shows elevated levels of follow-up on parliamentary 
recommendations. Recommendations by parliamentary committees in India are not binding on the 
executive (Rajiv, 2010, p. 16). However, Standing Committee on Defence reports between 2011 and 
2016 reveal constant executive replies to parliamentary recommendations. Rajiv (2010, p. 15) notes 
that committees produce “Action Taken Reports (ATR) detailing the government responses on their 
inputs.” A clear and continuous line of follow-up is thus evident in the Committee’s work. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Within the context of liberal and representative democracy, this chapter elaborated on oversight as 
one of the primary functions of parliaments. Given the importance of transparency and accountability 
in liberal democracies, parliaments’ oversight function also extends to the realm of defence. With the 
principle of parliamentary oversight of the military established, a number of oversight tools, focus 
areas and potential weaknesses for parliamentary oversight of the military were identified. General 
consensus exists in terms of the tools utilised to ensure effective oversight, as has been highlighted in 
studies by Transparency International, the World Bank, the IPU and the DCAF.  
 
The aim of detailing these oversight tools, focus areas and potential weaknesses for parliamentary 
oversight of the military is to create a basis for evaluation against which to measure the South African 
case study in the following chapters. In order to affirm the applicability of the identified tools, focus 
areas and weaknesses, five cases were analysed to determine the level of applicability. The cases 
chosen reflect countries with varying degrees of democratic strength and oversight capacity. In terms 
of the oversight tools identified, this chapter found that parliamentary debates, questions, special 
defence inquiries, oversight visits and the use of external audit have widespread application. 
Furthermore, the chapter showed that countries where oversight tools are utilised more robustly, 
generally received higher ratings in terms of democracy and oversight of the military.  
 
Oversight focus areas also reflect the pattern above. Countries with higher ratings in terms of 
democracy and oversight of the military generally covered a wider variety of defence-related focus 
areas. Reviews of the defence budget, policy, procurement, deployment and human resources in 
particular found broad application. In addition to the focus areas stemming from existing research, this 
study aims to expand thereon by identifying a number of lower-order focus areas that may be 
considered in studies on parliamentary oversight of defence. Through a review of the five parliaments’ 
activities it is evident that oversight of lower-order focus areas occur to varying degrees among the 
cases utilised. A focus on annual reports, interdepartmental cooperation, military training, and 
defence infrastructure did not find as broad application, but showed sufficient frequency to ensure the 
relevance thereof in the measurement of oversight of the military. Aspects related to gender and racial 
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equality as well as defence morale did not find broad application in the cases reviewed. However, the 
review of these parliaments’ activities do reveal that although dedicated meetings on lower-order 
focus areas were not frequent, they were often addressed during other committee discussion. It 
therefore highlights the need to focus on the day-to-day activities of parliamentary defence 
committees when reviewing the quality and standing of defence oversight. The inclusion of the lower-
order focus areas is further substantiated by the importance attached thereto in existing literature. 
Finally, the chapter also highlighted potential weaknesses such as a lack of constitutional powers for 
oversight, a lack of parliamentary support staff, low political will for oversight and a lack of follow-up 
on parliamentary recommendations. The cases analysed revealed that, in general, states with lower 
scores in terms of democracy and oversight of the military are often constrained by one or more of 
these weaknesses. 
 
This chapter presented a broad overview of the application of tools, focus areas and potential 
weaknesses for parliamentary oversight of the military in selected countries. While not an exhaustive 
review, it nonetheless justifies the selection of these criteria as a credible indication of the quality and 
standing of parliamentary oversight of the military. This criteria will be utilised in Chapters 4 and 5 to 
review oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 2014 (South Africa’s first four 
democratic parliaments). The next chapter provides an overview of the political changes in South 
Africa both prior to and immediately after 1994 and highlights how these impacted on parliamentary 
oversight of the military. Thereafter, it reviews parliamentary oversight of the military during the first 
two parliaments (1994 to 2004) utilising the criteria for evaluation as set out in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 4  PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BETWEEN 1994 AND 2004  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Oversight of the executive reflects one of the primary functions of parliaments around the world as it 
aims to ensure that a state’s national resources are used efficiently and effectively (Madue, 2012, p. 
433; Rockman, 1984, p. 415). Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted oversight as a parliamentary activity and 
its connection to theories of democracy, which intends to ensure accountability and transparency of 
the executive. The link between oversight and theories of democracy is essential to the South African 
case study as 1994 marked the transition to a liberal democratic state through constitutional means. 
Based on this democratic transition and the implicit need for checks and balances, it should follow 
logically that parliamentary oversight is prioritised. The transition to democracy further holds 
implications for civil-military relations. Chapter 3 emphasised that parliaments play a central role in 
maintaining effective democratic civil-military relations. Born (2003, p. 19) notes that parliaments 
ensure “a bridge to the public” as MPs are in contact with the population of a state and can serve to 
establish this contact point with the military. The oversight process is key to the establishment and 
maintenance of this ‘bridge’ and ensuring democratic civil-military relations. 
 
Chapter 3 derived a number of broadly accepted tools and focus areas that may enhance 
parliamentary oversight of defence. Tools include parliamentary debates; parliamentary questions; 
special defence inquiries; oversight visits and study tours; and, the use of external audit, while the 
focus areas include the defence budget; defence policy; defence procurement; human resources; 
and, military deployments. It was further established that room exists for expansion of these criteria of 
oversight to include a focus on annual and quarterly departmental performance; aspects of 
interdepartmental cooperation; military training and education; gender and racial equality; defence 
morale; and, defence infrastructure. Finally, in order to avoid weak oversight, it should be ensured 
that a number of aspects are in place, including constitutional and legal powers; customary practices 
for oversight; resources and expertise; political will; and, the ability to follow up on recommendations.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to review parliamentary oversight of the military during the first ten years of 
democracy in South Africa (1994 to 2004). The chapter commences with a brief overview of 
parliamentary oversight of the military prior to 1994 and then lays the foundation for analysis after 
1994 by unpacking relevant legislative and policy advances. The tools, focus areas and potential 
weaknesses of oversight identified in Chapter 3 are thereafter used as a framework for analysis of 
parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa’s first two parliaments. 
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2. An overview of parliamentary oversight of the military prior to 1994 
 
Chapter 1 alluded to the value of critical theory’s ontological underpinnings related to historical 
realism. Although this study is largely based on the ontology of the interprevist paradigm, the inclusion 
of historical context was identified as important as it provides crucial historical context.  As such, prior 
to reviewing parliamentary oversight of the military in a democratic South Africa (post-1994), it is of 
value to briefly review whether this practice was established prior to democratisation. To determine a 
snapshot of oversight prior to 1994, the work of Arthur Marwick can be used as a framework. In 
reviewing the consequences of conflict, Marwick (1973, p. 83) notes that war serves as “the supreme 
test of a country’s military, social, political and economic institutions.” Given the previously stated role 
of Parliament as a political institution, and its role in maintaining civil oversight, a review of the impact 
of conflict (war) on Parliament’s oversight role will provide insight into the historic status of 
institutionalised parliamentary oversight.  
 
A logical starting point would be the establishment of the Union Defence Force (UDF) formed in 1912 
after the formation of the Union in South Africa in 1910 (le Roux, 2005, p. 243). The UDF was guided 
by the 1912 Defence Act (RSA, 1912) that postulated specific roles for the two houses of the 
Parliament. Section 77(2) of the Act, for example, noted the need for the Governor to inform 
Parliament of the reasons for the deployment of the UDF. The Second Schedule of the Act noted that 
the Minister of Defence shall be responsible for reporting annually to Parliament on the governance of 
the UDF in the previous calendar year. The advent of the First World War in 1914 saw the South 
African Parliament engage in robust debate to determine whether South Africa should become 
involved (Khan, 2014, pp. 7–11). However, gaps in the institutional power of Parliament were 
immediately visible as the Defence Minister, Jan Smuts, began mobilisation for an invasion of 
German South West Africa prior to obtaining parliamentary approval (Crafford, 1945, p. 106; van der 
Waag, 2015, p. 94). Parliament subsequently approved South Africa’s participation in the war, but 
seemingly with little concern for criticism of the state of readiness of the UDF. The military experience 
of many UDF leaders and the capacity to partake in an international conventional conflict was 
questioned by many (van der Waag, 2013, pp. 153–154). The impact of Smuts as ‘super-minister’44 
and Parliament’s unwillingness to adequately scrutinise UDF capacity prior to a decision on 
participation in the First World War thus highlight fault-lines in the institutionalised nature of oversight 
of the military. 
 
The start of the Second World War again saw parliamentary oversight of the military intentionally 
limited.  Robust parliamentary debate surrounded the decision to enter the war, resulting in a vote in 
favour of Smuts’ proposal to participate (Hancock, 1968, pp. 322–323). However, these debates 
occurred in September 1939, and Parliament was not reconvened until mid-January 1940. This meant 
the executive, under Prime Minister Smuts, made preparations for a major conflict without any 
oversight function being fulfilled by Parliament. Furthermore, Hancock (1968, p. 334) notes that 
                                                          
44 The terming of Smuts as ‘super-minister’ is in line with findings by van der Waag (2013).  
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Smuts “did not have the statutory emergency powers which have been drafted under the previous 
government but had to take the powers he needed by proclamation in advance of parliamentary 
sanction.” Crafford (1945, p. 293) also notes the deplorable state of the South African military at the 
beginning of the war, despite significant budgetary allocations by Parliament. This highlights a 
potential lack of oversight by Parliament on the utilisation of budgetary allocations, bringing into 
question the ability to perform ongoing oversight.  
 
After the establishment of the Republic in 1961, a significant shift occurred that impacted on 
parliamentary oversight of the military. The 1966 Verster Commission recommended that the position 
of Defence Secretary be discontinued and the Chief of the Defence Force become the primary 
accounting officer. Furthermore, the Minister of Defence was now to focus only on matters related to 
defence policy. This essentially created a direct link between the Chief of the Defence Force and 
Cabinet, which severely undermined the scope for parliamentary oversight (Mollo, 2000, p. 16). By 
1975, South Africa became involved in a protracted conflict in South West Africa. This conflict should 
be seen in the context of the ‘total strategy’, which was based on the perception that South Africa 
faced a ‘total onslaught’. Subsequently “the military assumed a more influential role in government 
planning and policy and defence spending was increased” (Perk, 2011: 17). This shift is reflected in 
the 1977 White Paper on Defence that was drafted as strategic doctrine under which the Defence 
Department gained prominence over other state departments (van der Waag, 2015, pp. 251–252). In 
the context of the changes brought about by the Verster Commission, the ascendency of the Defence 
Department further limited parliamentary influence.  
 
In the 1980s, under Prime Minister (later President) Botha, the State Security Council (SSC) was 
established as the solitary defence policy-making institution. The SSC was chaired by the President 
and served by some cabinet ministers and the chiefs of the security departments. Former President, 
F.W. de Klerk (1998, p. 133) noted that the SSC was central to the ‘securocrat-system’ that impacted 
not only on security-related portfolios, but all government departments. While the SSC’s decisions 
were, in theory, subject to Cabinet approval, in practice it became far more powerful than Cabinet 
itself. De Klerk even noted that, while he served as president, he felt “marginalised” within the SSC 
(de Klerk, 1998, p. 134). The SSC was not accountable to Parliament, or those serving on it. In 
addition, the majority of military procurement was done through the Special Defence Account, 
established in 1974. The Account also lacked effective parliamentary oversight (Sylvester, 2011a, p. 
12). Under the ‘total strategy’ and within the context of the war in South West Africa, parliamentary 
oversight thus gradually subsided and made way for strengthened executive dominance. 
 
In addition to Marwick’s framework that reveals executive dominance over Parliament during periods 
of conflict, other sources evaluating the strength of military and political institutions further 
substantiate this finding. Of specific relevance is the impact that the ‘total onslaught’ had on these 
institutions. In line with the findings noted, Cock and Nathan (1989: 3-13) notes the broader 
militarisation of South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. They claim that militarisation manifested at 
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economic, political and ideological levels. Specifically at political level, Cock and Nathan (1989: 6) 
state that the power of the military can be conceptualised through “its increasing influence in state 
decision-making.” Evans and Phillips (in Swilling et al, 1988: 139) use the declaration of a state of 
emergency in June 1986 as an example of how opportunities were created for the security forces to 
formulate and implement state policy. They further claim that “powers granted to the security 
forces…have assisted the building of a shadow state behind the contention-ridden civilian façade.” 
Liebenberg (2008: 147) similarly refers to the development of parallel structures and restricted 
political institutions during this period. These claims thus confirm the rising power of military 
institutions at the expense of political institutions which would include Parliament. Liebenberg (2008: 
148) states it directly by noting “the locus of decision-making moved away from parliament and the 
influence of, for example, the police bureaucracy declined, while the influence of the military 
bureaucracy increased.” 
 
Although elementary in its review, what is evident from the pre-1994 overview is that during periods of 
conflict, the executive rose to overshadow the oversight powers of Parliament. Therefore, in the 
context of Marwick’s framework that uses wartime periods to test the strength of military and political 
institutions, the historic strength of the South African Parliament’s oversight of defence is 
questionable. Similarly, the militarisation of South Africa amid the ‘total onslaught’ clearly 
strengthened military institutions at the expense of political institutions, including Parliament. This 
approach underlies what Huntington termed subjective control of the military which infers the 
disappearance of the distinction between the armed forces and government (Huntington, 1957, pp. 
83–84). A shift to democracy after 1994 and the simultaneous move away from the militarisation of 
the country thus had the potential to shift away from such subjective control of the military. 
 
3. The advent of democracy and the impact on the oversight of the military 
 
Chapter 2 already established that post-1994 South Africa defined itself as a liberal democracy 
through constitutional means. Chapter 2 further highlighted a key characteristic of liberal democracy 
namely the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial spheres of 
government. This separation is essential in establishing a system of checks and balances and 
parliaments form an integral part of such a system. 
 
The separation of powers and the key roles of Parliament were of concern to both the ANC and pre-
1994 South African government during negotiations on the transition to democracy. Tjønneland and 
Mathisen (2001, p. 2) note that the ANC saw a robust Parliament as necessary to ensure popular 
participation in politics while the pre-1994 government saw it as a means of ensuring that that new 
executive power remained checked. This resulted in the 1993 Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) 
placing significant focus on parliamentarianism and the principle of the separation of powers (See 
Constitutional Principles Number VI in (RSA, 1993)). This focus impacted on oversight of the military 
as, firstly, Parliament’s role was elevated and, secondly, the system of checks and balances required 
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increased transparency of government sectors. The impact on oversight is most evident in the 
evolution of legislation and policies regarding defence. However, to contextualise the legislative 
developments, it is crucial to first highlight the country’s shift in security focus during the transition to 
democracy in 1994. 
 
3.1 A shift in security focus 
 
A review of the security focus in South Africa is essential as the democratisation of the country was 
likely to impact significantly on the status quo of the state’s security focus. In the traditional view of 
security, national security is defined in relation to a state’s ability to protect its physical territory; its 
international economic relations; its government and internal political processes, and its borders 
(Brown, 1983, p. 4). The inter-state connotation of the Cold War security focused specifically on 
protection against aggression from foreign states. During this period, it was the perception of military 
threats that shaped national security. The traditional view of national security thus revolved around 
the state and the perception of imminent external threat. This notion was further entrenched by Cold 
War thinking where the external focus often resulted in internal threats to national security being 
neglected (Hough, 2003, p. 2).  
 
The post-Cold War era has seen a change in the concept of national security and of the dominant 
focus placed on external military threats. Societal, economic and ecological threats became 
increasingly important in maintaining national security (see Buzan, 1991, pp. 122–134). Furthermore, 
any significant development that may have an impact on the territorial integrity or political stability of a 
state may be considered a national security threat (Ayoob, 1995, p. 8). As such, the internal (intra-
state) dimension of national security gained prominence. In addition, the concept of human security, 
or individual security, gained prominence. The inclusion of human security can largely be attributed to 
the irreversible connection between the state and individuals, which is in line with the liberalist 
paradigm and the rise of liberal democracies. Threats to individuals may arise from pressures on the 
social, economic and political environments (Buzan, 1991, pp. 37–39).  
 
Prior to 1994, South Africa’s focus on external threat perception revealed that it interpreted national 
security in the traditional sense. This is reflected in, for example, the state’s military response to both 
internal and external security threats framed as the ‘total onslaught’ and the ‘soviet onslaught’ 
(Garnett, 1989; Malan, 1980). Human security was thus not necessarily prioritised. Post-1994, 
changes in threat perception and a shift along with international trends towards the inclusion of 
human security characterised developments around the military. This was reflected in, for example, 
the 1996 White Paper on Defence that notes the inclusion of socio-economic and political matters as 
national security threats by stating that “the greatest threats to the South African people are socio-
economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence 
of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence” (RSA, 1996b, p. 6).  
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Post-1994 South Africa, with a security focus now including human security, sought a two-pronged 
approach to national security. First, in international terms, national security would mean the 
assurance of “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence… and the promotion of 
regional security…” (RSA, 1996b, p. 6). Secondly, it would focus on advancing democracy, 
addressing rising crime levels, ensuring social justice within the scope of maintained economic 
growth, and maintaining a politically stable state (RSA, 1996b, p. 6). This significant change in focus 
also had clear implications for civil-military relations. Most notably, the Constitution and White Paper’s 
call for the advancing of democracy aimed at bringing civil-military relations in the country in line with 
international democratic norms. 
3.2 Legislative and policy changes: The shift in civil-military relations 
 
Negotiations regarding defence during the immediate pre-1994 transition period saw opposing 
schools of thought on the future defence trajectory. Jordaan (2004, pp. 25–28) observes that both 
idealist and realist views were put forth on defence matters and that the former often dominated. The 
exact role of the military in the context of a democratic South Africa was often questioned. In order to 
draft subsequent legislation, a degree of compromise had to be reached regarding the military and, 
specifically, the question of civil-military relations. The discussions around shifts in civil-military 
relations based on compromise and cooperation between civil and military roleplayers show strong 
correlation to Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory. Such discussions highlight a shift away from the 
subjective control form of civil-military relations observed prior to 1994. The subsequent legislation 
that flowed from such discussions arguably laid the foundation for a new structure of civil-military 
relations based on cooperation and dialogue. 
 
3.2.1 The 1993 Interim Constitution  
 
Post-1994 policy changes regarding oversight of the military in South Africa should logically 
commence with an overview of the 1993 Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) as this lay the foundation 
for the democratisation of the country. Two focal points of the Interim Constitution impacted on the 
oversight of the military, namely its provisions on parliament and its restructuring of the military. 
 
The first provision of the Interim Constitution that impacted indirectly on parliamentary oversight refers 
to the legislative authority ascribed to Parliament as per Section 37 (RSA, 1993). This allowed for 
Parliament to approve/reject laws related to defence and, indirectly, determine the defence trajectory. 
In terms of its direct impact on oversight, the Interim Constitution, Section 58 (1)(a), allowed for the 
creation of committees of Parliament and for the institution to determine rules guiding such 
committees. Section 60(4) also provided for Parliament to consider and approve money bills that 
include the defence allocation. The Interim Constitution further impacted on the construct and 
management of the SANDF. Section 225 (RSA, 1993) noted that the President will appoint a Chief of 
the SANDF who will be “subject to the directions of the Minister responsible for defence.” This 
sentiment provided a clear foundation for civil control of the military. In addition, Sections 226 (2) and 
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226 (3) noted that both the permanent force and reserve force’s “establishment, organisation, training, 
conditions of service and other matters…shall be as provided for by an Act of Parliament.” This 
placed Parliament at the centre of civil oversight of a broad range of activities and spheres of the 
military. The President is also compelled by Section 228 (4) to inform Parliament of any deployment of 
the SANDF and Parliament may, through a resolution, terminate any such deployment. This provision 
for accountability to Parliament is further cemented through Section 228 that notes the following: 
 
 Section 228 (1): The Minister responsible for defence shall be accountable to 
Parliament for the National Defence Force.  
 Section 228 (2): Parliament shall annually approve a budget for the defence of the 
Republic. 
 Section 228 (3)(a): A joint standing committee of Parliament on defence shall be 
established, consisting of members of all political parties holding more than 10 seats in 
the National Assembly and willing to participate in the committee. 
 
3.2.2 The 1996 Constitution 
 
The 1996 Constitution (hereafter the Constitution) remained true to the liberal democratic principles of 
the 1993 Interim Constitution and sought to permanently entrench the principle of the separation of 
powers. This is evident in Section 198 (d) (RSA, 1996a) which states that “[n]ational security is 
subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.” The 1996 Constitution goes further 
than the Interim Constitution in focusing directly on the oversight role of Parliament. Section 42 (3) of 
the Constitution (RSA, 1996a) notes that “[t]he National Assembly is elected to represent the people 
and to ensure government by the people… [through] scrutiny[s]ing and overseeing executive action.” 
This duty is enhanced through Section 55 (2) that indicates that Parliament must establish 
mechanisms to ensure that executive organs of state remain accountable to Parliament and that the 
institution must oversee executive action and the implementation of legislation. To enable Parliament 
to fulfil this function, the Constitution allows for the establishment of committees in the National 
Assembly and for Parliament to determine and control its internal arrangements, including the 
functioning of such committees (Section 57 of RSA, 1996b). Sections 60 to 70 of the Constitution 
allows for similar control of internal arrangements of the National Council of Provinces.  
 
The 1996 Constitution also sought to entrench the principle of civil control of the military as was the 
case in the 1993 Interim Constitution. As such, Sections 201 and 202 (RSA, 1996a) highlight the 
commanding role of the President over the SANDF and the appointment of a Minister of Defence to 
assume political responsibility of the military. Crucially, the 1996 Constitution makes an addition to the 
1993 Interim Constitution through the legal requirement of a Defence Civilian Secretariat (RSA, 
1996a, Section 204). This added a layer of civilian oversight over the military. The 1996 Constitution 
therefore made permanent the notions of civilian control of the military and parliamentary oversight of 
defence. These foundations underpinned defence policies subsequent to 1996. 
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3.2.3 The 1996 White Paper on Defence 
 
The first major post-1994 defence-related policy was the 1996 White Paper on Defence. The title of 
the White Paper, Defence in a Democracy, indicates that post-1994 policy development followed the 
ideological shift toward liberal democracy. The White Paper on Defence also had the task of defining 
the country’s civil-military relations trajectory within a democratic context. 
 
It has already been established through legislation (the 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 
Constitution) that the military will remain subject to civilian control. This relation of powers is 
summarised in Chapter 3 of the White Paper (RSA, 1996b) which states that “the Chief of the SANDF 
enjoys executive military command of the armed forces; this command is exercised under the 
direction of the Minister of Defence in times of peace and under the direction of the President during a 
state of national defence; and the Minister is in turn accountable to Parliament and Cabinet for the 
SANDF.” This statement provides clear guidelines on how accountability should be ensured. The 
White Paper also recognises the need for public scrutiny of the military and transparency on military 
matters. In an effort to achieve the required balance, Chapter 3 of the White Paper (RSA, 1996b) 
identifies specific roles for Parliament in relation to the military, including: 
   
a. Parliament’s legislative powers regarding defence. 
b. Parliamentary approval of the annual defence budget. 
c. Reviews of the President’s decision to deploy the SANDF. 
d. The JSCD’s powers to investigate and make recommendations on defence matters. 
e. The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence’s role in providing oversight of Defence 
Intelligence. 
f. Parliament’s right to “independent and critical judgement on defence policy and practice.” 
 
By providing for constitutional parameters, a structure for civil control, the assurance of judicial control 
through the separation of powers, and clear roles for Parliament, the 1996 White Paper on Defence 
recognises the supporting structures for democratic civil-military relations. Chapter 3 of the White 
Paper (RSA, 1996b) further highlights core values of defence policy that are reconcilable with 
democratic civil-military relations. These included, for example, a need for military professionalism, 
including the “acceptance by military personnel of the principle of civil supremacy.” In order to achieve 
such high levels of professionalism, the White Paper notes the importance of education and training 
for military personnel. The White Paper also notes the responsibility of the government towards the 
military and the need for a balanced approach in their utilisation. Finally, the White Paper reflects on 
the importance of the relations between civil society and the SANDF. These focus points address 
several of the requirements for democratic civil-military relations as highlighted by Huntington (1957, 
pp. 83–85), Shiff (1995, p. 13), Williams (1998, pp. 39–40) and Hangii (2003, p. 16).  
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3.2.4 The 1998 Defence Review 
 
Following on the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review (RSA, 1998) aimed to 
provide long-term planning at a policy level based on the guidance of the White Paper. The Defence 
Review consulted “with Parliament and with broader civil-society in the form of business, labour, 
clergy, non-governmental organisations and community leadership” (RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 15, 
Section 10). The Review further cemented the relationship between Parliament and the DOD by 
highlighting the need for a “collaborative partnership” and recognises the oversight role of Parliament 
(RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 15, Section 11). Parliament’s role in compiling the Defence Review is also 
noteworthy as MPs formed part of the Working Group and subcommittees that drafted the Review 
(RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 1, Section 9). Furthermore, the Defence Review reiterates Parliamentary 
roles related to oversight: 
 
 Parliamentary debates on peace support operations are important and Parliamentary 
approval for such operations is required (RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 5, Section 4-5). 
 Parliament is empowered to review the decision of the President to deploy the SANDF in 
peace support operations (RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 5, Section 22). 
 Parliamentary approval of the Defence Review’s Force Design was sought (RSA, 1998, p. 
Chapter 8, Section 7). 
 Parliament remains responsible for oversight of finances, legislation and the policy framework 
of the military (RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 9, Section 2.1). 
 
4. Restructuring parliamentary oversight structures in the post-1994 environment 
 
The previous section established that, according to legislation and policy, Parliament was considered 
a crucial component of the changing civil-military relations dynamic in South Africa. Specific roles 
were identified for Parliament, notably in terms of oversight. It is thus necessary to review how 
Parliament as an institution set out to practically achieve these requirements. This can firstly be done 
by considering broader Parliamentary initiatives for creating oversight structures and, secondly, by 
reviewing the establishment of specific measures aimed at oversight of the military. 
 
4.1 Providing for oversight in the South African Parliament  
 
Reviewing the practical manifestation of policy and legislative ideals aimed at increasing 
Parliamentary oversight capacity is essential to determine whether the foundations exist for the 
fulfilment of oversight. The two sections below highlight broader Parliamentary initiatives to creating 
oversight-enhancing structures. 
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4.1.1 Developing the Committee System 
 
The utilisation of the committee system in Parliament changed drastically after 1994. Calland (1997, 
pp. 3–7) highlights a key difference in that before 1994 only 13 committees existed in Parliament and 
their meetings were closed to public scrutiny. The immediate post-1994 system saw the number of 
committees increase to more than 50 and committee meetings being opened to the public. Macozoma 
(1995, p. 112)  ascribes this to, inter alia, the ANC’s immediate post-1994 focus on the utilisation of 
the committee system as a means of ensuring enhanced accountability and oversight of the 
executive. It is thus unsurprising that the committees also received prominence in legislation. 
 
Section 58 of the Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) reflected the desire for the increased involvement 
of committees as it allowed for both the National Assembly and Senate45 to establish committees and 
determine the rules guiding such committees. The Interim Constitution further allowed for committees 
to sit at venues other than at parliament and, crucial to oversight, allowed for committees to summon 
persons and receive representations as requested. This focus on committees was transferred to the 
1996 Constitution with Sections 56 and 57 confirming the powers of committees (RSA, 1996a). 
Section 59 of the Constitution further calls for parliament to ensure public access to, and involvement 
in, committee work (RSA, 1996a). 
 
The legislative framework that created space for parliamentary committees also allowed for 
parliament to control these structures, notably through the Rules of Parliament. In February 1995, 
new rules for the National Assembly were drafted that stipulated the functions and roles of portfolio 
committees. Rule 52(1) and Rule 53 (Parliament of South Africa, 1995b, p. 9) note that a portfolio 
committee shall, inter alia: 
 
 Consider or deal with bills or other matters which are referred to it by the Speaker under these 
Rules, or by or under a resolution of the House. 
 Consider or deal with an appropriation or money bill or any aspect of an appropriation or 
money bill referred to it by the Speaker or the House. 
 Monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the 
legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, 
structure, personnel, policy formulation or any other matter it may consider relevant, of the 
government department or departments falling within the category of affairs consigned to the 
committee.  
 
From the above it is evident that there were various ways in which to establish parliamentary 
committees. These include establishment in terms of the Constitution, in terms of Statutes, in terms of 
the rules of Parliament, and in terms of a House resolution (Parliament of South Africa, 2011, pp. 12–
14). The structure of the new committees was aimed at ensuring maximum oversight over the various 
                                                          
45 The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) was formerly known as the Senate. 
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government departments. Committees were therefore established to mirror government departments, 
notably the portfolio committees of the National Assembly. As from 1999, under the National Council 
of Provinces (NCOP), a number of Select Committees were also established with the power of 
oversight, focusing on aspects affecting the various provinces (Parliament of South Africa, 1999d, p. 
53). However, due to comparatively lower number of MPs, these Select Committees are not linked to 
government structures. Each committee thus focuses on several government departments. 
Furthermore, joint committees were established that consisted of MPs from the National Assembly 
and the NCOP (Obiyo, 2006, pp. 63–68). The size of committees varied, but generally ranged 
between 15 and 25 MPs while the majority of committees were chaired by MPs from the ruling party 
(Calland, 1997, pp. 6–7).  
 
4.1.2 Additional oversight structures in the post-1994 South African Parliament 
 
In addition to the prominence of the rise of committees, two existing tools (structures) of oversight in 
Parliament were maintained and enhanced. First, parliamentary debates in the plenary remained a 
means of oversight. While plenary debates existed prior to 1994, its use was reinforced in both the 
1993 Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. The Interim Constitution focused on the notion of 
freedom of speech to allow for robust debate in both the National Assembly and the Senate (RSA, 
1993, p. Section 55). The Constitution (Section 57(2)) notes, inter alia, that the National Assembly 
should provide for the establishment and composition of committees and the involvement of minority 
parties in the procedures of the assembly (RSA, 1996a). Based on these fundamentals, Esau (2008, 
p. 98) postulates that the “constitutional mandate for oversight refers to both plenary and non-
plenary…activities.” The plenary also provides an opportunity for debate where an important issue 
requires broader debate beyond the scope of, for example, a committee setting that will likely receive 
less media and/or public focus (Nwuche, 2015, p. 455). The value of plenary debates to oversight, in 
the context of representative democracy, thus lies in the sense of collective ownership of debates and 
decisions. This value is also reflected in the Constitution that allocates decision-making to the 
assembly (plenary) (RSA, 1996a, p. Section 53). However, Shaw (1998, pp. 226–227) concludes that 
although plenaries are often the best-known feature of a parliament’s oversight function, such large 
meetings are not always effective. Plenaries, he argues, can be viewed as “a series of meetings of 
informal committees.” 
 
Second, parliamentary questions were also not a new phenomenon in post-1994 South Africa, but it 
was important to make provision for this practice to continue in an effort to enhance oversight. 
Tjønneland and Mathisen (2001) argue that while the Parliament drifted from the Westminster 
tradition, parliamentary questions remained as an important feature. In the first edition of the Rules of 
the National Assembly, Rules 191 to 201 make explicit provision for the utilisation of interpellations, 
oral and written questions by MPs to the various departmental ministers, the Deputy President and/or 
the President (Parliament of South Africa, 1994b).  
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4.2 Providing scope for military-specific oversight by Parliament in post-1994 South Africa 
 
The previous sections determined that oversight and accountability structures received attention in 
the immediate post-1994 period. Central to this was the rapid expansion of the committee system. 
Committees were therefore bound to be central to oversight of the military. Two key defence-related 
committees emerged in the post-1994 period to provide oversight of the military, namely the JSCD 
and Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV).46 A third committee, the Select 
Committee for Security and Constitutional Affairs in the NCOP, was established to deal with defence-
related matters on an ad hoc basis. However, given the wide scope of oversight of this committee, its 
largely provincial focus and the existence of a JSCD which comprises Members of the NCOP, the 
committee has a limited focus on defence. 
 
The establishment of the JSCD was of significance in the immediate post-1994 period as it played an 
important role in the difficult integration process of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and 
former non-statutory forces to form the SANDF (Ngculu, 2002, p. 180; Sylvester, 2011a, p. 15). The 
requirement for oversight of the military in this context was of such priority, that the Interim 
Constitution prescribed the establishment and functions of the JSCD. Section 228 of the Interim 
Constitution (RSA, 1993) determined the establishment of the JSCD which should consist “of 
members of all political parties holding more than 10 seats in the National Assembly and willing to 
participate in the committee.” Section 228(v) further crucially described the oversight powers and 
functions of the JSCD: 
 
The committee shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations regarding the 
budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the 
National Defence Force and to perform such other functions relating to parliamentary 
supervision of the Force as may be prescribed by law. 
 
In addition to these functions, the Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993, p. Sections 4-5) noted the 
requirement for the President to inform the JSCD of all military deployments when Parliament is not in 
sitting. This places the JSCD in a central position regarding the executive’s utilisation of the military. 
The JSCD thus enjoys a wide range of powers and played a key role in facilitating the 1998 Defence 
Review (Sylvester, 2011a, p. 15). As per legislative directive, Parliament also assigns general powers 
to all joint committees. The Joint Rules of Parliament allow committees to summon any person to give 
evidence, receive petitions, conduct public hearings, permit oral evidence, and meet at venues 
determined by it on any day and/or time (Joint Rules Committee Parliament of South Africa, 2008a, 
pp. 20–21). The PCDMV, in turn, was established under Rule 51 of the National Assembly Rules 
Book. This rule calls for the establishment of portfolio committees on governmental affairs and bills 
                                                          
46 The PCDMV was initially only known as the Portfolio Committee on Defence. However, for purposes of 
comparison in subsequent chapters, the Committee is referred to as the PCDMV throughout the study. 
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that may be assigned to it by the Speaker (Parliament of South Africa, 1995b, p. 8).47 The reason for 
the establishment and maintenance of two defence-related committees can thus largely be attributed 
to legislative requirements. Since Section 228 of the 1993 Interim Constitution remains in place, the 
JSCD cannot be dissolved. Section 228 of the 1993 Interim Constitution also does not explicitly state 
the review of bills as a function of the Committee, thus creating a potential gap in oversight and 
Parliament’s legislative function. The creation of the PCDMV in line with parliamentary rules and with 
functions including the consideration of bills therefore fills this void. The JSCD and PCDMV represent 
the ‘engine rooms’ of Parliament in terms of oversight of the military.  
 
5. Parliamentary oversight of the military from 1994 to 2004 
 
Chapter 3 provided broad criteria for an analysis of oversight of the military. This section aims to apply 
these criteria to the South African Parliament’s oversight of the military during the first two parliaments 
(1994 to 2004). Oversight tools utilised, focus areas, lower-order focus areas, and potential 
weaknesses for defence oversight during this period are reviewed. Addendum B provides a summary 
of the findings of this review and can be read in conjunction with the sections below. 
 
5.1 Oversight tools utilised in defence oversight 
 
The following subsections review several oversight tools that are utilised to conduct oversight of the 
military. These include parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, special defence inquiries, 
oversight visits and study tours as well as the use of external audit. 
 
5.1.1 Parliamentary debates 
 
Parliamentary debates on defence can take place either in the plenary or committee level. Yamamoto 
(2007, p. 62) defines debates as “oral exchanges of opinions that are intended to facilitate the 
chamber’s collective decision-making on certain issues.” While frequent debates itself does not 
ensure quality oversight, regular engagements are essential to broader oversight efforts.  
 
When reviewing debates in the plenary to determine a focus on defence matters, it is essential to 
remain as close to the definition of debates as possible. As such, the basic requirement for a debate 
is for ‘exchanges of opinion’ to take place. While defence-related matters are noted in some speeches 
by MPs, this does not necessarily translate to a defence-centred exchange of opinion. For the 
purpose of this study, only in-depth debates on defence (where a defence-related topic was 
scheduled for debate) are considered.48 A review of debates in the Houses of Parliament between 
                                                          
47 See Section 4.1.1 for the roles of portfolio committees as per the National Assembly Rules. 
48 In holding with the definition, Member statements on defence, the introduction of defence-related bills, the 
Minister’s statements on defence, and State of the Nation references to defence were not considered as defence-
related debates as no substantial exchange of opinion took place.  Similarly, the NCOP often notes a discussion 
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1994 and 2004 reveal limited focus on military affairs. The National Assembly held the majority of 
debates on defence, with the Appropriation Bill and Adjusted Appropriation Bill being debated every 
year. These defence budget votes often resulted in robust debate covering an array of focus areas 
related to defence.49 Furthermore, the introduction of defence-related bills, such as the 1995 Defence 
Amendment Bill and the 1996 White Paper on Defence, also resulted in extended debate. The 
majority of parliamentary debates on defence therefore focused on budgetary and policy-related 
matters. Few other specific defence-centered debates were scheduled. The exceptions to this include 
a 1997 debate on the government ban on landmines; a 1998 debate on the theft of weapons from 
military bases; two debates in 1998 on the situation in Lesotho following the SANDF’s involvement; 
and two debates (1999 and 2002) on the SDPP (Parliament of South Africa, 1997a, p. 434; 1998, pp. 
2819, 6763, 7317; 1999c, p. 807; 2002a, p. 6593). The Senate/NCOP had no dedicated defence-
related debates between 1994 and 2004, except for the consideration of the appropriation bills, 
adjusted appropriation bills and other ad hoc introduced bills referred to it for approval through the 
legislative process. Finally, although joint sittings of the two Houses of Parliament are limited, one 
defence-specific debate was held in 2000 that considered peacekeeping and the humanitarian role of 
the SANDF (Parliament of South Africa, 2000c, p. 23). 
 
In terms of committee work, the JSCD and PCDMV met with varied frequency between 1998 and 
2004 (See Graph 4.1).50 Addendum D provides a list of all JSCD and PCDMV meetings between 
1998 and 2004. The JSCD was more active than the PCDMV in 1998. This can largely be attributed 
to the work on the Defence Review as a number of meetings on this matter were scheduled. 
However, except for a resurgence in 2001, the regularity of committee meetings by the JSCD 
declined from 1999 onwards. The 2001 surge can largely be attributed to the JSCD’s work on the 
SDPP that comprised nine of its 23 meetings for the year (PMG, 2017a). These meetings were held 
jointly with the PCDMV and are reflected twice in the statistics for 2001.51 The regularity of PCDMV 
meetings stabilised from 2001 onwards and fluctuated between 18 and 25 meetings per year.  
 
In order to contextualise defence committee’s frequency of meetings, it may be of value to compare it 
to that of other committees, specifically committees in the security cluster (See Graph 4.2). From such 
a comparison it is clear that the reduced frequency of JSCD meetings after 1998, resulted in it 
comparing unfavourably to other committees. Post-2000, the PCDMV’s frequency of meetings 
compared more favourably to that of other committees. However, in general, the Portfolio Committee 
on Police maintained a much higher frequency of meetings than other committees in the cluster 
(PMG, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
on Defence appropriation or adjusted appropriation. However, where these votes are simply adopted and not 
thoroughly debated they were also excluded.   
49 See National Assembly Hansard 1994 – 2004 (Parliament of South Africa). 
50 Committee minutes are based on records kept by the non-governmental organisation, the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (PMG). This is due to the lack of official physical or electronic committee minutes being kept by 
Parliament’s Committee Section (see similar concerns raised by Govender et al. (2007) p. 71). PMG minutes of 
parliamentary committee meetings can only be traced back to the beginning of 1998.  
51 Integrated statistics are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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While the activities of the PCDMV and JSCD are reflected, an important demarcation to the study 
should be added in terms of the Select Committee for Security and Constitutional Affairs. While 
crucial to note the existence of this Committee and the fact that it discusses defence matters on an ad 
hoc basis, the work of this Committee can largely be excluded for the purposes of this study. For 
example, between 1998 and 2004, the Committee held only 12 meetings related to defence. Crucially, 
ten of these meetings related to the discussion on legislation (bills) referred to the Select Committee 
by the PCDMV. Only in May 2001 and June 2003 were meetings held to discuss defence-related 
matters, including the defence budget (PMG, 2001a, 2003d). While the value of the Select Committee 
for Security and Constitutional Affairs in evaluating legislation is apparent, its oversight role in terms of 
the military is highly limited. This is largely linked to the wide range of departments overseen by the 
committee, resulting in little time for a portfolio such as defence that has limited provincial impact. 
 
Graph 4.1 JSCD and PCDMV Meetings: 1998 - 200452 
   
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2004) 
 
                                                          
52 For 2004a, data only reflects information up to the date of the general elections (the end of the Second 
Parliament). 
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Graph 4.2 JSCD and PCDMV meetings compared to other Security Cluster Committee 
meetings: 1998 - 200453 
 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2004) 
 
5.1.2 Parliamentary questions54 
 
Questions from MPs to the executive can either be submitted orally or in written form.55 A review of 
questions to the Minister of Defence between 1994 and 2004 reveals a high number of questions. In 
total, 447 questions were posed during the First Parliament and 590 during the Second Parliament, 
bringing the total number of questions on defence during the first ten years of democracy to 1 037 
(See Graph 4.3).  
 
Three immediate assumptions can be drawn from the frequency of questions. First, this oversight tool 
underwent a period of incremental use over the two parliaments as it grew from a 53 questions in 
1994 to a high of 175 questions in 2001. Second, there is a significant disparity in the frequency of 
questions posed by MPs of the two houses of Parliament. Defence-related questions posed by the 
Senate/NCOP decreased significantly during the Second Parliament. Between 1999 and 2004, only 
19 defence-related questions were raised by MPs form the NCOP, while MPs from the National 
Assembly posed 571 questions. This decrease in NCOP questioning in relation to defence coincides 
with the decreased activity of the JSCD (Note that the JSCD is a joint committee which includes MPs 
from the National Assembly and NCOP). Third, it is noticeable that fewer questions were posed 
during election years, including 1994, 1999 and 2004. Both in 1994 and 1999, only 53 questions were 
asked per year while 21 questions on defence were posed in 2004 prior to the election.  
                                                          
53 For 2004, data only reflects information up the date of the general elections (the end of the Second 
Parliament). 
54 Statistics on parliamentary questions were compiled from National Assembly Questions and Replies as well as 
Senate/National Council of Provinces Questions and Replies, as produced annually by Parliament. 
55 As is permitted by House Rules, questions that are submitted for written reply may be raised as oral questions 
should the opportunity arise in either the National Assembly or NCOP. In such cases, for the purpose of his 
study, questions are considered as oral questions. 
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Graph 4.3 National Assembly and Senate/National Council of Provinces questions to the 
Minister of Defence: 1994 - 200456 
 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and Senate/NCOP Question Papers (1994 – 2004) 
 
Questions to the Minister of Defence can also be viewed in terms of a breakdown between written 
and oral questions (See Graph 4.4). Oral questions are posed to the Minister during his/her 
appearance in the Houses of Parliament. When reviewing this breakdown, it is clear that there has 
generally been a balance between the number of written and oral questions, except for 2001 and 
2002 where oral questions outnumbered the number of written questions.  
 
Graph 4.4 Written and oral questions to the Minister of Defence: 1994 - 200457 
 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP Question Papers (1994 – 2004) 
                                                          
56 1999a refers to the period prior to the general elections in 1999 and thus falls within the First Parliament. 
1999b falls in the Second Parliament. For 2004a, data only reflects information up to the date of the general 
elections (the end of the Second Parliament). 
57 1999a refers to the period prior to the general elections in 1999 and thus falls within the First Parliament. 
1999b falls in the Second Parliament. For 2004a, data only reflects information up the date of the general 
elections (the end of the Second Parliament). 
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Finally, it is crucial to determine the relevance of parliamentary questions as this is linked to the 
effectiveness thereof as an oversight tool. When reviewing questions, it is possible to determine 
several main categories of questions that occur frequently.58 Key categories that are apparent in 
parliamentary questions on defence include matters related to (1) personnel, (2) the defence budget 
and other military spending, (3) defence policy and legislation, (4) the procurement and sale of military 
equipment for/by the DOD and broader defence industry, (5) operational aspects, including the 
deployment of the SANDF, and (6) individual DOD members. Further categories that relate to the 
focus areas identified in this study include (7) training and education, (8) gender and race, (9) defence 
infrastructure and equipment, and (10) military discipline. Lastly, (11) a category for questions of a 
purely political nature was included. This refers to questions relating specifically to the Minister and 
other Members of the executive, as well as questions where political determinants are at play, such 
as international relations.  
 
Table 4.1 Categories of parliamentary questions on defence asked: 1994 - 2004 
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1994 6 1 14 5 4 2 1 3 1 10 1 5 53 
1995 14 9 8 8 12 2 1 7 4 10 2 6 83 
1996 33 11 15 7 6 5 1 5 4 4 1 5 97 
1997 25 12 6 16 5 4 2 13 4 14 7 7 115 
1998 17 8 8 10 3 0 0 22 6 4 8 6 92 
1999a 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 7 
1999b 5 1 8 4 3 4 0 5 2 5 4 5 46 
2000 4 14 15 3 13 2 5 9 2 3 6 7 83 
2001 12 20 34 17 18 9 4 16 7 13 6 19 175 
2002 22 18 34 12 22 8 4 10 5 13 3 11 162 
2003 8 14 23 4 11 7 6 11 2 6 3 8 103 
2004a 4 1 4 0 2 1 2 1 2 4 0 0 21 
TOTAL 150 111 169 86 100 44 26 104 39 86 43 79 1037 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP Questions and Replies (1994 – 2004) 
 
A review of the parliamentary questions during the first ten years of democracy reveals a significant 
focus on policy matters that is in line with the need to establish defence policy in the immediate post-
1994 period (See Table 4.1). Personnel-, budget-, infrastructure/equipment- and operational-related 
                                                          
58 The construct of the categories of questions is based on two overlapping determinants. Firstly, questions with a 
recurring theme, such as personnel-, policy and budgetary-related questions were used to determine overarching 
categories. Secondly, the focus areas identified in this study (See Chapter 3) were used to determine categories 
where a sufficient number of such questions were found. Efforts were made to identify the central focus point of 
each question to determine the category to which a question belongs. However, the categorisation of questions is 
admittedly subjective.  
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questions make up the bulk of the remaining questions asked. Personnel-related questions received 
more attention during the First Parliament, while budgetary-related questions increased substantially 
in the Second Parliament. Other lower-order focus areas received comparatively less attention in 
terms of parliamentary questioning (the utilisation of questions per category is expanded on further in 
discussions on oversight focus areas, notably Sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
5.1.3 Special defence inquiries 
 
Special defence inquiries are characterised by in-depth engagement on specific defence-related 
aspects. An overview of JSCD and PCDMV activities between 1998 and 2003 reveals limited 
utilisation of this oversight tool. One significant defence inquiry was, however, conducted in 2001. 
This was a joint defence inquiry between the JSCD and PCDMV into the SDPP. Although this can be 
considered a special defence inquiry, it did not take the form of an independent inquiry by the two 
committees. Rather, several joint meetings were held between 14 November 2001 and 4 December 
2001 when briefings were provided to the committees by government’s investigating agencies (PMG, 
2001n). Further, the JSCD conducted public hearings and at least two meetings on the language 
policy of the SANDF in 1999 (PMG, 1998f, 1998g). While public and/or expert opinion was sought and 
this represented a deeper level of inquiry, it still falls short of the criteria set for a special defence 
inquiry (See Chapter 3). In addition, although the development of subcommittees were discussed in 
the JSCD in 2000 (PMG, 2001c), no mention is made of the subsequent work of such committees. 
The only functioning subcommittee established during the Second Parliament was the Parliamentary 
Integration Oversight Committee. Although exact minutes of meetings held by this committee are not 
available, several briefings were made to the committee by the SANDF Integration Committee and the 
BMATT (le Roux, 2005, p. 254). As such, the utilisation of subcommittees as a means of conducting 
special defence inquiries was not extensively used in the first and second parliaments. 
 
5.1.4 Oversight visits and study tours 
 
The effectiveness of oversight visits and study tours should ideally be measured through its impact, 
which is difficult to determine. However, a basic condition for an oversight visit or study tour to have 
impact is for it to be conducted within the rules of parliament and for concrete recommendations to 
emanate therefrom. The 1995 version of the Rules of Parliament (Rule 53 (f)) established that 
committees may “conduct its proceedings or any aspect of its work, at any venue it deems to be the 
most suitable” while Rule 61 stated that “[t]he report of a portfolio committee shall be presented to the 
House by the chairperson or another member of the committee” (Parliament of South Africa, 1995b, 
pp. 10–11). The Rules therefore provide a requirement for a report to be submitted to the National 
Assembly and/or NCOP by any committee on its activities, including oversight visits and study tours. 
Reports are officially published in Parliament’s ATC Reports.  
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A Review of the ATCs between 1994 and 2004 reveal that the Parliament’s defence committees 
conducted two study tours. In 1998, the PCDMV conducted a study tour to Germany, Switzerland and 
Belgium. The visit focused on integration and the establishment of a Military Ombud office (Parliament 
of South Africa, 1999b). In 2001, the PCDMV and JSCD jointly conducted an oversight visit to Nigeria 
focusing on, inter alia, peacekeeping in Africa, force preparation, border control and parliamentary 
oversight of the military (Parliament of South Africa, 2001b). Official reports were tabled for these 
study tours, in line with the parliamentary requirements. However, only one such report was published 
in the ATCs for oversight visits. In 1994, the JSCD visited various military bases in an effort to 
observe the integration process. The report included several recommendations to the Minister of 
Defence and Chief of the SANDF (Parliament of South Africa, 1994a).  
 
While only one report was published in the ATC, Committee minutes between 1998 and 2004 reveal 
that other oversight visits did take place. In 2001, the Chairperson and eight members of the JSCD 
visited the territorial reserve forces in Kirkwood and Grahamstown. The content of the visit was 
opened for discussion by the JSCD in a June 2001 meeting (PMG, 2001i). The 2003 Annual Report of 
the PCDMV also noted three oversight visits by smaller groups of MPs on the Committee to Tellumat 
(Pty) Ltd (a defence company), the Artillery Formation in Potchefstroom, and the De Brug military 
training area (PMG, 2000a). No official reports of these visits are reflected in available committee 
minutes or in the ATCs and therefore the direct impact of such oversight visits can be questioned. 
 
5.1.5 Use of external audit 
 
During the period under review, the use of external audit by Parliament started off slowly, but 
increased over the years. External audit opinions utilised by Parliament were mostly that of the 
Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). A review of the PCDMV and JSCD meetings between 1998 
and 2004 reveals some briefings to the committees making reference to auditing work completed by 
the AGSA. In September 2000, the JSCD received a briefing of an audit on the integration process 
while an August 2003 meeting made reference to the AGSA Report on excess stock in the SANDF 
(PMG, 2000b, 2003g). Over this period, however, no direct briefings by the AGSA to the JSCD or 
PCDMV were recorded. On only three occasions (1998, 2002 and 2004) did committee minutes make 
reference to the AGSA’s input on the budgets of the military (PMG, 1998c, 2002f, 2004a). The 
committee did respond positively through tabling formal reports in relation to the Ombudsman Report 
on Salary Adjustments in 1995 (Parliament of South Africa, 1995a). Similarly, in 2001, the JSCD 
tabled a formal report (Joint Investigation Report into the SDPP) that, in part, responded to the 
Special Review by the Auditor-General of the Selection Process of SDPP (Parliament of South Africa, 
2000b, 2001a). The irregular use of external audit thus undermined the potential impact thereof as an 
oversight tool. 
 
Of specific concern regarding the use of external audit is the misalignment between the work of the 
AGSA and information reflected in the minutes of the JSCD and PCDMV committees. In 1996 and 
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1998, for example, the AGSA compiled two reports dealing with (1) performance of the DOD during 
the last 6 months of 1995 and, (2) an audit report on the annual financial statements and vehicle fleet 
management in the SANDF (Auditor-General of South Africa, 1996, 1998; Parliament of South Africa, 
1999a). In 2000, a Special Report of the Auditor-General on the Investigation into the Stockholding of 
the DOD was also referred to the PCDMV (Parliament of South Africa, 2000a). Although submitted to 
Parliament and referred to the PCDMV, the 1998 and 2000 reports do not reflect in Committee 
discussions of the JSCD or PCDMV. It should be noted that the 2000 AGSA report on Stockholding 
was deliberated on and the DOD called for questioning by the SCOPA (PMG, 2000g).59 
 
5.2 Focus areas of defence oversight  
 
The sections below review to what extent the South African Parliament focused on several key focus 
areas related to the military. These focus areas include the defence budget, defence policy, 
procurement, human resources and the deployment of the military. 
 
5.2.1 Defence budget 
 
Since 1994, the defence budget received regular attention by Parliament, both ex post and ex ante. It 
is reflected in the ATCs of Parliament that the defence budget was submitted to Parliament each year 
between 1994 and 2004. The defence budget, as well as the annual adjusted appropriation, resulted 
in robust debates in the National Assembly and the Senate/NCOP during this period.60 This is in line 
with the regulatory requirement for parliamentary appropriation of the budget as per Section 228 (2) of 
the 1993 Interim Constitution and Section 77 of the Constitution. A review of JSCD and PCDMV 
meetings between 1998 and 2004 reveals regular engagement on budgetary aspects (See Table 4.2). 
These meetings reflect that, during the period under review, the DOD budget was analysed by one or 
both committees each year. In addition, the DOD’s medium-term budget was also reviewed regularly. 
This indicates that both short- and medium-term budgetary imperatives received oversight by 
Parliament.  
 
Budgetary aspects received increasing attention in terms of parliamentary questions. During the First 
Parliament, 43 questions related to the DOD’s budget and/or expenditure were posed by MPs. This 
increased to 58 during the Second Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Minutes of the SCOPA are not available on PMG prior to 2000. Committee minutes of the SCOPA requested 
from Parliament’s Committee Section for meetings prior to 2000 were also not available. 
60 Refer to the National Assembly and NCOP Hansards (1994 – 2004). 
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Table 4.2 Defence Committee Meetings on DOD Budgets: 1998 - 2004 
 JSCD PCDMV 
1998 29 October: DOD Medium-term budget 20 May: DOD Budget 1998/99 
1999 23 February: Defence 1999/2000 budget 
20 October: The defence budget cycle 
20 October: The defence budget cycle 
2000 4 October: DOD Medium-term budget 03 April: DOD Budget 2003/04 
2001  31 May: DOD Budget 2001/02 
1 June: DOD Budget 2001/02 
2002 25 October: DOD budget and planning for 
2003/04 
8 May: DOD Budget 2002/03 
2003 13 March: DOD Budget 2003/04 13 May: DOD Budget 2003/04 
16 September: Adjusted budget for 
2003/04 
2004 17 February: DOD Budget 2004/05 No meetings prior to the end of the 
Second Parliament. 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 to 2004) 
 
5.2.2 Defence policy 
 
Given the transition to democracy and the shift in civil-military relations, alterations to defence policy 
in the immediate post-1994 period were required. The role of Parliament was crucial to provide 
credence to the ‘defence in democracy’ approach as is reflected in the 1996 White Paper on Defence 
(RSA, 1996b). Calland (1997, p. 15) notes that between 1994 and 1997, the JSCD in particular 
became increasingly involved in oversight of policy development.  
 
The National Assembly and NCOP plenaries debated defence-related bills frequently when tabled. 
Between 1994 and 2004, 11 bills and two policy documents were debated by the Houses of 
Parliament.61 This is in line with the constitutional requirements for Parliament to pass legislation 
(RSA, 1996a). In terms of Committee discussions regarding defence policy, JSCD and PCDMV 
records available after 1998 reveal regular focus on matters of defence policy and legislation (See 
Table 4.3). From this overview it is evident that the legislative function dominated the first and second 
parliaments and significant time was spent on finalising legislation. It also emerges that the PCDMV 
played a more significant role in dealing with legislation than the JSCD who had more discussions on 
policy matters. This likely relates to the fact that proposed bills are only considered by Joint 
Committees when a Bill is expressly referred to such committees (See for example Rule 111 of the 
                                                          
61 Refer to the National Assembly and NCOP Hansards (1994 – 2004). 
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Joint rules of Parliament (Parliament of South Africa, 1997b)). As such, briefings on possible 
legislation to the JSCD would only have been for information while the actual processing of draft bills 
would be considered by the PCDMV.  
 
Table 4.3 Defence Committee meetings focusing on policy and legislation: 1998 - 2004 
 JSCD PCDMV 
1998 The DOD Language Policy 
The 1998 Defence Review 
Military Veterans Affairs Bill 
Military Disciplinary Code (Defence Act) 
Defence Special Tribunal Bill 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance 
Bill 
Demobilisation Amendment Bill 
1999 White Paper on Defence Industries 
Civil-military relations in South Africa 
Transformation policy in the SANDF 
Military Discipline Supplementary 
Measures Draft Bill 
Draft Defence Bill 
Civil-military relations in South Africa 
2000 The Armscor Bill 
 
The Armscor Bill 
Draft Defence Bill 
Conventional Arms Control Bill 
2001 The DOD HIV/Aids Policy 
Policy on Recognition of Non-Statutory 
Forces for Pension Benefits 
The Conventional Arms Control Bill 
Demobilisation Amendment Bill 
Termination of Integration Intake Bill 
2002 None Defence Bill 
Anti-personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
Burundi Appropriation Bill 
National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
2003 White Paper on Peacekeeping 
Defence Foreign Relations Policy 
Equal opportunities policy 
Transformation policy in the SANDF 
The Armscor Bill 
Anti-personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
Project Phoenix (phasing out Commandos) 
White Paper on Defence Industries 
2004 None Common African Defence Security Policy 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2004) 
 
The utilisation of oral and written questions on defence offers an additional oversight tool to review 
defence policy. An analysis of questions between 1994 and 2004 reveals that the majority of 
questions asked were policy-related questions (See Table 4.1). A total of 169 such questions were 
posed by MPs during the first two parliaments. Of further interest is the fact that policy-related 
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questions became increasingly prominent during the Second Parliament and focus on such questions 
extended beyond Parliament’s work on the White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. 
These questions often focused on the implementation of earlier policy decisions. 
 
5.2.3 Defence procurement 
 
Defence-related procurement requires constant oversight as procurement is an ongoing process in 
the defence environment. Griffiths (in Olson et al., 2008, p. 236) notes the importance of 
parliamentary oversight of procurement “due to the controversy generated by arms sales, their 
technical complexity, and the potential for corruption often associated with such lucrative 
transactions.” Oversight of procurement therefore provides a good indication of the level of 
accountability achieved through parliamentary oversight.  
 
In terms of committee work, procurement received regular attention between 1998 and the end of the 
Second Parliament. In March 1998, for example, the JSCD received a briefing on Defence Acquisition 
Management (PMG, 1998b). In the same year, procurement also featured regularly in engagements 
on the Defence Review. In-depth scrutiny of procurement policies and processes in the DOD came to 
the fore during and after 1999 with oversight of the SDPP. While 1999 saw the JSCD and PCDMV 
deliberate the Defence Industry White Paper and the Armscor Act, it was in 2001 that both these 
Committees resorted to in-depth oversight of procurement during presentations on the Joint 
Investigation Report into the SDPP. Between 14 November 2001 and 4 December 2001, nine joint 
meetings were held on the SDPP and the report officially adopted by the Committees (PMG, 2001n). 
Furthermore, the SCOPA held a high number of meetings on the SDPP between 2000 and 2001. At 
least 17 SCOPA meetings were held on this topic with a final committee report adopted on 11 
December 2001 (PMG, 2001j).  
 
Despite this in-depth oversight of the procurement process in 2001, there has been widespread 
criticism of the way Parliament conducted oversight of the SDPP. Griffiths (in Olson et al., 2008, pp. 
236–238) concludes that oversight of this process revealed the negative impact of party-discipline as 
well as the lack of capacity and expertise of parliamentary committees to conduct in-depth oversight 
of procurement. Sylvester and Seegers (2011, p. 58) confirm these concerns by noting that 
Parliament, notably the JSCD, must approve all major arms procurements, but that the committee 
“has faced is the high rate of turnover among members, members’ limited expertise, and insufficient 
research support. Despite its effort, the JSCD often lags behind the SANDF in understanding defence 
issues.” Obiyo (2007, p. 61) in turn notes that the SCOPA also fumbled in its investigations due to 
pressure form the executive. In essence, the marginalisation of Parliament and its oversight process 
vis-à-vis the power of the executive branch of government is one of the main weak points that 
characterised the SDPP process and subsequent investigations (Sylvester & Seegers, 2011, p. 73). 
This imbalance in power is in line with concerns identified in the pre-1994 period (See Section 4.2). 
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Following the 2001 inquiry, the focus of oversight on procurement fell largely on discussions regarding 
the National Conventional Arms Control Bill and annual reports of the National Arms Control 
Committee (NCACC) (PMG, 2002d, 2003h). The NCACC reports to Parliament on all international 
arms sales and procurement by the South African government and private institutions, as enacted in 
2002 (RSA, 2002b). A key concern regarding oversight emanates from Section 21(3)(b) of the 
NCACC Act that requires the NCACC to make quarterly and annual reports to a committee of 
Parliament (RSA, 2002b). A review of JSCD and PCDMV meetings in 2003 show that only the annual 
report and one quarterly report were considered by the JSCD (PMG, 2003i).  
 
The need for information on - and oversight of - defence procurement is arguably also demonstrated 
by the number of parliamentary questions related to defence. Between 1994 and 2004, 86 questions 
on defence procurement and the sales of arms to others states were posed by MPs. A significant 
portion of these do, however, relate to the sale of arms. It can therefore be expected that the regular 
reporting on such sales by the NCACC after 2002 should reduce questions in this regard. This decline 
is evident in 2003, for example, when only 4 questions related to procurement and the sales of arms 
were posed (See Table 4.1).  
 
5.2.4 Human resources 
 
Human resources and related personnel matters received significant attention during the first two 
democratic parliaments. This is most evident in the 150 personnel-related parliamentary questions 
posed between 1994 and 2004.  In addition, 39 questions related to individuals serving in the DOD 
were also posed, the majority of which related to conditions of employment (See Table 4.1). These 
questions reveal that one of the primary reasons for the focus on human resources is most likely the 
complex process of integration62 and force rationalisation in the post-1994 period. This focus is also 
reflected in the establishment of a Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee as a subcommittee 
of the JSCD that provided oversight of the integration process (le Roux, 2005, p. 254).   
 
The work of the JSCD and PCDMV on human resources between 1998 and 2004 reflects the 
prioritisation thereof by committees. Committees paid specific attention to Force Structure as a subset 
of human resources matters. In 1998, the JSCD discussed the Force Structure as part of the Defence 
Review (PMG, 1998e). In February 2003, the JSCD also received a dedicated briefing on the 2010 
Human Resources Strategy (PMG, 2003f). Furthermore, the SANDF personnel component regularly 
formed part of deliberations on the DOD budget. Other discussions on human resources aspects that 
featured as part of committee meetings are reflected in Table 4.4, revealing continued committee 
engagement. 
 
 
                                                          
62 The integration process refers to the integration of the South African Defence Force with non-statutory forces, 
notably Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, as well as the military forces of the 
former homeland states to form the new SANDF. 
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Table 4.4 Major human resources aspects addressed by committees: 1998 - 2004 
 JSCD PCDMV 
1998 Defence Review discussions on force 
structure/force design 
Force rationalisation 
None 
1999 Force rationalisation 
Human resource related Initiatives 
Force rationalisation 
 
2000 Setai Commission recommendations on 
human resources 
Audit report on force integration 
Force rationalisation 
2001 Integration report 
Setai Commission recommendations on 
human resources 
Equal opportunities 
Human Resource Development 
Termination of Integration Intake Bill 
2002 None None 
2003 Human Resources Strategy 2010 
Integration and transformation in the SA 
Navy  
Integration and transformation in the SA 
Army 
Integration and transformation in the 
SAMHS 
Force design and phasing out of 
Commandos 
Integration and transformation in the SA Air 
Force  
2004 None None 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2004) 
 
5.2.5 Deployment of the military 
 
The SANDF was frequently deployed for military operations both inside and outside South Africa’s 
borders between 1994 and 2004. Clear legislative guidelines for such deployments were provided for 
in both the 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. The two constitutions overlapped in 
their directives regarding the deployment of the military. Summarising from Section 201 of the 
Constitution, the President may authorise the ‘employment’ of the Defence Force (1) in co-operation 
with the police service, (2) in defence of the Republic, and/or (3) in fulfilment of an international 
obligation. Later legislation, through Section 18(1) of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002), also permits 
the Minister of Defence to authorise the employment of the Defence Force for service inside the 
Republic or in international waters.  
 
For both deployments, according to the Constitution and the Defence Act, provision is made for 
parliamentary oversight. Section 201(3) of the Constitution states that, should the Defence Force be 
employed, the President must inform Parliament of (a) the reasons for the employment of the Defence 
Force; (b) any place where the force is being employed; (c) the number of people involved; and (d) 
the period for which the force is expected to be employed. In addition to these requirements, 
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subsections 18(2)(e) of the Defence Act also advises the President or Minister to inform Parliament of 
the expected expenditure of the relevant deployment. Furthermore, Section 201(4) of the Constitution 
notes that “[i]f Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed 
… the President must provide the information required [above] to the appropriate oversight 
committee.”  
 
In addition to the guidelines regarding the oversight of parliament in the Constitution, certain sections 
of the 1993 interim Constitution should also be considered for the 1994 to 2004 period, as these 
sections were retained under the 1996 Constitution.  In terms of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) 
Schedule 6, Transitional Arrangements Clause 24, Sections 224 to 228 of the Interim Constitution 
remain in operation. These Sections have an impact on parliamentary oversight of defence 
deployments as they provide legislative guidelines for the JSCD’s role. Section 228(4) of the Interim 
Constitution stipulates that: 
 
The President shall, when the National Defence Force is employed for service referred to in  
section 227 (1)(a), (b) or (e), forthwith inform Parliament of the reasons for such 
employment. 
If, in the case of such an employment referred to in section 227 (1) (a) or (b), Parliament is 
not sitting, the President shall summon the joint standing committee referred to in subsection 
(3) to meet expeditiously, but not later than 14 days after the commencement of such 
employment, and shall inform the committee of the reasons for such employment. 
Parliament may by resolution terminate any employment referred to in 227 (1)(a), (b) or (e), 
but such termination of employment shall not affect the validity of anything done in terms of 
such employment up to the date of such termination, or any right, privilege, obligation or 
liability acquired, accrued or incurred as at the said date and by virtue of such employment. 
 
Given the specific role of the JSCD in reviewing SANDF deployments and the power to terminate 
deployments, it is of value to review the committee’s activity in this regard. The SANDF’s first major 
foreign deployment in the post-1994 period was Operation Boleas, a regional military intervention in 
Lesotho (Neethling, 2006). This first external deployment already showed concerns in terms of 
parliamentary oversight. While the deployment commenced on 22 September 1998, the Joint 
Standing Committee only received a briefing on the matter on 2 November 1998. It should be noted, 
however, that this was a rather extensive briefing on Operation Boleas by the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, and the Operational 
Commander, Colonel Robbie Hartslief (PMG, 1998i). Nonetheless, the inaction by Parliament shows 
a lack of immediate oversight capacity to deal with deployments. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
ATC’s reveal that Parliament indeed received the Presidential Letter of Deployment of the SANDF to 
Lesotho on 22 September 1998, but only deliberated on it more than a month later (ATC No 117 of 
1998).  
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The SANDF peacekeeping deployment to Burundi that commenced on 29 October 2001, reflected the 
country’s first foray into international peacekeeping operations (ACCORD, 2007, p. 26; Engelbrecht, 
2009a). It should be noted that the roles prescribed for Parliament in oversight of defence 
deployments as per the Constitution and the Defence Act were maintained in the 1998 White Paper 
on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. Section 7.3 of the White Paper (RSA, 
1998) notes the following procedures when the President employs the SANDF in peacekeeping roles: 
 
 The President will promptly and in appropriate detail inform Parliament, if in session, or, if 
Parliament is not in session, the appropriate Parliamentary Committees, as to the reasons for 
the deployment; the place where the force is to be deployed; the number of persons involved; 
and the expected duration of the deployment. 
 Those Parliamentary Committees with a direct interest in South Africa’s involvement in peace 
support operations - the Parliamentary Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence 
and Finance - should be briefed on the preparation for the peace support operation in 
question. 
 The Parliamentary Committees must be informed of the proposed entry and exit criteria and 
risks involved, and the Treasury Committee on the financial implications of the operation in 
the operation. 
 The Parliamentary Committees should be informed of the proposed command and control 
arrangements and the details of the proposed force, as well as the proposed [Rules of 
Engagment] and the proposed withdrawal plans for the force in question. 
 Documentation must be provided to parliamentarians in a timely fashion to expedite their 
decision. This would outline to the parliamentarians whether the operation, in the opinions of 
those state departments involved in preparing for the operation, accords with South African 
national interests, national policy and foreign policy objectives. 
 
While the above suggested guidelines were put forward in 1998, peacekeeping largely escaped such 
levels of oversight. According to the ATC, the presidential letter of deployment for the SANDF mission 
to Burundi was submitted to Parliament only two days after the deployment date of 29 October 2001 
(ATC No 142 of 2001). On 30 October 2001, the JSCD held its first meeting that touched on the 
Burundi deployment. Subsequent meetings on the deployment were held in November 2001 and 
March 2002 (PMG, 2001f). While this sequence of events highlig ht a more structured oversight than, 
for example, the Lesotho case, concerns did emerge. The haste with which the deployment took 
place did not allow for thorough engagement by Parliament. Furthermore, a Cabinet Memorandum 
approving the deployment was only signed in February 2002 (ACCORD, 2007, pp. 26–27). 
Furthermore, in the first JSCD meeting on the deployment, MPs raised concern about not being 
properly briefed on the deployment and having to rely on media reports for information (PMG, 2001q). 
This unfolding of events thus exposes that even when constitutional protocol is followed, it does not 
necessarily ensure thorough oversight, especially in terms of the stringent procedures suggested in 
the White Paper on .South African Participation in International Peace Missions.   
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Except for additional meetings on the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and the White Paper on 
Peacekeeping, which did not deal with actual SANDF deployments, the JSCD did not receive any 
further dedicated briefings on defence deployments between 1998 and March 2004. This comes 
despite the fact that Parliaments ATCs reveal letters of deployment submitted from the President 
regarding deployments to, inter alia, Angola, Tanzania and the DRC (in 1998), Mozambique (1999 – 
2001), the Comoros (2001) and Iran (2004). As such, while the executive complied with the formal 
legislative requirements for military deployments, the JSCD did not deliberate on all of these 
deployments. Furthermore, Parliament never exercised its prerogative to terminate SANDF 
deployments. This reflects a poor overall level of oversight of military deployments as the executive is 
largely free to announce deployments without constant in-depth scrutiny by Parliament. 
 
Finally, parliamentary questions reflect an increasing focus on operational matters, notably after 2000. 
This coincides with the increasing operational demands on the SANDF following the 1998 Operation 
Boleas involvement, the 2001 deployment to Burundi, and growing border safeguarding 
responsibilities. During the First Parliament, only 31 questions on operational matters were posed to 
the Minister of Defence. This increased to 71 during the Second Parliament, arguably indicating a 
need for additional information on defence deployments. This increase reads in line with frustration 
uttered by MPs during meetings on deployment that there is a lack of information provided to 
Parliament on such deployments (PMG, 2001q). 
 
5.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight 
 
Several lower-order focus areas for oversight of the military were identified in Chapter 3. The sections 
below review Parliament’s focus on these areas, including annual and quarterly performance, 
interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial equality, defence 
morale and defence infrastructure. 
 
5.3.1 Annual and quarterly performance 
 
The submission of annual and quarterly departmental reports allows Parliament to track performance 
and not merely focus on financial indicators. However, this tool remained underdeveloped in South 
Africa prior to 2000 (National Treasury of South Africa, 2005, p. 3). Major advances in terms of 
Parliament’s oversight of departmental performance only came about during the Second Parliament. 
The Public Finances Management Act (1999) established a statutory requirement for national 
departments to submit an annual report to parliament (RSA, 1999, p. Section 55(3)). Of importance is 
that Section 40(3)(a) of the Act requires the accounting officer of a department to include performance 
against predetermined objectives in the annual report (RSA, 1999). While these requirements were 
set in 1999, regulations imposed by National Treasury in 2001 further expanded the scope for 
Parliament to track departmental performance. Section 5.3.1 of the Treasury Regulations (National 
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Treasury of South Africa, 2001) issued in April 2001 states that “[t]he accounting officer of an 
institution must establish procedures for quarterly reporting to the executive authority to facilitate 
effective performance monitoring, evaluation and corrective action.” 
 
Given the development of these directives in 1999 and 2001 respectively, it is only possible to review 
parliament’s oversight of annual and quarterly performance after these implementation dates. 
Nonetheless, a review of JSCD and PCDMV activities between 1999 and 2004 reveal little focus on 
annual reports and no engagements related to quarterly reports. Only the annual reports of Armscor 
were considered in 1998 and 2003 by the JSCD and PCDMV respectively (PMG, 1998a, 2003a). The 
lack of engagement on performance related matters as per the annual reports was highlighted, for 
example, in 2003 when DOD officials requested MPs to consult the annual report for information on 
performance in terms of the departmental Strategic Plan (PMG, 2003d). While legislative parameters 
for improved parliamentary monitoring of the DOD’s performance have been developed during the 
Second Parliament, the JSCD and PCDMV failed to use these effectively.  
 
5.3.2 Interdepartmental cooperation 
 
Interdepartmental cooperation is essential to the achievement of broader government goals. The 
DOD often supports other departments or is reliant on other departments for services. 
Interdepartmental cooperation received limited attention by the JSCD and PCDMV during the first two 
parliaments. One of the key departments with which the DOD cooperates is the South African Police 
Service (SAPS). Three defence committee meetings related to the cooperation between the DOD and 
SAPS were held during the first two parliaments. On 9 and 16 May 2000, the JSCD received two 
briefings and held deliberations on the policing powers for SANDF when in support of SAPS (PMG, 
2000c, 2000d). Furthermore, a PCDMV meeting in October 2002 related to the DOD budget dealt to a 
limited degree with cooperation between the SANDF and SAPS regarding border safeguarding (PMG, 
2002e). No other meetings were held dedicated to cooperation between the DOD and other 
departments. 
 
5.3.3 Military training and education 
 
In the context of non-offensive defence, militaries are prone to focus on training and preparation for 
the deployments (Moller as cited by Jordaan, 2004, p. 53). Given the White Paper’s (RSA, 1996b, p. 
Section 11) assentation that South Africa will pursue peaceful international relations, it is clear that the 
country entered a period underscored by a non-offensive, defensive approach. Jordaan (2004, p. 74) 
argues that, during the immediate post-1994 era, training and preparation of military personnel were 
deemed essential in the process of defence policy formulation. This was reflected in, for example, the 
White Paper on Defence (RSA, 1998, p. Chapter 10) that emphasised the need for training and 
education in the SANDF. Training competencies and improving the quality of training was prioritised 
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and educational needs also received significant attention ranging from basic educational needs to 
tertiary and civil education.  
 
Based on the White Paper’s identification of training as a priority, it can be expected that 
parliamentary oversight in the first two parliaments would have reflected this. Of specific importance 
would have been the work of the JSCD, given that the 1993 Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) makes 
provision for the committee to oversee the “state of preparedness” of the national Defence Force that 
would invariably relate to aspects of training. While the work of the JSCD and PCDMV reveals several 
interactions related to training, no dedicated meetings on this were held. Interactions on training 
between 1998 and 2004 most frequently came during meetings on the defence budget. This largely 
related to the impact of financial allocations on training. Meetings on transformation, integration and 
equal opportunities also had some reference to training. Meetings with a more specific focus on 
training include a PCDMV engagement in October 2001 which focused on how training addresses 
equal opportunities in the SANDF (PMG, 2001g). Similarly, meetings by the JSCD in March 2003 on 
integration and transformation in the SA Navy and SA Army included discussion on the training of 
SANDF members, notably the training of African personnel, women and spending on training (PMG, 
2003j, 2003k). Training and re-training of former soldiers for the civilian labour market also featured in 
discussions around force rationalisation, notably during a PCMDV meeting held in March 2000 (PMG, 
2000e). A total of 44 questions on training and education were asked during the first ten years of 
democracy, with the majority thereof being posed during the Second Parliament.  
 
Military education received more dedicated attention than aspects of training by the defence 
committees between 1998 and 2004. In November 2001, the PCDMV held a meeting on the 
education offered by the SA Military Academy and the Defence College (PMG, 2001p). The content of 
this meeting focused on civic education in the SANDF, which was also the focus of an April 2003 
PCDMV meeting (PMG, 2003c). Civic education was also dealt with in deliberations regarding the 
Defence Bill in May 2002 (PMG, 2002c) as well as on an ad hoc basis during other meetings by the 
JSCD and PCDMV. The focus of oversight on aspects of civic education in the first ten years should 
be viewed in the context of the democratisation of South Africa and the need for the SANDF to 
function within this democratic setting (Cawthra, 2005, p. 98; Modise in le Roux et al., 2012, p. 47).  
 
5.3.4 Gender and racial equality 
 
Given the need for integration of the various armed forces and an overhaul of the SANDF’s personnel 
component, it can be expected that gender and racial equality received significant oversight during 
the first years of democracy. This is reflected in, for example, Chapter 6 of the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence (RSA, 1996b) that emphasises the need for integration, the provision of equal opportunities 
including education and training opportunities for “black officers, service women and other previously 
disadvantaged personnel.” While the DOD prioritised racial and gender equality through its policies, 
parliamentary oversight in terms of questions by MPs were lacking. During the first ten years, only 26 
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parliamentary questions related to race and gender were asked (See Table 4.1).63 Questions in this 
regard were likely minimal due to the extent of work done by the parliamentary committees in terms of 
oversight of gender and racial equality. 
 
Equal opportunities, largely under the theme of organisational transformation, featured regularly in the 
work of the JSCD and PCDMV. References to racial and gender equality featured in the majority of 
meetings of both the JSCD and PCDMV between 1998 and 2004. It would therefore be of value to 
rather review committee meetings dedicated exclusively to race and gender equality. The JSCD was 
particularly active in overseeing the DOD’s search for increased equality. In 1999, a dedicated 
meeting on transformation in the DOD was held, while engagements regarding the BMATT Report 
also focused heavily on transformation and race/gender equality (PMG, 1999e, 1999c). In 2000, the 
JSCD met to discuss transformation in the Reserve Force as well as the Setai Commission 
recommendations on transformation (PMG, 2000h, 2000f). In 2001, the JSCD again engaged the 
Setai Commission’s recommendations and also met to discuss the official Integration Report (PMG, 
2001h, 2001r). In 2003, the Committee dealt with the DOD’s formal response to the Setai 
Commission recommendations on transformation. Transformation and integration were also dealt with 
at a lower level through oversight of transformation activities in the SA Army, SA Navy and SA Air 
Force respectively (PMG, 2003j, 2003k, 2003l).  
 
5.3.5 Defence morale 
 
Section 228(v) of the Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) notes one of the key functions of the JSCD as 
overseeing morale of the country’s Defence Force. A review of JSCD deliberations between 1998 and 
2004 do not reveal any significant engagements on the morale of the SANDF. Of interest is that 
during three separate JSCD meetings, in 1999, 2001 and 2003, the committee was informed of the 
challenge of low morale in the SANDF (PMG, 1999a, 2001l, 2003c). However, no follow-up 
discussions are noted during these and other meetings. Similar to the JSCD, the PCDMV received 
information on the challenge of low morale in 2000 and 2001 (PMG, 2000c, 2001b). In an October 
2001 meeting, the PCDMV Chairperson noted that “anything that impacts on the policy and morale of 
the Department becomes the business of Parliament's oversight role” (PMG, 2001e). The chairperson 
indicated that this matter should be revisited by the Committee at a later stage. However, by the end 
of the Second Parliament, no dedicated meeting on this matter was recorded. 
 
Eekelen (in DCAF, 2010, p. 59) notes that “[p]ublic reports by an inspector general and an 
ombudsman greatly assist the parliamentary committee in judging the overall situation in the services 
and the morale of their personnel.” When reviewing the work of the two defence committees, no 
engagements with external role players regarding the morale of the SANDF are found. It is thus 
evident that the JSCD failed to effectively address its constitutional directive to oversee the morale of 
                                                          
63 Questions related to race and gender exclude questions related to integration as these were considered policy-
related questions. 
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the SANDF, despite being informed of the challenges. The PCDMV similarly failed at addressing this, 
notably in a period where a loss of qualified personnel and challenges to operational standards posed 
a threat to morale in the DOD (Kummel & von Bredow, 2000, p. 69). 
 
5.3.6 Defence infrastructure 
 
Parliamentary questions related to SANDF infrastructure and equipment64 reveal a high level of 
interest from MPs. Between 1994 and 2004, a total of 104 questions related to infrastructure and 
equipment were asked. The trajectory of the frequency of questions is of interest as it increased 
steadily over the ten-year period (See Table 4.1). This may be an indication that, due to the 
prioritisation of aspects such as the integration process and organisational transformation, less 
opportunities existed for oversight of equipment and infrastructure. This trajectory is also reflected in 
the work of the JSCD and PCDMV between 1998 and 2004. While the PCDMV briefly referred to 
infrastructure management in its 1999 European Study Tour Report (PMG, 1999d), concerns around 
infrastructure only started coming to the fore in 2001 and 2002. During two PCDMV meetings in 2001, 
the Committee was informed that expenditure on infrastructure programmes are urgently needed 
(PMG, 2001d, 2001k). The need for infrastructure investment and dissatisfaction with the Department 
of Public works (DPW) were also reflected in terms of budget requirements to the JSCD in 2002 
(PMG, 2002e). Nonetheless, the review of JSCD and PCDMV meetings reveals limited engagement 
on the matter. No Committee meetings dealt exclusively with defence infrastructure. Budgetary 
aspects of infrastructure, which are prioritised by the IPU and DCAF (Born, 2003, p. 134,157), also 
did not receive any significant attention.  
 
5.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military 
 
The sections to follow review the extent to which identified weaknesses to oversight of the military in 
South Africa manifested between 1994 and 2004.  
 
5.4.1 Constitutional and legal powers 
 
The IPU and DCAF note that constitutional and/or other legal requirements for executive 
accountability to a parliament regarding defence matters are essential for strong oversight. Sections 
3.2 and 4 of this Chapter already elaborated on the constitutional and legal parameters established 
after 1994 that created space for parliamentary oversight in general, and oversight of defence in 
particular. Both the 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 Constitution firmly entrenched civil oversight 
of the military, including parliamentary oversight. Section 228 of the Interim Constitution (RSA, 1993), 
which was not repealed in 1996, maintained specific oversight criteria over the military through the 
powers of the JSCD. These powers and the principle of parliamentary oversight were also reflected in 
                                                          
64 These questions do not deal exclusively with defence infrastructure, but includes questions related to 
equipment utilisation, needs and maintenance. 
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lower-order defence policy, such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review 
that aligned it with legislative requirements (RSA, 1996b, 1998). As such, it is clear that definitive 
constitutional and legal powers for parliamentary oversight of defence were established after 1994, 
marking an improvement from the pre-1994 era (See Section 2). The constitutional and legal powers 
for oversight should be viewed in the context of the post-1994 democratic adjustment made by South 
Africa. For example, by 2006, the Economists’ Index for Democracy allocated South Africa a score of 
7.91/10 in terms of the level of democracy. Although categorised as a ‘flawed democracy’ this score 
placed South Africa at a relatively high standing in terms of electoral process and pluralism, civil 
liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture (Kekic, 2007, p. 3). 
 
5.4.2 Customary practices 
 
Customary practices in terms of oversight refer to the availability and usage of oversight tools in 
parliament. From the above-mentioned sections, it is evident that oversight tools were used with 
varying degrees of success in the South African Parliament in terms of oversight of the military 
between 1994 and 2004. Dedicated parliamentary debates on defence matters during plenaries were 
very limited, except during budgetary and bill debates. Defence committee meetings also varied, with 
the reduction in JSCD meetings after 1998 detracting from the value of committee-debates as an 
effective oversight tool. Parliamentary questions as an oversight tool were used frequently, although 
questions posed by MPs from the NCOP decreased significantly during the Second Parliament. The 
focus areas of these questions were largely related to policy, personnel, operational and budgetary 
aspects (See Table 4.1) which, it can be argued, coincided with the developmental priorities in the 
immediate post-1994 era. Special defence inquiries were not used effectively to maximise oversight. 
Although some inquiries were held, these were not truly independent special defence inquiries. 
Oversight visits and study tours were used to a very limited extent. Two study tours were conducted, 
reported on and recommendations made. The impact of oversight visits were limited by the fact that 
between 1994 and 2004, only one official JSCD oversight visit report was tabled in Parliament. 
Finally, the use of external audit as a tool for oversight was used to a very limited extent. Limited 
reference is made to input provided by reports of the Auditor-General and no dedicated briefings by 
the AGSA to the JSCD or PCDMV were recorded between 1998 and 2004. 
 
5.4.3 Resources and expertise 
 
Calland (1997, p. 4) argues that, with the advent of democracy in 1994, new MPs of the South African 
Parliament were often inexperienced and unfamiliar with the institution as well as its procedures. He 
further notes that Parliament was severely underprepared for this drastic change and lacked, for 
example, administrative, technological and research support for MPs. This had the potential to impact 
negatively on the work of committees. Of specific importance in terms of addressing inexperience and 
limited content knowledge is the work of parliamentary researchers. Researchers are responsible, in 
part, for providing input to the committee programme and for preparing research briefs prior to 
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committee engagements (Dlomo, 2004, p. 62). By 1997, Calland notes that for committees to become 
successful, they will need to “nurture expertise and policy specialism in both its support staff and 
within the committee membership itself.” Jordaan (2004, p. 20) again notes the lack thereof as an 
inhibiting factor that contributed to a weak legislature by the end of 2004. The lack of research support 
to MPs in the defence committees was also highlighted by Griffiths (Pelizzo et al., 2006, p. 51) as a 
particular concern during the interrogation of the SDPP deliberations.  
 
Perhaps the clearest indication that research support for committees was lacking during the first ten 
years of democracy came from the findings of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament, 
published in 2007. The report noted that MPs felt that they “lacked adequate research staff, that the 
available researchers did not have appropriate skills and that the present administrative structure did 
not allow researchers to develop the necessary technical skills to service the needs of Members of 
Parliament and committees properly” (Govender et al., 2009, p. 70). Given that the lack of research 
support was noted throughout the first and second parliaments, efforts were made to address this. 
While only 10 researchers were employed in 1997, this increased to 34 by 2007. Research staff were 
also encouraged to further their training and specialisation in their respective fields (Govender et al., 
2009, pp. 70–71). The 2007 Report therefore confirms the inadequacy of research support between 
1994 and 2004 and highlights the fact that this was likely to be addressed during the Third Parliament. 
 
Parliamentary committees are also supported by a Committee Section that includes committee 
secretaries and other administrative staff. “The support provided by Committee Secretaries are wide 
ranging, including activities such as minute taking, drafting committee reports, securing venues for 
committee meetings, and addressing the travel and catering requirements” (Govender et al., 2009, 
pp. 70–71). The Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament found significant 
shortcomings in the Committee Section, including record keeping of committee minutes. This severely 
limited institutional memory. The Report also found that language services to parliament require 
improvement. Between 1994 and 2004, limited interpretation services were offered and an 
interpreting unit was only established in 2004. In addition, a digital recording system was only 
introduced in 2003. These factors, in conjunction with personnel limitations, limited the services 
rendered by the Language Services Department during the first two parliaments (Govender et al., 
2009, p. 71). Broadly viewed, research and administrative support to MPs and committees thus fell 
short between 1994 and 2004. 
 
5.4.4 Political will 
 
The World Bank (Born, 2003, p. 76) notes three possible indications of a lack of political will for 
effective oversight that may find application in South Africa. First, due to party discipline, 
parliamentarians from the governing political party might be unwilling to effectively hold the executive 
to account (Power in Pelizzo et al., 2004, pp. 47–58). While difficult to determine party discipline, a 
review of the regularity of parliamentary questions posed by members of the governing party (the 
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ANC), provides insight. During the first two parliaments, a total of 1 037 parliamentary questions on 
defence were asked. Of these, only 124 were asked by MPs from the governing party, representing 
11.96% of all questions asked. Of further interest is that these questions were particularly limited 
during years preceding elections and during election years (See Graph 4.5). 
 
The fact that such limited questions on defence have been asked by members of the governing party 
reveals that parliamentary questions as an oversight tool were not optimally used by ANC MPs. Of 
further interest is the fact that the majority of questions posed by ANC MPs were oral questions; thus, 
only asked when a member of the executive (primarily the Minister of Defence) is present in the 
Houses of Parliament. This reveals a lack of continuous and consistent questioning by MPs from the 
governing party. Several examples of ‘sweetheart questions’ can be found in the questions posed by 
MPs of the governing party. Sweetheart questions are not truly aimed at inquiry (with an aim at 
oversight), but rather affords the executive an opportunity to explain government policy or to reflect on 
the achievements of the department (Dlomo, 2004, p. 4; Helen Suzman Foundation, 2009). Often 
sweetheart questions refer to questions where the answers are already widely known or information 
available publicly. Although subjective in its determination, some clear examples of sweetheart 
questions between 1994 and 2004 include: 
 
 Oral Question 197 (2001) from Ms SB Ntuli to the Minister of Defence: Whether any SANDF 
members were deployed to the DRC as part of the United Nations (UN) mission to the DRC; if 
so, (a) how many and (b) for how long is it anticipated that they will be deployed in the DRC? 
(Parliament of South Africa, 2001c, p. 2511) 
 Oral Question 45 (2001) from Ms ZA Kota to the Minister of Defence: How many Memoranda 
of Understanding have been signed with countries in Africa and what is the significance of 
those memoranda to South Africa and to Africa as a whole? (Parliament of South Africa, 
2001c, p. 99) 
 Oral Question 6 (2002) from Ms ZA Kota to the Minister of Defence: Whether the SANDF has 
embarked on a programme to recruit volunteers? (Parliament of South Africa, 2002b, p. 1118) 
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Graph 4.5 Parliamentary questions on defence – Governing party versus opposition:  
1994 - 2004 
 
Source: Compiled from Parliamentary questions (1994 – 2004) 
 
Second, a lack of political will may be elevated by low levels of public interest in defence matters 
(Born, 2003, p. 76). In this sense, it may be of interest to review the consulting of NGOs and other 
external stakeholders by the JSCD and PCDMV between 1998 and 2004. A review of committee 
activities over this period refers to some level of engagement with external stakeholders and the 
recognition of the role of these. For example, during a JSCD seminar on civil-military relations in 
September 1999, the chairperson noted the importance of engagement with all NGOs as a means of 
utilising them as a resource. Furthermore, an academic from the United States Naval Postgraduate 
School was used as a facilitator for the seminar (PMG, 1999b). Deliberations by the PCDMV on the 
banning of landmines also involved input from a number of NGOs and other civil society organisations 
(PMG, 2002a). In May 2002, the US Department of Defense sponsored a three-day seminar for 
members of the PCDMV to develop an understanding of the importance of the relationship between 
the legislative branch and the armed forces. Various MPs from the PCDMV as well as a number of 
NGOs attended the workshop (PMG, 2002b). Finally, the committees also received input from NGOs, 
civil society organisations and other interested parties on a number of occasions. Between 1998 and 
2004, the following matters discussed by the two defence committees received submissions: 
 
1998: JSCD meeting on the SANDF Language Policy. Input received from three interested  
             parties (PMG, 1998h). 
1998: PCMDV meeting on the Foreign Military Assistance Bill. Input received from nine  
             interested parties, including NGOs and academic institutions (PMG, 1998d). 
2001: JSCD meeting on the role of the Commandos. Input received from three  
             stakeholders (PMG, 2001o). 
2000:  PCDMV meeting on the policing powers of the SANDF. Input from 11 stakeholders  
             received (PMG, 2000d). 
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2001: PCDMV meeting on the National Conventional Arms Control Bill. Input from nine external  
             stakeholders received (PMG, 2001m). 
2001: PCDMV meeting on the Demobilisation Amendment Bill and Termination of Integration  
             Intake Bill. Input received from three stakeholders (PMG, 2001e). 
2002:  PCDMV meeting on the Defence Bill. Input from seven stakeholders (PMG, 2002c). 
2002: PCDMV meeting on the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill. Input from five stakeholders  
             received (PMG, 2002a). 
2002: PCDMV seminar on civil-military relations. Input form one academic institution received 
             (PMG, 2002b). 
2003:  PCDMV meeting on the Armscor Bill. Input from four stakeholders received (PMG, 2003b). 
 
Third, security considerations could limit parliamentary oversight of the military. A review of 
parliamentary questions between 1994 and 2004 reflect no clear instances where questions were not 
responded to by the DOD due to security considerations. Furthermore, the PMG database reflect no 
closed meetings (closed to public attendance) between 1998 and 2004. As such, parliamentary 
debate on the military remained open to the public and largely unhindered by security considerations. 
 
5.4.5 Follow-up on defence-matters 
 
Follow-up on defence matters refers to follow-up debates by committees on recommendations made 
or requesting department officials to report on progress made (Agnihotri, 2011, p. 9; Pelizzo et al., 
2006, p. 44). A review of JSCD and PCDMV meetings between 1998 and 2004 reveal some clear 
instances where follow-up was requested and executed (See Table 4.5). However, while some cases 
like these exist, the execution of follow-up on committee recommendations and meetings was 
generally lacking between 1994 and 2004.  
 
Table 4.5 Committee meetings follow-up commitments: 1998 - 2004 
Committee Meeting 
date 
Commitment to follow up Follow-up 
PCDMV 06 Sep 1999 How to apportion time to different 
sections of the Draft Defence Bill 
Seven additional meetings held 
in 1999 on the Draft Defence Bill 
PCDMV 19 Aug 2002 
 
Briefing on Disciplinary Reviews 
and the Military Justice System 
Related matters discussed in 
2004, but no dedicated follow-up 
meeting 
JSCD 28 Aug 2001 Military Trade Unions Follow-up meeting held on 9 
October 2001 
JSCD 4 June 2001 Defence Secretariat performance 
since 1994 
Follow-up meeting held on 26 
February 2001 
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Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2004) 
 
While the meetings in Table 4.5 note successful follow up on commitments made during committee 
meetings, challenges remained. The concern related to follow-up of the defence committees was 
highlighted in 1999 by the Chairperson of the PCDMV, Ms T Modise (PMG, 1999b), when she noted 
that “[t]he lack of resources limits the committee's chances of speciali[s]ing and following-up.” Three 
specific areas of concern exist. First, the lack of follow-up on the deployment of the SANDF is of 
significant concern. No formal reports were produced by the JSCD on SANDF deployments following 
on letters of deployment from the President. Furthermore, only the SANDF’s deployments in Lesotho 
(1998) and Burundi (2001) were extensively discussed in JSCD meetings while a meeting in 2003 
reviewed all deployments in that year (PMG, 1998i, 2001f, 2003e). Second, no formal departmental 
response was reflected in the ATCs or minutes of Committee meetings on the recommendations 
made on the 1998 Study Tour to Europe or 2001 Study Tour to Nigeria. Finally, no system existed to 
effectively track the follow-up by the Defence Committees or by the DOD, which had the potential to 
undermine the core function of oversight and limits opportunities for public scrutiny. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
South Africa entered the post-1994 period of democratisation on unstable foundations in terms of 
parliamentary oversight of defence. Prior to this period, the quality and strength of parliamentary 
oversight of the military was largely overshadowed by the role of the executive. However, negotiations 
prior to the 1994 transition saw a sense of deliberation and compromise between political and military 
elites steering civil-military relations more towards concordance. The 1993 Interim Constitution 
subsequently symbolised the first step in permanently addressing poor oversight as it set clear 
guidelines and made pronouncements on the roles of Parliament in ensuring effective oversight. 
These guidelines were reaffirmed in the 1996 Constitution and subsequent defence legislation and 
policies. Legislative advances were mirrored by a concurrent process of institutional developments 
within parliament as a means of strengthening the oversight capacity of the institution. The roles and 
functions of the committee system received specific attention. Despite the legislative advances toward 
transparency and enhanced oversight, oversight between 1994 and 2004 should be seen within the 
context of a changing institution. This implies that the process of oversight was characterised by a 
steep learning curve for MPs amid the growth of the institution. As such, many challenges in terms of 
oversight remained. 
 
Despite legislative and institutional advances, the first two parliaments were characterised by several 
factors that undermined the quality and standing of oversight of the military. Oversight tools were 
used with varying degrees of success. Parliamentary debates had varying degrees of success, less 
so in the plenaries. Parliamentary questions were used more frequently while oversight visits and 
study tours saw very limited usage and formal reporting. The utilisation of special defence inquiries 
and the use of external audit was severely underutilised as oversight tools. Committee work in 
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conjunction with the use of parliamentary questions resulted in several primary focus areas being 
addressed more successfully, including defence policy, annual budgetary aspects, defence 
procurement and human resources. However, quarterly budgetary and performance aspects, and the 
deployment of the military saw low levels of scrutiny. In terms of lower-order focus areas for defence 
oversight, parliament fell short in a number of areas. Departmental performance assessment, 
interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, and defence morale received little to 
no attention. Only matters related to defence infrastructure, and race and gender equality, saw higher 
levels of oversight. Finally, several indicators point to weak oversight in the first two parliaments. 
Despite a solid legislative framework allowing for oversight, oversight tools were used with varying 
degrees of regularity and success. Indicators of a lack of political will for effective oversight also 
surfaced and there was a lack of follow-up on concerns identified related to defence. Sufficient 
parliamentary resources, notably a research department, were not well established during the first ten 
years of democracy, thus failing to maximise institutional support for oversight. 
 
The following Chapter follows a similar structure to Chapter 4 in reviewing parliament oversight of the 
military during the third and fourth parliaments (2004 – 2014). Given that the first ten years of 
democracy arguably presented a major learning curve in terms of parliamentary oversight, it may be 
assumed that the foundations have been laid for improved oversight in subsequent years. This is 
specifically relevant in the context of improved oversight mechanisms developed over the first years. 
Chapter 5 reviews parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa during a period of enhanced 
institutional capacity, subsequent to the first ten years of democracy where Parliament’s focus on 
legislation often overshadowed that of oversight. 
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CHAPTER 5   PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA’S  
                                       THIRD AND FOURTH PARLIAMENTS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 reviewed parliamentary oversight during the first and second parliaments (1994 to 2004) 
based on the tools and focus areas for defence oversight identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
determined that the post-1994 Parliament focused predominantly on the establishment of a 
democratic state through the enactment of necessary legislation to support such a state. This also 
reflected in oversight activities related to defence, where substantial time was spent on the passing of 
legislation to establish a Defence Force within a democratic setting and based on the principle of civil 
oversight. The said chapter further revealed that different oversight tools were used with varying 
degrees of success, thus diminishing the general quality of oversight of the military.  
 
With ten years having passed since the start of the First Parliament, it was expected that the capacity 
for oversight has been well established by the start of the Third Parliament in 2004. This is reflected in 
the legislative developments and capacity building of oversight during the first two Parliaments. The 
concept of civil oversight of the military, including the role of Parliament, was also well entrenched 
during the first ten years of democracy. The role of Parliament and its committees were established 
through both the the 1993 Interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution and emphasised in the 1996 
White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. With this platform having been laid, the 
question then arises whether the South African Parliament was able to build on the foundations for 
oversight of the military. Bucur-Marcu (2009, p. 46) notes that “[o]versight is a continuous activity for 
every branch of government.” This implies that an ongoing focus of oversight of the military in the third 
and fourth parliaments was required for it to entrench the values of civil oversight of the military as 
established in the post-1994 period.  
 
Chapter 5 reviews parliamentary oversight during South Africa’s third and fourth parliaments (2004 to 
2014).65 This analysis is done according to the tools and focus areas for defence oversight identified 
in Chapter 3. The aim of the chapter is to determine the quality and standing of parliamentary 
oversight of defence over this ten-year period which will lay the foundation for comparison in  
Chapter 6. 
 
2. The 2004 elections: A shift in Parliamentary focus 
 
Chapter 1 already referred to a stated shift in parliamentary focus from its legislative to its oversight 
function after the Second Parliament as the foundation for the period-split in this study. While this shift 
was alluded to, specifically by Parliament’s Presiding Officers, it is still of value to analyse to 
                                                          
65 The Third Parliament commenced after the April 2004 general elections and lasted until the April 2009 
elections. The Fourth Parliament commenced after the April 2009 general elections and lasted until the May 2014 
elections. 
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determine whether focus actually shifted in practical terms. The sections below aim to qualify this 
information and highlight measures put in place by Parliament to enhance oversight and point to 
potential challenges to oversight despite this shift in focus. 
 
2.1 Qualifying the shift in parliamentary focus 
 
The transition to democracy in 1994 and the need for the establishment of a truly democratic state 
required significant improvement to the pre-1994 legislative framework. The 1993 Interim Constitution 
and the 1996 Constitution laid the foundation for this democratic transition. However, in addition to the 
adoption of the Constitution, a large number of further legislative changes were required to see the 
establishment of a state based on democratic constitutional principles. Parliament played the central 
role in the development and passing of legislation to fulfil these democratic aspirations. It thus follows 
logically that the immediate post-1994 period was marked by parliamentary focus on its legislative 
function (Parliament of South Africa, 2004, p. 33). The focus on legislation is reflected in the high 
number of bills introduced and passed between 1994 and 2004. Table 5.1 reveals that the focus on 
legislation was extremely high during the First Parliament, but stabilised during the Second 
Parliament and was reduced significantly by the third Parliament. 
 
Table 5.1 Legislation introduced and passed: 1994 - 2004 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bills 
introduced 
51 108 108 116 142 66 70 85 70 74 25 42 35 51 
Bills 
passed 
52 89 108 108 137 60 70 69 75 61 40 39 28 45 
Source: Parliament of South Africa (2004). p.33; Parliament of South Africa (2008c). p.33; 
 
The 2004 general elections brought to a close the first ten years of democracy in South Africa and the 
end of the first two parliaments. With a decreased need for Parliament’s focus on its legislative role, 
the institution increasingly began to focus on its oversight role. This shift was already evident in 1999 
when Parliament commissioned a report with recommendations on the status of oversight. The shift to 
oversight was further confirmed by the Speaker of the National Assembly (Speakers Forum South 
Africa, 2008, p. 1) who stated that, “[i]n the second decade of democracy, the focus has shifted to the 
effective implementation of policies and laws and overseeing delivery on the ground.”  
 
The shift in focus from its legislative focus to oversight became entrenched by the beginning of the 
Third Parliament. In 2004, the Presiding Officers noted that “in giving credence to its increasingly 
important oversight role, Parliament's new strategic vision…is driven by the ideal of realising a better 
quality of life for all the people of South Africa, underpinned the manner in which the organisation 
began engaging on the need to institutionalise public participation as an integral part of its oversight 
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function (Parliament of South Africa, 2009).” Parliament’s Strategic Plan for the Third Parliament also 
reaffirms the shift in focus by emphasising the institution´s development of the Parliamentary 
Oversight Model. The oversight model highlighted the oversight cycle that “feeds into a longterm view 
of oversight in order to ensure effective oversight and sustainable delivery. It therefore provides a 
means through which Parliament can monitor government delivery in terms of long-term 
commitments, as well as on annual commitments, annual planning and performance assessments 
thus providing for continuity in Parliament’s oversight activities from year to year” (Parliament of South 
Africa, 2008c: 72). Oversight from the Third Parliament onwards therefore aimed at effective policy 
implementation through constant monitoring and evaluation. This focus remained entrenched 
throughout the Third Parliament.  
 
Based on the above developments, the third and fourth parliaments were therefore expected to see a 
broader institutional focus on oversight which were to be incrementally developed and become 
increasingly effective. Such a shift in focus correlates with the evolution in civil-military relations 
theory. Increased oversight of the military can still be explained in terms of Schiff’s concordance 
theory that focuses on deliberation and cooperation between political and military roleplayers. Under 
conditions of enhanced oversight, deliberations are just likely to be more constant. However, 
increased focus also links strongly to Cohen’s theory of active control of the military that focuses on 
high levels of questioning, nagging and bullying by political elites. Under conditions of enhanced 
oversight, such engagements between political and military role players can thus be expected.  
 
2.2 Enhancing oversight in the third and fourth parliaments 
 
Given the stated intention to increase Parliament’s focus on oversight, it is of value to review the 
processes followed to strengthen this capacity. The first concrete step towards strengthening the 
oversight capacity was through the commissioned work of Professor Hugh Corder et al. from the 
University of Cape Town who prepared a Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability 
(Parliament of South Africa, 2008b, p. 58). It was already established in Chapter 4 of this study that 
various means of oversight existed in Parliament based on constitutional imperatives and the internal 
rules of the institution. However, the Report on Oversight and Accountability highlighted various 
means to ensure improved oversight, including the following (Parliament of South Africa, 2008a 
Chapter 4):  
 
 Clustering committees for oversight so that they can report jointly on overarching matters. 
 Establishment of mechanisms to facilitate the processing, referral and guidance on attending 
to petitions. 
 Amending the rules of Parliament to allow for sub-plenary sessions of the National Assembly. 
 Establishing a Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Government Assurance Committee whose 
powers will include the governing of the work of parliamentary committees. 
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 Establishing an Oversight Advisory Section that can track issues between Parliament and the 
executive. This Section should also be responsible for archiving and ensuring institutional 
memory. The Section may comprise of a Financial Scrutiny Unit, a Tracking and Monitoring 
Unit and an Advisory Unit. 
 Raising issues from constituency work by MPs. 
 Enhance public participation. 
 Developing parliamentary rules in sanctioning Cabinet Members for non-compliance. 
 
In addition to these new means to ensure improved oversight, the Oversight and Accountability Model 
also suggested the enhancement of existing oversight measures. These include (a) improved 
reporting by committees to the Houses of Parliament, (b) establishing ad hoc committees where 
necessary, (c) ensuring compliance by cabinet members in answering written and oral questions and 
(d) enhanced oversight by individual MPs. The Oversight and Accountability Model provided the 
foundation for improved oversight by Parliament during the third and fourth parliaments. Further 
means for improved oversight were also developed throughout the period under review (2004 – 
2014). In 2005, National Treasury released its Guideline for Legislative Oversight through Annual 
Reports (National Treasury of South Africa, 2005). The aim of the guideline was to give credence to 
Section 92(3)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, which states that “Members of Cabinet must provide 
Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.” The guideline sought 
to promote a higher level of oversight of the financial and non-financial performance of government 
departments and entities by parliamentary committees. Internal developments at Parliament also 
aimed to foster increased levels of oversight. In 2011, the Manual for Parliamentary Committees was 
published (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). The Manual aimed at highlighting the processes and 
tools for oversight to ensure improvement oversight. In the same year, the Budget Analysis Manual 
was released to foster greater understanding of and utilisation of the budgetary oversight process in 
Parliament (Rustin & Nel, 2011). 
 
2.3 Challenges to oversight during the third and fourth parliaments 
 
Through the Oversight and Accountability Model and other internal developments in Parliament, a 
framework was set for improving oversight. However, as noted in Chapter 4 of this study, problems 
related to oversight existed prior to 2004 and this had the potential to continue during the third and 
fourth parliaments. In 2009 (end of the Third Parliament), the report of the Independent Panel 
Assessment of Parliament was released. The Report notes several challenges that manifested itself 
in the Third Parliament. A primary concern highlighted related to the impact of the party lists system 
on oversight and that it often limited MPs’ willingness to hold the executive to account. The lack of 
influence of chairpersons and Parliament in general were also noted as a concern related to the 
relationship between the executive and Parliament (Govender et al., 2009, pp. 36, 40). In terms of 
oversight by Committees, the Panel noted that some reports generated by committees are not 
adopted by the National Assembly or NCOP. This inhibits Parliament’s ability to follow up on 
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recommendations made. Poor drafting of reports are often a reason provided for not adopting the 
report. The absence of MPs from committee meetings were also noted as a concern (Govender et al., 
2009, pp. 37–39). Other aspects noted were the lack of research support to committees and the 
general level of ineffectiveness of Parliament’s Committee Section. Information management was 
raised as a specific shortfall of the Committee Section (Govender et al., 2009, p. 73). 
 
While these findings were made at the end of the Third Parliament, similar concerns were also raised 
in studies on oversight during the Fourth Parliament. In a study on the quality of democracy in South 
Africa, Victoria Graham (Graham, 2013, p. 197) found the following, in relation to committees, that 
“[a]dministrative and staffing problems within committees; an inherent tension experienced by ANC 
MPs between accountability to the people they represent and allegiance to the ruling party; the lack of 
seriousness with which the ruling party takes question time; and the apparent interference in 
parliamentary committees by the executive are problematic.” Graham does, however point to a 
general improvement in oversight performance between 1999 and 2012. Mbete (2016, pp. 123–125) 
further highlights a number of concerns in the Fourth Parliament, specifically the low quality of 
committee reports and the fact that not all reports were adopted by the Houses of Parliament. Limited 
influence of the chairpersons of committees over the executive was also raised as an ongoing 
concern. An improvement was noted in terms of the quality of support that MPs received from support 
staff, but the research capacity to deal with matters related to policy remained limited. These 
concerns represent the broad themes that have inhibited the quality of oversight in the third and fourth 
parliaments. The question should then be raised whether the same applied in the case of defence 
oversight. 
 
The sections above highlighted institutional improvements to enhance oversight as well as 
institutional inhibitors threatening the quality thereof. The following sections will review parliamentary 
oversight of the military in the third and fourth parliaments and reflect how these improvements and 
challenges played out in the defence portfolio. An overview of defence-related oversight should be 
viewed against the backdrop of a stated increase in focus on Parliament’s oversight function. 
 
3. Parliamentary oversight of the military from 2004 to 201466 
 
Chapter 3 provided broad criteria for an analysis of oversight of the military. This section aims to apply 
these criteria to the South African Parliament’s oversight of the military during the third and fourth 
parliaments (2004 to 2014). Oversight tools utilised, focus areas, lower-order focus areas, and 
potential weaknesses for defence oversight during this period are reviewed. Addendum C provides a 
summary of the findings of this review and can be read in conjunction with the sections below. 
 
 
                                                          
66 The period under review includes two parliamentary terms, including the Third Parliament (2004 – 2009) and 
the Fourth Parliament (2009 – 2014).  
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3.1 Oversight tools utilised in defence oversight 
 
The following subsections review the utilisation of oversight tools by Parliament between 2004 and 
2014. These tools include parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, special defence inquiries, 
oversight visits and study tours as well as the use of external audit. 
 
3.1.1 Parliamentary debates 
 
Parliamentary debates on defence take place either in the plenary or at committee level. Reviewing 
debates by the National Assembly, NCOP and Joint Sittings of Parliament reveal a limited number of 
dedicated defence debates.67 68 As customary, the Appropriation Bill and Adjusted Appropriation Bill 
were debated annually, including its references to defence. In addition, the introduction of defence-
related bills often resulted in debate. Members’ statements and Ministerial responses to oral 
questions were also offered on various occasions and occasionally resulted in debate. However, 
besides bills, statements and oral questions, only two defence-specific debates were scheduled 
during the third and fourth parliaments. The National Assembly debated the death and injuries to 
SANDF members during Operation Seboka in October 2007. In March 2008, the Assembly debated 
the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The NCOP had no dedicated debates on defence-related matters and 
no Joint Sitting debates regarding defence were held. Of concern is the lack of debate on significant 
defence-related developments. For example, neither the 2009 strike by members of the SANDF, nor 
the 2013 conflict in the CAR (that resulted in SANDF losses) received a dedicated debate in either of 
the Houses of Parliament. Rather, these developments were both limited to Member’s statements and 
a Ministerial Response in the National Assembly.  
 
While dedicated defence-related debates in the Houses of Parliament were lacking, debate at 
committee level showed a higher resolve (Addendum D provides a list of all JSCD and PCDMV 
meetings between 2004 and 2014). This is particularly relevant in terms of the work of the PCDMV in 
the Third Parliament (See Graph 5.1). The number of PCDMV meetings remained consistently high 
with between 22 and 35 annual meetings between 2005 and 2011. In contrast to this period, there 
was a marked decline in the number of PCDMV meetings in the latter part of the Fourth Parliament 
(2012 and 2013), with only 16 meetings each year. While the PCDMV showed initial success, the 
JSCD showed a significantly lower frequency of meetings. During the ten-year period under review, 
six years were recorded where five or less meetings were held by the JSCD. During the Third 
Parliament, 2007 was the most successful year for the JSCD when it held 16 meetings. This increase 
may be related to the committee’s work on military veterans’ benefits that included public hearings on 
                                                          
67 In holding with the definition, member statements on defence, the introduction of defence-related bills, the 
Minister’s statements on defence, and the State of the Nation’s references to defence were not considered as 
defence-related debates as no substantial exchange of opinion took place.  Similarly, the NCOP often notes a 
discussion on Defence appropriation or adjusted appropriation. However, where these votes are simply adopted 
and not thoroughly debated they were also excluded.   
68 Parliamentary debates on defence reflected here are based on a review of the Hansard of Parliament for the 
Third and Fourth Parliaments. 
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the improvement of service to veterans. Thereafter, an improvement was only noticeable in 2011 and 
2012, with 16 and 11 meetings held respectively. The number decreased again thereafter with only 
eight meetings held cumulatively in 2013 and 2014.  
 
Graph 5.1 JSCD and PCDMV Meetings: 2004 - 201469 
 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
Given the noted changes in institutional focus after 2004, it is of value to compare the frequency of 
PCDMV and JSCD meetings to that of other committees in the security cluster (See Graph 5.2). A 
number of observations are apparent. First, given the already stated low number of JSCD meetings, 
the frequency of JSCD meetings compare poorly to the work of other committees in the cluster. 
Second, the frequency of PCDMV meetings compare favourably to that of other committees, notably 
between 2004 and 2011. Third, there was a comparative reduction in the frequency of PCDMV 
meetings from 2012 onwards and it compares poorly to that of other committees over this period. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Portfolio Committee on Police showed a marked improvement in 
the frequency of meetings from 2010 onwards, with up to 50 meetings held annually. This is 
significantly more than any of the other committees in the cluster, including the two defence 
committees. It does, however, reveal that the parliamentary programme allows scope for increased 
frequency in meetings. 
                                                          
69 Committee meetings for 2004 refer only to those held after the 2004 elections. Similarly, 2009a includes 
meetings held during the Third Parliament and 2009b includes meetings held after the 2009 general elections 
during the Fourth Parliament. Meetings reflected for 2014 only include meetings held prior to the 2014 general 
elections during the Fourth Parliament. 
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Graph 5.2 JSCD and PCDMV meetings compared to other Security Cluster Committee 
meetings: 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
3.1.2 Parliamentary questions70 
 
Parliamentary questions posed to the Minister of Defence provide an important tool for continuous 
Parliamentary oversight of the military. The third and fourth parliaments saw the ongoing use of this 
tool with questions on defence regularly posed. Over the terms of these two Parliaments, a total of 1 
008 written and oral questions were posed to the Minister of Defence. A number of observations on 
the utilisation of this tool can be made. There was clear disparity between the number of questions 
posed by members of the National Assembly as opposed to those of the NCOP (See Graph 5.3). A 
total of 897 questions emanated from the National Assembly while only 111 came from the NCOP 
over the ten-year period. It is noted that both Houses of Parliament posed more questions in the 
Fourth Parliament (565 questions) than in the Third Parliament (443 questions). A correlation between 
the activities of the JSCD and the number of questions posed by MPs from the NCOP is again 
apparent. During the Third Parliament, when the JSCD showed very low levels of activity, only 45 
questions related to defence were posed by MPs from the NCOP. The Fourth Parliament saw 66 
questions on defence posed which coincides with the increased activity of the JSCD between 2010 
and 2013.71 
 
                                                          
70 Statistics on parliamentary questions were compiled from National Assembly Questions and Replies as well as 
Senate/National Council of Provinces Questions and Replies, as produced annually by the Parliament of South 
Africa (See Reference List: National Assembly Questions and Replies 2004 – 2014; National Council of 
Provinces 2004 – 2014). 
71 The increased activity of the JSCD in the Fourth Parliament merely refers to increased activity compared to the 
Third Parliament. Overall JSCD activity remained low throughout the two parliaments. 
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Graph 5.3 National Assembly and National Council of Provinces questions to the Minister of 
Defence: 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from NA and Senate/NCOP Question Papers (2004 – 2014) 
 
Written questions significantly outnumbered oral questions in the third and fourth parliaments (See 
Graph 5.4). This comes despite a development in 2000 that saw the Joint Rules Committee increase 
question time in the Houses from 30 minutes to two hours per week. Graham (2013, p. 191) argues 
that this “benefitted the ANC majority the most as questions are now allocated to parties roughly 
based on their proportionate representation in Parliament.” Nonetheless, a total of 847 written 
questions were posed by MPs while only 161 oral questions were addressed to the Minister of 
Defence in the third and fourth parliaments. The number of oral questions in both Houses of 
Parliament decreased in the Fourth Parliament compared to the Third Parliament. In the Third 
Parliament, 105 oral questions were posed to the Minister while only 56 oral questions were posed 
during the Fourth Parliament. On the contrary, written questions on defence increased from 338 in the 
Third Parliament to 509 during the Fourth Parliament. 
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Graph 5.4 Written and oral questions to the Minister of Defence: 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from NA and NCOP Question Papers (2004 – 2014) 
 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 of this study highlighted that key categories are apparent in parliamentary 
questions on defence. These include matters related to (1) personnel, (2) the defence budget and 
other military spending, (3) defence policy and legislation, (4) the procurement and sale of military 
equipment for/by the DOD and broader defence industry, (5) operational aspects, including the 
deployment of the SANDF, and (6) individual DOD members. Further categories that relate to the 
lower-order focus areas identified in this study include (7) training and education, (8) gender and race, 
(9) defence infrastructure and equipment, (10) military discipline, and (11) a category for questions of 
a purely political nature was included. An additional category emerged in the Fourth Parliament in the 
build-up to and after the passing of the Military Veterans Act (2011). Several parliamentary questions 
were posed in relation to the establishment and functioning of the Department of Military Veterans. 
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates that the largest number of questions on defence during the third and fourth 
parliaments related to policy and budgetary affairs. The increased focus on budgetary aspects was 
especially pronounced during the Fourth Parliament. Questions related to infrastructure and 
equipment, procurement and sales, as well as personnel showed a regular frequency throughout the 
ten year period under review. The Fourth Parliament saw a significant increase in the number of 
questions related to military operations, as well as questions purely political in nature. Finally, 
questions related to discipline, training and matter of gender and race received comparatively less 
attention. A total of 25 questions emerged during the Fourth Parliament specifically related to military 
veterans. The categories of questions will be further extrapolated in subsequent sections dealing with 
oversight of specific focus areas.  
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Table 5.2 Categories of parliamentary questions on defence: 2004 - 2014 
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2004b 7 6 15 4 4 7 1 4 0 7 6 5 0 66 
2005 7 8 17 8 6 2 9 10 7 11 13 5 0 103 
2006 10 10 14 4 7 0 0 10 5 7 10 6 0 83 
2007 8 11 33 13 5 3 1 8 3 2 2 3 0 92 
2008 13 10 22 10 5 4 1 8 8 1 8 6 0 96 
2009a 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2009b 3 12 8 13 9 0 0 9 4 3 1 6 0 68 
2010 14 25 9 6 12 3 1 12 1 6 3 2 8 102 
2011 9 17 11 8 14 2 2 9 5 12 1 7 2 99 
2012 5 32 21 17 10 11 0 14 5 19 8 7 12 161 
2013 8 26 22 5 15 3 0 12 2 16 6 7 3 125 
2014a 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 10 
TOTAL 85 158 173 93 88 35 15 96 40 86 59 55 25 1008 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP Questions and Replies (2004 – 2014) 
 
3.1.3 Special defence inquiries 
 
Special defence inquiries include the work of parliamentary committees and their individual or 
collective inquiry into defence governance. Such inquiries are characterised by in-depth analysis of 
specific defence-related aspects. Given Parliament’s admitted focus on oversight, it can be argued 
that an increased scope for such inquiries existed in the third and fourth parliaments. However, a 
review of available committee activities reveals a limited utilisation of this oversight tool.72  
 
In 2004, the PCDMV arguably came closest to a special defence inquiry in their follow-up 
engagements on the 1998 Defence Review. A total of six meetings were held on the Defence Review, 
including two days of public hearings (PMG, 2004b). Three further meetings were held in 2005, 
concluding with a meeting held on the White Paper and Defence Review Restructuring (PMG, 2005k). 
In 2008 and 2009, three meetings were held regarding unionisation in the SANDF, including a public 
hearing with the South African National Defence Union (SANDU). The final of these meetings dealt 
with an illegal protests by SANDU members in August 2009 (PMG, 2009b). Despite the more focused 
approach of the PCDMV on the matters related to unionisation, no in-depth specific analysis took 
place and no formal committee report on the matter was drafted. 
 
                                                          
72 In-depth inquiries, hearings and deliberations on proposed legislation are not considered a Special Defence 
inquiry as it falls outside the scope of oversight and related to the normal legislative function of Parliament. 
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In 2007, the JSCD conducted a number of hearings on the improvement of services to military 
veterans. This fits with the build-up to the passing of the Military Veterans Act (2011). Two meetings 
were held whereby public submissions on military veterans were considered (PMG, 2007f, 2007g). 
Furthermore, two additional meetings were held related to the Special Pensions Act (1996) and the 
impact this had on military veterans (PMG, 2007j, 2007k). However, no follow-up meetings were held 
in the subsequent years amid declining JSCD activity. As such, the outcome and/or impact of this 
semi in-depth inquiry is unclear. A new defence review process was introduced to the JSCD in 2012 
and it was indicated that the Committee has “an important function in determining how the Defence 
Review would come about” (PMG, 2012a). Although preliminary meetings on the defence review were 
held in 2012, it was only introduced to Parliament in 2014 and Committee work on the Review thus 
falls outside the scope of this study.  
 
Despite the fact that both the PCDMV and JSCD had some areas of focus that received elevated 
levels of attention and input from external experts, these did not conform to true special defence 
inquiries. In the cases noted above, no specific reports were published by the committees related to 
specific defence focus areas. Furthermore, neither the PCDMV nor the JSCD established any 
subcommittees to look into specific defence matters.73 
 
3.1.4 Oversight visits and study tours 
 
Oversight visits and study tours were utilised to varying degrees of success by the PCDMV and JSCD 
during the third and fourth parliaments. Of importance is to review whether and when reports on 
oversight visits and study tours were published in Parliament’s ATC Reports as these reflect the 
formal tabling and findings by Parliament. The PCDMV showed significantly more success than the 
JSCD in this regard. 
 
In terms of oversight visits, the PCDMV conducted at least 10 visits in the third and fourth 
parliaments. The following visits were conducted (where formal reports were adopted by the National 
Assembly it is indicated as such): 
 
October 2004: Oversight visit to De Aar and Bloemfontein. An oversight report was published in 
the ATC on 29 March 2005.   
November 2004: Oversight visit to Swartklip Products. An oversight report was officially published 
in the ATC on 8 March 2005 (PMG, 2005f; Portfolio Committee on Defence, 
2005c). 
January 2005: Oversight visit to the Military Academy in Saldanha. An oversight report was 
officially published in the ATC on 14 April 2005 (PMG, 2005f). 
                                                          
73 Two subcommittees were established in 2006 to deal with the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Prohibition and Regulation of certain activities in an area of Armed Conflict Bill [B42-2005]. This relates to 
Parliament’s legislative responsibility and is thus excluded from its oversight function reflected in a special 
defence inquiry. 
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August 2005:  Oversight visit to Wallmannstahl to discuss land claims. An oversight  report was 
officially adopted in October 2005 (Portfolio Committee on Defence, 2005b). 
During the same period a visit was conducted to Advanced Technologies & 
Engineering Co., a defence related company. A report was published in the ATC 
on 29 November 2005. 
August 2005: Oversight visit to various military units in Thaba Tshwane (Pretoria). The 
oversight report was published in the ATC on 15 November 2005 (Portfolio 
Committee on Defence, 2005a).  
September 2007: A report related to an oversight visit to the Simon’s Town Naval Base and the 
Military Academy was submitted. It was noted that various recommendations in 
the 2007 Report on the Military Academy overlapped with the findings on the 
2005 Report. The Report was ultimately published in the ATC on 31 January 
2008 (PMG, 2007b).   
November 2007: The PCDMV took part in the visit with the JSCD to Lohatla in 2007. A report was 
drafted by the Committee on 6 November 2007, but it was noted that the report 
would be considered further at the next meeting (PMG, 2007d). A report by the 
JSCD was published in the ATC on 25 January 2008. 
April 2010: The PCDMV conducted an oversight visit to various border areas to review 
SANDF border safeguarding deployments. The report was accepted by the 
Committee on 14 September 2010, but does not reflect in the ATC for 2010 or 
2011 (PMG, 2010d).  
August 2011: An oversight visit was conducted to various military units around Pretoria along 
with the JSCD. A Joint Report was published in the ATC on 24 November 2011. 
January 2013: The Committee undertook an oversight visit to various Air Force bases 
countrywide, as well as selected Armscor facilities. A formal report on the 
oversight visit was published in the ATC on 5 June 2013 (PMG, 2013e). 
August 2013: In August 2013, the Committee conducted a countrywide oversight visit to various 
military bases. These included the School of Tactical Intelligence and 1 Tactical 
Intelligence Regiment in Potchefstroom, Lenz and Doornkop military bases in 
Johannesburg, the SA Army Infantry School in Oudtshoorn and, the SA Naval 
College in Gordons Bay. A formal report for the oversight visit was published in 
the ATC on 10 March 2014 (PMG, 2014d).  
 
In addition to these oversight visits, the PCDMV also conducted several study tours. These study 
tours were conducted in conjunction with the JSCD and the reports published in Parliamentary 
records reflect them as reports of the JSCD. In October 2005, a joint visit was conducted to the South 
African forces deployed in the DRC.74 A formal report on the outcomes of the visit was published in 
the ATC on 11 April 2006 (Portfolio Committee on Defence, 2006). In November 2006, during a 
                                                          
74 In this instance the visit to the DRC was considered a study tour. Even though it was to oversee SANDF forces 
deployed, it is an external visit and allows scope for observation of international best practice. 
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PCDMV meeting, the Chairperson of the PCDMV gave feedback on a study tour to Canada 
undertaken by herself and two other MPs. It was indicated that an official report was not yet drafted 
(PMG, 2006d). During a meeting on 17 September 2007, a report on the study tour was distributed, 
but none of the MPs who undertook the tour were present (PMG, 2007b). A formal report was 
eventually published in the ATC on 30 January 2008. Similar reporting delays also characterised the 
joint PCDMV/JSCD study tour to Algeria in November 2006. On three occasions in 2007 the adoption 
of the official study tour report was postponed (PMG, 2007a, 2007d, 2007c). A report was finally 
adopted and published in the ATC on 19 October 2007. In September 2012, a study tour to Vietnam 
was allegedly approved despite opposition parties opposing the tour (PMG, 2012d). However, the tour 
did not go ahead as planned.   
 
While the JSCD took part in the above-mentioned study tours, the committee conducted only three 
oversight visits within South Africa. Two visits took place in 2007 to the Lohatla Military Base and the 
Makhado Air Force Base respectively (PMG, 2007d). Reports on these visits were published in the 
ATC on 25 January 2008. Only one oversight visit to Pretoria was noted in the Fourth Parliament that 
took place in August 2011. The oversight visit included a meeting with the Chief of the Navy and Chief 
of the SANDF who briefed MPs on Somali-based piracy. A report was published in the ATC on 24 
November 2011. A study tour to Algeria took place in November 2006 with a report on the study tour 
only published on 19 October 2007. The oversight visits and study tours of the JSCD occurred almost 
exclusively during the Third Parliament, indicating a lack of oversight at ground level during the Fourth 
Parliament. The dearth of oversight visits and study tours by the JSCD was raised as a concern by 
MPs during the Fourth Parliament. For example, in a meeting on 12 June 2013, MPs from the 
governing and opposition parties highlighted “the importance of this committee going out to do 
oversight.” MPs also expressed frustration in the long process of receiving sign-off for approval of 
such visits (PMG, 2013g). 
From the overview of committee activities, it is evident that oversight visits became an increasingly 
utilised oversight tool. The inclusion of some study tours further benefited the effectiveness of 
oversight to improve service delivery at ground level. The effectiveness of the utilisation of this tool 
was, however, decreased by (1) the limited activities of the JSCD and (2) the delays in compiling and 
tabling of reports on oversight visits and study tours.  
3.1.5 Use of external audit 
 
The work of the AGSA reflects the most commonly used form of external audit by Parliament. It allows 
committees to exercise more stringent oversight of both financial and non-financial performance 
aspects of departments. Of interest during the third and fourth parliaments is the increased regularity 
to which the auditing opinions of the AGSA are referred to. MPs of the PCDMV made reference to 
AGSA findings every year during engagements with the DOD on its annual reports. The level of 
engagement between the PCDMV and the AGSA became increasingly frequent and established 
during the Third and especially the Fourth Parliament. Several such engagements were held: 
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18 October 2005: Briefing by the AGSA on the auditing process and the performance of the 
DOD in preceding years (PMG, 2005b). 
11 September 2006: Members of the AGSA present during deliberations by the PCDMV on the 
DOD annual report. Input provided by the AGSA on the financial reporting 
system (PMG, 2006a). 
16 June 2009: Briefing by the AGSA on audit findings reflected in the DOD annual report 
(PMG, 2006f). 
12 October 2009: Briefing on the DOD Annual Audit Report (PMG, 2009a). 
18 October 2010: Briefing on the DOD Annual Audit Report (PMG, 2010e). 
12 October 2011: Briefing on the DOD Annual Audit Report (PMG, 2011d). 
8 October 2012: Briefing on the DOD Annual Audit Report (PMG, 2012b). 
8 October 2013: Briefing on the DOD Annual Audit Report (PMG, 2013b). 
5 March 2013:  AGSA findings on the use of consultants in the DOD (PMG, 2013m). 
27 February 2014: Briefing on the DOD audit findings (PMG, 2014b). 
 
The engagements above highlight the increased engagements between the PCDMV and the office of 
the AGSA on the DOD’s audit findings. This practice seemingly became institutionalised in the Fourth 
Parliament as is reflected in the annual briefings by the AGSA. Of further importance is the briefing in 
2013 on the use of consultants by the DOD. This meeting highlights the inclusion of external audit 
opinions by the PCDMV. 
 
3.2 Focus areas of defence oversight  
 
The sections below review the work of Parliament on certain focus areas between 2004 and 2014. 
These focus areas include the defence budget, defence policy, procurement, human resources and 
the deployment of the military. 
 
3.2.1 Defence budget 
 
Section 228(2) of the 1993 Interim Constitution and Sections 73 and 77 of the Constitution place 
emphasis on the need for parliamentary oversight of government expenditure. As per the 
constitutional requirement, a Money Bill is introduced to Parliament annually related to the division of 
revenue. This allows for ex ante oversight of government expenditure. As per the ATC of Parliament, 
the Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE) were submitted to Parliament annually between 2004 
and 2014. This includes a detailed breakdown of defence expenditure. The ENEs are generally 
interrogated by the PCDMV and/or JSCD and result in a debate on the defence budget. Furthermore, 
presentations to the two defence committees on the DOD’s annual reports allow an opportunity for 
these committees to conduct oversight of defence expenditure ex post. A review of PCDMV and 
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JSCD meeting minutes in the third and fourth parliaments reveal regular interaction related to the 
defence budget, both ex post and ex ante. 
 
Table 5.3 reveals that, as from the Third Parliament, the responsibility of budgetary oversight clearly 
shifted to the PCDMV. A review of the meetings held also highlights a real improvement in in holistic 
(ex post and ex ante) oversight of defence expenditure when measured by the structure of meetings. 
The PCDMV, after the tabling of the ENE, held annual briefings on the DOD budget allocation and 
generally produced a report on this. Expenditure of the previous financial year was then reviewed as 
part of the annual report submissions by the DOD. The review of the DOD’s annual report resulted in 
the PCDMV drafting a report that makes mid-year recommendations on the DODs budget as part of 
the adjustment-budget process. This flow of events became especially pronounced in the Fourth 
Parliament as all aspects of the process were not always sufficiently addressed in committee 
meetings during the Third Parliament. This flow of oversight events of the budget is known as the 
Budgetary Review and Recommendations Report (BRRR) Process and was established through the 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (2009). The Act establishes that a BRRR 
must (1) provide an assessment of the department’s service delivery performance given available 
resources, (2) provide an assessment on the effectiveness and efficiency of the departments use and 
forward allocation of available resources and (3) include recommendations on the forward use of 
resources. Section 7(4) of the Act then also prescribes that the Minister of Finance must submit a 
report to Parliament on how the budget gives effect to, or the reasons for not taking into account, the 
recommendations contained in the BRRR. 
 
While the BRRR process clearly impacted on the regularity and formalisation of engagements on the 
DOD budget, the process was not without flaws. Time spent by the PCDMV on the DOD budget 
engagements were of concern. In some years such as 2004, 2009, and 2012, at least three meetings 
on the budget were held. In other years, all budgetary discussions were held within a single day or 
even a single session. While multi-day meetings may not necessarily translate to improved oversight 
of the budget, a single-day meeting arguably allows little scope for in-depth engagement by the 
committee on budgetary aspects. 
 
Budget-related questions also reveal a similar trajectory as the Committee engagements on 
budgetary aspects. As the process of budgetary oversight became cemented in the Fourth 
Parliament, parliamentary questions on budgetary aspects also increased during that period. Budget-
related questions increased from 45 in the Third Parliament to 113 in the Fourth. 
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Table 5.3 Defence Committee Meetings on DOD Budgets: 2004 - 2014 
 JSCD PCDMV 
2004 No budget-related meetings 30 May: DOD Budget 2004/05 
31 May: DOD Budget 2004/05 
3 Jun:    DOD Budget 2004/05 
19 Oct:  DOD Annual Report 
4 Nov:   DOD Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 
2005 No budget-related meetings 8 Mar:   DOD Budget 2005/06 
14 Mar: DOD Strategic Plan & Budget 
2 Aug:   DOD Budget related to procurement 
7 Nov:   DOD Annual Report  
2006 No budget-related meetings 13 Mar: DOD Budget 2006/07 
11 Sep: DOD Annual Report 2004/05 
16 Oct:  Report on DOD Annual Report 2005/06 
2007 21 Jun: Report on hearings on  
             DOD’s 2007/08 Budget  
21 Mar: DOD Budget 2007/08 
08 Oct:  Report on DOD 2007/08 Budget 
15 Oct:  DOD Annual Report 
2008 No budget-related meetings 18 May: DOD Budget 2008/09 
19 May: Report on DOD 2008/09 Budget  
17 Nov: DOD Annual Report 
18 Nov: DOD Annual Report 
2009 No budget-related meetings 16 Jun:  DOD Budget 2009/10 
22 Jun:  DOD Budget 2009/10 
23 Jun:  Report on DOD 2009/10 Budget  
26 Oct:  DOD Annual Report 
27 Oct:  DOD Annual Report 
2010 No meetings held 02 Mar: DOD Budget 2010/11 
16 Mar: National Treasury input on the DOD Budget 2010/11 
23 Mar: DOD Budget 2010/11 
18 Oct: AGSA on DOD Annual Report 
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 JSCD PCDMV 
25 Oct: DOD Annual Report 
26 Oct: Draft Budgetary Review Report 
2011 No budget-related meetings 22 Mar: DOD Budget 2011/12 
11 Apr: Report on DOD 2011/12 Budget 
12 Oct: AGSA on DOD Annual Report 
17 Oct: DOD Annual Report 
31 Oct: Draft Budgetary Review Report 
2012 No budget-related meetings 24 Apr: DOD Budget 2012/13 
01 May: DOD Budget 2012/13 
08 May: DOD Budget 2012/13 
15 May: Report on DOD 2012/13 Budget 
08 Oct:  AGSA on DOD Annual Report 
16 Oct: DOD Annual Report 
22 Oct: Draft Budgetary Review Report 
2013 No budget-related meetings 7 May: DOD Budget 2013/14 
21 May: Report on DOD 2012/13 Budget 
08 Oct: AGSA on DOD Annual Report 
14 Oct: DOD Annual Report 
21 Oct: Draft Budgetary Review Report 
2014 No budget-related meetings No budget-related meetings prior to the end of the Fourth 
Parliament. 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 to 2014) 
 
3.2.2 Defence policy 
 
The first two parliaments saw significant attention paid to defence policy due to the transition to 
democracy and the shift in civil-military relations. This was reflected, as noted in Chapter 4, in the 
legislative changes and the introduction of the other policy documents such as the 1996 White Paper 
on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. With the enactment of the Defence Act in 2002, it could 
thus be expected that the focus on policy may decrease during the period 2004 to 2014. However, 
committee meetings reflect that Parliament remained involved in the legislative and, to a lesser 
extent, the policy process. 
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Table 5.4 reflects on a number of bills being tabled for consideration during the third and fourth 
parliaments. However, the same period saw comparatively little focus on policy-related matters. Given 
that bills are only considered by Joint Committees when a Bill is expressly referred to such 
committees (See for example Rule 111 of the Joint rules of Parliament (Parliament of South Africa, 
1997b)), it thus follows that the PCDMV played a more pronounced role in considering legislation. 
This arguably left the JSCD with an opportunity to focus more on policy-related matters, but a review 
of JSCD meetings reflect few such engagements. The limited number of JSCD engagements on 
policy-related matters tended to focus almost exclusively on transformation in the SANDF. In general, 
the number of bills for consideration was slightly lower in the Fourth Parliament. This declining trend is 
also reflected in oral and written questions related to policy. During the Third Parliament, 101 
questions related to defence policy were put forward by MPs. This decreased to 72 during the Fourth 
Parliament (See Table 2). 
 
During the third and fourth parliaments, the PCDMV thus showed an ongoing commitment to engage 
thoroughly on introduced legislation. However, the lack of efficiency of the JSCD arguably 
undermined the capacity of Parliament to consider a broad spectrum of defence policy as well. 
 
Table 5.4 Defence Committee meetings focusing on policy and legislation: 2004 - 2014 
 JSCD PCDMV 
2004 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Several meetings on the 1998 Defence 
Review 
DOD Human Resources Strategy 
Draft Framework for a common African 
Defence and Security Policy 
2005 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Meetings on the 1998 Defence Review and 
1996 White Paper on Defence 
Armscor Amendment Bill 
Special Defence Account Amendment Bill 
Military Ombudsman Draft Bill 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill 
2006 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill  
Special Pensions Act 
DOD Exit Mechanisms Policy 
2007 Transformation Strategy/Policy Prohibition or Restriction of Certain 
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 JSCD PCDMV 
Conventional Weapons Bill 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill  
DOD Exit Mechanisms Policy 
2008 Defence Amendment Bill (one meeting) Castle Management Act Repeal Bill 
Restriction of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Bill 
Draft Defence Amendment Bill 
National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
2009 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Procurement Policies 
2010 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Defence Amendment Bill  
DOD Human Resources Policy 
DOD Exit Mechanisms Policy 
2011 Human resources transformation and 
promotion policies in the SANDF 
 
Military Veterans Bill  
Military Ombud Bill  
Implementation of Geneva Convention Bill 
2012 Defence Review (2012 Consultative 
process) 
Military Ombud Bill  
 
2013 Proposed amendments to Special 
Pensions Act 
No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
2014 No policy and/or legislation-specific 
meetings 
Convention on Cluster Munitions 
Military Veterans Act Regulations 
Private Defence Amendment Bill 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
3.2.3 Defence procurement 
 
Parliamentary oversight of defence-related procurement is essential due to the complexity of such 
transactions, which elevates the risk of corruption. When analysing the focus of Parliament on 
defence procurement in the third and fourth parliaments, it should be done against the backdrop of 
the passing of the National Conventional Arms Control Act (2002) that was gazetted in February 
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2003. The Act establishes the NCACC and requires it to make quarterly and annual reports to a 
committee of Parliament (RSA, 2002b). Such reports include information on the procurement and sale 
of conventional arms by the state and/or private institutions permitted to trade in such arms. While the 
NCACC is obliged, through the Act, to submit quarterly and annual reports to Parliament, the question 
for oversight is to determine whether a parliamentary committee considered such reports.  
 
A review of PCDMV and JSCD meetings reveal limited engagement on NCACC annual and quarterly 
Reports. In the third and fourth parliaments, the annual reports of the NCACC were only considered 
four times in 2005, 2009, 2011 and 2013 (PMG, 2005e, 2009c, 2010a, 2013i). The quarterly reports 
from the NCACC were considered only once during a 2012 JSCD meeting (PMG, 2013h). 
Disagreement seemed to reign between the JSCD and the NCACC as to compliance with the 
legislation. In 2008, the Chairperson of the JSCD drafted a letter to the Speaker regarding the non-
compliance of the NCACC in appearing before the committee (PMG, 2008e). In 2013, members again 
raised the limited appearance of the NCACC before the JSCD. However, the Minister (Chairperson of 
the NCACC) noted that “the NCACC would like to be guided by the Committee how far it wanted to 
hear about the work” (PMG, 2013i). When considering the Rules of the National Assembly and the 
Joint Rules of Parliament75, it is noted that committees have the power to summon “any person to 
appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents” (Parliament of 
South Africa, 2015, p. 20, 2016, p. 117). As such, while it is required of the NCACC to submit its 
reports to Parliament (in written form), appearance before the PCDMV and/or JSCD seems to be the 
responsibility of the committees and its scheduling. A lack of engagement with the NCACC during the 
period under review thus brings into question the oversight efforts of defence procurements and 
conventional arms sales. 
 
Finally, when considering questions related to the procurement and sale of arms and other defence 
equipment, some consistency appears between the two parliaments. Related questions increased 
from 42 in the Third Parliament to 51 in the Fourth Parliament (See Table 5.2). While some questions 
in the Third Parliament still focused on the arms deal, focus shifted to other procurement aspects in 
the Fourth Parliament, notably the purchasing of the Very Very Important Person (VVIP) aircraft and 
the SANDF’s renewal of its Infantry Fighting Vehicles. The regularity of questions related to arms 
sales throughout the two parliaments further highlights the impact of the lack of engagement with the 
NCACC. 
 
3.2.4 Human resources 
 
During the third and fourth parliaments, the interest in personnel matters showed a steady decrease. 
This is clear from the number of questions related to personnel matters. Of the 1 008 questions posed 
by MPs in the third and fourth parliaments, only 85 related to personnel (See Table 5.2). Except for 
                                                          
75 The PCDMV is guided by the National Assembly Rules while the JSCD is guided by the Joint Rules of 
Parliament. 
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2010, the number of personnel-related questions in the Fourth Parliament was generally low and 
pertained mostly to vacancies and critical skills shortages. 
 
The defence committees also showed little engagement dedicated to personnel matters (See Table 
5.5). While the PCDMV dealt with the DOD’s Human Resources Policy in 2004, 2005 and 2010, no 
other dedicated meetings were held related to the Department’s strategic approach to personnel 
matters. The JSCD focused almost exclusive on matters pertaining to transformation in the SANDF 
and the various arms of service. A further observation relates to the limited engagement of both 
committees on personnel matters in the Fourth Parliament. This is of interest as human resources 
concerns, such as an ageing force and high personnel expenditure, increasingly became a concern 
for the SANDF over this period (Defence Review Committee, 2014, pp. 9–7; Louw, 2013, p. 60). 
 
Table 5.5 Major human resources aspects addressed by committees: 2004 - 2014 
 JSCD PCDMV 
2004 None Briefing on the DOD HR Strategy 
DOD Final Integration Report 
2005 None DOD HR Strategy Update 
DOD HR Development Report and Force 
Rejuvenation 
2006 None Force Mobility Exit Mechanisms  
 
2007 SANDF Transformation Management 
SA Navy Transformation 
Force Mobility Exit Mechanisms  
 
2008 None Engagement with Defence Unions on Personnel 
concerns 
2009 None None  
2010 None DOD HR Policy 
Personnel Grievance Procedures 
2011 SANDF Transformation 
Promotions and Demographics Challenges in the 
SA Air Force. 
Promotions and Demographics Challenges in the 
SA Navy. 
None 
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 JSCD PCDMV 
2012 None None 
2013 None None 
2014 None None 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
3.2.5 Deployment of the military 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted the legislative roles of Parliament in terms of oversight of defence deployments 
as per the 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. The special role for the JSCD in 
overseeing defence deployment, as per the 1993 Interim Constitution, was also noted. As was the 
case prior to 2004, SANDF deployments inside and outside the borders of South Africa continued 
throughout the third and fourth parliaments. However, committee minutes reveal limited engagement 
dedicated to defence deployments.  
 
Given the JSCD’s pronounced role in oversight of defence deployments, it is expected that limited 
attention would be paid to this aspect by the PCDMV. This is confirmed in the fact that only three 
dedicated meetings related to deployments were held by the PCDMV in the third and fourth 
parliaments. An extensive briefing was provided to the PCDMV on all peacekeeping operations in 
2004 (PMG, 2004e). In 2005, the PCDMV received a briefing on SANDF missions in the DRC, Sudan 
and Burundi (PMG, 2005i) and in 2010, the committee received a briefing on border deployments of 
the SANDF (PMG, 2010d). The responsibility for oversight of military deployments therefore lay 
predominantly with the JSCD. However, it has already been established that the JSCD’s frequency of 
oversight meetings were low and this impacted on the frequency of oversight meetings on military 
deployments. Only two dedicated JSCD meetings were held on deployments. In 2006, the Committee 
received a briefing on the situation in the DRC that indirectly related to the SANDF’s deployment 
(PMG, 2006c). In April 2013, the Minister briefed the Committee on the Battle of Bangui and the 
impact thereof on the SANDF deployment in the CAR (PMG, 2013a). In terms of parliamentary 
questions on operations, a total of 88 such questions were asked during the third and fourth 
parliaments. The number of questions increased from 27 in the Third Parliament to 61 in the Fourth 
Parliament. This increase may arguably be related to the decreased JSCD focus on operations. For 
example, in 2013 at least 17 questions were asked by MPs from the National Assembly and NCOP 
related to the SANDF’s involvement in the CAR vis-à-vis one (short) meeting on the matter by the 
JSCD (PMG, 2013a). 
 
Another indication that reflects directly on parliamentary oversight of defence deployments relates to 
the consideration of deployment letters from the President as per required legislation. Significant gaps 
are visible in this process (See Table 5.6). As is clear from committee minutes, the consideration of 
deployment letters happened on an ad hoc basis at best. Several years (2004, 2009, 2010, 2012) saw 
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no deliberations on the presidential letters of deployment. Furthermore, on at least four other 
occasions, the Committee could not make a decision on deployments due to a lack of a quorum.  
 
Table 5.6 Meetings by the JSCD to consider Presidential deployment letters: 2004 - 2014 
Year Letters considered Outcome 
2004 None - 
2005 All external deployment (PMG, 2005d) Letters adopted 
2006 Comoros deployment 
 (PMG, 2006e) 
No quorum to adopt letters 
DRC deployment (PMG, 2006g) No quorum to adopt letters 
Lesotho deployment  (PMG, 2006i) Letter adopted 
2007 DRC and Burundi deployments (PMG, 2007a) Letters adopted 
West Indies, Nepal and Mozambique. (PMG, 2007n) Letters adopted 
Uganda deployment (PMG, 2007d) Letter adopted 
2008 Darfur and deployments with SAPS (PMG, 2008e) Adoption postponed 
2009 None - 
2010 None - 
2011 DRC, CAR, Mozambique deployments (PMG, 2011c) No quorum to adopt letters 
2012 None - 
2013 Deployments with SAPS and Mozambique (PMG, 
2013k) 
No quorum to adopt letters 
All internal/external deployments (PMG, 2013g). Inconclusive, but quorum 
was achieved 
2014 DRC, South Sudan and internal deployments (PMG, 
2014c) 
Inconclusive, but quorum 
was achieved 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
3.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight 
 
Lower-order focus areas for oversight of the military were identified in Chapter 3. The sections below 
review Parliament’s focus on these areas between 2004 and 2014 and focuses on annual and 
quarterly performance, interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and 
racial equality, defence morale and defence infrastructure. 
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3.3.1 Annual and quarterly performance 
 
Section 5.2.1, in dealing with budgetary oversight, provided an overview of the submission of the 
DOD’s annual reports. These reports not only allow for oversight of finances, but include performance 
of the DOD against set performance targets. From Table 5.3 it is clear that an annual report was 
submitted every year and was discussed by the PCDMV as per legislative requirements of the Public 
Finances Management Act (RSA, 1999, p. Section 55 (3)). During the Fourth Parliament, the PCDMV 
also drafted a BRRR after considering the DOD’s annual report. These reports included 
recommendations on performance and budgetary aspects. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, Section 5.3.1 of the Treasury Regulations (National Treasury of South Africa, 
2001) issued in April 2001 states that “[t]he accounting officer of an institution must establish 
procedures for quarterly reporting to the executive authority to facilitate effective performance 
monitoring, evaluation and corrective action.” A review of the PCDMV’s meetings in the third and 
fourth parliaments reveals that oversight of quarterly expenditure and performance was only achieved 
sporadically. In this period, only five meetings were held related to quarterly performance and 
finances of the DOD (PMG, 2005g, 2006b, 2007e). The majority of these were considered closed 
meetings and the content thereof thus not available. In its 2011 BRRR, the PCDMV notes that “to 
date, the portfolio committee’s method of work does not include quarterly evaluation of departmental 
spending and performance” (PMG, 2011a). The reasons for this exclusion of a focus on quarterly 
reports are not indicated, but may reveal whether limited attention was paid to it prior to 2011. From 
2012 onwards, the consideration of quarterly reports became frequent. From 2012 until the end of the 
Fourth Parliament, the PCDMV considered financial and performance reports of the DOD every 
quarter. As such, while the National Treasury guidelines on the tracking of quarterly performance did 
not translate to effective oversight in the PCDMV prior to 2012, significant improvement can be 
observed thereafter.  
 
3.3.2 Interdepartmental cooperation 
 
Oversight is a valuable means of ensuring high levels of interdepartmental cooperation and of 
addressing areas where cooperation is lacking. Given that the DOD does not function in isolation and 
carry out some tasks with other departments, oversight of such interactions are necessary. Although 
some aspects related to interdepartmental cooperation did form part of general briefings by the DOD 
to the PCDMV and JSCD, no meetings dedicated to interdepartmental cooperation were held. 
Broader committee discussions on interdepartmental cooperation occurred only twice during the third 
and fourth parliaments. In 2005, an interdepartmental briefing on the Prohibition of Mercenary 
Activities and Regulation of Activities in the Armed Conflict Bill were presented to the PCDMV (PMG, 
2005h). In 2008, a briefing on interdepartmental cooperation between SANDF and SAPS in 
preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup was held (PMG, 2008c).  
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Key to oversight of interdepartmental cooperation is engagement by the defence committees with 
other relevant state departments working in cooperation with the DOD. A limited number of these 
engagements are reflected in PCDMV and JSCD minutes. For example, despite cooperation between 
the DOD and the DPW often raised as a major concern by DOD officials, limited engagement with 
officials from the DPW occurred. In 2005, the DPW and Department of Land Affairs were invited to 
brief the PCDMV during an oversight visit to Wallmannstahl (related to land claims) (PMG, 2005j). In 
2007, the PCDMV also invited the DPW to brief it on the Repair and Maintenance Programme 
(RAMP) since 2001 (PMG, 2007h). No further dedicated follow-up engagements were held between 
the PCDMV and the DPW. The establishment of the DOD’s Defence Works Formation in 2011 could 
be seen as an outflow of the lack of cooperation between the DOD and the DPW (Helfrich, 2015). 
Furthermore, by 2014, the Secretary for Defence again noted the ongoing difficulties experienced in 
its cooperation with the DPW in a meeting with the PCDMV (PMG, 2014f).  It could thus be argued 
that the limited engagement by the PCDMV and JSCD on interdepartmental cooperation between the 
DOD and DPW failed to adequately address long-term concerns. Parliamentary activity therefore did 
not contribute to a vibrant interdepartmental engagement culture and was rather driven by oversight 
of ad hoc problems. 
 
3.3.3 Military training and education 
 
With South Africa’s increasing role in peace support operations around Africa and the context of 
increased focus on human security in the post-1994 period, training a professional SANDF remained 
important over the period 2004 to 2014. Jele (in Ferreira, 2007, p. 245) argued in 2004 already that 
for the SANDF “multi-role preparation and skills-based training have become vital.” Despite the need 
for a focus on multi-role training amid ongoing SANDF deployments, limited questions were asked by 
MPs related to training of forces. During the third and fourth parliaments, only 35 written and oral 
questions were asked related to military training and education (See Table 5.2).  
 
The limited number of questions posed by MPs was arguably a result of frequent engagement by the 
PCDMV and JSCD on SANDF training and education. The SANDF’s Military Skills Development 
System (MSDS) was launched in 2003 as the primary recruitment means for force rejuvenation 
(Engelbrecht, 2009b). Training related to the MSDS was therefore crucial to ensure the future of the 
force and adhere to requirements for multi-role preparation and skills-based training. The PCDMV and 
JSCD frequently discussed training related to the MSDS during various meetings. Dedicated 
meetings on MSDS training and progress were held in 2006 (PMG, 2006h), 2007 (PMG, 2007i) and 
2013 (PMG, 2013d) while in 2010 a meeting was held related to the expansion of the MSDS. The 
PCDMV also conducted oversight visits related to education and training. In 2005, the Committee 
visited the SA Military Health Services’ Training Formation, War College and Defence College as well 
as the Air Force Gymnasium and Air Force College (PMG, 2005j). In 2005 and 2007, visits to the 
Military Academy were conducted (PMG, 2007b; Portfolio Committee on Defence, 2005d). In 2007, 
the training area in Lohatla was visited (PMG, 2007d). In 2013, several training bases were visited, 
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including the Langebaan Central Flying School (PMG, 2013e), the School of Tactical Intelligence, 
Infantry School and the Naval College (PMG, 2014d). The increased use of oversight visits as an 
oversight tool in the third and fourth parliaments therefore had a specific positive impact on oversight 
of military training and education. 
 
Two observations are clear from the committees’ engagement on training. Firstly, committee minutes 
reveal regular PCDMV discussions on matters related to training as well as a few dedicated meetings 
related to the MSDS and training issues. These engagements coupled with several oversight visits 
allowed for increased regularity in oversight of training issues. Secondly, it is apparent that the 
engagement by the JSCD related to training is comparatively less than that of the PCDMV, despite 
the JSCD’s constitutional directive to oversee the state of preparedness of the military (RSA, 1993 
Section 228(v)). 
 
3.3.4 Gender and racial equality 
 
While the focus on gender and racial equality in the SANDF presented a natural focus point in the 
post-1994 period, it may be expected that focus on these aspects declined over time. However, the 
contrary proves to be correct as various sources note the ongoing need for a focus on the 
transformation of the SANDF. For example, in a retrospective view, Perk (2011, p. 66) notes that in 
the post-2000 period “South African race relations remain an explosive mixture in the context of an 
organi[s]ation responsible for the management of organized violence.” Transformation was thus an 
ongoing process. This is also reflected in the central government’s focus on transformation. By 2004, 
the National Treasury (2005, p. 45), in its guidelines for legislative oversight, stated that “Government 
has developed very specific policy targets for the transformation of the public service. Members [of 
Parliament] need to be familiar with these policies so that they can evaluate the progress entities are 
making towards becoming transformed and representative organisations.” 
 
During the third and fourth parliaments, questions raised by MPs related to gender and racial equality 
were limited. Only 15 such questions were raised, of which the majority were in 2005 (See Table 5.2). 
The questions in 2005 related mostly to the racial transformation in the various arms of service of the 
SANDF. The lack of focus on matters of gender and race is also reflected in PCDMV meetings. 
Although gender and racial equality was mentioned in several meetings, these did not generally 
represent central focus points of discussions. The gender and racial composition of the SANDF were 
discussed as part of the PCDMV’s oversight of the DOD’s Transformation Policy in 2004 and 2005 
(PMG, 2004d, 2005g). During deliberations on the DOD’s HR Policy in 2010, very limited discussions 
were held on gender and/or race matters (PMG, 2010c). In 2011, the DOD held a gender conference 
and released research findings on the status of women in the Department (PMG, 2011e), but this did 
not result in further discussions on gender matters. The JSCD provided more oversight on gender and 
race matters as it was the central focus of several meetings. In 2007, meetings were held related to 
Transformation Management Developments and the SA Navy’s transformation strategy (PMG, 
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2007m). In 2011, two meetings were also held related to progress employment in the SANDF as well 
as transformation in the SA Air Force (PMG, 2011j, 2011b). A dedicated meeting was also held in 
2011 on Transformation, Gender Equity and Empowerment in the SANDF (PMG, 2011k). 
 
Oversight of gender and race-related transformation occurred on an ad hoc basis in the third and 
fourth parliaments. Such oversight therefore arguably showed a lack of continuity. In 2013, following 
an oversight visit, the PCDMV noted in its report that “transformation in terms of race, gender and 
the utility in the rank structure is still work in progress. Although the various units have made 
significant improvement in terms of transformation, it emerged that the desired end state is still at 
a distant future” (PMG, 2013l). This highlights the potential ineffectiveness of the committee in 
driving matters related to gender and racial equality through transformation in its oversight 
process. 
 
3.3.5 Defence morale 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the JSCD is tasked through the 1993 interim Constitution with, inter alia, 
conducting oversight of the SANDF’s morale. During the third and fourth parliaments, no dedicated 
JSCD meetings were held that focused on the morale of the SANDF. In a 2011 meeting on the Interim 
National Defence Force Service Commission’s Final Report, it was noted that concerns with morale 
existed in the Defence Force. Nonetheless, no subsequent discussions were held (PMG, 2011g).  
 
The PCDMV showed a higher resolve for discussions on SANDF morale. Although no dedicated 
meetings on morale were held, the matter did form part of broader discussions during some meetings. 
In 2004, morale was discussed during deliberations on peacekeeping operations (PMG, 2004e). In 
2007, during interactions with defence unions, problems with low morale and the SANDF’s grievance 
system were discussed at length (PMG, 2008f). Factors that impact morale were also noted in the 
PCDMV’s Report following several oversight visits in 2013 (PMG, 2013j). Nonetheless, the dearth of a 
dedicated meeting on defence morale by either of the two committees reflects poor oversight of the 
matter. This is of concern as low morale was often highlighted as a problem, including by the 
Secretary of Defence in 2005 (PMG, 2005c) and the Interim National Defence Force Service 
Commission raised it as a concern in 2011. A positive development was the addition of a performance 
indicator in the DOD’s annual report related to the “Level of Department of Defence morale” in 2012 
(PMG, 2012c). However, committee minutes reveal that this was an initiative from the DOD itself and 
not posed as a requirement from the JSCD or PCDMV. 
 
3.3.6 Defence infrastructure 
 
A continued focus on defence infrastructure is important as it contributes to the functioning of a 
military force. This is reflected in the aspirations of militaries in developing countries (such as 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikista and Estonia), as well as the focus of established highly functional military forces 
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around the world (such as Canada) (Born et al., 2003, pp. 122, 143; Lagasse, 2010, p. 40). The 
importance of continued focus on defence infrastructure in South Africa was highlighted by, inter alia, 
the 1998 Defence Review and the Interim National Defence Force Service Commission’s study in 
2010 (Louw, 2013, p. 66; RSA, 1998 Chapter 13). Parliamentary questions related to defence 
infrastructure and equipment reveal an ongoing interest by MPs on this matter. A total of 98 such 
questions were asked during the third and fourth parliaments. Of interest as well is the consistency of 
such questioning, with each year reflecting between 8 and 14 questions related to defence 
infrastructure and equipment. (See Table 5.2). 
 
Infrastructure and equipment were raised frequently in PCDMV meetings dealing with the defence 
budget, annual reports and during oversight visits. In addition, several meetings dedicated to 
infrastructure were held in the Third Parliament. During the 2004 hearings on the Defence Review, 
infrastructure was frequently raised (PMG, 2004c). In 2005, the PCDMV held a meeting on Defence 
Land and Facility Maintenance (PMG, 2005a). In 2007, a meeting was again held with the DPW on 
maintenance and repair of military bases (PMG, 2007h). A change can be observed in the Fourth 
Parliament as no dedicated meetings related to infrastructure were held. Limited focus on 
infrastructure during this period should be seen in the context of rising concerns related to 
infrastructure. Such concerns were frequently raised in oversight reports and even the PCDMV’s 2013 
BRRR (PMG, 2013e, 2013l). The JSCD held no dedicated meetings related to infrastructure and only 
dealt with the matter during deliberations on the Interim Defence Force Service Commission’s Report 
in 2011 (PMG, 2011g). 
The above reveals that oversight of defence infrastructure therefore did take place with relative 
frequency. However, Section 5.3.2 already established that limited engagement by the PCDMV and 
JSCD on interdepartmental cooperation between the DOD and the DPW arguably failed to adequately 
address long-term concerns. This lower-order focus area of oversight therefore presents a dichotomy 
between frequent oversight and a lack of impact of said oversight. 
 
3.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military 
 
The sections below highlight whether identified weaknesses presented itself in parliamentary 
oversight of the military in South Africa between 2004 and 2014. These sections include constitutional 
and legal powers of parliament to conduct oversight, customary practices of oversight, resources and 
expertise available for to parliament, the political will to do oversight and follow-up on defence 
matters. 
 
3.4.1 Constitutional and legal powers 
 
Significant legislative amendments in the post-1994 period brought about a framework for ensuring 
executive accountability to Parliament, including accountability of the military. Such legislative 
directives include sections of the 1993 Interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution, the 1996 White 
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Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review and the 2002 Defence Act (See Chapter 4). The 
legislative framework developed for oversight of the military during the first two parliaments remained 
in place during the third and fourth parliaments. The fact that no new legislation was introduced76 to 
alter the principle of oversight underscores the entrenchment of the principles of parliamentary 
oversight that was established after 1994. In 2012, the Minister of Defence introduced a draft Defence 
Review for public engagement. This document, set to map out the future defence approach of the 
country, refers frequently to the importance of parliamentary oversight. It further reiterates the 
established principle of civilian oversight of the military by stating that “[s]ound civil control over 
Defence is enhanced through Ministerial Control, Parliamentary Oversight, comprehensive defence 
policy and the performance monitoring and evaluation of the Defence function” (Department of 
Defence, 2012, p. 161). 
 
The established constitutional and other legislative directives that ensure parliamentary oversight can 
also be viewed against the trend of democracy in South Africa over the period under review. By 2006, 
the Economists’ Index for Democracy provided South Africa a score of 7.91/10 in terms of the level of 
democracy (Kekic, 2007, p. 3). By 2014, the score stood at 7.82/10, which indicates a high level of 
stability in terms of democratic trends in South Africa. The Report does, however, raise a concern that 
developed in South Africa, which may impact on oversight. The Report notes that in South Africa “the 
ruling party continues to dominate most levels of government. Opposition parties struggle to make an 
impact, and many crucial debates take place within the ruling group, rather than in the public arena, 
discouraging public participation” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014, p. 33). The rise of a 
phenomenon of discouraged public participation and public debates has the potential to impact 
negatively on parliamentary oversight as a whole. 
 
3.4.2 Customary practices 
 
Customary practices in terms of oversight refer to the availability and usage of oversight tools in 
Parliament. Section 5.1 of this Chapter provided an overview of the utilisation of five primary oversight 
tools during the third and fourth parliaments. First, dedicated debates on defence in the National 
Assembly and/or NCOP were limited. Committee meetings saw general consistency in the number of 
meetings held, notably by the PCDMV. However, the effective utilisation of this tool through 
committee activity is severely undermined by the poor performance of the JSCD in terms of regularity 
of meetings and topics covered during such meetings. The decline in PCDMV meetings towards the 
end of the Fourth Parliament is further cause for concern. Second, parliamentary questions posed to 
the Minister of Defence showed continuity with 1 008 questions posed during the period under review. 
Oral questions remained limited, notably between 2008 and 2012, which impacted negatively on the 
utilisation of this tool. Third, the use of special defence inquiries was limited by the PCDMV and 
                                                          
76 Amendments to existing defence legislation were introduced (such as a number of defence amendment bills), 
but these did not impact on the principle of parliamentary oversight. 
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JSCD. Although some areas received special focus by the two committees, these did not conform to 
true special defence inquiries. 
 
Fourth, oversight visits were frequently used as an oversight tool by the PCDMV. At least eight such 
visits to an array of military units and other defence installations were held. Findings of such visits 
were well reflected in subsequent committee reports. Study tours were also conducted by the 
PCDMV, on occasion in conjunction with the JSCD. While the PCDMV managed to utilise this 
oversight tool frequently, the JSCD failed to do so. The ineffectiveness of the JSCD and the delay in 
the submission of reports on oversight visits and study tours decreased the effectiveness of this 
oversight tool. Fifth, there is a positive trend in the utilisation of external audit by Parliament related to 
defence oversight. While limited engagement between the AGSA and Parliament occurred in the 
Third Parliament, there was a marked increase in interaction in the Fourth Parliament.  
 
In terms of the broader utilisation of oversight tools, it can thus be argued that tools for oversight of 
defence were used with increasing frequency over the ten-year period under review. The major 
shortcomings relate to the use of special defence inquiries and the poor performance of the JSCD 
that stifled overall oversight efforts. 
 
3.4.3 Resources and expertise 
 
Chapter 4 noted the concerns at the commencement of the First Parliament with the combination of 
inexperienced MPs and limited administrative, technological and research support to MPs (Calland, 
1997, p. 4). Of particular concern during the first ten years of the democratic Parliament was a lack of 
a coherent research capacity to support MPs, a key finding by the Independent Panel Assessment of 
Parliament (Govender et al., 2009, p. 70).  
 
Given the findings of the Panel, this challenge was incrementally addressed. While only 10 
researchers were employed in 1997, this increased to 34 by 2007 (Govender et al., 2009, pp. 70–71). 
However, this increased capacity seemed not to have immediately addressed the requirement in 
terms of defence oversight. During a PCDMV meeting in 2008, the Chairperson raised concerns 
about the Research Unit and questioned why a portion of the Committee’s budget was not allocated 
for researchers. Other MPs in the Committee noted concerns related to the dearth of proactive 
research and the failure to ensure institutional memory of Parliament  (PMG, 2008b). These concerns 
echo the findings of Parliament’s own 2008 Oversight and Accountability Model (Parliament of South 
Africa, 2009). The Model notes the “immediate need to increase the research (and content specialist) 
capacity of committees, which is currently underway.” Given these recommendations and the 
observations by MPs, it can thus be deduced that a research capacity was not adequately developed 
in the Third Parliament. Critique of the research capacity also continued during the Fourth Parliament. 
In specific relation to defence oversight Sylvester (Sylvester, 2011a, p. 9) reiterated the lack of 
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research support and the impact thereof. He noted that “Parliamentarians lack knowledge and 
experience of the defence sector and Parliament's research capacity is under-resourced.”  
 
Support offered by the Committee Section of Parliament faced similar concerns. Given challenges to 
institutional memory, the Oversight and Accountability Model (Parliament of South Africa, 2009) noted 
the need for the “implementation of systems to capture and manage information within committees [as 
well as] continuous capacity development of…support staff to committees in terms of information and 
communications technology, budgeting practices and other skills required to enhance their oversight 
capacity.” Other criticism of the Committee Section that emerged during the period under review 
include accusations that information management is below standard and that committee minutes are 
not kept (Graham, 2013, pp. 124–125). 
 
Despite clear evidence that support structures to MPs were inadequate during the period under 
review, the period was not without progress. The number of researchers increased during the Third 
and especially the Fourth Parliament (Graham, 2013, p. 125). Furthermore, several frameworks were 
established to guide the support structures to MPs. This includes, for example, the development of an 
oversight guide for committee staff (Committees Forum of SALSA, 2008) and the Manual for 
Parliamentary Committees (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). The development of a Budget Analysis 
Manual (Rustin & Nel, 2011) and increased frequency of presentations by researchers to committees 
are further indications of improved use of this resource. In terms of the oversight of defence, several 
presentations by the researchers to the PCDMV are evident in the Fourth Parliament, notably in 
relation to analysis of annual reports and budgetary planning of the DOD (PMG, 2013c, 2013f, 2014a, 
2015a). 
 
3.4.4 Political will 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, three possible indications of a lack of political will for effective 
oversight are used in this study to provide insight into the political will for oversight of the military. 
First, due to party discipline, parliamentarians from the governing political party might be unwilling to 
effectively hold the executive to account (Power in Pelizzo et al., 2004, pp. 47–58). While complex to 
determine, parliamentary questions provide insight into this determinant. During the third and fourth 
parliaments, a total of 1 008 questions related to defence were asked. Only 79 (7.84%) were asked by 
MPs from the ruling party (See Graph 5.5). Such questions were particularly limited during years 
preceding elections and during election years.  
 
Furthermore, questions posed by MPs from the governing party were almost exclusively oral 
questions. Of the 79 questions posed by ANC MPs, 62 (78.5%) were oral questions. These questions 
are only asked when a member of the executive (primarily the Minister of Defence) is present in the 
Houses of Parliament. This reveals an absence of continuous and consistent questioning by MPs 
from the governing party. Of further concern is that some of these oral questions were again 
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representative of what can be termed ‘sweetheart questions’. These include questions related to, for 
example, the value of the SADC Defence Pact (2005), whether or not SANDF operations contribute to 
peace in areas of deployment in Africa (2010), and steps taken for the SANDF to assist the state 
(2012). Such questions clearly provide a platform for the executive to explain government policy and 
successes rather than truly function as questions of oversight. 
 
Graph 5.5 Questions on defence – Governing party versus opposition:  
2004 – 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP question papers (2004 – 2014) 
 
Second, a lack of political will may be reflected in limited public involvement in defence matters (Born, 
2003, p. 76). This is especially relevant given the stated (by the Presiding Officers) focus on the aim 
of Parliament to enhance public participation in the Third Parliament (Parliament of South Africa, 
2009). This study reviews the consultations with civil society and other stakeholders by the JSCD and 
PCDMV as a means of determining public interest. In the third and fourth parliaments, engagements 
with NGOs and other role players in the defence sector were extremely limited. An engagement was 
held with the SANDU on concerns related to the SANDF (PMG, 2008f). Despite this engagement, no 
further meetings were held with external role players, except for the dealing with public submissions 
during deliberations on legislation and policy. Several public submissions were received and public 
hearings held by the defence committees, including the following: 
 
2004: At least 11 NGOs, NPOs and other stakeholders gave input into public hearings by the   
             PCDMV on the Defence Review (PMG, 2004c). 
2006: Submissions were made by several organisations and individuals to the PCDMV during   
             engagements on the Prohibition of Mercenary Activity & Prohibition and  
             Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill (PMG, 2005h). 
2007: Various organisations and individuals made presentations to the PCDMV on the Prohibition of  
             Restriction of Certain Conventional Weapons Bill (PMG, 2007l). 
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Public hearings by the JSCD on improvement of services to military veterans (PMG, 2007g).  
2008: Public submissions were made to the PCDMV in relation to the National Conventional  
             Arms Control Amendment Bill (PMG, 2008d). 
             Public submissions to the PCDMV on the Castle Management Act Repeal Bill (PMG, 2008). 
 Public submissions to the JSCD on the Defence Amendment Bill.  
2010: Public submissions made to the PCDMV on the Defence Amendment Bill (PMG, 2010b). 
2011: Public submissions made to the PCDMV on the Military Veterans Bill (PMG,2011i). 
             Public submissions to the PCDMV on the Military Ombud Bill (PMG, 2011h).  
             Public submission to the PCDMV on the Geneva Conventions Bill (PMG, 2011f).  
 
The limited public involvement in defence matters at parliamentary level correlates with findings by 
Heinecken (2016) regarding concerning trends in research of the military in South Africa. Heinecken’s 
research based on primary sources shows that several research hubs and scholars focused on 
defence matters, specifically in the immediate post-1994 period, but that this declined over time. The 
focus of such research hubs shifted away from defence aspects to focus more extensively on aspects 
related to human security. Heinecken (2016, p. 47) therefore argues that the decrease in research 
output on military affairs adds to “an ever-widening civil-military gap [and that] this will inevitably affect 
civil-military relations, how defence and security is defined, resourced and is able to execute its 
mandate as regional military power.” The observations on the decreasing research output on military 
affairs highlight the need for engagement between Parliament and external stakeholders as it 
contributes to the broader defence debate in the country. Linked to Heinecken’s concerns is the third, 
aspect that may indicate a lack of political will to conduct oversight, namely that security 
considerations could limit parliamentary oversight of the military. This concern manifested itself 
between 2004 and 2014, notably during the Fourth Parliament, through an increasing reluctance on 
the part of the DOD to respond to questions from MPs. During this period, 77 questions went 
unanswered either due to the information being considered classified or it is stated that a further 
responses will be provided at a later stage. Furthermore, at least five references to closed JSCD and 
PCDMV meetings were found in the third Parliament with several calls for such closed meetings also 
being made in the Fourth Parliament. The latter should, however, be seen as exceptions to the rule of 
generally open parliamentary engagement on defence matters. 
 
In addition to the criteria considered above, the period under review saw increased questions raised 
regarding the political will to ensure executive accountability in the defence sector. This relates 
specifically to the Fourth Parliament when tensions rose between the then Minister of Defence, 
Lindiwe Sisulu, and Parliament. Sisulu was in the position of Defence Minister from May 2009 to June 
2012 (South African Government Information, 2009). In April 2010, the Minister decided to “boycott 
Parliament's financial watchdog body, for what she has described as unfair treatment” (Mkhwanazi, 
2010). Opposition MPs were extremely critical of the way in which Minister Sisulu engaged with the 
Parliament and accused her of diminishing oversight. David Maynier (MP), noted:  
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[Minister Sisulu] ensured that Nyami Booi, former Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on 
Defence and Military Veterans, was fired; has prevented the Chief of the South African 
National Defence Force, General Godfrey Ngwenya, and his successor, together with the 
service chiefs, from briefing Parliament on the military preparedness of the Defence 
Force; rarely appears before the portfolio committee, the Joint Standing Committee on 
Defence or the Standing Committee on Public Accounts; refused to provide copies of the 
interim reports of the National Defence Force Commission to the portfolio committee, which 
suggested the Defence Force itself could become a threat to national security; and either 
refuses to reply, or provides partial replies, to oral and written questions on the defence 
force in Parliament.  
 
The latter part of Maynier’s concern holds true for the entire Fourth Parliament, which reflected an 
increasing unwillingness of the Minister77 to respond to parliamentary questions. In 2009, at least 16 
parliamentary questions went unanswered either due to the information being considered classified or 
where it is stated that a further response will be provided at a later stage. In 2010, 13 such instances 
were recorded, 17 in 2011, 13 in 2012, 15 in 2013 and 3 in the last session of the Fourth Parliament 
in 2014. This compares poorly to the Third Parliament where almost all questions received answers.  
 
The indicators above reveal significant concerns related to political will during the third and fourth 
parliaments. There seems to be a lack of political will by MPs from the governing party to conduct 
continuous oversight though the utilisation of parliamentary questions on defence. The dearth of 
executive responses to various parliamentary questions in the Fourth Parliament highlights the 
potential weakening in terms of executive accountability. Furthermore, there is a clear absence of 
engagement with civil society on defence matters, except for engagement related to legislation that is 
a legislative requirement.  
 
3.4.5 Follow-up on defence-matters 
 
Follow-up on defence matters refers to follow-up debates by committees on recommendations made 
or requesting departmental officials to report on progress made (Agnihotri, 2011, p. 9; Pelizzo et al., 
2006, p. 44). It should be noted that general committee meetings often serve as platforms for 
following-up on issues related to previous meetings or recommendations made in committee reports. 
This section reviews whether cases where the committee committed to follow-up on matters raised 
during meetings actually transpire. The aim of the section is thus to create a broad view of the 
willingness and execution of follow-up within the two defence committees. 
 
 
                                                          
77 During the Fourth Parliament, two Ministers of Defence served. First, as noted, Minister Lindiwe Siculu and 
second, Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula.  
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Table 5.7 Committee meetings follow-up commitments: 2004 - 2014 
Committee Meeting date Commitment to follow up Follow-up 
PCDMV 24 Oct 2005 Impact of land claims on 
Wallmannstahl Military Area 
A brief follow-up discussion held in 
one-subsequent meeting 
PCDMV 5 Sep 2006 Oversight visit to the Military 
Academy with intention to follow 
up on key matters 
A follow-up oversight visit was held on 
8 May 2007. 
PCDMV 11 Sep 2006 Engagement with stakeholders on 
the Special Pensions Act 
No follow-up by PCDMV, but several 
meetings held by JSCD in 2007 
PCDMV 4 Mar 2008 Update on the state of the SA 
Army and a Defence update 
should commence 
No immediate follow-up; Meetings on 
the defence review was held only in 
2012 
PCDMV 18 Mar 2008 Vacancies at Castle of Good 
Hope 
Vacancies only addressed again in 
Nov 2012 
PCDMV 6 Jul 2009 Request for a follow-up on 
defence readiness 
Series of closed meetings held to 
follow up on this matter in Nov 2009. 
PCDMV 26 Aug 2009 Response from Speaker on 
mandate of Committee on 
defence deployments 
No follow-up; Similar commitment to 
follow-up made in Aug 2012 
PCDMV 30 Jun 2009 
(ATC) 
MSDS and skills shortages in the 
SANDF 
Dedicated meetings on HR held that 
dealt with the MSDS; skills-retention 
addressed as part of other meetings 
PCDMV 17 Oct 2011 Challenges of Operation Corona No dedicated follow-up 
PCDMV 18 Jun 2013 Secretary for Defence quarterly 
report: Follow-up in writing 
requested 
No clear follow-up on outstanding 
discussions  
PCDMV 26 Feb 2013 Request for follow-up by PCDMV 
on matters to be submitted by the 
DOD in writing 
No clear follow-up on outstanding 
discussions 
PCDMV 21 May 2013 DOD projections on mortality 
rates 
No follow-up 
JSCD 15 Feb 2007 Issues pertaining to delays in 
receiving letters of deployment 
No clear follow-up; concerns raised 
again at future meetings (e.g. 15 Feb 
2012 and 26 Feb 2014) 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (2004 – 2014) 
 
Table 5.7 provides broad insight into the follow-through of the defence committees when making an 
undertaking to follow up on matters. Based on the above, the PCDMV did well to follow-up on 
commitments in the Third Parliament, but generally lacked clear follow-up in the Fourth Parliament. 
This is underscored by the increase in requests for written responses by the PCDMV in the Fourth 
Parliament. During several meetings, time constraints prompted the Chairperson to require responses 
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to outstanding matters in writing. However, clear follow-up on such written submission are not 
reflected in committee minutes. It is also unclear if such responses are actually submitted. In one 
instance, a MP from the PCDMV “record[ed] his objection, on the basis that he was never provided 
with the written responses” (PMG, 2014e). This potentially undermines the transparency through 
which Parliament is intended to function (Parliament of South Africa, 2008a). The lack of follow-up by 
the JSCD was severely undermined by infrequent meetings. In the most prominent case where follow-
up was proposed, related to the submission of presidential letters of deployment, this did not 
transpire.  
 
The recurrence of discussions on defence-related topics by the PCDMV, and to a lesser extent the 
JSCD, could be seen as building continuity and ensuring follow-up. However, the levels of official 
follow-up in cases where such follow up was committed to raises a concerning trend for both defence 
committees, especially towards the end of the Fourth Parliament. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
With the democratisation of South Africa in 1994 and through constitutional and other legislative 
amendments, a platform was created for a system of checks and balances to power in South Africa. 
Parliament has a particularly important role to play in this regard. While the first ten years of 
democracy saw Parliament focus on its legislative function, the third and fourth parliaments saw a 
shift in focus towards the institution’s oversight function. This shift had the potential to move civil-
military relations from a cooperative theoretical approach (as per the concordance theory), observed 
after 1994, to what Cohen terms active control of the military characterised by increased inquiry and 
tension between political and military roleplayers. However, a review of parliamentary oversight of 
defence between 2004 and 2014 does not directly reflect increased inquiry and prodding by political 
elites. 
 
Several oversight tools for effective oversight of the military as well as focus areas related to defence, 
were established and developed during the first two parliaments. During the third and fourth 
parliaments, oversight tools were used better, but to varying degrees of success by Parliament and its 
substructures. Debates regarding defence in the plenary were extremely limited. However, at 
committee level, debate rose to a higher level through the activities of the PCDMV. The lack of 
meetings by the JSCD, as well as the decrease in the number of meetings by the PCDMV in the latter 
half of the Fourth Parliament, arguably decreases the success of this tool’s utilisation. Special 
defence inquiries represent a further tool that was severely underutilised in the defence portfolio of 
Parliament. Parliamentary questions, as well as oversight visits and study tours, were two well-utilised 
tools of oversight. In the latter, only the inactivity of the JSCD limited the success of oversight visits. 
Furthermore, the use of external audit became increasingly institutionalised, especially during the 
Fourth Parliament through interaction between the PCDMV and the AGSA. 
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In terms of the focus areas of Parliament related to defence, the committees made important 
advances in dealing with the military budget. This culminated with the institutionalisation of the BRRR 
Process in the Fourth Parliament through which Parliament could influence the mid-year budget. 
Despite this success, committees failed to effectively consider defence policy, defence procurement, 
human resources matters and defence deployments. The lack of attention to defence policy and 
deployments can, to a large extent, be attributed to the inactivity of the JSCD who has the 
constitutional mandate to oversee these aspects. The dearth of oversight related to procurement of 
arms is of specific concern given that legislative guidelines were set for such oversight through the 
National Conventional Arms Control Act (2002). In terms of lower-order focus areas, Parliament had 
regular interactions on the annual reports of the DOD as well as with quarterly reports after 2011. 
Matters related to military education and training received significant attention, notably through 
oversight visits. Gender and racial equality, as well as issues related to defence morale, were raised 
on an ad hoc basis by the PCDMV and JSCD. The Committees did, however, fall short in terms of 
overseeing interdepartmental cooperation and defence infrastructure with limited dedicated meetings 
in this regard, despite these being identified as areas of concern.  
 
Parliament further struggled to make progress in addressing potential weaknesses in oversight. With 
the legislative foundations for oversight in place, oversight tools were only used to varying degrees of 
success. Thus, scope for improvement exists. A concerted effort was made to improve the resources 
and expertise available to MPs. Yet, concerns related to knowledge management and the quality of 
committee reports remained in the Committee Section. The expansion of the Research Unit provided 
some relief, but some MPs continued to point to an under-resourced research capacity. The Fourth 
Parliament saw the rise of two specific areas of concern related to potential weaknesses in defence 
oversight. First, the political will for oversight represents a major concern. Parliamentary questions 
were mostly from opposition parties and, during the Fourth Parliament, the number of unanswered 
questions increased drastically. Criticism of the committees’ ability to hold the Minister of Defence to 
account also increased. Additionally, despite Parliament’s stated ambition to increase public 
participation, the PCDMV and JSCD had very limited interaction with external role players (except 
during the passing of legislation, where public engagement is a requirement). Finally, while the 
committees showed significant progress in following up on matters where further action was promised 
during the Third Parliament, the inclination to follow up dwindled in the Fourth Parliament. 
 
Based on the above overview and in the context of Parliament’s stated intention to focus on oversight 
from the Third Parliament onwards, it can be postulated that the institution was only partially 
successful in bringing about efficient oversight of the military during the third and fourth parliaments. A 
number of increased oversight mechanisms were introduced during this period, but such mechanisms 
were not always successfully implemented and/or utilised. This shortfall should be seen with the 
decreased effectiveness of the JSCD in the third and fourth parliaments, as well as the reduced 
activity of the PCDMV in the Fourth Parliament. As such, despite some successes, an overall 
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downward trend in oversight of the military is arguably evident despite the introduction of improved 
oversight mechanisms and expectations around an increased focus on oversight. 
 
The following Chapter will provide a comparison of oversight of the military during the first two 
Parliaments (Chapter 4) and the third and fourth parliaments (Chapter 5). Crucially, the following 
chapter will introduce information from a number of primary sources based on interviews that would 
serve to contextualise the comparisons made. 
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CHAPTER 6  KEY THEMES ON OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
VIEWS FROM INSIDE PARLIAMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 reviewed parliamentary oversight during the second and third parliaments (2004 to 2014), 
based on the tools and focus areas for military oversight identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 studied a 
period of parliamentary activity during which the institution shifted focus from its legislative function to 
its oversight function. In terms of defence oversight, however, Chapter 5 concluded that Parliament 
was not always effective in bringing about efficient oversight in the second and third parliaments. Of 
specific concern during this period was the general inactivity of the JSCD. Furthermore, a downwards 
trend in oversight activity was observed towards the end of the Fourth Parliament, despite the 
introduction of improved mechanisms to enhance parliamentary oversight. The findings on 
parliamentary oversight of the military made in Chapter 5 should be viewed against findings made in 
Chapter 4. This allows for two transformative parliamentary eras, each characterised by different 
focus points, to be compared. Subsequently, overarching trends that characterises parliamentary 
oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 2014 can be identified. 
 
This chapter’s key contribution lies in the addition of primary information obtained from interviews with 
MPs, parliamentary officials and academics. The chapter first extracts key themes from interviews, 
including how such information relates to the structure of the study and broad new contributions from 
these interviews. Thereafter, the chapter returns to the structure for reviewing oversight of the military 
provided in Chapter 3. Conclusions on the various criteria for assessing parliamentary oversight of the 
military as per the information presented in chapters 4 and 5 are offered. These conclusions are then 
contextualised through the addition of relevant information from the various interviews. By providing 
context from interviews, it is possible to determine whether the information obtained from committee 
minutes, Parliament’s ATCs and other primary sources are in line with general perceptions from 
interviewees. Through this review process, the chapter concludes with overarching findings on the 
standing of parliamentary oversight of the military. 
 
2. Interviews on oversight of the military  
 
The study thus far presented criteria for evaluating parliamentary oversight of the military and applied 
these to the two periods of oversight in Parliament. While primary data from committee minutes, 
parliamentary questions and academic articles were consulted to review the South African case 
study, these often fall short as it fails to capture the finer nuances of the political setting at the time. It 
is therefore essential that additional primary data be gathered from primary sources with in-depth 
knowledge of parliamentary oversight of the military during the period under review.  
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Based on the need for additional contextual data, this chapter includes information from various 
interviews (See Addendums E and F) . This is aligned to the qualitative research approach identified 
in Chapter 1 where an “insider’s perspective” is required (Babbie and Mouton, 2011, p. 53). As such, 
three groups of primary sources based on 15 semi-structured interviews were consulted. First, 
perspectives from nine former MPs that served on the JSCD and/or PCDMV are included.78 This 
included four former governing party (ANC) MPs and five MPs from various opposition parties. 
Crucially, the mix of MPs interviewed allowed for both ANC and opposition views from each 
parliamentary period between 1994 and 2014. Second, two former parliamentary officials were 
interviewed. These parliamentary officials were specifically consulted for their knowledge on the 
development of support structures to MPs at committee level. Finally, four academics were consulted 
to provide a broader perspective on the development of civil-military relations in South Africa, the role 
of Parliament in the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations and their perspectives on the 
growth/decline of parliamentary oversight. The academics consulted were selected to include 
individuals that have engaged directly with Parliament between the period 1994 and 2014. The semi-
structured interviews were broadly based on the framework of the study. Interviews with former MPs 
were based on discussions around parliamentary tools and focus areas for oversight identified in this 
study. Several attempts were made to include at least seven additional MPs that previously served on 
the defence committees (five ANC and two opposition MPs). However, these members were not 
willing to or did not respond to requests for participation in the study. 
 
Interviews with key role players in the domain of parliamentary oversight of the military played a dual 
role. It served to confirm/reject overarching trends already identified in this study. Interviews also 
added new perspectives on parliamentary oversight of the military that do not directly reflect in other 
primary and secondary sources.  
 
2.1 Primary information and the overarching assumptions in this study 
 
Several assumptions that underpin the study were made in the previous chapters based on existing 
literature. These assumptions impacted on the structure of the study and its theoretical underpinnings. 
Although not the primary aim of the interviews, information gathered from academics, MPs and 
parliamentary officials reflected on three key assumptions of the study.  
 
First, two interviews made reference to the shift to human security in South Africa after 1994 that 
affected the traditional focus on security in military terms. This shift impacted on parliamentary 
oversight of the military in terms of the agenda items that reached the defence committees for 
deliberation (Interview 3). One MP interviewed alluded to this shift by the defence committees, as they 
focused increasingly on aspects related to human security. It was also evident in the legislative 
                                                          
78 The pool for potential interviews was limited to only a small number of MPs having served actively on the 
JSCD and/or PCDMV since 1994. While several efforts were made to attract more interviews, responses from 
former MPs were not always forthcoming. In total, 19 MPs were approached with only nine responding positively 
to requests for interviews. 
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amendments made after 1994 period (Interview 7). This new focus on human security thus moved 
away from the traditional views prevalent prior to 1994 that focused on external threat perception and 
the state’s military response to both internal and external security threats. 
 
Second, linked to the observation above, discussions during interviews often centred on the changing 
civil-military relations in South Africa, especially in the immediate post-1994 period (Interviews 3, 10 
and 11). Interviews reflected the shifts in civil-military relations presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
highlighted the disproportionate power of the military before 1994 (Interview 7). Prior to 1994, South 
Africa was characterised by ‘disrupted civil-military relations. This came to the fore strongly under the 
presidency of P.W Botha that established a semi-militarised decision-making body in the public sector 
through the SSC79. This disrupted civil-military relations in the sense that it undermined the normal 
political oversight processes through elected political representatives (Interview 10). Prior to 1994, 
military policy was therefore not driven by public representatives. During negotiations around 1994, 
the ANC paid particular attention to this disrupted state of civil-military relations and aimed to create a 
policy environment in which to restore such relations. Robust debate in the ANC on which civil-military 
relations approach to take ultimately resulted in the adoption of a western model of civil oversight, 
linked to the writings of Huntington. This approach is also reflected in the constitutional directives on 
civil oversight of the military (Interview 10). However, viewing civil-military relations purely in terms of 
Huntington’s objective and subjective control of the military proved difficult in South Africa over time 
as the military became increasingly civilianised. It is therefore essential to consider a possible shift in 
South Africa towards the Concordance Theory of civil-military relations put forth by Rebecca Shiff 
(Interview 3). The shifts in civil-military relations observed during interviews point to an increasing 
scope for accountability and therefore provide a growing scope for parliamentary oversight.  
 
Third, interviews largely confirmed the significance of the selected two parliamentary eras (1994 to 
2004 and 2004 to 2014). Interviews reflected that the aim and functioning of Parliament was different 
in each of these two eras. MPs and former parliamentary officials acknowledged that Parliament’s 
legislative function dominated between 1994 and 2004. They also verified a shift to Parliament’s 
oversight function after 2004 (Interviews 1, 2, 9 and 15). It was only from the Third Parliament that the 
institution transformed itself to an ‘activist parliament’. From the Third Parliament onwards, oversight 
was included in the activities of Parliament and oversight activities, such as local oversight visits and 
international study tours, were specifically funded (Interview 9). Given the confirmation of two distinct 
parliamentary eras, the discussions presented in Chapters 4 and 5 should be viewed in the context of 
a move towards increased oversight. An evaluation of oversight should therefore be cognisant of 
Parliament’s stated intent, confirmed by MPs, to increase oversight from the Third Parliament 
onwards. 
 
 
                                                          
79 Another academic questioned whether the SSC actually resulted in the militarisation of the state by noting that 
the SSC’s establishment related more to the organisational skills of the military which were sought to address 
national concerns. Other ministries did not have similar organisational and skills sets (Interview 12). 
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2.2 Adding new perspectives 
 
One of the main contributions from information emanating from interviews was that it provided context 
to other primary information. Information from interviews often overlapped and it was possible to 
extract broad context-providing perspectives, presented below. Information obtained on the use of 
oversight tools, focus areas and potential weaknesses for oversight (discussed from Section 3 
onwards) should therefore be read in the context provided by the interviews.  
 
2.2.1 Parliamentary oversight of the military developed from a low base 
 
A key perspective that emerged during interviews was that parliamentary oversight of the military 
developed from a low base. This perspective focused heavily on the transition to democracy around 
1994. One MP interviewed noted that prior to 1994, parliamentary oversight of the military was ‘a 
myth’ (Interview 7). This study noted significant gaps in oversight of defence prior to 1994 (See 
Chapter 4). Another MP confirmed these oversight gaps by noting the significant advances made in 
enhancing transparency around the military, notably the budget and procurement aspects thereof, 
after 1994 (Interview 1). The importance of a shift to transparency around military affairs should be 
seen in the context of a lack of legitimacy of the military during the transition period (Interview 3). The 
shift towards transparency on military affairs did not, however, result in immediate elevated levels of 
parliamentary oversight. Building a culture of accountability towards civilian oversight in the military 
was a lengthy process (Interview 7). This was confirmed by parliamentary officials and a member that 
highlighted the incremental development of oversight structures since 1994 (Interview 2 and 8). For 
example, the formalising of oversight processes developed over time, including the reviews of annual 
reports, departmental budgets and quarterly performance reports. These developments culminated in 
the establishment of the BRRR process (Interview 2).  
 
The perspective that parliamentary oversight developed incrementally from a low base highlights the 
need to contextualise parliamentary oversight after 1994. Shortfalls that can be identified in 
parliamentary oversight should therefore be viewed against advances made and against the ongoing 
effort to refine the oversight process.  
 
2.2.2 The changing nature of parliamentary oversight of the military 
 
The immediate post-1994 period saw a clear prioritisation of defence matters. Given the central role 
that the military played in state affairs prior to 1994, a growing general consensus held that the role of 
military had to change. It was accepted that, in a democratic context, the military cannot continue to 
perform similar functions to those prior to 1994 (Interview 10). As such, significant work was required 
to reposition the military within the state and redefine its role within a democratic dispensation. At 
parliamentary level, the defence portfolio was prioritised along with the finances portfolio during the 
First Parliament. This prioritisation reflected in parliamentary activity, notably the defence and 
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finances committees (Interview 6). Unsurprisingly, engagement regarding defence in the immediate 
post-1994 period was described as robust (Interview 12).  
 
The prioritisation of defence matters immediately after 1994 also saw a unique approach to oversight 
at parliamentary-political level. The First Parliament saw efforts to depoliticise the defence domain. 
The success of the 1998 Defence Review was, in part, ascribed to this cooperative approach to 
defence oversight. Generally good cooperation existed between the chairpersons of the JSCD and 
PCDMV, despite them being from different political parties (Interview 1). MPs also observed that a 
sense of unity existed in the defence portfolio. This stemmed from a search for consensus regarding 
defence matters as it was a national competency and required attention in the post-1994 transition 
period. A sense of unison, purpose and ‘consensus-seeking’ reflected the approach among all parties 
represented on the defence committees (Interviews 6 and 7). ‘Consensus seeking’ was also noted as 
a broader theme of the restructuring of civil-military relations immediately after 1994 (Interview 10). 
This is in line with the opinion of a parliamentary official that noted a ‘different spirit’ in parliament in 
the immediate post-1994 period. The official noted that “it was a time of policy development 
and…everybody in parliament was working together for a common purpose” (Interview 2). 
 
The sense of purpose that characterised parliamentary oversight of the military in the First Parliament 
came under pressure from the Third Parliament onwards. As the state’s developmental plans (through 
the Redistribution and Development Programme) grew and became prioritised, the military became 
less of a priority (Interview 7). Given that South Africa did not face any major military threats in the 
post-1994 period, the military was not considered a serious national issue any longer (Interview 11). 
Role definition of the military therefore became a concern. Around 2004 it was put to the PCDMV that 
Parliament should make a decision as to the type of force (light conventional or fully conventional) it 
wants, and that this role should then be funded accordingly (Interview 8). Despite the lack of role 
clarity of the military, Parliamentary discussions started to focus largely on the ‘soft issues’ such as 
representivity in the SANDF and unionisation in the DOD rather than the ‘hard issues’ such as force 
deployment, force capability, role definition and the bloated nature of the SANDF (Interview 11).  
 
Furthermore, in contrast to an observation of cooperation among chairpersons of the JSCD and 
PCDMV in the First Parliament, an interviewee noted a level of tension between the chairpersons 
emerged around the Third Parliament. Although this was not necessarily a reflection on the 
chairpersons themselves, the tensions related more to the practical functioning/scheduling of the 
JSCD (Interview 9). During this period there was also a decrease in the pressure from civil society to 
perform the oversight function of the military (Interview 3). The focus on military affairs further 
decreased in the Fourth Parliament with the establishment of the DMV that took significant time from 
the defence committees (Interview 1). Based on the above observations, it is evident that the nature 
of parliamentary oversight of the military changed from a prioritised consensus-seeking approach to 
oversight in the First Parliament to oversight that did not view the military as a priority and focused on 
non-core military aspects. 
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2.2.3 Incremental institutional development to aid parliamentary oversight 
 
With it already established that parliamentary oversight of the military developed from a low base, 
information obtained from interviews reveal a similar development in terms of Parliament’s capacity to 
do oversight. The first steps to enhance oversight of the military occurred during the transition period 
to democracy. Benchmark studies were conducted to look at parliamentary oversight of the military in 
other countries. Teams from the SADF, MK, APLA and the TBVC states were given the opportunity to 
review oversight models in situ, for example, the UK and Germany. NGOs and other external 
stakeholders also made significant input into the models for civil oversight of the military during the 
CODESA discussions (Interview 11). With the notion of civil oversight established, practical means to 
improve oversight were also implemented over time. The development of governmental reporting 
documents such as detailed annual reports and ENEs that were available in the Fourth Parliament 
were not developed to the same extent in the First Parliament (Interview 2). The quality of information 
emanating from the DOD to Parliament thus improved significantly over the years (Interview 7). This 
reflects important growth in terms of transparency. 
 
Incremental growth in the general parliamentary oversight processes provided further scope for 
oversight. This is reflected in, for example, the BRRR process80 that provided structure to the 
oversight process (Interviews 1 and 2). Parliament also saw significant growth in its assistance to 
MPs through the growth of the Parliamentary Research Unit and the appointment of Content Advisors 
(to be discussed) (Interviews 2, 9 and 15). Another aspect of growth relates to the development of 
MPs themselves. MPs develop their specialisation in a specific field (such as defence) over time 
(Interview 9). It can be expected that oversight improves with some MPs having built up experience of 
the sector as time progressed. The above factors thus demonstrate that institutional support at 
executive and parliamentary level improved over time and, in theory, would be able to contribute to 
more thorough oversight of the military. 
 
2.2.4 The important role of committee chairpersons 
 
MPs and parliamentary officials noted the important role of committee chairpersons in ensuring 
engagement on defence matters (Interviews 1, 2, 9 and 15). A parliamentary official stated that the 
parliamentary cycle has developed quite extensively to ensure oversight of the budget through the 
BRRR process. However, due to the time-consuming nature of this oversight, aspects related to 
policy may be neglected. It is therefore dependent on the individual chairperson to ensure that policy 
and other non-mandated areas of oversight be covered. Committees that are more successful in 
conducting meetings and oversight are characterised by a dedicated chairperson. However, the 
                                                          
80 MPs and parliamentary officials also provided input on the potential negative impact of structured processes 
such as the BRRR process (Interviews 1 and 2). For example, while the BRRR process enhances oversight, it is 
a time consuming process and takes up committee time. It was noted by an official that “success areas [such as 
the BRRR process] pushes out time for other focus areas of oversight” (Interview 2).  
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challenge is to balance oversight, as overloading meetings with agenda items can result in a lack of 
in-depth inquiry and oversight (Interview 2). One MP consulted observed an interesting development 
in this regard in that prior to 2004, critical questions could easily be raised, while in the later years, 
chairpersons (including the chairpersons of the defence committees) did not always allow for 
discussion on such matters (Interview 1). Another MP confirmed this by noting insufficient political will 
to do oversight in the context of party-political interests (Interview 4). The importance of chairpersons’ 
willingness to call external stakeholders to brief a committee was also highlighted as this allows for an 
overall higher level of preparation of MPs on the committee once they engage with the departments 
(Interview 9). Given these concerns, it was stated that the real objective of chairpersons have 
decreasingly been on keeping the executive to account and increasingly on preventing robust scrutiny 
of the executive (Interview 5). After 2004, chairpersons were increasingly reluctant to allow members 
to ask critical questions or have such aspects placed on the agenda (Interview 1). 
 
In terms of Parliament’s defence committees, Graph 6.1 highlights the JSCD and PCDMV meetings 
between 1998 and 2013, interspersed with the dates of appointment of new chairpersons. Of 
significance from the data presented in Graph 6.1 is that both the JSCD and PCDMV had regular 
changes in chairpersons over fifteen-year period reflected. This potentially impacted on continuity and 
committee planning. Of specific concern are changes in chairpersons in the middle of a specific 
Parliament and not following the establishment of a new Parliament. For example, the JSCD 
appointed a new Chairperson in 2002, three years after the 1999 elections. Both the JSCD and 
PCDMV had similar shuffles in 2007 and 2011. Further, the data suggests that some chairpersons 
were able to affect growth in the regularity of meetings, while the tenure of others resulted in 
decreased regularity. While a multitude of factors may affect a chairperson’s ability to drive the 
regularity of committee meetings, the data should be viewed alongside observations by MPs that 
chairpersons play a role in driving oversight. The changes in regularity of meetings immediately 
following the appointment of new chairpersons (as reflected in Graph 6.1) therefore seem to support 
the role of chairpersons in influencing committee activity. 
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Graph 6.1 JSCD and PCDMV activities and chairpersons appointments: 1998 - 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2013) 
 
2.2.5 General impressions on parliamentary oversight of the military 
 
In order to ensure a correlation between the primary research question of the study and data 
collection during interviews, participants were asked to reflect on their general impression on the trend 
of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 2014. Two broad yet 
conflicting views emerged. As alluded to in the previous sections, there was a view that parliamentary 
oversight in general saw an upwards trajectory over the twenty-year period. This is largely attributed 
to the developing maturity of Parliament (Interviews 2 and 9) as well as the improvement of oversight 
mechanisms (Interviews 2, 8, 9 and 14). Contrary to the perception of an upwards trajectory of 
oversight, a broad view from academics and MPs alike was that, despite institutional advances, there 
was a general regression in parliamentary oversight of the military specifically (Interviews 10, 11 and 
14).  
 
Three key reasons were provided for the perceived regression in parliamentary oversight of the 
military. First, there was a decreased interest in the military by the executive itself. Two MPs claimed 
that the executive either showed a limited interest in defence matters or they attempted to utilise it for 
party political purposes (Interview 7 and 11). Second, the broad de-prioritisation of defence at 
executive level also reflected at parliamentary level. The general view was that the decline in 
oversight, specifically in later years, was in contrast to the more efficient functioning of Parliament in 
the immediate post-1994 period when the institution understood its role better. The process of writing 
and approving the 1996 White Paper on Defence was noted as a particular period that saw a high 
level of engagement on the strategic concerns facing the military (Interviews 11 and 12). Thereafter, 
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another MP observed a decline in the role and status of Parliament as an institution (Interview 14). 
The need for the establishment of the Interim Defence Force Service Commission, to an extent, 
served as an indication that Parliament failed in its oversight role (Interview 1). Third, interviews 
revealed the changing roles of the PCDMV and JSCD as practical concerns regarding oversight of the 
military (Interview 7). Confusion existed as to the roles and competencies of each committee, despite 
the JSCD’s role being stipulated in the Interim Constitution. In the immediate post-1994 period the 
PCDMV largely focused on budgetary and legislative affairs for which the JSCD did not have an 
oversight mandate. However, both chairpersons of the PCDMV and JSCD in the First Parliament 
identified the possible need to do away with one of the committees (Interview 1). Throughout the 
period there was ongoing questioning whether two defence committees are actually required 
(Interview 6).  
 
The perceived regression in parliamentary oversight of the military should be viewed alongside two 
other factors that emerged strongly during interviews. First, several participants referred to a 
decreased interest in South African military affairs that possibly impacted on the level of parliamentary 
oversight. Civil society’s limited interest in defence matters and a lack of empirical academic inquiry 
into defence showed a steady decline over the twenty-year period (Interviews 3 and 11). This impacts 
negatively on potential external expertise that informs parliament. While in the first years after 1994 
such experts were more frequently called for formal presentations to the defence committees, such 
engagements decreased considerably thereafter (Interviews 11, 12 and 14). An academic recounted 
a personal experience of the decrease in consultancy by individual MPs on military affairs (Interview 
12). The potential negative impact on parliamentary oversight is further exacerbated by shortcomings 
in the training of MPs on aspects of civil-military relations (Interview 10). The absence of training and 
input from external stakeholders impacts negatively on the ability of MPs to deal with complex and 
often technical aspects of defence policy and other military-related concerns. Second, general 
knowledge of the military at parliamentary level decreased. A limited number of MPs serving on the 
portfolio had a military background and there was a general lack of understanding and interest in 
defence matters (Interview 8). This reflects, for example, in a statement by one MP regarding the 
dearth of engagement on defence matters by members of the defence committees and limited 
publishing in, for example, newspapers on defence matters (Interview 4). The concerns raised above 
gave rise to a growing gap between MPs and the military. In the immediate post-1994 period, there 
was a stronger relationship between MPs and former SADF and/or MK/APLA and/or TBVC military 
personnel. Regular communication thus took place, but this changed over time with the formalisation 
of the SANDF (Interviews 7 and 8). 
 
The perspectives presented above provide context within which to analyse the oversight tools, focus 
areas and potential weaknesses for oversight of the military in South Africa. The following sections 
review these aspects and include further information revealed by MPs, parliamentary officials and 
academics. 
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3. Comparing oversight of the military: Two varying parliamentary periods 
 
This section views the two parliamentary eras discussed, 1994 to 2004 (Chapter 4) and 2004 to 2014 
(Chapter 5) to determine macro-trends in parliamentary oversight of the military over the twenty-year 
period under review. The comparisons are broadened by information obtained during interviews. 
 
3.1 Oversight tools utilised in defence oversight 
 
The study identified parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, special defence inquiries, 
oversight visits and study tours as well as the use of external audit as tools utilised for parliamentary 
oversight of the military. The following sections summarise the use of these tools between 1994 and 
2014. 
 
3.1.1 Parliamentary debates 
 
Parliamentary debates on defence take place both at plenary and committee level. At plenary level, 
dedicated defence debates were held by the National Assembly on an ad hoc basis. Between 1994 
and 2004, several defence bills were introduced and at least six dedicated defence debates held. An 
interviewee confirmed regular and thorough debates on defence matters, specifically in the First 
Parliament (Interview 6). Consistency was achieved in debating defence-related aspects annually in 
terms of the Appropriations Bill and the Adjusted Appropriations Bill. Budget debates were also a 
standard practice since the First Parliament, resulting in robust debate (Interview 6). The Second 
Parliament also had more regular debates, specifically in the light of introduced legislative 
amendments (Interview 8). However, there was a significant decrease in dedicated defence debates 
after the first two parliaments. Between 2004 and 2014, only two dedicated defence debates were 
held. Limited debates were confirmed by a MP interviewed, stating that defence debates were 
regarded as non-priorities (Interview 9) while aspects such as education, economic development and 
unemployment were prioritised. Defence-related debates were thus relegated to committee level 
(Interview 4). In the Fourth Parliament, for example, even substantive defence issues such as the 
Defence Review were not thoroughly debated in the Houses of Parliament (Interview 5). Despite 
increased focus on institutional support, some MPs have a limited understanding of military affairs 
that inhibits thorough oversight. Debates are therefore often not constructive and informed (Interview 
14).  
 
Given the decreasing engagement on defence matters at National Assembly-level throughout the 
twenty-year period, more robust debate at committee-level should thus be expected. This is of 
specific importance as committees are considered the engine rooms of parliament (Ngculu, 2002, p. 
180). While frequent defence committee meetings in itself is not an indicator of high levels of 
oversight, Chapter 3 highlighted that parliaments with elevated levels of oversight of defence are often 
characterised by more frequent meetings. Graph 6.2 provides an overview of PCDMV and JSCD 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
197 
 
meetings between 1998 and 2013. From the number of meetings held, four key deductions can be 
made. First, there has been a steady decline in the activity of the JSCD. While the JSCD was still 
actively involved in deliberations around the 1998 Defence Review, its subsequent activity became 
very limited. Second, the periods when the JSCD were more active related to specific defence 
aspects, such as the SDPP (2001), military veterans benefits (2007) and administrative meetings 
related to the programme and mandate of the JSCD (2011). Third, the reduction in JSCD activity was 
offset, in part, by an increase in PCDMV activity from 2000 onwards. Fourth, overall PCDMV and 
JSCD activity saw a sudden decline in 2012 and 2013. The latter is of specific concern as it reverses 
the steady increase in engagements by the PCDMV over the preceding years. 
 
Graph 6.2 Macro-trend in JSCD and PCDMV meetings: 1998 - 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from Committee Minutes PMG (1998 – 2013) 
 
A further analysis of all JSCD and PCDMV meetings held between 1998 and 2013 provides additional 
insight into the state of PCDMV and JSCD meetings. Graph 6.3 includes an overview of all JSCD and 
PCDMV meetings. It differs from Graph 6.2 in that it also denotes the number of joint meetings 
between the two committees as well as meetings that were purely administrative in nature (such as 
meetings where only minutes were adopted or chairpersons elected). Graph 6.2 therefore provides a 
true macro-trend indication of the number of unique defence oversight meetings held between the 
JSCD and PCDMV. Three additional deductions emerge from this analysis. First, except for the 2001 
joint meetings on the SDPP, joint meetings between the JSCD and PCDMV were highly underutilised. 
Second, the number of purely administrative meetings (where no oversight took place) increased 
during the third and fourth parliament. This is specifically true of the JSCD. Finally, the broader view 
of unique defence oversight meetings between 1998 and 2013 reflects a moderate increase in activity 
after 2000 (this is further elaborated upon in Section 3.4.1). 
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Graph 6.3 True macro-trend for JSCD and PCDMV meetings: 1998 - 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from Committee Minutes PMG (1998 – 2013) 
 
From the above observations regarding defence committee activity, it can be argued that the overall 
frequency of parliamentary inquiry on defence was significantly undermined by the inactivity of the 
JSCD. The JSCD became reactionary throughout the period 1998 to 2014 and undermined the ideals 
of continuous oversight. During years where the JSCD was slightly more active, higher levels of 
overall engagement on defence matters were achieved. When the PCDMV and JSCD operated at 
elevated capacity, it was able to achieve a joint average of up to 40 meetings annually. This was, 
however, an exception to the generally limited number of engagements. Furthermore, the sudden 
decline in PCDMV and JSCD activity in 2012 and 2013 is of concern as it occurred in the period 
leading to discussion on the 2014 Defence Review.  
 
The trends observed and deductions made based on the data presented correlates with observations 
noted during interviews. Given limited information on committee meetings prior to 1998, additional 
data on committee activity in the First Parliament was obtained through interviews. MPs noted that 
committee meetings in the First Parliament were regularly held and well organised (Interviews 6 and 
7). In general, such meetings were attended by a full complement of MPs serving on the committees. 
This intensity remained in the first and second parliaments (Interview 6). One MP interviewed did 
however state that, in the Second Parliament, both the committees were not active enough, 
particularly the JSCD (Interview 8). The perception of decreased effectiveness of the committees 
became stronger in the Third Parliament. An academic interviewed underscored these challenges by 
noting an increasing concern regarding the lack of robust debate on military affairs (Interview 3). This 
coincides with observations that, from the Third Parliament onwards, robust debate declined and that 
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it was characterised by efforts to protect the executive and not necessarily hold it to account 
(Interview 13).  
 
Heavy criticism was also forthcoming regarding JSCD and PCDMV meetings in the Fourth 
Parliament. In terms of the regularity of meetings, for example, ample time in the Parliamentary 
programme existed for thorough engagement on the 2014 Defence Review, but that these periods 
were simply not utilised. This work-rate compares poorly to that of other committees in Parliament 
(Interview 5). MPs also found debate at committee level stifling. Practically, MPs noted that robust 
engagement between members and the DOD was inhibited by insufficient opportunity to pose follow-
up questions or where meetings were simply cut short (Interviews 4 and 5). When written follow-up 
responses were requested, these were not submitted to Parliament and/or did not reach MPs 
(Interview 4).  
 
Interviews provided some context for the observed decline in JSCD activity. A change in the nature of 
the JSCD was noted. Initially the committee was established as a joint committee to focus on the 
‘joining’ of various military forces (integration), rather than a joint venture that included the NCOP and 
National Assembly. Furthermore, the size of the committee became a concern that impacted on the 
ability of the committee to function optimally (Interview 7). This relates to concerns regarding 
scheduling identified during the Third Parliament and onwards. The attendance of NCOP members 
became problematic as their programme differed to that of the National Assembly. Programming thus 
forced JSCD meetings to be scheduled on Friday mornings when most MPs have already left to their 
various constituencies (Interviews 8, 9 and 13). This resulted in the JSCD seldom forming a quorum 
(Interview 9).  
 
In conclusion, the overall trends in parliamentary debates on defence reflect some growth, but general 
inconsistency. Plenary debates remained limited and JSCD activity showed decline over the twenty-
year period. While PCDMV activity did increase over time, a negative trend is observed towards the 
end of the Fourth Parliament. 
 
3.1.2 Parliamentary questions 
 
Between 1994 and 2014, a total of 2 045 questions on defence were posed by MPs. The number of 
questions stayed relatively consistent over this period with 1 037 questions posed during the first ten 
years of democracy and 1 008 during the second ten years. Graph 6.4 reveals that questions 
regarding defence were asked mostly by Members from the National Assembly. This may be 
considered in line with the fact that defence is a national competency and only occasionally affect 
matters of provincial importance. Key to note, however, is that the number of questions by MPs from 
the NCOP correlate, to an extent, with the activity of the JSCD (See Graph 6.2), as the JSCD includes 
MPs from the National Assembly and the NCOP. While initially posing more frequent questions on 
defence between 1994 and 1999, the number of questions by Members of the NCOP decreased after 
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that with marginal increases in 2001, 2007 and 2011, correlating with the trend of JSCD activity. It 
could therefore be argued that the decline in JSCD activity directly affected NCOP interest and 
oversight in defence matters. On the contrary, questions by MPs from the National Assembly 
remained consistent throughout the twenty-year period, with sporadic increases of questions between 
2001 and 2003 as well as between 2011 and 2013.  
 
Graph 6.4 20 Year trend – Questions per houses of Parliament: 1994 - 2013 
 
 
A key contribution from interviews is that it provided insight into the effectiveness of parliamentary 
questions on defence between 1994 and 2014. During the First Parliament, questions were well 
utilised, but a MP interviewed highlighted the importance of noting that questions are posed by 
individuals. As such, parliamentary questions are often more political in nature (Interview 6). In the 
Second Parliament, questions were well utilised (specifically from an opposition point of view) and the 
executive always provided responses (Interview 8). However, parliamentary questions were arguably 
not utilised effectively from the Third Parliament onwards (Interview 13). A key concern noted by an 
interviewee is the fact that responses to questions were often classified. From around 2007/08, 
questions that were previously answered in detail became classified as it related ‘operational matters’. 
This was related to a lack of political will to ensure oversight (Interview 1). A similar concern was 
noted by another MP, stating that some questions were simply not responded to (Interview 5).  
 
Concerns regarding the effectiveness of parliamentary questions on defence became further 
exacerbated in the Fourth Parliament. Some MPs lamented the fact that questions were largely posed 
by opposition members (See Section 3.4.4) (Interviews 4 and 5). The Fourth Parliament saw the 
executive not always providing responses to questions or providing superficial/incomplete answers. 
Criteria for not answering questions were not consistent and where information may be considered 
open and provided to MPs in a certain year, a similar question posed in the following year would not 
be responded to (Interview 5). Confidentiality of information, including in instances where it is not 
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warranted, became an increasing concern over the years (Interview 12). In general, questions were 
underutilised by MPs, specifically in terms of the substance thereof. Questions were often only used 
for political grandstanding (Interview 9). 
 
Graph 6.5 demonstrates the higher frequency of written compared to oral questions. This is in line 
with the international norms whereby time for oral questions is often limited, as highlighted in Chapter 
3. Of interest in the South African case is, however, the significant decrease in oral questions to the 
Minister of Defence throughout the twenty-year period. A widening gap between written and oral 
questions can be noted from 2004 onwards. It can therefore be argued that, in the third and fourth 
parliaments, the decreasing utilisation of oral questions undermined the overall effectiveness of using 
questions as a means of holding the Ministry of Defence to account. One MP interviewed noted that 
the limited utilisation of oral questions is due to time restrictions in the National Assembly. Not all 
questions can be answered and although the executive is then required to answer outstanding 
questions in writing, opposition MPs are reluctant to go this route and simply submit written questions 
(Interview 1). During the Fourth Parliament, replies to oral questions simply became prepared 
statements (pre-prepared answers), notably when the question originated from governing party MPs 
(Interview 4). 
 
Graph 6.5 20 Year trend – Written and oral questions: 1994 - 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP Question Papers (1994 – 2013) 
 
Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 also reviewed parliamentary questions on defence per category. While the 
overall number of questions remained similar in the first and second ten years of democracy, some 
shifts in focus in parliamentary questions can be observed. Interest in personnel matters decreased 
significantly, from 150 questions being asked (1994 to 2004) to 85 questions posed (2004 – 2014). 
Matters related to military operations also decreased slightly from 100 questions to 88 questions. 
Similarly, the focus on gender and racial representation decreased from 26 questions to only 15. An 
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increased focus on budgetary aspects can be noted, with questions increasing from 111 to 158. 
Military veterans also became a stand-alone category during the Fourth Parliament, resulting in 25 
questions. A focus on military veterans therefore did not significantly detract from a focus on other 
aspects of the military in terms of written and oral questions posed. 
 
The key deduction from the data, and context provided by interviews, is that of increasing written 
questions amid decreasing oral questions, with the efficiency of such questions declining over time 
due to an apparent unwillingness of the DOD to provide comprehensive and transparent answers 
(Interviews 4, 5 and 12). The contribution thereof to continued parliamentary oversight of the military 
thus declined over time. 
 
3.1.3 Special defence inquiries 
 
Special defence inquiries remained a highly underutilised oversight tool throughout the twenty-year 
period under review. In the First Parliament, a MP recalled the establishment of a subcommittee in the 
JSCD related to the Integration Process (Interview 14). Between 1998 and 2004, inquiries on the 
SDPP as well as Language Policy of the DOD were held. Between 2004 and 2014, inquiries were 
held on, inter alia, the 1998 Defence Review implementation and unionisation in the DOD. These 
reflect a limited number of in-depth inquiries over a twenty-year period. Furthermore, not all of these 
inquiries truly conformed to the requirements of special defence inquiries, as they often did not result 
in a formal committee report or the stipulation of specific recommendations to the executive. Except 
for subcommittees on Integration in the First Parliament, the PCDMV and JSCD also did not make 
significant use of subcommittees for in-depth scrutiny of identified concerns. Suggestions on the 
formation of subcommittees in the Second Parliament did not materialise. Similarly, except for a joint 
investigation into the SDPP by the PCDMV and JSCD, no ad hoc committees were established to 
investigate defence matters. The more ‘in-depth’ inquiries conducted by the defence committees are 
therefore rather in line with its normal oversight functions than a special defence inquiry. These 
findings were largely confirmed by MPs, noting limited special defence inquiries and/or the 
establishment of subcommittees with specific investigative purposes (Interviews 4, 5 and 14). 
Interviewees also noted that even crucial military events, like Operation Boleas, shootings in military 
bases and the SANDF losses in the CAR did not result in Special Defence Inquiries (Interviews 12 
and 14). 
 
3.1.4 Oversight visits and study tours 
 
In terms of international study tours, five such tours were conducted by the PCDMV and JSCD (often 
jointly) over the twenty-year period under review. In all cases, formal reports were published in the 
parliamentary ATC. An interviewee highlighted the relevant and positive nature of a study tour in the 
First Parliament to study civil oversight of the military and the integration of forces (Interview 1). The 
submission of reports became a concern around the Third Parliament, when official study tour reports 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
203 
 
were only submitted several months after the actual study tours took place, which potentially reduce 
the impact of such study tours. Despite discussions on possible study tours, no study tours were 
conducted during the Fourth Parliament, which is in line with decreased PCDMV and JSCD activity 
(Interviews 4 and 5). The limited number of study tours impacts negatively on the broader civil 
oversight of defence deployments. For example, it means that the Minister of Defence only received 
uncontested information on deployments from the DOD itself (Interview 9). 
 
While defence-related study tours were not regularly conducted, local oversight visits were 
increasingly used as an oversight tool, especially from the Third Parliament onwards. PMG minutes 
between 1998 and 2004 reveal that only three oversight visits were conducted. Only one related 
official report was published in the ATC. Despite the ATCs revealing limited oversight visits by the 
defence committees in the first and second parliaments, MPs noted that several such visits were in 
fact conducted. One of the MPs consulted noted that these initial (undocumented)81 oversight visits in 
the immediate post-1994 period were important as it occurred during the integration period (Interviews 
6 and 7). Oversight visits were experienced positively and worked towards a sense of unity in the 
newly established SANDF. The MP noted that visit reports were submitted to the Houses of 
Parliament and that the Speaker referred findings in such reports to the Minister of Defence for 
response and implementation (Interview 6).  
 
A marked increase in the use of oversight visits and official reporting thereon is visible from the Third 
Parliament onwards. At least 13 oversight visits took place in the third and fourth parliaments, 
including 10 by the PCDMV and 3 by the JSCD. The increased utilisation of oversight visits as an 
oversight tool can be viewed as a positive development as it allows MPs to better familiarise 
themselves with defence matters at ground level (Cover & Meran, 2013, p. 43; Interview 8). However, 
the increased utilisation of this tool is weakened by delays in the submission of formal reports 
following oversight visits. Following most PCDMV oversight visits in the third and fourth parliaments, 
formal reports were generally only published in the ATC between three and six months after the visit. 
A further factor that may limit the successful utilisation of this oversight tool is the lack of activity of the 
JSCD that failed to effectively use oversight visits between 1994 and 2014. There was also a decline 
in the utilisation of this oversight tool in the Fourth Parliament, with only three oversight visit reports 
tabled in the ACT compared to seven in the Third Parliament. This is again in line with reduced 
committee activity in the latter parts of the Fourth Parliament. 
 
Interviews reveal that MPs generally felt that oversight visits were positive tools and found the 
conducting of such visits constructive (Interviews 1, 4, 8 and 13). For example, the value of oversight 
visits was highlighted, notably when departmental officials are open about challenges and when 
comprehensive sharing of information takes place. Despite this, several factors that undermine the 
constructive nature of oversight visits were also revealed. While oversight visits were useful, not 
                                                          
81 For the purpose of this study, these oversight visits are considered ‘undocumented’ as no official minutes 
and/or reports of these visits could be found. 
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enough facts were being shared with MPs (Interview 8). An academic interviewed observed a concern 
from past oversight visits in that the DOD would ‘soft soak’ MPs during visits, thus limiting in-depth 
inquiry during such visits (Interview 11). Criticism of oversight visits during the Fourth Parliament was 
particularly strong. One MP noted that engagements with DOD personnel are often limited by time 
constraints or by a decision to end the day’s oversight activities early. Thorough engagement during 
oversight visits is thus lacking. An example was mentioned of an oversight visit to an infantry base 
whereby the chairperson of the delegation stopped the engagement with personnel at the base at 
lunchtime and MPs returned to Parliament. Committee members were not consulted in this decision 
(Interview 4). As such, some MPs wish to conduct oversight visits themselves due to the fact that 
committee visits are often ineffective. However, obtaining such permission is often a lengthy process 
which further undermines oversight (Interview 4).  
 
Study tours and oversight visits are crucial tools to broaden MPs sector-specific competence and 
familiarise them with challenges at ground level. These tools were increasingly utilised between 1994 
and 2014, but a clear reduction is observed in the Fourth Parliament. The challenges to the nature of 
oversight visits during the Fourth Parliament highlighted by MPs raise significant questions as to the 
efficiency and impact thereof. 
 
3.1.5 Use of external audit 
 
Audit reports from the AGSA are the main external audit opinion utilised by the JSCD and PCDMV. 
This oversight tool is perhaps one of the most significant areas of growth in terms of defence 
oversight between 1994 and 2014. Between 1998 and 2004, reports by the AGSA were only 
referenced three times by the PCDMV. The tool was thus initially used only sporadically. This grew 
notably during the third and fourth parliaments, whereby the AGSA regularly briefed the PCDMV on 
its audit opinions. Consideration of the AGSA’s audit opinion of the DOD’s annual report became fully 
entrenched during the Fourth Parliament. The increased use of external audit is in line with broader 
efforts to enhance legislative oversight, including the 2005 National Treasury Guidelines for 
Legislative Oversight through annual reports as well as the Manual for Parliamentary Committees 
(National Treasury of South Africa, 2005; Parliament of South Africa, 2011). 
 
The incremental use of the AGSA’s audits also surfaced in interviews (Interview 14). In the Second 
Parliament, limited use was made of the work of the AGSA and the committees did not thoroughly use 
this to impact on its work. The AGSA did, however, play an important role in the arms deal 
investigations (Interview 8). One MP confirmed the shift towards broader utilisation of the AGSA’s 
work in the Third Parliament, specifically during annual report hearings (Interview 13). However, 
another MP highlighted this approach as a major concern, notably during the Fourth Parliament, as 
engagement between the committees and the AGSA takes place only once a year during the annual 
report reviews. There is thus scope for improvement in the engagement between committees and the 
AGSA as the engagement between the AGSA and SCOPA, for example, is much more robust 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
205 
 
(Interview 4). Furthermore, requests for special audits were never considered by the AGSA (Interview 
5). As such, in the context of a twenty-year overview, the increased utilisation of the AGSA’s work at 
parliamentary level is a positive contributor to overall oversight efforts, but room for improvement 
remains. 
 
3.2 Focus areas of defence oversight  
 
For thorough oversight of the military, several focus areas ought to be overseen at parliamentary 
level, including the defence budget, defence policy, defence procurement, human resources and 
defence deployments. The sections below summarise parliamentary oversight of these focus areas 
between 1994 and 2014.  
 
3.2.1 Defence budget 
 
Prior to 1994 much of the defence budget, notably expenditure related to procurement, lacked 
effective parliamentary oversight (Sylvester, 2011a, p. 12). With the advent of democracy, major 
strides were made towards parliamentary oversight of the defence budget, as per the newly set 
constitutional requirements. Annual PCDMV and JSCD meetings on budgetary aspects were held 
between 1998 and 2004. After 2004, however, the function of budgetary oversight was taken over 
almost exclusively by the PCDMV. In the third and fourth parliaments, the JSCD held only one 
budgetary-related meeting while the frequency of such meetings by the PCDMV increased to between 
three and six meetings a year. This increased regularity of oversight of the defence budget fits with 
the development of Parliament’s BRRR process (N. Naidoo, 2012, pp. 76–78). Through the 
institutionalisation of the BRRR process, the PCDMV became increasingly active in reviewing the 
defence budget both ex post and ex ante. The increased focus on the defence budget is also 
reflected in the number of budget-related parliamentary questions posed by MPs during the third and 
fourth parliaments (See Section 3.1.2).  
 
Improved oversight of budgetary aspects between 1994 and 2014 was echoed during interviews. A 
parliamentary official highlighted the enhanced information available from government on budgetary 
aspects that enabled Parliament to better analyse the country’s budget, including the defence budget. 
As such, Parliament’s work on budgetary aspects has developed to become one of the strong points 
of the institution (Interview 2). Mechanisms for budgetary oversight in Parliament also improved 
significantly (Interviews 8 and 14). The increased transparency in this regard was already apparent in 
the shift from pre-1994 to post-1994 with one MP noting significant advances (Interview 1). The JSCD 
specifically was tasked to focus on budgetary oversight in the First Parliament and it held regular 
meetings on budgetary reports received. The Committee also incorporated budgetary aspects into its 
oversight visits to see how funds were spent (Interview 6). In the Second Parliament, budgetary 
aspects were also regularly discussed and reviewed. However, further improvements were noted in 
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the third and fourth parliaments (Interview 8). Regular and in-depth analysis of the budget of the DOD 
and its entities were executed during the Third Parliament (Interview 13).  
 
While significant improvement has been made in terms of budgetary oversight and related 
parliamentary processes, some criticism of defence budget oversight did emerge during interviews. 
Long-term budgetary aspects were not effectively overseen. Parliament failed to address the ever-
increasing expenditure on personnel in the DOD and the adverse effect this had on operations and 
capital acquisition (Internet 14). Similarly, an academic interviewed observed a constant request from 
defence-committee MPs for an increased defence allocation from National Treasury. However, these 
requests have never resulted in an increase in the defence budget (Interview 12). This brings into 
question the impact of budgetary oversight. Furthermore, specifically during the Fourth Parliament, 
engagement on the budget was not robust and simply reflected an exercise requiring completion by 
the PCDMV. This was echoed in, for example, the fact that the committee never reviewed the Special 
Defence Account. Similarly, no closed meetings were held to discuss sensitive financial information 
(Interview 5). From these inputs it is thus clear that the impact and comprehensiveness of budgetary 
oversight requires questioning. Despite these limitations emerging from interviews, improved 
transparency, regular engagement and thorough structuring of Parliament’s oversight of the defence 
budget stands in sharp contrast to the status quo prior to 1994 and therefore marks a positive trend in 
oversight.   
 
 3.2.2 Defence policy 
 
A review of Parliament’s engagement on defence legislation and policies between 1994 and 2014 
mirrors the context of the political changes after 1994. The first ten years of democracy saw 
significant focus placed on legislative amendments to align legislation with a democratic state. This 
resulted in the JSCD and PCDMV deliberating regularly on a number of defence bills passing through 
Parliament. During the First Parliament, the committees were largely grappling with what the role of 
the SANDF ought to be and how this impacted on the force structure (Interview 14). This was evident 
through the 1996 White Paper on Defence. Furthermore, in the absence of a credible external 
security threat, policy matters such as HIV/AIDS and other diseases, peacekeeping and personnel 
exit mechanisms were prioritised (Interview 7). The 1998 Defence Review also required specific 
attention during the First Parliament. MPs on the defence committees paid significant attention to the 
1998 Defence Review in the four years preceding the adoption of the Review (Interview 6). MPs were 
also actively involved in the workgroups established to draft the 1998 Defence Review (Interview 12). 
In the Second Parliament, there was a follow-up on the implementation of the 1998 Defence Review 
by the defence committees. However, this policy document was not adhered to at political level. The 
committee at the time called for a five-year public review, but these did not take place (Interview 8). 
The engagements above nonetheless demonstrated a willingness to address policy. 
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After 2004, with the focus of Parliament shifting from legislating to oversight, focus on policy matters 
decreased. The PCDMV continued to process defence-related bills introduced, while the JSCD dealt 
with limited policy matters (in line with the decreased activity of the JSCD over this period). In the 
Third Parliament, there were also instances of active engagement by some MPs in defence policy, 
such as the attendance of some MPs of the Defence 2020 Vision policy discussions (Interview 12). 
However, overall engagement on policy decreased and seems to have been exacerbated in the 
Fourth Parliament. This is visible in, for example, the approach to the 2014 Defence Review. In 2004 
and 2005, the PCDMV held at least nine meetings to assess the 1998 Defence Review. In contrast, 
parliament’s engagement on the 2014 Defence Review, which commenced in 2012, was limited. The 
Defence Review Committee first briefed the PCDMV in this regard on 18 April 2012 and the JSCD on 
25 April 2012. During another JSCD meeting on 16 May 2012, “Members asked that the Defence 
Review Committee be asked to brief the JSC[D] again on specific key chapters, and then be re-called, 
after the public hearings, to brief the JSC[D] again, who would then produce an interim report for 
debate in the House. It was necessary to ensure due speed of the review process, but also ensure 
that it was done thoroughly” (PMG, 2012a). Despite this recommendation, the JSCD held no 
additional meetings related to the 2014 Defence Review in the Fourth Parliament. This trend 
continued into the Fifth Parliament, whereby the JSCD received only two briefings by the Defence 
Review Committee, where after it held one public hearing and one session of deliberations on the 
Review before publishing a report (PMG, 2015b).82   
 
Various MPs and academics echoed concerns regarding policy engagement in the Fourth Parliament. 
Two key policy documents came before the PCDMV and JSCD in this period namely the 2014 
Defence Review and the Military Veterans Policy. One MP interviewed noted that, for example, the 
2014 Defence Review was never costed and Parliament never engaged on the financial requirements 
and implications for implementing thereof. This was corroborated by another MP who noted, 
specifically, the limited time spent on the 2014 Defence Review. The recommendations and input 
from opposition parties were not considered or taken into account by the JSCD (Interview 5). 
Academics interviewed also raised the question regarding the non-implementation and lack of funding 
of the 2014 Defence Review and questioned the role that the parliamentary committees played in 
addressing such concerns (Interviews 10 and 11). Another academic questioned the ongoing 
mismatch between the operational requirements put before the DOD and the dearth of funding to fulfil 
such allocation (Interview 12). Similar to the criticism above, the financial implications of the Military 
Veterans Act were not considered robustly during committee oversight (Interview 5). There is thus a 
policy dilemma in this regard and the effective utilisation of Parliament to influence defence-related 
policy can therefore be questioned (Interview 10). 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Although the reference to the Fifth Parliament falls outside the scope of this study, its inclusion in relation to the 
processing of the 2015 Defence Review is relevant as it demonstrates the continued reduced engagement on 
important defence policy matters. 
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3.2.3 Defence procurement 
 
Between 1998 and 2004, the JSCD and PCDMV held several meetings related to procurement. The 
most significant development in this period was the joint meetings held in 2001 on the 1999 SDPP. 
MPs stated that parliament, in the immediate post-1994 period, identified the need to address the 
state of equipment in the SANDF, specifically the SA Air Force and SA Navy (Interviews 6 and 7). The 
acquisition process, a MP noted, was well intentioned but that the actual purchases were 
unfortunately characterised by corruption, resulting in parliamentary investigation. All parties involved 
represented on the defence committees has access to all documents on the SDPP. Yet, no MP could 
find any concrete proof of corruption during its investigations. The MP thus considered that the 
process was transparent and that parliament did not stifle the investigation by the committee 
(Interview 6). However, another MP interviewed differed from this view by noting that very little 
information was forthcoming regarding the procurement process. There was a sense of 
defensiveness regarding the procurement process and the chairperson at the time stifled 
transparency in this regard and possibly conspired with members of the executive to provide as little 
details as possible on the SDPP (Interview 14). These concerns are aligned with academic 
perspectives on the failure of parliamentary oversight on the SDPP (February, 2006, p. 124; Seedat, 
1999, p. 4; Sylvester, 2011a, p. 10). The effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of defence 
procurement at committee level thus came into question already in the Second Parliament. 
 
Further efforts to increase oversight of defence procurement (and sales) came towards the end of the 
Second Parliament with the passing of the NCACC Act (2002). Despite the passing of the Act, which 
requires the NCACC to submit quarterly and annual reports to Parliament, engagement with the 
NCACC in the third and fourth parliaments remained limited. This can largely be attributed to the 
committees as they retain the responsibility of requesting the presence of the NCACC. As such, while 
mechanisms exist for parliamentary oversight of defence procurement, the handling of the 1999 
SDPP, as well as a continued inability to regularly engage with the NCACC, highlight major concerns 
in Parliament’s capacity to effectively oversee defence procurement. The fact that parliamentary 
questions regarding procurement and sales did not decrease after the introduction of the NCACC Act 
further highlights that sufficient information was not forthcoming from engagements between 
Parliament and the NCACC (86 questions posed between 1994 and 2004; 93 questions posed 
between 2004 and 2014). Limited engagement with the NCACC also reflected in interviews with MPs. 
During the Third Parliament, MPs noted that NCACC reports were often not received by Parliament, 
despite this being a statutory requirement. This was of concern as the sale of arms often did not 
comply with the conditions as prescribed and questions posed by the committee were not responded 
to (Interview 13). During the Fourth Parliament, there was a general lack of engagement at committee 
level on defence procurement. While some aspects of procurement were discussed, these generally 
emerged as a result of a controversy surrounding a specific procurement contract (Interview 5).   
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Based on the above, developments in terms of parliamentary oversight of defence procurement 
between 1994 and 2014 saw a downwards trajectory. The arms deal served as a particular turning 
point in this regard as it provided “an interesting perspective on what can become of oversight bodies 
when they encounter realpolitik head-on” (February, 2006, p. 133). The subsequent measures put in 
place to review procurement aspects, namely Parliament’s oversight of the NCACC, was poorly used 
and remained ineffective. 
 
3.2.4 Human resources 
 
Section 3.1.2 alluded to the decreased interest in personnel matters between 1994 and 2014 based 
on parliamentary questions. The initial interest in personnel matters during the first and second 
parliaments should be seen in the context of the post-1994 force integration process that necessitated 
debate on human resources (Interview 10). Matters related to force rationalisation and human 
resources policies and strategies as well as integration were also regularly addressed at committee 
level during these initial years. In the First Parliament, notably during oversight visits, the well-being of 
soldiers at military bases was a key focus (Interview 6). One MP interviewed did, however, criticise 
the information provided on human resources by the DOD as being inconsistent and that the DOD’s 
internal audit capacity lacked the ability to effectively scrutinise human resources aspects. This was of 
concern given the need for transformation in the SANDF (Interview 7). Concerns regarding 
inconsistent information ties to an observation by another MP that, in the first and second parliaments, 
SANDF members from the Personnel Division were never called to Parliament to address human 
resources concerns such as the ageing troop contingent. MPs were dependent on parliamentary 
questions to obtain such information (Interview 14). 
 
During the third and fourth parliaments, engagement on human resources matters at committee level 
decreased significantly, specifically in the JSCD. This links to an observation by an MP that 
transformation became less of a priority in terms of oversight as the process was largely completed 
(Interview 8). While the PCDMV did have ad hoc meetings on the Human Resources Strategy, exit 
mechanisms and the Human Resources Policy, the JSCD still dealt with matters of transformation. 
Beyond transformation aspects the JSCD had very little engagement on human resources, which is of 
special concern  given the Interim Constitution’s provision for the JSCD to be competent to oversee 
the defence organisation (RSA, 1993 Section 228). A further decrease in committee engagement on 
human resources can also be noted in the Fourth Parliament. During this period recommendations 
from, among others, the National Treasury noted the need for the SANDF’s human resources 
component to be reduced. This also came to the fore in the 2014 Defence Review. However, limited 
parliamentary oversight was done to address the rising median age of the SANDF and other human 
resources concerns. Where recommendations on these matters were made by the committee, the 
executive did not fully engage on these recommendations, notably in relation to the development of 
personnel exit mechanisms in the DOD (Interview 4). Limited oversight of human resources was 
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therefore prevalent and one MP stated that this was due to human resources issues presenting a 
political conundrum to MPs from the ruling party (Interview 5).  
 
In summary, one of the MPs interviewed noted that throughout the twenty-year period, the level of 
expenditure on personnel increased significantly and many high-ranking military personnel were 
simply appointed without the necessary qualifications or experience. This resulted in the personnel 
focus being on welfare rather than military needs (Interview 1). The decreased parliamentary focus on 
personnel over the twenty-year period can therefore be highlighted as a concern. While many of these 
concerns were identifiable throughout the twenty-year period, parliamentary oversight had little 
impact, as the 2014 Defence Review still expressed deep concern related to personnel management, 
rejuvenation and personnel-related expenditure (Defence Review Committee, 2014, pp. 14–9). 
 
3.2.5 Deployment of the military 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted substantial legislative developments related to oversight of local and foreign 
military deployments. The 1993 Interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution and the Defence Act make 
multiple provisions that provide scope for parliamentary oversight of defence deployments. However, 
the argument can be made that sufficient parliamentary oversight of defence deployments have not 
been forthcoming over the twenty-year period under review. First, during the first and second 
parliaments, various letters of deployment were submitted to Parliament by the President, yet these 
deployments were never debated at committee level. Second, in the third and fourth parliaments, a 
number of letters of deployment were reflected in the Parliamentary ATC, but these were often not 
adopted by the JSCD due to the lack of a quorum or other reasons. Third, the reduced activity of the 
JSCD resulted in significantly less focus on defence deployments. This is of particular relevance given 
the requirements in the Interim Constitution for the JSCD to oversee such deployments. Fourth, 
despite several ongoing SANDF deployments, limited briefings on defence deployments (aside from 
Presidential letters) continued in the third and fourth parliaments, with the PCDMV only receiving 
three such meetings while the JSCD received only two.  
 
From these four indicators it is clear that oversight of military deployments is not effectively 
considered either immediately after its announcement or even during the period of actual deployment. 
Furthermore, two examples of deployments also show poor oversight at committee level after 
deployments were terminated. In 1998, during Operation Boleas, only one meeting on the situation in 
Lesotho was held by the JSCD (PMG, 1998i). Similarly, in 2013, only one briefing was held on the 
South African deployment to the CAR (PMG, 2013a). These deployments resulted in the largest battle 
losses for the SANDF in the first twenty years post-1994, but received scant oversight attention as 
opposed to other less casualty-prone deployments. Single-meeting reviews with limited scope for 
debate during such meetings thus highlight a severe lack of oversight. The 2013 JSCD meeting on 
the SANDF operation in the CAR illustrates this point well whereby, following a briefing by the Minister 
of Defence and one round of questions from MPs, the meeting was called to a close as some MPs 
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argued that “Members wanted to return to their constituencies and had flights booked” (PMG, 2013a). 
No follow-up meetings on what became known as the Battle of Bangui were held despite this being 
the largest single loss of SANDF personnel after 1994.  
 
The concerns deduced above based on committee minutes and Parliamentary ATC were confirmed 
by MPs. An interviewee stated that oversight following Operation Boleas was characterised by limited 
information sharing with the Committee. Committee members were accused of being ‘unpatriotic’ by 
members of the executive when they requested details on the deployment as such details were 
considered operational in nature (Interview 14). Pressure mounted in the Third Parliament for 
oversight of defence deployments and questions and meetings in this regard increased. This was, 
however, largely driven by opposition parties to hold the President to the constitutional requirements 
on reporting to Parliament. However, active oversight of deployments remained limited (Interview 9). 
Furthermore, an interviewee stated that although the JSCD has an important role in executing its 
constitutional mandate to oversee SANDF deployments, it was largely failing. The delays in 
discussion of Presidential letters of deployment were noted as a specific concern (Interview 7). A 
similar concern was raised during the Fourth Parliament with a MP claiming that even when 
Presidential letters were considered, these were merely box-ticking exercises (Interview 4). No robust 
engagement on deployments took place and the Chief of the SANDF or Chief of Joint Operations was 
never present to be interrogated on such deployment. No oversight visits to foreign deployment areas 
were held in the Fourth Parliament (Interview 5).  
 
Several MPs and academics recounted the SANDF deployment to the CAR as a particular example of 
poor oversight of defence deployments. The single meeting held in 2013 following the SANDF 
deployment to the CAR was limited in scope and many outstanding issues remained unaccounted for 
following the meeting (Interview 4). MPs also noted that no DOD personnel were held accountable for 
the military losses in the CAR (Interviews 5, 12 and 14). In addition, the deployment to the CAR and 
specifically the Battle of Bangui did not prompt the broader requisite debate in the South African 
public (Interview 11).  
 
3.3 Lower-order focus areas of defence oversight 
 
The study added various lower-order focus areas of oversight of the military. The sections below 
summarise parliamentary oversight of these lower-order focus areas, including annual and quarterly 
performance, interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial 
equality, defence morale as well as defence infrastructure. 
 
3.3.1 Annual and quarterly performance 
 
Annual reports allow parliaments to track financial and other identified performance areas of defence 
departments. Chapter 3 revealed that, among the selected comparative cases, parliaments that 
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considered annual reports tended to score higher in terms of oversight of the military. The South 
African Parliament can also be credited with making significant strides in this regard. While 
committees did not extensively review annual reports in the first and second parliaments, the 
introduction of the 1999 Public Finances Management Act (RSA, 1999) provided a foundation for 
oversight of the annual reports. Such oversight became institutionalised from 2003 onwards when 
annual reports were considered every year. This was confirmed by MPs that noted the limited scope 
of oversight in the Second Parliament vis-à-vis improved discussions in the Third Parliament 
(Interviews 8 and 13). The process of review was enhanced through the introduction of Section 5(2) of 
the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Act 9 of 2009). Through the Act, the 
outcome of the performance assessment process followed by committees is to annually submit a 
BRRR for tabling in the National Assembly. The value of the annual reports and BRRR process was 
highlighted by a MP (Interview 14). The introduction of a legislative requirement for oversight thus had 
a significantly positive effect on oversight of defence matters in South Africa. Despite more regular 
and thorough engagement, the impact of oversight of the annual reports was questioned. MPs noted 
that the aim of the BRRR, that follows annual report deliberations, is to look back and draw 
conclusions. However, the recommendations made by the defence committees are mostly not 
responded to by the Minister of Defence, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME) and/or National Treasury83 (Interview 4). Another MP interviewed concurred that the review 
of the annual reports were ‘box-ticking exercises’ conducted by the PCDMV (Interview 5). 
 
While not common occurrence in the other cases discussed in Chapter 3, the requirement for the 
South African DOD to submit quarterly expenditure and performance information can be considered a 
positive development in terms of ensuring continuous oversight. Although this requirement was 
instituted in 2001, Parliament’s defence committees only sporadically considered quarterly reports 
from the DOD during the Third Parliament. It thus took significant time for the adequate adherence to 
the requirement to review quarterly performance. Only from 2012 onwards were quarterly reports 
frequently considered by the PCDMV (Interview 2). Despite more frequent engagements in the Fourth 
Parliament, engagement on quarterly reports are often extremely outdated or considered together 
(two or more quarterly reports considered at the same meeting). The Committee can thus not make 
recommendations to amend spending patterns in a subsequent quarter. Engagement on quarterly 
reports therefore also became ‘box-ticking exercises’ (Interview 4). Another MP felt that what was truly 
needed was for MPs to have access to quarterly expenditure reports prepared by National Treasury, 
but that these were not made available to MPs (Interview 5)84. 
 
Similar to budgetary oversight, Parliament’s engagement on the DOD’s annual reports and quarterly 
reports showed significant growth between 1994 and 2014. This was largely prompted by legislation 
and regulations from National Treasury as well as the development of internal oversight mechanisms 
                                                          
83 The non-submission of replies by National Treasury reflects the position of the MP interviewed. However, it is a 
legislative requirement for National Treasury to respond to BRRR recommendations and these are well complied 
with and published.  
84 Quarterly expenditure reports prepared by National Treasury are, in fact, submitted to the SCOPA, but not to 
MPs on other committees. 
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of Parliament. Despite improvement, interviews reflect that committee work may not have been 
sufficiently in-depth to ensure regular performance tracking through quarterly reports and to effect 
departmental changes in the performance of the DOD. 
 
3.3.2 Interdepartmental cooperation 
 
Interdepartmental cooperation is essential in achieving broader overarching government goals. For 
holistic parliamentary oversight, aspects of interdepartmental cooperation should therefore ideally be 
considered. As with the international cases considered (See Chapter 3), the PCDMV and JSCD only 
considered aspects of interdepartmental cooperation on an ad hoc basis throughout the 20-year 
period under review.  
 
The lack of effective interdepartmental cooperation had a profound practical impact on the DOD. First, 
of specific impact was cooperation with the DPW. The dearth of effective cooperation is perhaps most 
evident in the establishment of the Defence Works Formation, reflecting a desire from the DOD to find 
its own internal solutions to maintenance needs. Repair and maintenance at military facilities became 
a major concern and was often reported to Parliament. Yet, a review of committee activities between 
1998 and 2014 reflects that parliamentary oversight failed to (a) identify this as a major concern and 
(b) to address this concern effectively. Second, the DOD is also actively involved in border 
safeguarding operations. During the Fourth Parliament, the possible establishment of a Border 
Management Agency became a major interdepartmental topic. However, limited engagement in this 
regard took place by the defence committees. While some engagement did take place, receiving 
reports back from such engagements often take extremely long (Interview 4).  
 
Interviews with MPs and academics further revealed a broader concern regarding vision and 
cooperation in the security cluster as a whole (Interview 10). The practical implication for the DOD 
relates to the utilisation of the military as a foreign policy tool (Louw, 2013, p. 79). One MP noted that 
the lack of oversight on interdepartmental cooperation, notably between the DOD and Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), showed in the aftermath of the CAR incident in 
2013. In the MPs opinion, no cooperative approach existed between the two departments in the CAR 
(Interview 5). The gap between foreign policy directives and military capability has continuously grown 
in the post-1994 period (Interview 11). In the context of limited oversight of defence deployments and 
very limited engagement with the DIRCO, poor parliamentary oversight of interdepartmental 
cooperation is reflected. Limited oversight of interdepartmental cooperation thus reflects at practical 
level, such as the DOD-DPW relations, and policy level, such as oversight of the broader security 
cluster approach which includes DOD-DIRCO relations. 
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3.3.3 Military training and education 
 
In the context of non-offensive defence, the immediate post-1994 period required increased focus on 
training and education by the South African military. This reflects in specific constitutional 
requirements for the JSCD to focus on oversight of training. MPs also reflected on this requirement by 
noting that training was considered a priority for oversight in the First Parliament, especially during 
oversight visits (Interviews 6 and 7). This was of importance given the discontinuation of conscription 
and the need to attract young individuals of all races to join the SANDF (Interview 7). There was also 
the need for training of all members of the SANDF in a conventional combat force concept (Interviews 
7 and 8). Furthermore, Parliament also emphasised the need for civic-education at all levels of the 
SANDF (Interview 6). Despite this prioritisation, some training concerns did emerge during this period 
that were not addressed by Parliament, such as the completion of training courses by politically 
connected individuals who were ‘helped through’ the courses (Interview 14). During the Second 
Parliament, reviewing aspects related to training were not prioritised. Oversight visits in this regard 
were held, but with limited impact (Interview 8). In terms of committee meetings in the Second 
Parliament, matters of military training were often treated as a secondary subject, only discussed on 
the periphery of meetings on transformation and budgetary aspects.  
 
A positive shift in oversight came after the launching of the MSDS in 2003. A marked increase in 
dedicated meetings on the MSDS and other training aspects can be noted in the third and fourth 
parliaments. Several oversight visits added to this level of oversight. MPs did, however, question the 
value of oversight in this regard. Not enough was done by the defence committees in terms of 
oversight of training and education. Several oversight visits were held to some of the training 
institutions. However, while the DOD has various quality training institutions, problems emerge when 
soldiers finish their training and are transferred to their various units. At this point, limited funding and 
other problems result in soldiers not remaining current with training requirements. The value gained 
from visits to training and education facilities was therefore questioned (Interview 4). Another MP 
interviewed noted that during the Fourth Parliament, training and education were only dealt with on an 
ad hoc basis, but that these were mostly related to incidents at training institutions (Interview 5). 
 
Despite criticism, the integration and post-MSDS periods saw increased oversight of military training 
and education. The increased focus on aspects of training should largely be credited to the work of 
the PCDMV. Despite the JSCD’s constitutional requirement to oversee matters pertaining to military 
training it had comparatively less engagements than the PCDMV. More consistency was achieved by 
the PCDMV and JSCD in oversight of defence educational needs throughout the 20-year period 
through ad hoc meetings and oversight visits to educational institutions such as the Military Academy, 
South African National Defence College and various SANDF gymnasiums. 
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3.3.4 Gender and racial equality 
 
Given the integration process after 1994 it was expected that matters of transformation, notably 
gender and racial transformation of the SANDF, were to be prioritised. This was the case at 
committee level where, during the First Parliament, gender and racial equality were some of the 
biggest challenges that needed to be arrested after the integration period (Interview 7). 
Transformation also remained a major aspect for discussion in the Second Parliament. Both the 
PCDMV and JSCD regularly held meetings on gender and racial equality in the first and second 
parliaments. The JSCD was particularly active in this regard between 1998 and 2004. This focus area 
consumed substantial time of the parliamentary committees as most discussions were in some way 
linked to the topic of transformation. It thus overshadowed other topics (Interview 8). 
 
With the integration processes completed by the late 1990s, a decline in focus on matters of gender 
and racial equality could perhaps have been expected. This decline in the prioritisation of 
transformation from 2004 onwards was confirmed by an interviewee (Interview 8). Over this period, 
parliamentary questions on gender and race became less and PCDMV engagement on matters of 
gender and racial equality decreased. This was especially true in the Fourth Parliament as one of the 
MPs interviewed noted that although the issue of racial and gender equality were raised more 
frequently, it did not receive substantial inquiry from the PCDMV/JSCD (Interview 5). However, 
despite a reduction in questions and limited PCDMV engagement, the JSCD continued to focus on 
gender and racial equality in the third and fourth parliaments. This could arguably be related to the 
2004 National Treasury guidelines for oversight that stated that specific targets for transformation in 
government departments should be developed and reported to Parliament. The JSCD’s continued 
focus on gender and racial equality should also be seen in the context of its declining activity. Based 
on committee minutes, it is evident that the JSCD thus spent a high percentage of its meeting time on 
transformation matters related to gender and racial equality.  
 
In terms of a broad overview of committee activity, there has been a constant review of gender and 
racial equality throughout the twenty-year period with perhaps a natural/expected reduction towards 
the Fourth Parliament. 
 
3.3.5 Defence morale 
 
The establishment of the SANDF, through the integration of various armed forces, was expected to 
pose challenges to defence morale. Louw (2013, p. 58) notes that “three years after the establishment 
of the SANDF, some analysts were already hinting that the armed forces’ operational standards were 
under pressure, that its morale was not what it should be and that it was haemorrhaging managerial 
and technical expertise.” The need for oversight of defence morale was recognised in Section 228 (v) 
of the Interim Constitution that provides specific directives for the JSCD to oversee defence morale 
(RSA, 1993). However, neither the JSCD nor the PCDMV showed much resolve to address defence 
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morale in the twenty-year period under review. Of specific concern is that, on various occasions 
throughout this period, the SANDF, DOD, Secretary of Defence and the Interim National Defence 
Force Service Commission noted defence morale as a concern. Despite this, neither committee 
scheduled any dedicated meetings on defence morale. In the Second Parliament, morale was 
discussed, specifically in the context of the ageing personnel component of the SANDF. Discipline 
also became a concern in the absence of a significant military threat to South Africa (Interview 8). 
These discussions did not, however, result in any dedicated meeting on the state of defence morale. 
In the Fourth Parliament MPs confirmed a lack of effective oversight of defence morale. While the 
DOD has their own measurement of defence morale, this measurement should be considered as 
‘relative’ as morale can differ from one military unit to another and among different rank groups. The 
measurement of the median morale of the DOD can therefore be questioned (Interview 4). Another 
MP confirmed that no in-depth oversight of morale took place in the Fourth Parliament (Interview 5). 
 
3.3.6 Defence infrastructure 
 
Committee discussions regarding defence infrastructure received generally limited attention between 
1994 and 2014. In the immediate post-1994 period, aspects such as the closing of bases had to be 
prioritised as a consequence of the integration of forces. Decisions had to be made on bases and, 
specifically, the utilisation of bases in the former TBVC states (Interview 7). The committees thus paid 
some attention to base infrastructure in this period. In the Second Parliament, committees observed 
deteriorating defence infrastructure at military bases during oversight visits and that this impacted on 
discipline within the force (Interview 8). Despite these concerns being observed, committee minutes 
reveal very limited engagement on defence infrastructure in the Second Parliament. Oversight of 
defence infrastructure by the defence committees showed an increase in the Third Parliament, but 
such engagements again declined in the Fourth Parliament. One MP interviewed claimed that 
although oversight visits were conducted to observe infrastructure challenges, the committee did not 
address the issue substantively. On a positive note, the MP noted return visits to inspect infrastructure 
led to notable improvement in the state of infrastructure. However, not enough oversight visits were 
done to ensure MPs stay on top of infrastructure and other challenges (Interview 4). This information 
correlated with the observation of another MP who described oversight of defence infrastructure as 
having been superficial (Interview 5). 
 
Despite some committee engagement over the twenty-year period and regular parliamentary 
questions on infrastructure, significant challenges in this regard faced the DOD. This includes the 
reported inability of the DPW to maintain DOD facilities. The IPU and DCAF note that “security sector 
expenditure on pensions, infrastructure, transportation etc. are quite often transferred to the budgets 
of other ministries/sectors such as welfare, housing, railways etc. This practice misrepresents the 
defence budget and it distorts the ability of the public and parliament to make valid assessments of 
the real defence expenditure” (Born, 2003, p. 134). Limited parliamentary engagement with the DPW 
thus undermined oversight of defence infrastructure (also see Section 3.3.2). Committee minutes 
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further reveal that, as early as 2001, dissatisfaction with the work of the DPW was highlighted by DOD 
personnel to Parliament. Yet, limited engagement followed from parliamentary committees, except for 
two dedicated meetings on infrastructure, one held in 2005 and the other in 2007. By 2014, the 
Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014, pp. 14–26) noted that “[t]he matter of the repair 
and maintenance of defence facilities has gained considerable prominence in recent years… 
However, funding constraints have severely hindered the maintenance of essential defence 
infrastructure, giving rise to a significant maintenance backlog which impacts directly on the 
operational readiness of the Defence Force and its ability to prepare and employ forces.” The 
importance attributed to and impact of oversight of defence infrastructure therefore comes into 
question. 
 
3.4 Reviewing the potential for weaknesses in oversight of the military 
 
The sections below review various weaknesses that may undermine parliamentary oversight of the 
military. These sections highlight the manifestation of such weaknesses in the South African 
Parliament between 1994 and 2014. 
 
3.4.1 Constitutional and legal powers 
 
The democratisation of South Africa in 1994 brought about significant legislative changes. Military 
affairs prior to 1994 were highly guarded in nature which did not correlate well with the openness and 
transparency that characterises effective democracies (See Chapter 2). The control of the military and 
broader civil-military relations thus had to be redefined in a democratic context. The foundation for this 
was found in Section 228(1) of the Interim Constitution that states outright that “[t]he Minister 
responsible for defence shall be accountable to Parliament for the National Defence Force” (RSA, 
1993). The principle of parliamentary oversight of the military as further entrenched in the 1996 
Constitution, the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review and the 2002 Defence Act 
(See Chapter 4). These pieces of legislation and policies remained active throughout the twenty-year 
period under review. A thorough legislative foundation therefore underpinned parliamentary oversight 
of the military during this period.  
 
South Africa’s level of democracy can be considered to have remained stable over the 20-year period. 
Chapters 4 and 5 noted that the Economists’ Index for Democracy reduced South Africa’s score only 
slightly from 7.91/10 in 2006 to 7.82/10 in 2014. The 2014 analysis did, however, raise a concern 
about the rising dominance of the ruling party and the limited impact of opposition parties, which may 
potentially impact on parliamentary oversight. This concern was also raised by one MP noting that 
Parliament has a wide variety of powers to enforce accountability which it did not always use. There is 
thus scope for improvement through the amendment of legislation to bring about even higher levels of 
transparency, including in the defence realm. The MP noted that this is important to prevent a 
situation where defence accountability is stifled by the DOD hiding behind the argument of 
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securitisation of the state. The MP further noted that South Africa is a one-party dominant system and 
that this often supersedes South Africa as a constitutional democracy which impacts on the level of 
oversight (Interview 5). Despite these challenges that may impact on the execution of oversight, the 
legislative foundations provided a stable democratic context within which oversight could take place. 
 
In the context of a developing constitutional state and a relatively stable democratic outlook, 
legislative developments also impacted on the process of parliamentary oversight. In addition to the 
provision for oversight in the 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 Constitution, several other legislative 
developments aimed at enhancing oversight. Chapters 4 and 5 noted such development to 
specifically include the Public Finances Management Act (1999) that established a statutory 
requirement for national departments to submit an annual report to Parliament. Furthermore, in 2001, 
National Treasury Regulations were introduced that required quarterly reports to Parliament (National 
Treasury of South Africa, 2001). These legislative and regulatory amendments forced increased 
levels of oversight in the third and fourth parliaments as the submission of these documents required 
parliamentary attention.  
 
In terms of defence oversight, the legislative changes introduced by the National Treasury may have 
been a contributing factor to an increasing trend of defence committee meetings. Graph 6.6 reflects 
that, despite reduced engagement by the JSCD, an upwards trend is visible in the number of unique 
defence committee meetings after 2000. This date coincides with the introduction of National 
Treasury legislation (Note that election years were removed from the figure given that the number of 
committee meetings in an election years is generally less than normal. A long-term trend is thus 
clearer with the exclusions of election-year data). Even during the latter years of regressed committee 
activity (2012 and 2013), the few meetings that were held included several aspects forced by the 
National Treasury legislation and regulations. These include meetings on the annual reports of the 
DOD and defence entities as well as quarterly reports (See Addendum D).   
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Graph 6.6 True macro-trend in defence meetings: 1998 – 2013 (excluding election years) 
 
Source: Compiled from PMG Committee Minutes (1998 – 2013) 
 
3.4.2 Customary practices 
 
Customary practices, for the purpose of this study, refer broadly to the availability and usage of 
oversight tools to Parliament. The analysis provided in Section 3.1 reveals that five oversight tools 
(debates, questions, special inquiries, oversight visits and external audit) are available to the South 
African Parliament. Section 3.1 provided a long-term overview of the utilisation of these tools and, 
when read cumulatively, a gradual improvement in the utilisation of oversight tools for defence is 
visible. Three specific tools stand out in terms of improvement. First, the frequency of debates at 
committee level improved gradually over time (with the exception of the decreased activity during the 
Fourth Parliament). Second, oversight visits and study tours on defence were increasingly utilised. 
The submission of official reports, albeit often delayed, underscores the formal increase in the usage 
of these tools. Third, the use of external audit, notably the work of the AGSA became increasingly 
prominent towards the third and fourth parliaments. Furthermore, parliamentary questions were 
consistently used throughout the period 1994 to 2014. Debates at plenary level show a similar trend 
as dedicated scheduled debates on military affairs were limited throughout the twenty-year period. 
Special defence inquiries represent one significantly underutilised tool in terms of oversight of the 
military in South Africa. The trend between 1998 and 2014 also reflects a move away from in-depth 
studies and the utilisation of subcommittees by the JSCD and PCDMV.  
 
General progress can be observed regarding the utilisation oversight tools for defence between 1994 
and 2014. While this does not reflect on the effectiveness of the utilisation of such tools, the 
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availability and increasingly frequent usage thereof fits with the post-1994 democratic legislative 
developments to enhance transparency and accountability. The positive trend in this utilisation of 
tools did, however, come under pressure in the Fourth Parliament. 
 
3.4.3 Resources and expertise 
 
Crowly (in Bullen, 2005, p. 38) states that “[p]arliamentarians are faced with a number of challenges 
regarding information [as] there is a huge overload of information. But in addition there is often scarce 
information in areas where there has previously been no legislation.” The role of parliamentary 
officials is thus essential as they assist MPs in executing their oversights function more effectively 
(Madue, 2012, p. 439). The Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament specifically identified this 
shortcoming in 2007 (see Chapter 4). Subsequent years saw the expanding of the Parliamentary 
Research Unit to provide sector specific researchers to committees, including the defence committees 
(Interview 15). Little has been written on the development of the parliamentary Research Unit, but 
primary data gathered from interviews reveals how this shortcoming in Parliament was addressed 
over time. 
 
Interviews with parliamentary officials confirmed significant development in terms of institutional 
support to MPs and committees. Of specific importance is the provision of content-specific research 
support. Although party researchers were employed by the various political parties, it was only in 
1997 that Parliament’s Research Unit was established. The Unit was initially funded by the European 
Union and not from the parliamentary budget. The Unit consisted of only eight researchers, each 
serving a cluster of parliamentary committees. One researcher was thus allocated to the security 
cluster that included the defence portfolio. Although researchers had their individual areas of 
expertise, it meant that not all portfolios had dedicated, content-specific researchers (Interviews 2 and 
15). Researchers were initially limited in the support they could offer due to limited information being 
available from government (when compared to later parliaments). Similarly, the parliamentary cycle 
was not as defined in the First Parliament, resulting in less structured research support (Interview 2). 
The Research Unit was expanded around 1999 and 2000, aiming to have at least one researcher per 
committee and developing a management system within the Unit. As the Unit established itself, 
training, information sharing and standardisation of documents started to take place (Interview 15). To 
ensure quality, minimum requirements were set for research positions, such as an Honours degree 
and a specific number of years of research experience (Interview 2). Content-specific support from 
Parliament’s Committee Section was also enhanced during the Fourth Parliament with the creation of 
Content Advisor positions (Interview 2). These advisors serve to inform the committee programme 
and also assist with research support functions to committees. 
 
Complaints from MPs regarding the lack of effective research support came to the fore strongly in the 
2006 review of parliamentary support to committees. This resulted in the further expansion of the Unit. 
It was during this period where content-specific defence researchers were appointed. Following the 
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expansion, services to MPs were improved through the Research Unit official’s permanent attendance 
of committee meetings, liaison with chairpersons, the provision of input into committee programmes, 
as well as the annual revision of departmental budgets and the State of the Nation Address. The 
Research Unit also became involved in the training of new MPs. Over time, efforts were made to align 
research support to MPs to the evolving oversight structures through the provision of research briefs 
on quarterly and annual reports to inform the BRRR process. The Unit further became involved in the 
identification of priorities for subsequent parliaments (Interview 15). Given that research support only 
developed after 1997, it is unsurprising that MPs noted poor institutional support, except for 
committee secretaries, in the First Parliament. As such, MPs largely did their own research or depend 
on political party researchers (Interviews 6 and 14). From the Second Parliament onwards, MPs noted 
an increase in institutional support (Interviews 4 and 13). In terms of content and research support, 
significant strides were made in the quality of work (analysis) presented to MPs. Members 
increasingly utilised documents prepared by research and content specialists assigned to the 
Committee. In addition to research support, other parliamentary officials were added to assist with 
logistical arrangements of the committees (Interview 4).  
 
Despite the growth of research and other support structures available to MPs and committees, some 
challenges were noted. Research support was often undermined by the non-utilisation of these 
services by MPs. For example, a parliamentary official noted that it occurs regularly in parliament that 
researchers (and later Content Advisors) are not consulted on the drafting or amending of the 
committee agenda (Interview 2). Linked to this concern, it was noted that the optimal and efficient 
utilisation of researchers is highly dependent on the chairperson of a committee (Interviews 9 and 15). 
Another complaint that emerged was that while committees did receive pro forma research support, 
such support was not tailored to the needs of individual MPs serving on the committee, specifically 
opposition MPs (Interview 5). Another interviewee claimed that some researchers are young and not 
familiar with all the historic defence developments. There is also a further need for researchers to do 
primary research and not just work on information received from the Secretary of Defence (Interview 
7). Secretarial support to committees also came under criticism. Of specific concern is that secretaries 
(along with chairpersons) often do not build time into the programme for follow-up on 
recommendations during discussions at management meetings (Interview 9). A further concern of 
secretarial work (and Parliament’s broader information management) related to the availability of 
minutes of committee meetings. Academics noted that PMG reflects the most reliable source of 
information on committee meetings and discussions (Interviews 10 and 11). In-house records are not 
easily available and/or accessible. 
 
The concerns raised above provide grounds for further improvement of support to MPs and 
committees. It is, however, evident that major strides were made in providing content-specific support 
from 1997 onwards. Both a former parliamentary official and MP noted that, to a large extent, 
parliamentary researchers carry the bulk of institutional memory in the organisation as MPs often 
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change between parliaments (Interviews 9 and 15). Support staff is thus essential to institutional 
memory which, in turn, impacts directly on sustained oversight efforts. 
 
3.4.4 Political will 
 
Political will to do oversight of the military remains difficult to measure, but is crucial to the prevention 
of weak oversight. However, criteria for evaluating general trends exist, as noted by the World Bank et 
al. (See Chapter 3). These criteria include (1) party discipline that undermines accountability, (2) 
limited public interest in defence matters and (3) the non-disclosure of defence findings due to 
security considerations. The subsections below draw conclusions on the discussions in Chapters 4 
and 5 and add perspectives from interviews to determine some trends in political will to exercise 
oversight of defence in South Africa between 1994 and 2014. 
 
3.4.4.1 Willingness to hold the executive to account 
 
A first indicator relates to the willingness of MPs from the governing party to hold the executive to 
account. A review of the utilisation of parliamentary questions provides insight into oversight activities 
by the governing party. This review reveals a decreasing trend in questions posed by MPs from the 
ANC. The overall number of defence-related questions asked by MPs remained fairly consistent. 
However, questions posed by MPs from the governing party decreased from 124 between 1994 and 
2004 to 79 between 2004 and 2014 (See Graph 6.7). The majority of these questions were oral 
questions, thus asked to a member of the executive during a parliamentary sitting. A review of the 
data further reveals that some of these questions were clearly ‘sweetheart questions’, thus not truly 
aimed at thorough inquiry/oversight.  
 
Graph 6.7 20 Year trend – Questions by governing party and opposition: 1994 - 2014 
 
Source: Compiled from National Assembly and NCOP Question Papers (1994 – 2013) 
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Interviews provided some context to the limited utilisation of parliamentary questions by ANC MPs. 
One MP interviewed claimed that the limited utilisation of questions by ANC MPs is generally a 
function of politics and not a function of work ethics as it is natural for governing party MPs not to 
make the department look bad. It is thus a self-imposed restriction. However, the MP also noted that a 
Chief Whip is essential for driving MPs to submit questions (Interview 8). Another MP stated that it 
should be viewed against the fact that opposition questions are more as opposition parties often set 
quotas to fill in terms of the number of questions they ask (Interview 14). As such, there is party-
political pressure to pose questions and keep the executive to account. Other MPs noted that 
increased focus on social spending and economic development took the focus away from defence 
and may have resulted in a decrease in the number of questions asked (Interviews 6 and 7). Two final 
reasons offered relate directly to the MPs and their support staff. One MP claimed that if weaker MPs 
come to the fore that are less ‘hands-on’, less questions will be asked (Interview 6) while another MP 
noted that opposition parties in general had better party support staff to guide them on defence 
questions (Interview 9). 
 
While the above reasons offer mitigating circumstances for the lower number of questions posed by 
ANC MPs, some MPs stated that the low number of questions asked was directly related to a lack of 
political will. Written questions were generally not forthcoming from ANC MPs largely due to party 
loyalty. The differentiation between Parliament and the executive thus became convoluted and 
accountability suffers as a result of party loyalty (Interview 4). Similarly, members from the governing 
party do not ask probing questions, but rather focus on ‘sweetheart questions’ that serve little purpose 
for promoting oversight (Interviews 1 and 5).  
 
While cognisant of the fact that it is in the nature for opposition parties to ask more questions, the 
growing gap between defence questions asked by ANC MPs and those asked by opposition MPs is of 
concern. This should be viewed with the perception that ‘sweetheart questions’ are often posed and 
the fact that ANC questions are mostly oral questions. As such, the data presented is corroborated by 
the view from MPs that parliamentary questions are not effectively used by ANC MPs and may thus 
point to a dearth of political will or imposed solidarity not to hold the executive to account. 
 
3.4.4.2 Political will to ensure public engagement 
 
A second indicator for political will reflects in a lack of public involvement in defence matters. This is of 
specific importance in the South African Parliament that aimed to transform itself into the “People’s 
Parliament”, underscored by the principles of “freedom, equality, eradication of poverty, political 
inclusivity and public participation” [own emphasis] (Hasson, 2010, p. 366). When reviewing the 
activities of the JSCD and PCDMV between 1998 and 2014, there is a marked decrease in 
engagement with external stakeholders. While committee data is not available during the First 
Parliament, interviews revealed that the defence committees often consulted external 
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stakeholders/researchers on specific matters (Interview 6). This trend continued between 1998 and 
2004, several engagements were held with stakeholders and interested parties on policy matters and 
broader defence orientation in South Africa, including civil-military relations. However, between 2004 
and 2014, engagement with external stakeholders became limited to formal submissions during 
legislation deliberations. As noted in the general observations by MPs and academics in Section 
2.2.5, there is concurrence with the downward trend in the consultation with external defence 
stakeholders (Interviews 9 and 12). This observation is in line with Heinecken’s (2016) finding of a 
growing civil-military gap developing in South Africa due to decreased interest in and research output 
on defence matters. A representative parliament should, ideally, serve as a platform for public debate 
and engagement on defence matters. Thorough debate, in turn, will contribute to the broader debate 
on defence and civil-military relations. 
 
South African statutes and the Rules of Parliament prescribe such public participation processes 
during the consideration of legislation and complied with by the PCDMV. However, for defence 
committees to truly function as part of the ‘People’s Parliament’, broader engagement should have 
reflected in the third and fourth parliaments. The political will to engage such stakeholders thus 
seemed to have waned and Parliament arguably contributed to the growing civil-military gap. 
 
3.4.4.3 Defence findings and security considerations 
 
A third indicator of a lack of political will to do oversight of the military includes the non-disclosure of 
parliamentary discussions on defence matters due to imposed security considerations. Chapter 5 
highlighted a significant increase in the confidentiality around defence information, specifically in the 
Fourth Parliament. This reflected in Ministerial responses to parliamentary questions with a total of 77 
questions unanswered either due to the information being considered classified or where it is stated 
that a further responses will be provided at a later stage. The trend regarding confidentiality of military 
information also reflected in interviews. The criteria for not answering questions were not consistent 
and while information is often provided to MPs in a certain year, similar questions posed in the 
following year would not receive a response. MPs noted specific questions regarding VVIP flights by 
the SA Air Force as an example of this, whereby such details were provided in the first and second 
parliaments, but not thereafter (Interviews 1 and 5). An academic interviewed also noted that 
confidentiality of information, including in instances where it is not warranted, became an increasing 
concern over the years (Interview 12). A positive aspect, however, is that parliamentary discussions in 
itself remain very public. All JSCD/PCDMV meetings are open to the public, except where a closed 
session is declared. The latter option was used to a very limited extent between 1994 and 2014. 
 
3.4.4.4 Additional findings on the political will to do oversight 
 
In addition to the three criteria discussed above, interviews with MPs provide further insight that can 
be linked to the state of political will to do oversight of the military. These views should be read 
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together with the general observations made in Section 2.2 on the changing nature of parliamentary 
oversight of the military.  
 
Section 2.2 highlighted that a shift away from a cooperative and consensus-seeking status of 
parliamentary oversight of the military that was evident after the First Parliament. An interviewee 
noted high attendance levels and commitment of MPs serving on the defence committees in the First 
Parliament. The interviewee also alluded to the high calibre of MP that served on the defence 
committees with a keen interest and experience in defence matters. This allowed for a bond to be 
formed between MPs on the defence committees (Interview 6). The shift in the cooperative approach 
after the First Parliament came to the fore strongly during interviews. During the first two parliaments, 
there was a realisation among MPs as to what their roles entail. However, after 2004 there was a 
clear decline in the political will to do oversight. One MP interviewed claimed that a level of arrogance 
set in during the later parliaments, notably among ANC MPs, which stand in contrast to the pre-2004 
mutual respect among MPs (Interview 1). As such, a general decrease in political will to do oversight 
can be observed over time (Interview 7). These concerns seemed to be in line with the findings of the 
Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament at the end of the Third Parliament. The Report notes 
several challenges that manifested itself in the Third Parliament. A primary concern highlighted 
related to the impact of the party lists system on oversight that often limited MPs’ willingness to hold 
the executive to account and rather encourages accountability to a political party. The absence of 
MPs from committee meetings was also noted as a concern (Govender et al., 2009, pp. 37–39). 
 
A major turning point in terms of the political will to hold the executive to account came as a result of 
the inquiries into the SDPP (Interview 8). Of specific concern after that was the perceived protectionist 
role of the chairpersons and the establishment of parallel oversight structures. For example, a MP 
interviewed claimed that chairpersons would ‘protect’ members of the executive. When additional 
information from members of the DOD was requested during committee meetings, the chairperson 
would step in and declare that the question has been answered. The MP ascribed this to South Africa 
being, de facto, a one-party state. In this system, the role of the chairperson of a committee becomes 
skewed away from ensuring accountability of the executive to parliament. The MP went as far as to 
note that active efforts were made by some chairpersons to prevent any effort at accountability 
(Interview 5). Another MP specifically noted that after 2004, chairpersons excluded critical questions 
(Interview 1). The use of ANC study groups as inhibiting factors to oversight was also raised as a 
concern. Often, including in the case of the PCDMV/JSCD, such study group meetings would precede 
the actual committee meetings and would include members of the executive and the military 
command. These parallel structures that exist through study group meetings mean that the activity of 
oversight shifts away from committees where it supposed to be located. As such, oversight is not 
effectively executed during committee meetings and it results in only opposition parties doing the 
majority of oversight/interrogation during committee meetings (Interview 5). The existence of study 
groups and briefings by the executive were confirmed by another MP (Interview 9). 
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While the shift away from consensus-seeking oversight of the military was largely confirmed, some 
positive indicators for oversight also came to the fore during interviews. An interviewee stated that, in 
broad, Parliament was moderately successful in ensuring civil oversight of the military and that this 
indicated that political will exist to conduct oversight (Interview 13). An academic interviewed noted 
that the defence committees should be commended for at least dealing with important matters as they 
arise, such as sexual violence in the military (Interview 3). They thus showed a reactionary capability 
in terms of oversight. Another MP stated that oversight does play out at parliamentary level and 
further noted that this is strengthened through information given to opposition MPs, in confidence, by 
members of the public or departmental officials (Interview 5). This information can be used by 
members in committee meetings, debates or motions in the National Assembly. Albeit informal, the 
information shared in this manner contributes greatly towards parliamentary influence on military 
affairs.  
 
The subsections above reveal a number of indicators that point to a decreasing trend in the political 
will to do oversight of the military. This trend stands in contrast to the perception of cooperative and 
consensus-seeking oversight of the First Parliament. Of specific concern is the perception among 
MPs that parliamentary oversight is often intentionally inhibited and becoming increasingly 
protectionists as this is contrary to a transparent representative democratic institution. 
 
3.4.5 Follow-up on defence-matters 
 
A review of committee minutes reveals that the ability and willingness of the PCDMV and JSCD to 
follow up on recommendations, and in cases where it committed to follow up during meetings, is of 
particular concern. With the exception of perhaps the Third Parliament, both these committees largely 
failed to follow up regularly where such commitments were made. During the Second Parliament, the 
incapacity to follow up was noted by the chairperson of the PCDMV. Follow-up related to SANDF 
deployments and study tours were of specific concern. In the Fourth Parliament, a shift is noted 
whereby departmental responses to oversight were requested in writing, but no formal follow-up by 
the committees are evident. The fact that formal follow-up was achieved at a higher level during the 
Third Parliament highlights that there is institutional capacity to ensure follow-up. However, further 
development of this capacity is clearly required. This finding in the study is confirmed by Mbete (2016, 
p. 108) who found, in a study on oversight and accountability in the Fourth Parliament, that there was 
no tracking mechanism in Parliament to monitor executive compliance with parliamentary oversight 
and recommendations. 
 
Similar concerns were highlighted during interviews with MPs and parliamentary parliamentary 
officials. From a parliamentary official’s perspective, it was noted that the tracking of the 
implementation of recommendations by parliamentary committees is an ongoing concern. The 
establishment of Content Advisor positions in the Fourth Parliament could possibly serve to address 
this potential shortcoming, although the role was not formalised by the end of 2014. There is also a 
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need to collate all relevant information, such as committee work, parliamentary debates and 
parliamentary questions to track the development around these (Interview 2). An interviewee noted 
that follow-up has generally been poor in the defence committees and, in fact, in Parliament as a 
whole. It was stated that this once again comes down to a lack of willingness to hold the executive 
effectively to account (Interview 8).  
 
MPs were particularly concerned about follow-up in two regards. First, at defence committee-level, 
concern exists about the lack of opportunities for members to ask immediate follow-up questions in 
committee meetings. Often, extended presentations and elusive answers would consume a significant 
amount of time and no time for effective follow-up questions remain during committee meetings 
(Interview 14). Furthermore, committee programming should provide opportunities for follow-ups on 
previous committee recommendations. However, this was identified as a broader parliamentary 
concern, including in the defence committees (Interview 9). Second, recommendations made on 
oversight visits are not always implemented and followed up. MPs noted that this has been an 
ongoing weakness in terms of oversight in general throughout the twenty-year period (Interviews 1, 4, 
5 and 9). A positive aspect noted in the Fourth Parliament relates to the chairperson’s consultation 
with committee members on which military bases they would like to return to for oversight, which 
ensured a follow-up opportunity (Interview 4).  
 
The general consensus among MPs and parliamentary officials was that the institution lacked 
effective mechanisms to track the progress and implementation of recommendations and that there 
was limited opportunities to make immediate follow-up questions during committee meetings. These 
concerns also extend to the defence portfolio. One MP interviewed summarised this concern by 
noting that the ‘circle of oversight’ has not been completed yet and that follow-up is required to 
complete the oversight loop (Interview 9).  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6 provided an overarching view on parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa 
between 1994 and 2004 based on more in-depth discussions in Chapters 4 and 5. The addition of 
information gathered from interviews with MPs, parliamentary officials and academics further aimed at 
providing context to the information presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
A key determinant from the information obtained from interviews is that, in large, it links well to the 
information obtained from committee minutes, parliamentary ATC and other primary sources. 
Interviews also provided an important perspective on oversight of the military in the First Parliament, 
given the lack of information and official committee minutes from this period. This perspective was 
important as it highlighted a First Parliament characterised by a largely cooperative and consensus-
seeking oversight model for defence. This was crucial at the time given the context of the need to 
establish a new unified SANDF, but also within the broader context of limited oversight of the military 
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prior to 1994. While the need to focus on legislation and defence policy development did detract from 
oversight during this period, MPs largely claimed it to be a positive experience, which reflected on the 
committees’ contribution to important policy documents such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence 
and the 1998 Defence Review. 
 
The context provided of the approach to oversight of the military during the First Parliament is 
important as it stands in sharp contrast to some subsequent developments. Parliament’s handling of 
investigations into the SDPP, including the defence committees’ participation in this process, was 
often mentioned as a turning point in terms of oversight. General consensus seems to exist that from 
2004 onwards oversight of the military became problematic. This again does not resonate well with 
the stated intention of Parliament to shift its focus to oversight from the Third Parliament (2004) 
onwards. Interviews confirmed that this shift in parliamentary focus was indeed the aim after 2004 yet, 
several anxieties were raised in subsequent years. Of specific concern is the dramatic decline in 
oversight activities during the Fourth Parliament. 
 
With Parliament’s focus shifting to oversight after 2004, this Chapter revealed opposing developments 
between the institutional direction and oversight of the military. Significant growth is evident in 
Parliament’s institutional capacity to fulfil its oversight function after 2004. Legislation was introduced 
to compel the DOD (and other departments) to submit annual and quarterly reports to Parliament. 
These reports were to enable Parliament to better track the budgetary aspects of the DOD as well as 
performance. The NCACC was also established and legally required to report to Parliament. NCACC 
reports offered Parliament an opportunity for insight into arms procurement and sales. MPs also noted 
that, over time, the quality of information reported to Parliament by the DOD improved. Furthermore, 
institutional support offered to MPs improved drastically with the appointment of content-specific 
defence researchers and (later) content advisors. Institutional structures for oversight also improved, 
such as the formalisation of the BRRR process. This allowed the defence committees to constantly 
review the budget and performance of the DOD and make concrete recommendations to both the 
DOD and National Treasury on future expenditure and performance. As such, the parliamentary 
oversight environment improved after 2004 and provided a foundation for thorough oversight of the 
military.  
 
In line with the improved environment for oversight, tools for oversight of defence were increasingly 
well utilised in Parliament, with the exception of special defence inquiries that was largely unutilised. 
However, the utilisation of oversight tools should be viewed in context. Significant concerns are 
evident in, specifically the decline in committee activity in the Fourth Parliament, the longstanding 
inability of Parliament to resolve challenges with the JSCD functioning and MPs acknowledgement 
that parliamentary debate on defence is lacking. The challenges related to committee meetings are of 
particular importance as it erodes on the ability to thoroughly scrutinise oversight focus areas. Serious 
concerns were raised by MPs after 2004 on oversight of defence policy, defence procurement and 
specifically defence deployments. Furthermore, the impact of National Treasury legislation and 
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parliamentary processes, such as the BRRR process, is severely hampered by a lack of thorough 
engagement, poor committee scheduling and limited follow-up. Collectively the latter voids elevate the 
fear that oversight of the military has, after 2004, become ‘box-ticking’ exercises rather than 
opportunities for in-depth inquiry. These concerns noted should be viewed in light of a perceived 
reduction in political will to conduct oversight of the military after 2004. 
 
Following the review of parliamentary oversight of the military provided in Chapter 6 and the 
contextual addition of primary information from interviews, the next chapter returns to the original 
research questions posed by the study. Chapter 7 provides an overarching summary of the main 
findings of the study, puts forth responses to research questions and emphasises the main 
contributions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 7   CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study aimed at providing an analysis of twenty years of parliamentary oversight of the military in 
South Africa by contrasting developments in the immediate post-1994 period (1994 to 2004) to 
developments of the third and fourth democratic parliaments (2004 to 2014). To facilitate the analysis, 
the study developed a broad framework for the review of parliamentary oversight of the military. The 
framework utilised was tested against international cases and existing literature, notably in the context 
of transparency and accountability that characterise modern liberal democracies. The framework was 
used to evaluate parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa during the first twenty years of 
democracy (1994 to 2014). The primary focus of the study was to determine the status of 
parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa over this period. To explore the status of 
oversight, four research questions were put forward. The questions explored throughout the study 
were (1) what are the distinguishing features of successful democratic parliamentary oversight of the 
military?; (2) how does South African Parliamentary oversight of the military compare to international 
benchmarks and international best practice?; (3) what changes can be observed in relation to the 
oversight of the military when comparing the first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) to the third and 
fourth parliaments (2004 – 2014)?; and (4) what are the ‘views from the inside’ on parliamentary 
oversight of the military?.  
 
This chapter provides a summary of the main findings of the study, before returning to addressing the 
primary research questions. Possible criticisms to the study as well as some limitations are also 
addressed. The chapter concludes by reviewing the contribution of the study and the way forward in 
terms of further proposed research. 
 
2. Summary of findings 
 
In its aim to review parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa, the study was conducted 
within the theoretical parameters of theories of democracy, notably within the paradigm of liberalism. 
The focus on liberal democracy as a framework for analysis served a dual purpose. It firstly linked the 
focus areas of the study (the concept of oversight and the institution of parliament) to an appropriate 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, liberal democracy provided a contextually sound framework for 
analysis as it is in line with South Africa’s post-1994 constitutional and political derivatives. The 
process of parliamentary oversight in South Africa after 1994 should therefore be viewed in the 
context of shifts to improved transparency and accountability. The study also highlighted that liberal 
democratic characteristics extended to the state’s security thinking. Prior to 1994, security thinking 
revolved around external threat perception and the state’s military response to both internal and 
external security threats. The transition to democracy around 1994 brought about a new approach 
with increased focus on human security. As such, drastic changes became evident in the construction 
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of South Africa’s civil-military relations prior to and after 1994. Efforts were made to entrench the 
notion of civil control of the military in line with liberal democratic principles. These efforts included, 
inter alia, ensuring thorough parliamentary oversight of the military, as was evident from specific 
provisions contained in the 1993 interim Constitution (RSA, 1993) and subsequent defence-related 
legislation and policy documents.  
 
In order to review parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa after 1994, the study set out 
to establish a credible framework for analysis. Four broad criteria for evaluation were identified along 
with various sub-themes. First, the utilisation of parliamentary oversight tools, including parliamentary 
debates, questions, special defence inquiries, oversight visits and study tours as well as the use of 
external audit were included. Second, key focus areas for oversight of the military were identified, 
including oversight of the defence budget, policy, procurement, human resources and the deployment 
of the military. These tools for oversight and focus areas have been well established in academic 
literature and through various credible institutions such as the DCAF, IPU and Transparency 
International. Third, the study aimed to add to these criteria for evaluation by introducing a number of 
lower-order focus areas for oversight. The introduction of such lower-order focus areas aimed to 
increase detail of oversight in the South African case and provide more depth in the analysis of 
oversight. Lower-order focus areas included the review of annual and quarterly performance, 
interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial equality, defence 
morale as well as defence infrastructure. The inclusion of lower-order focus areas were substantiated 
by reference thereto in literature, although not found to be universally applicable. Fourth, the study 
added potential indicators for weak oversight of the military including limited constitutional and legal 
powers, meagre customary oversight practices, insufficient resources and expertise, deficient political 
will and limited follow-up on parliamentary recommendations.  
 
Within the new liberal democratic context of post-1994 South Africa, the study utilised the above 
criteria for reviewing parliamentary oversight of the military. The analysis was based on information 
from parliamentary documents, such as the Hansard and ATCs, committee minutes (from PMG) and 
other primary and secondary sources. In addition, strong focus was placed on information obtained 
from primary parliamentary sources through interviews with MPs and parliamentary officials to capture 
the finer nuances of the political setting during the twenty-year period under review. Academics were 
also consulted to add further insight into broader developments around Parliament’s role in ensuring 
the military’s accountability. The review of primary and secondary information on parliamentary 
oversight of the military between 1994 and 2014 revealed five key overarching findings reflected in 
the sections below. 
 
2.1 The context of a shift in parliamentary focus 
 
The study reviewed research on parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa in two distinct 
eras, the first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) and the third and fourth parliaments (2004 to 2014). The 
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decision for structuring the thesis along this division was based on literature revealing the intention by 
Parliament to shift focus towards oversight over time. MPs and parliamentary officials interviewed 
confirmed that this shift was indeed the aim of Parliament and that several efforts were made to 
facilitate the transition. The first two parliaments focused specifically on Parliament’s legislative 
function, with a high number of laws being processed between 1994 and 2004, including amendments 
to existing defence legislation. A shift in focus came about at the end of the Second Parliament, when 
the decreasing need for legislative amendments brought about increasing emphasis of Parliament’s 
oversight role. The study therefore found that an increasing opportunity for thorough parliamentary 
oversight presented itself from the Third Parliament (2004) onwards, as was envisaged in the 
institutions strategic planning that emphasised the monitoring and evaluation of government policy.  
 
2.2 The context of institutional improvement 
 
In addition to the shifting parliamentary focus, the study made a finding related to institutional 
improvements in Parliament. This finding provides important context within which to view 
developments around parliamentary oversight of the military. The study found that, as part of the post-
1994 shift to a liberal democracy, significant progress was made in ensuring a parliament aligned with 
its functions in a democratic state based on a distinct separation of power between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary. Practical steps were taken in the post-1994 period to enhance parliamentary 
oversight. While key oversight tools such as parliamentary debates and questions were maintained 
and enhanced, a key growth area for oversight was the expansion of the committee system. 
Committees increasingly became the so-called ‘engine rooms’ of parliamentary oversight work. 
 
With additional parliamentary scope for oversight, incremental growth was made in terms of the 
requirements for executive reporting to Parliament. Interviews confirmed a marked improvement in 
the quality and quantity of information reported to Parliament (by the executive). The increase in 
information was further supplemented by the use of external audits by the AGSA. The introduction of 
the Public Finances Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) made it a statutory requirement for departments 
to submit annual reports to Parliament. Crucially, the information reported in annual reports grew to 
also include performance information and not only budgetary information for oversight. Parliament 
therefore increasingly focused on the effective and efficient utilisation of state resources (linking 
performance to expenditure). The introduction of the requirement for quarterly reports to be submitted 
to Parliament offered an additional opportunity for continuous oversight of performance and 
expenditure. In the Fourth Parliament, the introduction of the BRRR process provided Parliament a 
further opportunity to impact on the budget allocations of state departments. The growth in scope for 
oversight discussed above should be viewed together with a growth in institutional support to MPs. 
This relates specifically to the post-1997 growth of Parliament’s Research Unit and the establishment 
of Content Advisor positions in the Fourth Parliament. Content-specific input and research support 
were thus offered to committees and MPs to enhance oversight. It is therefore evident that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
Parliament’s focus not only shifted from a legislative to an oversight role, but that the institution also 
capacitated itself to better fulfil the oversight task.  
 
The context provided above is crucial to a comprehensive review and understanding of parliamentary 
oversight of the military in South Africa in the post-1994 period. Interviewees identified better 
information flows from the DOD, enhanced internal parliamentary processes as well as improved 
institutional support as key driving forces behind improved oversight. The introduction of the JSCD 
through the 1993 Interim Constitution, in addition to the PCDMV, presented the institution with an 
additional capacity for oversight of the military at committee level. The scope of oversight assigned to 
the committees were also wide-ranging and in complete contrast to the limited oversight scope of 
parliament on military affairs prior to 1994. 
 
2.3 The varied use of oversight tools 
 
Throughout the four parliaments under review, the study found that generally accepted parliamentary 
oversight tools were used to oversee the military. However, the study found that while some tools 
were used effectively, others were significantly underutilised. On the positive, external audits were 
increasingly used, specifically from the third and fourth parliaments onwards, through engagement 
between defence committees and the AGSA. The general increase in the number of oversight visits 
were noted by MPs as a positive oversight tool that played an important role throughout the twenty-
year period. A decrease in the number of visits in the Fourth Parliament and a tendency to submit 
official reports only months after the actual visit impeded the usefulness of such visits. Furthermore, 
parliamentary questions were well used, with 2 045 oral and written questions on defence posed by 
MPs over the twenty-year period. However, the efficiency of this tool was found to be undermined 
from the Third Parliament onwards by the increasing tendency of the executive not to respond to 
questions as information was deemed sensitive of confidential. 
 
While the oversight tools above were relatively well utilised with varying success, others showed 
negative trends throughout the twenty-year period after 1994. Special defence inquiries were largely 
unutilised throughout the first ten-year period, including the use of subcommittees. The tool with 
arguably the most impact on oversight, parliamentary debates, is characterised by some concerning 
trends over the twenty-year period. Limited time was afforded to parliamentary debates on defence in 
the Houses of Parliament, specifically during the third and fourth parliaments. More significantly, 
defence-related debates at committee level deteriorated through the ever-increasing inactivity of the 
JSCD. Although the PCDMV showed a positive twenty-year trend in terms of activity over the said 
period, the broader defence-related oversight structures of Parliament suffered as a result of JSCD 
inactivity. The fact that there are two Parliamentary committees on defence means that an opportunity 
existed for elevated levels of committee debate through regular meetings. A further negative trend in 
terms of parliamentary debate on the military at committee level is the rapid reduction in activity of the 
PCDMV towards the end of the Fourth Parliament. MPs further noted that a number of activities 
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conducted by the defence- committee merely became ‘box-ticking exercises’. As such, while 
legislative and internal parliamentary processes provided scope for increasing committee oversight, 
reduced activity and a ‘box-ticking’ approach (rather than robust inquiry) decreased efficiency. The 
study therefore finds that oversight tools were not utilised optimally and that the potential for elevated 
levels of oversight became increasingly undermined over time.  
 
2.4 The decline in focus areas covered by defence committees and the importance of 
legislation 
 
The non-optimal utilisation of oversight tools, notably defence debates at committee level, impacted 
negatively on Parliament’s ability to cover focus areas of defence oversight. Of specific importance is 
the decreasing focus on some of these areas over time. Defence policy received more in-depth 
oversight at committee level during the first two parliaments, which is in line with Parliament’s focus 
on legislation and policy over this period. MPs noted thorough and cohesive engagement on the 1996 
White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. However, limited engagement on policy 
matters was evident in the third and especially the fourth parliament. MPs referred to the JSCD’s poor 
engagement on the 2014 Defence Review as an example of such decline. Engagement on matters of 
defence procurement showed a similar trend. Parliament’s handling of the SDPP is generally 
accepted as having damaged the institutions’ resolve to conduct robust oversight. Measures put in 
place to review procurement aspects in later parliaments, notably NCACC reports, were also poorly 
dealt with by the defence committees. The impact of parliamentary oversight on aspects related to 
human resources should also be questioned. Serious concerns related to the military’s personnel 
component emerged over the twenty-year period, including personnel expenditure and the need for 
rejuvenation. Despite these concerns being raised continuously at parliamentary level, the 2014 
Defence Review highlights an ongoing deterioration. Furthermore, defence deployments saw very 
limited oversight despite clear constitutional provision made therefore. MPs were very critical of this 
lack of oversight, notably in cases where the SANDF was involved in combat such as Operation 
Boleas in Lesotho in 1998 and the 2013 involvement in the Battle of Bangui in the CAR. 
 
The study introduced several lower-order focus areas for parliamentary oversight of the military. 
These lower-order focus areas pertain more to areas of ‘normal’ committee work or specific areas of 
oversight not generally considered in oversight frameworks. The non-optimal utilisation of oversight 
tools discussed above also impacted negatively on some lower-order focus areas. Interdepartmental 
cooperation received only ad hoc attention throughout the four parliaments. Of specific concern is the 
limited engagement by the JSCD and PCDMV to address areas of interdepartmental concerns such 
as the DPW in terms of infrastructure developments and relations between the DOD and DIRCO in 
terms of peacekeeping. Linked to concerns around the DPW, defence infrastructure also received 
limited attention, with only ad hoc meetings on this topic held by the defence committees. MPs noted 
that oversight of defence infrastructure became superficial. Given the 2014 Defence Review’s 
scathing findings on the state of defence infrastructure, parliamentary oversight effectiveness can 
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thus be questioned. Oversight of defence morale also received no dedicated committee meetings, 
despite oversight thereof being a constitutional requirement. A lower-order focus area that did receive 
elevated levels of attention relates to military training and education. Increased oversight in this 
regard coincided with regular oversight visits by the PCDMV and JSCD to military training and 
education facilities. Despite some MPs questioning the impact of oversight visits related to training 
institutions, continuous oversight of this aspect has taken place with the post-integration and post-
MSDS periods seeing elevated levels of oversight.  
 
With the exception of oversight of military training and education, oversight of the majority of focus 
areas identified above showed either very limited engagement or decreasing trends of engagement 
between 1994 and 2014. However, three contrasting focus areas that received increased attention 
over this period became apparent in the study. First, matters related to gender and racial equality 
received ongoing attention. During the first two parliaments, this was understandable given the 
imperatives of the integration process. Focus on gender and racial matters in the third and fourth 
parliaments can, arguably, be attributed to the 2004 National Treasury guidelines for oversight that 
stated that specific targets for transformation in government departments should be developed and 
reported to Parliament. Second, oversight of annual and quarterly reports did manifest at committee 
level. MPs noted improved information to Parliament from the DOD, which included performance-
related information as per the annual reports. Quarterly reports were also increasingly considered, 
specifically in the Fourth Parliament. This is in line with National Treasury Regulations. Third, 
budgetary aspects were increasingly considered throughout the twenty-year period and Parliament’s 
impact in this regard expanded. This is of particular relevance in terms of Parliament’s impact through 
the BRRR process after the introduction of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related 
Matters Act (Act 9 of 2009). Despite the increases in consideration of annual, quarterly and budgetary 
reports, MPs were critical of the depth of focus and scrutiny during such engagement, most notably 
during the Fourth Parliament. 
 
The review above illustrates that in most focus areas and lower-order focus areas identified for this 
study, Parliament’s defence committees either engaged on such matters only on an ad hoc basis or 
showed a decreasing engagement between 1994 and 2014. The exceptions to this trend, where the 
committees showed increased engagement, can largely be attributed to the introduction of legislation 
and National Treasury Regulations.  
 
2.5 Weaknesses in parliamentary oversight of the military 
 
The study evaluated potential weaknesses in parliamentary oversight of the military. South Africa’s 
post-1994 Constitution, set in a liberal democratic context of transparency and accountability, 
provided a solid foundation for parliamentary oversight in general, and oversight of the military 
specifically. Built on this foundation, the study highlighted that various tools for oversight were 
available to MPs and committees. Improved resources were allocated, notably through the 
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development of Parliament’s Research Unit and active budgetary allocations for oversight purposes. 
Parliament also restructured its internal processes to ensure improved oversight outcomes based on 
legislative and regulatory requirements. Given the constitutional foundation, tools available, support 
structures developed and advances in oversight processes, the question then arises as to what 
resulted in a perceived decline in oversight of the military over the twenty-year period?  
 
A key potential weakness to oversight that may, to a large extent, explain the decline in oversight of 
the military relates to political will. The perception exists among MPs that there was a relative decline 
in the willingness to hold the executive to account. The low number of questions asked by MPs from 
the governing party substantiates this perception. A large proportion of questions by ANC MPs were 
oral questions and some clearly aimed at affording the executive an opportunity to explain 
government policy or to reflect on the achievements and were not truly aimed at inquiry. Linked to the 
decline in keeping the executive to account, there was a noticeable increase in non-responsiveness 
form the DOD based on security considerations. Of particular concern is the rise in questions either 
not being answered or only answered superficially due to information being considered as 
‘confidential’. Furthermore, the decline in public interest in defence matters, noted during interviews 
with academics, also reflected on a declining political will. At parliamentary level, a noticeable 
decrease in the utilisation of external stakeholders, academics and other experts are evident at 
committee level. This detracts from the quality of information available and utilised by MPs and stands 
in contrast to the ideals of an inclusive ‘People’s Parliament’. A further potential weakness, namely 
limited follow-up on recommendations, underscores some lack of political will for oversight. No 
effective tracking system for follow-up was developed in terms of parliamentary oversight of the 
military. MPs noted this as a broader parliamentary concern. Limited instances were found whereby 
actual follow-up is conducted by the PCDMV and JSCD where members of these committees vowed 
to do so. Follow-up questions during committee meetings also became a concern for MPs, especially 
during the Fourth Parliament. 
 
The decline in political will to conduct oversight of the military was perhaps most evident in the views 
of MPs on the oversight trend between 1994 and 2014. Several MPs noted a sense of cohesion and 
common purpose among MPs during the initial post-1994 years and how they sought to depoliticise 
the defence environment and establish elevated levels of oversight. However, despite an institutional 
shift towards a focus on oversight after 2004, the initial cohesion and political will to conduct oversight 
of the military seemed to have withered over time. MPs noted Parliament’s inquiry into the SDPP as a 
particular turning point in the willingness to hold the executive to account. From the Third Parliament 
onwards, several MPs also pointed to a rising concern of chairpersons not allowing critical inquiry into 
defence matters and not allowing time for follow-up questions during meetings. Although this study 
cannot draw conclusions on the exact role that each chairperson of the JSCD and PCDMV played 
over time, it found from literature and interviews that chairpersons do play a critical role in determining 
the level of oversight conducted. In Parliament, a shift can be observed from the First Parliament, 
where an opposition MP was elected as chairperson of the PCDMV and good cooperation between 
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chairpersons existed, to the third and fourth parliaments characterised by protectionist chairpersons. 
A further concern by MPs related to the shifting of the oversight role to platforms outside the defence 
committees, notably study groups by the governing party. Study group meetings would precede the 
actual committee meetings and include members of the executive and the military command. As 
such, it raises concern as to the openness and transparency that ought to come with a multiparty 
oversight process at committee level. The threat to openness and transparency further brings into 
question the longevity of the post-1994 focus on human security. While not the main aim of this study 
to determine shifts in the state’s security approach, it is crucial to note that executive dominance in 
the security sector does not align with a focus on human security. The undermining of Parliament thus 
results in limitations to openness and transparency which are characteristics more aligned with 
human security than, for example, traditional or regime security approaches. 
 
Despite increased institutional capacity and a wide variety of oversight tools available, a decreasing 
trend in parliamentary oversight of the military is evident between 1994 and 2014. The decreased 
questioning of the executive, limited engagement with external stakeholders, a rising degree of 
confidentiality around military affairs and perceptions around the protectionist role of chairpersons in 
later years should be viewed against a more constructive and consensus-seeking approach to 
oversight of the military immediately after 1994. Based on this shift, the study finds an increasing lack 
of political will to be a key contributor to the decline in parliamentary oversight of the military. 
 
3. Returning to the research questions 
 
The study commenced with the identification of four guiding research questions. Based on the 
information provided throughout the study and findings presented above, it is possible to provide 
informed answers to these questions. 
 
3.1 What are the distinguishing features of successful democratic parliamentary oversight 
of the military? 
 
The study considered a number of international cases and research done by international 
organisations such as Transparency International, the IPU, the DCAF and the World Bank. Through 
the correlation of information, the study found several features of successful oversight of the military 
in democracies. This includes the availability and extensive use of tools for oversight of the military, 
including committee hearings; hearings in the plenary; commissions of inquiry (including ad hoc and 
subcommittees); parliamentary questions (oral and written); and, interpellations. For parliaments to 
thoroughly review the military, several focus areas for oversight also need to be considered, including 
aspects related to the defence budget, policies, procurement, human resources and the deployment 
of the military. The study showed that countries such as the UK, Canada and Australia scores higher 
in international rankings on oversight of the military. These parliaments all have the above-mentioned 
tools available, show regular engagement on military affairs and reflect a deeper level of analysis of 
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focus areas for oversight of the military. The study found that successful oversight of the military can 
further be enhanced by looking at lower-order focus areas, including annual and quarterly 
performance, interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial 
equality, defence morale and defence infrastructure. While these criteria did not find universal 
application, countries with a higher rating in terms of oversight of the military did engage more of 
these criteria than countries with lower ratings. Key to ensuring success in oversight of all the criteria 
above is constant follow-up by parliamentary structures. 
 
The criteria above, when used effectively by Parliaments, will arguably lead to higher levels of 
success in parliamentary oversight of the military. However, the study ultimately found that a central 
feature of successful democratic parliamentary oversight of the military is political will. For political will 
to manifest, Parliaments require motivated chairpersons of defence committees, regular engagement 
with external stakeholders and defence experts as well as an elevated level of transparency around 
defence matters.  
 
3.2 How does South African Parliamentary oversight of the military compare to 
international benchmarks and international best practice? 
 
Although not the primary focus of the study, the information reviewed in Chapters 3 to 5 allows for a 
comparison between South Africa and the five cases expanded on in this study. In keeping with the 
structure of the study, it was firstly found South Africa compares favourably to other selected 
countries in terms of the number of oversight tools available to Parliament. This is in line with findings 
by the World Bank on the international usage of oversight tools. Similarly, Transparency International 
also found South Africa only to have a moderate risk of corruption after considering parliamentary 
oversight of the military in 82 countries. In terms of oversight of the military, South Africa’s Parliament 
made use of most of the tools (committee and plenary debates, oral and written questions, oversight 
visits and external audit). The utilisation of these tools is in line with countries such as the UK, 
Canada and Australia that are scored relatively high by international organisations on oversight of the 
military. Where South Africa’s Parliament falls short, however, is on the use of special defence 
inquiries and subcommittees as oversight tools.  
 
Second, on the focus areas identified for the study, the South African Parliament compares favourably 
in terms of oversight of certain military aspects. As noted, Parliament increased its budgetary 
oversight significantly over the years, including defence. This is in line with findings by Transparency 
International that ranks South Africa in a group of countries with robust parliamentary scrutiny of the 
defence budgets, along with (although slightly below) countries such as Australia and the UK. South 
Africa’s highly transparent defence budget adds significant weight to this rating. South Africa’s 
Parliament is also ranked among the parliaments of Australia and the UK as having elevated levels of 
oversight of defence policy, external audit and procurement oversight. Although ranked slightly below 
the parliaments of Australia and the UK, the South African Parliament was ranked higher than, for 
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example, the Indian Parliament. The international rankings noted above highlight that the South 
African Parliament compares favourably to other parliaments around the world in terms of oversight, 
being ranked in the upper half of countries evaluated in most categories. This is in line with the 
findings of this study which demonstrate Parliament to have significantly more robust oversight than 
Zambia and India, but faring slightly poorer than Australia, Canada and the UK in some fields.  
 
Despite South Africa’s parliamentary oversight of the military comparing favourably to the selected 
cases, significant room for improvement exists. The study found that Parliament does not optimally 
use its oversight tools and that many focus areas are not thoroughly overseen. The declining trend in 
oversight noted by MPs between 1994 and 2014 further brings into question the favourable 
comparison drawn by international institutions at various intervals during this period.  
 
3.3 What changes can be observed in relation to the oversight of the military when 
comparing the first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) to the third and fourth parliaments  
(2004 – 2014)?  
 
Several areas of change can be observed when comparing parliamentary oversight of the military 
between the first and second ten years of democracy in South Africa. Parliamentary focus shifted 
from its legislative function to an oversight function. This also transpired in terms of oversight of the 
military whereby the first ten years focus on the development of new defence legislation and policies 
suited to a democratic state. Institutional and procedural changes can also be observed when 
comparing the two periods. With a stated intent to focus on oversight in the third and fourth 
parliaments, the institution geared itself towards its oversight function through, inter alia, the addition 
of content research support and budgeting for oversight purposes. Legislative changes also facilitated 
an improvement in the information flow from the executive to Parliament and enhanced parliamentary 
oversight of budgetary aspects, annual and quarterly performance reports and defence procurement.  
 
The shifts between the different parliamentary eras noted above point to a platform focusing on 
enhanced oversight of the military. However, the study found that despite this deliberate shift in focus, 
there was a contrasting development between the institutional direction and oversight of the military. 
Institutional advances did not result in a similar improvement in oversight of the military. Decreasing 
attention was paid to the major focus areas for military oversight and there was a general decline in 
debate on military affairs (both at committee and plenary level). The perceived decline over time, 
based on reduced debate and engagement, was corroborated by MPs during interviews. MPs further 
corroborated findings of a greater decline of oversight in the latter parts of the Fourth Parliament. A 
general decline in oversight is therefore evident after 2004, confirmed by MPs noting that the 
oversight environment during the third and fourth parliaments differed significantly from the 
consensus-seeking approach to oversight of the military in the First Parliament.  
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3.4  What are the ‘views from the inside’ on parliamentary oversight of the military? 
 
Interviews with MPs and parliamentary officials provided perspectives on the development of 
parliamentary oversight of the military between 1994 and 2014. The study found four central views 
emerging from discussions. First, parliamentary oversight of the military developed from a low base. 
Significant improvement had to be made after 1994 as the pre-1994 period had very low levels of 
parliamentary oversight of the military. Second, throughout the twenty-year period on review, the 
nature of oversight of the military changed. In the First Parliament, matters of defence were prioritised 
as it reflected a key portfolio for the democratisation process. The First Parliament was characterised 
by consensus-seeking oversight of the military with MPs noting a degree of de-politicising of defence 
matters at parliamentary level. This resulted in robust engagement on key defence policies. The 
sense of purpose that characterised oversight in the First Parliament came under pressure from the 
Third Parliament onwards. Third, interviews confirmed the incremental institutional development to 
gear Parliament for oversight. This growth relates to internal support structures provided to MPs and 
committees for conducting oversight and the refinement of budgetary review processes in the 
oversight cycle. Fourth, MPs highlighted the important role that chairpersons play in determining 
successful oversight. For oversight of the military to be effective, a high level of commitment and drive 
form the chairpersons of the defence committees in Parliament is required. The four views that 
emerged resulted in a key overarching view from MPs. Contrary to the perception of an upwards 
trajectory of oversight in general, a broad view from MPs was that, despite institutional advances in 
the various periods analysed, there was a general regression in parliamentary oversight of the military 
specifically. 
 
4. Addressing possible criticisms  
 
The study on parliamentary oversight of the military bridges two spheres, namely a political and 
military sphere. As such, the study is not only rooted in liberalism and representative democracy, but 
also civil-military relations. A critique on this focus may hinge on the study’s inattention to SSR as a 
theoretical underpinning. While cognisant of the value of including SSR, two main reasons for the 
exclusion were put forward. At a theoretical level, the intrinsic link between SSR and civil-military 
relations largely reduces the need for significant focus on SSR. Civil-military relations relate to the 
relationship between the military and the civis. SSR also reflects this relationship, but has a wide and 
more practical focus of analysis. SSR includes various clusters of transformation such as cultural, 
human political and organisational transformation. As such, in a study focusing on parliamentary 
oversight, the viewing of civil-military relations arguably finds more application than SSR and its focus 
on the reform of the military itself. Furthermore, the SSR approach is better suited for a study on the 
South African transition to democracy and the accompanying SSR in the immediate post-1994 period. 
This study has limited focus on actual organisational changes within the military itself. Rather, this 
study has a longer-term overview of the control of the military within South Africa. The focus of this 
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study is thus more related to the separation of powers and developments around the control of the 
military within a democratic context that is more closely linked to civil-military relations theory.  
 
A more practical criticism of the study may stem from the framework for analysis used to analyse 
parliamentary oversight of the military and the level of depth with which these criteria were reviewed. 
The study selected a broad range of oversight tools, focus areas, lower-order focus areas and 
potential weaknesses. While efforts were made to align this to international best practice, including 
through a review of its utilisation in five selected countries, critics may identify additional criteria for a 
review of parliamentary oversight. The criteria for evaluation in this study are thus not exhaustive. 
Furthermore, in an effort to keep within the word limitation of the study, such criteria were only 
discussed with sufficient information to make a general deduction on the trend of oversight. As such, 
more in-depth studies can be done on each individual tool, focus area and weakness identified for 
parliamentary oversight of the military in this study. Furthermore, as a practical outflow for 
parliamentary oversight it must be noted that the tools and focus areas are not a definitive and closed 
framework for effective and quality oversight of the military. Even if all tools and focus areas are 
included, it may still not result in a high quality of oversight. However, a review of these criteria does 
provide insight into the general trends of oversight. 
 
Other practical limitations to the study, as noted in Chapter 1, relate largely to the availability of 
information. First, information for conducting of comparative studies on the work of other parliaments 
was limited. While aiming to review parliamentary oversight of the military in various Westminster-
styled parliaments in Africa, no sufficient information was publicly available to conduct such a study. 
Networking efforts with several African parliaments were made including Tanzania, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Nigeria. However, the eventual outcomes were disappointing. Online 
information of parliamentary activity around oversight of the military in these and various other African 
states were not sufficient for a thorough study. In addition, in the case of Tanzania, official records are 
often kept in languages other than English that complicates any potential research effort. Second, 
information from the South African Parliament also proved a limitation. Official parliamentary minutes 
on committee meetings are not readily available or have been lost, especially for the first two 
parliaments. As such, committee-meeting minutes from the PMG was utilised throughout the study. 
Third, by interviewing only MPs that served on Parliament’s defence committees, the pool for 
interviews were small yet necessarily specific. While nine MPs participated in the study, seven others 
that previously served on the defence committees (five ANC and two opposition MPs) were not willing 
to or did not respond to requests for participation in the study. 
 
5. Contribution of the thesis and the way forward 
 
The study is rooted in existing theory, including liberalism as paradigm, pluralism as macro-theory and 
representative democracy and constitutionalism as micro-theories. The study further links the theory 
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of civil-military relations to the liberalist paradigm. Given the rooting in existing theory, the study’s 
theoretical contribution is narrow with largely practical contributions.  
 
The study contributes to the theoretical study of civil-military relations in South Africa. Theorising on 
civil-military relations in a democratic context, such as in South Africa, is often based on Huntington’s 
(1957) differentiation between objective and subjective control of the military. In the age of the 
professional soldier, objective control of the military became prominent in democracies as it focuses 
on enhancing military professionalism and the distribution of power between civilian and military 
groupings in a country. It also allows for a separation of military and government with the former 
executing policy developed by the latter. The views by Huntington (and Janowitz) focused, to some 
degree, on the subjecting of the military to civilian power. However, studying civil-military relations 
exclusively in the context of this approach in post-1994 should be questioned. The study found a 
declining trend in parliamentary oversight after 2004, with the decline being particularly prominent in 
the Fourth Parliament. This decline brings into question effective systems of civilian checks and 
balances established in the post-1994 democratic era. Furthermore, interviews with MPs highlighted 
two aspects that question this theoretical approach. First, MPs noted that after 1994 there was a close 
connection between MPs and members of the military due to the links to the liberation struggle and 
integration processes. Second, the existence of study groups in Parliament, whereby the Ministry of 
Defence and military commanders report to the governing party study group prior to meeting with the 
official parliamentary committees on defence, suggest a closer relationship between political and 
military elites. These aspects are not aligned to a rigid theoretical approach (such as those of 
Huntington and Janowitz) based on subjecting of the military to civilian power. 
 
Given the concerns regarding non-alignment between developments in parliamentary oversight of the 
military and rigid theoretical approaches, Rebecca Shiff’s concordance theory of civil-military relations 
can be increasingly considered. In line with the practices observed by MPs, the concordance theory of 
civil-military relations “highlights dialogue, accommodation and shared values or objective among the 
military, the political elites, and society” (Schiff, 1995, p. 12). Rather than a separation of military and 
civilian powers, the concordance theory focuses on cooperation among the role players. At 
Parliamentary level, this cooperative approach between military and political elites (notably those in 
the governing party through the study group setting) plays out. Shiff’s concordance theory also 
explains the perceived decline in parliamentary oversight of the military observed in this study. While 
the immediate post-1994 period was marked by a cooperative approach to parliamentary oversight of 
the military, the study found that this withered over time. The decline in oversight thus fits with 
concordance theory as a breakdown in cooperation would lead to the development of a civil-military 
gap. Cohen’s theory on active control of the military characterised by increased inquiry and tension 
between political and military roleplayers may also be used to explain this decline. However, for the 
purpose of this study, concordance theory helps to explain the post-1994 transition, followed by a 
period of cooperation in oversight, subsequent developments leading to a decline in oversight and its 
contribution to the development of a civil-military gap. While studying Civil-Military Relations in South 
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Africa according to Shiff’s concordance theory is not new, this study contributes by supporting the 
validity of the shift in theoretical thinking on civil-military relations in South Africa.  
 
In terms of practical contributions, Chapter 1 noted three potential areas where the study could 
contribute. First, it has the potential to raise the prominence of the debate on parliamentary oversight 
of the military in South Africa. The study referred to literature on the ever-widening civil-military gap in 
South Africa, largely ascribed to decreasing research being conducted on military affairs. This has 
potential negative implications for civil-military relations in the country. A study on parliamentary 
oversight of the military thus contributes to the body of knowledge on the status and development of 
civil-military relations, notably in the post-1994 democratic setting. The study also contributes to a key 
aspect of Rebecca Shiff’s concordance theory, namely the relationship between the military, the 
political elites, and society. A parliament within a representative democracy is one of the key 
institutions where the relationship between the military, the political elites, and society plays out. A 
study on developments in Parliament’s oversight of the military therefore also highlights the standing 
of civil-military relations and the interplay of key role players according to the concordance theory. 
 
Second, the study contributes through the provision of a set of measuring tools for parliamentary 
oversight of the military relevant to the South African case study. The study sought to identify a variety 
of oversight tools and focus areas relevant to military oversight. Internationally applicable tools and 
focus areas were identified and applied to the South African case study. In addition, some lower-order 
focus areas were added. These lower-order focus areas had specific relevance to South Africa and/or 
were identified for specific oversight through legislative requirements. The extended framework can 
be utilised by Parliament to ensure that, for example, over a five-year parliamentary period, all focus-
areas identified receive sufficient attention. This can aid Parliament in the programming and 
measurement of oversight activities on military affairs. 
 
Third, the study contributes a practical framework for oversight to parliamentary officials and MPs in 
reviewing the institution’s oversight activities. Several tools for oversight were identified and measured 
in the study. Continued measurement of the effective use of such tools can serve as a means for 
Parliament to review oversight of the military. Parliament can review committee activity to prevent, for 
example, the continued disengagement of the JSCD on military affairs. Similarly, Parliament can also 
evaluate the activities of chairpersons to ensure that they maintain an effective committee. 
Parliamentary questions are another aspect to be monitored, perhaps by political parties themselves. 
MPs should be encouraged to utilise this tool for oversight of the military.  
 
Furthermore, the study also identified a number of weaknesses that, if addressed, may assist 
Parliament in reviewing oversight of the military. The institution can review the support services 
offered to MPs and committees, including research support, content advisor support and secretarial 
support to address ongoing concern of MPs. Parliament can also ensure broader political will for 
oversight of the military by evaluating the defence committees’ engagement with external 
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stakeholders and experts. Where concerns arise regarding the increased non-reporting to parliament 
on confidential matters, Parliament should ensure that appropriate platforms for engagements, such 
as closed meetings, are conducted. Finally, the study contributes through noting limited follow-up as a 
general concern in Parliament. This can be addressed by Parliament through the establishment of a 
formal follow-up system tracking committee recommendations. Should these concerns be addressed, 
it can arguably broaden oversight of the military and, in turn, contribute to the narrowing of the civil-
military gap in South Africa.  
 
Based on the above contributions, the study recognises the role of declining parliamentary oversight 
of the military in the growing civil-military gap in South Africa. It recommends a review of the efficiency 
of parliamentary processes, defence committee activity and the role of the chairpersons as an internal 
practical arrangement to enhance oversight. On a theoretical level, the study calls for the increased 
inclusion of discussion on the role of parliaments in maintaining civil-military relations, specifically in 
the context of evolving concordance theory. At an academic level, several areas for further inquiry 
exist. By confirming the growing civil-military gap in South Africa in this study, further studies on this 
phenomenon should be conducted to add to existing literature and the limited understanding thereof 
in the post-1994 context. Furthermore, findings in this study bring into question the longevity of the 
perceived focus on human security in the post-1994 period. Further studies on a potential turn back to 
traditional security approaches or to a regime-security approach can thus be done, inclusive of 
executive dominance and over-reach over Parliament. Such research should look beyond the 
timeframe of this study. this study, along with several other international studies, identified criteria for 
evaluating parliamentary oversight of the military. Yet, limited academic studies exist that focus on 
means to enhance such oversight, particularly in South Africa. Finally, in relation to the challenges 
noted in this study, an opportunity exists for in-depth studies of parliamentary oversight of the military 
in other African states. This will provide not only a view of oversight of the military in those countries, 
but also in Africa in general. Such studies can therefore add to the body of knowledge on the 
development of civil-military relations and defence oversight in Africa as a whole. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Two distinct yet contextually overlapping periods of parliamentary oversight, characterised the first 
twenty years of democracy in South Africa. Parliamentary oversight of the military can be analysed 
according to this separation. The first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) saw ongoing efforts to define 
defence policy and legislation within the newfound liberal democratic context. While the focus of the 
first two parliaments was on its legislative function, focus shifted to its oversight function in the third 
and fourth parliaments. Parliamentary processes, structures and oversight-enhancing legislation 
improved tremendously over the years to enrich the potential for thorough oversight in the third and 
fourth parliaments. Based on these improvements, and the relatively elevated levels of oversight 
already achieved by the JSCD and PCDMV in the first two parliaments, a continuously improved level 
of parliamentary oversight of the military could thus have been expected along the linear timeline. 
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However, oversight of the military did not improve in line with the scope offered for improvement. 
There was a shift away from de-politicised, consensus-seeking oversight as observed by interviewees 
during the First Parliament. Oversight tools were not used optimally, focus areas of oversight not 
balanced and significant risks to effective oversight manifested over time. The quality of oversight 
therefore showed contextual regression, bringing into question the standing of parliamentary oversight 
of the military. Such regression is in line with, and potentially contributed to, the Defence Force’s 
critical state of decline as found in the 2014 Defence Review as well as the growing civil-military gap 
in South Africa identified in existing literature and corroborated by interviews. 
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ADDENDUM A  Oversight tools, focus areas and indicators of weak oversight in selected parliaments  
 
BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
tools 
utilised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary 
debates 
Regular plenary and 
committee debates. 
 
198 meetings of the 
Select Committee on 
Defence between 2010 
and 2015.  
Regular plenary and 
committee debates  
 
230 total committee 
meetings on defence 
(two committees) 
between 2011 and 2015. 
Regular plenary and 
committee debates.  
 
High number of meetings 
by defence-committees. 
Very limited plenary and 
committee debates. 
 
70 meetings of the 
Security and Foreign 
Affairs Committee 
between 2010 and 2015 
(not all related to 
defence). 
Regular plenary and 
committee debates. 
 
82 meetings held by the  
Standing Committee on 
Defence between 2011 
and 2016. 
Parliamentary 
questions 
Very high levels of oral 
and written questions 
to the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
 
 
 
E.g. 1 905 Written 
questions posed in 
2015 alone (House of 
Commons). 
Relatively low level of 
written and oral 
questions on Defence. 
Time allocation for 
dealing with oral 
questions limited. 
 
E.g. 55 Written questions 
posed in 2011-2015 
(House of Commons). 
Relatively high level of 
written and oral 
questions on Defence. 
 
 
 
 
E.g. 199 Written 
questions between  
Nov 2013 and April 2015 
(Senate) 
Very low usage of oral 
questions. No reflection 
of the utilisation of 
written questions. 
 
 
 
E.g. Only 3 Oral 
questions on defence 
posed in 2014. (No 
information on written 
questions posed). 
Very high level of written 
and oral questions on 
Defence. 
 
 
 
 
E.g. 2279 Written 
questions from Sep 2011 
to Sep 2016 
Special defence 
inquiries 
Regular inquiries by 
the Defence 
Committee.  
Four special inquiries 
announced for 
2015/16. 
Regular inquiries by both 
Defence Committees. 
33 Special inquiries 
conducted  between 
2011 and 2015. 
Ad hoc inquiries by the 
two committees dealing 
with defence. Regularity 
of inquiries undermined 
by multidimensional 
focus of the committees. 
Three special inquiries 
(reports) on defence in 
2015 (excluding 
legislation) 
No real special defence 
inquiries, but focus on 
selected defence-related 
aspects during  
meetings.  
In-depth inquiries correlate 
largely with normal 
Committee work, but 
formal reports with 
recommendations and 
subsequent government 
responses are presented 
to the Houses of 
Parliament. 
32 such reports submitted 
between 2011 and 2016. 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
tools 
utilised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight visits 
and study tours 
Regular domestic and 
international oversight 
visits by the 
Committee or 
representatives. 
Significant focus on 
operational matters. 
Limited international 
study tours. 
Tool available and 
utilised.  Between 2011 
and 2015 only the 
Senate’s Standing 
Committee on National 
Security and Defence 
conducted oversight 
visits and two study 
tours. 
Tool available and used 
relatively frequently. 
Relevant foreign visits 
conducted in the past, 
including to deployment 
areas. 
Domestic and 
international oversight 
visits conducted by the 
Committee, but very 
limited focus on defence 
matters. 
Regular oversight visits to 
defence facilities.  
No evidence of foreign 
study tours/visits. 
 
Use of external 
audit 
National Audit Office 
reports to Parliament 
and extensively 
utilised. 
 
TI85 Score: 100/100 
Regular reports of the 
Auditor-General of 
Canada submitted to 
Parliament. 
 
TI Score: Not evaluated 
Regular finance and 
performance audit 
reports by the Australian 
National Audit Office to 
Parliament. 
 
TI Score: 100/100 
Office of the Auditor-
General reports to 
Parliament’s Public 
Accounts Committee, but 
reports lack depth. 
TI Score: Not evaluated 
Regular engagement with 
the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, but 
mostly by the Public 
Accounts Committee. 
TI Score: 50/100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
focus areas 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence budget Thorough oversight by 
defence committee. 
 
 
 
TI Score: 83/100 
 
 
Level of Budget 
Transparency86: High 
Transparency 
Regular oversight, but 
oversight lacks depth. 
Main criticism: Short 
defence budgetary 
meetings. 
 
TI Score:  Not evaluated 
 
Level of Budget 
Transparency: Not 
evaluated 
Thorough annual 
oversight of defence 
estimates. 
 
 
 
TI Score: 100/100 
 
Level of Budget 
Transparency: 100/10087 
Public Accounts 
Committee reviews 
defence expenditure, but 
reviews lack depth. 
 
TI Score: Not scored 
 
 
Level of Budget 
Transparency: Moderate 
Transparency 
Regular oversight  by the 
Standing Committee on 
Defence, including powers 
to reject/adjust the budget, 
but scope for improvement 
remains 
 
TI Score: 58/100 
 
Level of Budget 
Transparency: Moderate to 
low 
                                                          
85 Transparency International (TI) Score based on a 2013 Study on the quality of legislative oversight of defence in 82 countries (Cover & Meran, 2013b). 
86 Budget Transparency Score is based on a 2011 Study by Transparency International measuring the transparency of defence budgets (Levels of Transparency include High; 
Moderate to high; Moderate; Moderate to low; and, Low) (Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011b). 
87 In the case of Australia, the 2013 study on Budget Transparency is utilised as it was not reviewed in the 2011 study (Cover & Meran, 2013b). 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
focus areas 
Defence policy Regular, in-depth 
debates and veto 
power on defence 
policy. 
 
 
TI Score: 95/100 
Reports on policy 
matters produced, but 
limited impact on policy 
itself. 
 
 
TI Score:  Not evaluated 
 
Ad hoc discussions on 
policy matters. 
Regular tracking of 
developments related to 
policy implementation. 
 
TI Score: 95/100 
Defence committee has 
the power to review 
defence policy, but this is 
not regularly conducted. 
 
 
TI Score:  Not evaluated 
 
Policy reviewed by the 
Standing Committee on 
Defence. 
Recommendations made 
on policy requiring 
government feedback. 
 
TI Score: 45/100 
Defence 
procurement 
Strong legislative 
environment and 
transparent oversight. 
 
TI Score: 95/100 
Procurement reviewed, 
but limited reports 
compiled by 
parliamentary 
committees related to 
procurement. 
TI Score:  Not evaluated 
 
Committee inquiries 
reveal that procurement 
processed and specific 
large procurement 
packages are reviewed 
by the committees. 
TI Score: 95/100 
Engagement on 
procurement of defence 
equipment, but 
discussions lack depth 
on financial transactions. 
 
TI Score:  Not evaluated 
 
Improvement in 
procurement procurement-
related engagements since 
2013, but challenges 
remain.  
 
TI Score: 45/100 
Human resources 
(HR) 
Regular discussions 
on HR matters across 
various Committee 
Reports 
Regular discussions on 
HR matters by both 
Defence Committees. 
Ad hoc reviews of 
personnel matters as is 
evident in Committee 
Reports/Inquiries. 
Clear recommendations 
offered. 
Occasional  discussions 
on HR matters across 
various Committee 
Reports 
Regular discussions on a 
broad range of HR matters 
reflected in Committee 
Reports 
Deployment of 
the military 
Parliamentary approval 
not required by law, 
but increasingly being 
sought as convention 
now dictates 
parliamentary approval 
as a requirement. 
No legal requirements for 
parliamentary approval 
of deployments, but 
increasingly common. 
Previous 
recommendations to 
terminate external 
deployments have been 
adhered to. 
Deployments of the 
military are reported to 
Parliament and debated, 
but the prerogative for 
deployment remains with 
the executive. 
There have been 
instances of votes by the 
House on foreign 
deployments. 
No clarity on 
Parliamentary role in 
defence deployments.  
Defence committee had 
limited discussions on 
matters of deployment. 
No direct constitutional or 
other provisions for 
parliamentary oversight of 
defence deployments.  
Standing Committee on 
Defence briefed on some 
deployments and ad hoc 
debates held in plenary, 
but no significant impact 
on deployments. 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower-
order 
oversight 
focus areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual and 
quarterly 
performance 
Annual performance 
reviewed and reported 
on by the Select 
Committee on 
Defence. 
No consideration of 
quarterly performance. 
Provision made for 
annual reporting on 
defence as well as 
quarterly expenditure 
reporting. 
 
Annual performance 
reviewed by the Joint 
Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade. 
No consideration of 
quarterly performance. 
No reference to the 
Ministry of Defence’s 
annual reports in the 
Defence Committee’s 
reports. No provision 
made for quarterly 
reports. 
 
Annual reports referred to 
Committees, but Standing 
Committee on Defence 
had limited interaction on 
annual reports. Quarterly 
expenditure referred to, 
but quarterly performance 
not considered. 
Inter-
departmental 
cooperation 
Inter-departmental 
cooperation 
considered intermitted 
through input from 
other departments as 
part of discussions on 
defence.  
Senate Committee on 
National Security and 
Defence deals with 
various departments 
contributing to national 
security. However, 
limited meetings related 
to interdepartmental 
cooperation.  
Limited focus on 
interdepartmental 
cooperation, but the 
broad scope of the 
Committees (defence, 
trade and foreign affairs) 
allow for some degree of 
interdepartmental focus. 
 
Matters of 
interdepartmental 
cooperation considered 
occasionally.  
This likely stems from 
the Committee’s multi-
departmental focus. 
Ad hoc meetings related to 
interdepartmental 
cooperation. This is largely 
limited to cooperation 
between the military and 
the police. 
Military training 
and education 
Sporadic focus on 
military education by 
the Select Committee 
on Defence. Some 
plenary debates on 
military training 
aspects. 
Extensively addressed in 
regular meetings/studies 
by the defence 
committees. However, 
no specific 
meetings/reports on 
training. Limited focus on 
military education. 
Matters pertaining to 
training have been 
addressed by the 
committees. Education 
received limited attention 
in committee reports. 
Very limited oversight of 
training by the defence 
committee. No reference 
to military education. 
Regular meetings on 
military training aspects, 
including dedicated 
meetings on manpower 
and training. Limited focus 
on military education. 
Gender and racial 
equality 
Sporadic focus on 
gender equality in the 
military during Plenary 
debates. However, no 
engagement by the 
Select Committee on 
Defence.  
Sporadic engagement on 
gender inequality. No set 
meetings/reports on 
gender and racial 
equality. 
The employment of 
women in the Australian 
Defence Force has 
emerged in official 
committee inquiries. 
Limited reference is 
made to matters of racial 
equality. 
No engagement on 
gender and racial 
equality related to the 
defence sector. 
Only one discussion on the 
admission of girl cadets 
held in 2015. No 
discussions on racial 
equality. 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower-
order 
oversight 
focus areas 
Defence morale Mention of defence 
morale during Plenary 
debates. 
No engagement on 
morale by the Select 
Committee on 
Defence.  
Reference to defence 
morale during some 
meetings, but aspect not 
discussed as a stand-
alone topic.  
No specific engagement 
on the state of morale of 
the Australian armed 
forces. 
No specific engagement 
on Defence morale by 
the defence committee.  
 
No dedicated meetings on 
defence morale. Sporadic 
reference to morale during 
regular Committee 
meetings. 
Defence 
infrastructure 
Engagement by the 
Select Committee on 
Defence with the 
Defence Infrastructure 
Organisation. 
Infrastructure more 
regularly discussed as 
part of meetings on 
defence expenditure, but 
not as a stand-alone 
topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several engagements on 
defence infrastructure, 
notably defence-related 
housing.  
 
No specific focus on 
defence-specific 
infrastructure. 
Regular discussions on 
defence infrastructure with 
some meetings showing 
more in-depth discussion 
on infrastructure 
challenges. 
 
Indicators 
of weak 
oversight 
 
 
Constitutional 
and legal powers 
No set constitution in 
the UK, but oversight 
ensured through the 
principle of 
parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
Set constitutional 
provision for 
parliamentary oversight 
of the military. 
Set constitutional 
provision for 
parliamentary oversight 
of the military. 
Principle of 
parliamentary oversight 
entrenched in the 
Constitution. 
 No direct constitutional 
directives for parliamentary 
oversight of the military, 
but general parliamentary 
oversight provided for.  
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicators 
of weak 
oversight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customary 
practices 
Oversight tools 
available and widely 
utilised. 
Democratic values 
highly entrenched. 
FH Score88 = 1 
DI Score89 = 8.08 
 
Oversight tools available 
and utilised, but the 
impact thereof 
undermined to an extent 
by concerns related to 
political will. 
Democratic values highly 
entrenched. 
FH Score = 1 
DI Score = 9.07 
Oversight tools available 
and well utilised. 
Democratic values highly 
entrenched. 
FH Score = 1 
DI Score = 9.09 
Oversight tools available, 
but poorly utilised. 
Democratic values not 
fully entrenched. 
HF Score = 3 
DI Score = 5.25 
Oversight tools available 
and generally well utilised. 
High levels of democracy. 
FH Score = 2 
DI Score = 7.68 
Resources and 
expertise 
Very well supported 
Select Committee on 
Defence. 
Regular use of 
external specialists. 
 
Library of Parliament 
provides research 
support, but support 
limited and not always 
content experts. 
More regular usage of 
external experts to brief 
committees. 
Both Defence 
Committees well 
supported by 
parliamentary staff, 
including researchers.  
For specific reports, the 
Committees also make 
use of special defence 
advisors (serving 
members of the armed 
forces). 
Several support 
elements present, 
including researcher, 
library services, and 
committee assistants. 
Limited utilisation of 
external specialists. 
 
Poor support to 
Committees and MPs as 
they lack dedicated 
research staff. 
Limited use of external 
experts to brief the 
committee. 
Political will Executive dominance 
limited through 
principle of 
parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
Regular engagement 
with NGOs and other 
interest groups. 
Separation of powers 
entrenched. However, 
executive dominance 
impacting negatively on 
oversight of the military. 
MPs often bound by 
political loyalties to ‘toe 
the party line’. 
Separation of powers 
entrenched. Indications 
are of increased political 
will for parliamentary 
oversight and a balance 
of power between the 
executive and 
parliaments is in place. 
Advances in oversight 
since 1991 highlight an 
increasing political will 
for oversight of the 
military. However, 
advances are 
undermined by the poor 
execution of oversight.  
 
Executive dominance 
highlighted as an ongoing 
concern.  
Regression in 
parliamentary activity an 
indication of a lack of 
political will. 
                                                          
88 Freedom House (FH) Score refers to political rights and the link to democratically entrenched values, where 1 represent the most free and 7 the least free rating (Freedom 
House, 2015b).  
89 Democracy Index (DI) Score refers to a study by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit based on various democratic indicators, including the electoral process, the functioning of 
the government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties (Kekic, 2007). The study provides a score from 1 to 10 where 10 represents  the highest levels of 
democracy. 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
UK  
PARLIAMENT 
CANADIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AUSTRALIAN 
PARLIAMENT 
ZAMBIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
INDIAN  
PARLIAMENT 
 
 
Indicators 
of weak 
oversight 
Follow-up on 
parliamentary 
recommendations 
Follow-up is highly 
structured. The 
executive generally 
responds to 
Committee Reports 
within two months. 
Some degree of follow-
up through government 
responses, but scope for 
improvement exist in 
terms of follow-up.  
Follow-up is highly 
structured with three-
month deadlines for 
government responses 
to Senate Committee 
Reports. 
Although limited focus 
placed on defence 
oversight, the defence 
committee shows intent 
in following up on 
recommendations. 
Follow-up is well 
structured with executive 
feedback on 
recommendations 
regularly provided. 
Recommendations are, 
however, not binding on 
the executive. 
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ADDENDUM B  South African oversight of the military 1994 – 2004: Oversight tools, focus areas and indicators of weak oversight 
 
BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT: 1994 to 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
tools 
utilised 
Parliamentary 
debates 
Robust plenary debates on defence-related matters limited between 1994 and 2004. Defence matters mostly debated during debates on the 
Appropriations Bill, the Adjusted Appropriations Bill and other defence-related bills introduced on an ad hoc basis. 
The frequency of Committee meetings varied between 1998 and 2004. JSCD activities decreased significantly after 1998 (finalisaiton of the 
Defence Review), while PCDMV meetings increased in frequency. The number of PCDMV meetings compared favourably to that of other 
committees in the security cluster between 1998 and 2004. 
Parliamentary 
questions 
Parliamentary questions used frequently and covers a wide variety of defence focus areas. Parliamentary questions were utilised more 
frequently during the Second Parliament. However, there was a significant reduction in the number of defence-related questions posed by MPs 
form the NCOP during the Second Parliament. 
Special defence 
inquiries 
Very limited utilisation by the PCDMV and JSCD. Although some inquiries were held (including an inquiry into the  Strategic Defence 
Procurement Packages), these were not truly independent special defence inquiries. 
Oversight visits 
and study tours 
Limited usage of this oversight tool. Only two study tours conducted, although on relevant topics given the focus areas of the PCDMV and 
JSCD. Reports tabled for both study tours. Only one official report tabled for oversight visits (1994) although evidence exist of other oversight 
visits by the JSCD and PCDMV. The lack of official reports tabled limits the potential impact of oversight visits. 
Use of external 
audit 
Ineffective utilisation of this tool. Limited reference is made to input provided by reports of the Auditor-General and no dedicated briefings from 
the Auditor-General were recorded between 1998 and 2004, except to the SCOPA.  
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
focus areas 
Defence budget Annual and medium-terms budgets regularly scrutinised by the JSCD and/or PCDMV. Questions related to the Defence budget and 
expenditure increasingly prominent during the Second Parliament. 
Defence policy Significant oversight of defence policy and legislation by both the JSCD and PCDMV. The PCDMV focused more specifically on legislation. 
Parliamentary questions and committee meetings reveal a maintained focus on policy matters during the Second Parliament, suggesting 
continued oversight of legislation and policy implementation. 
 
Defence 
procurement 
Regular engagement on defence procurement at Committee level, notably related to an in-depth inquiry into the Strategic Arms Procurement 
Package. However, the quality of oversight of the procurement package has been challenged. Oversight of procurement shifted towards a 
focus on the National conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) around 2002, but challenges remained in the frequency of inquiry of 
NCACC activities. 
Human resources Regular engagement by the JSCD and PCDMV on human resources, notably related to the force structure of the SANDF. This included 
dedicated briefings on the human resources component of the 1998 Defence Review and the 2010 Human Resources Strategy. A high number 
of questions were posed related to personnel matters as well as questions related to individual military personnel. 
Deployment of 
the military 
Well established legislative guidelines exist that define the role of Parliament in relation to defence deployments. The scope of powers offered 
to Parliament, and notably the JSCD, was severely underutilised during the first two parliaments. Limited dedicated briefings were held on the 
deployments of the SANDF, which likely explains the high number of questions posed in relation to defence deployments during the Second 
Parliament. Poor overall levels of oversight of deployments as well as compliance requirements to the executive for deployments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual and 
quarterly 
Legislative directives established under the Public Finances Management Act (1999) and National Treasury guidelines in 1999 and 2001 
respectively placed specific focus on annual and quarterly reporting. However, following the implementation of these directives, the JSCD and 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT: 1994 to 2004 
 
 
 
Lower-
order 
oversight 
focus areas 
performance PCDMV showed limited engagement on  annual reports and no engagements on quarterly reports up to 2004. 
Inter-
departmental 
cooperation 
Limited oversight related to interdepartmental cooperation. Three meetings held related to cooperation between the SANDF and SAPS in terms 
of crime prevention and border safeguarding. 
Military training 
and education 
Despite the legislative requirement for the JSCD to focus on force preparation, no dedicated committee engagements were held on military 
training. It was, however, noted on an ad hoc basis during other meetings, notably budget-related discussions. Defence education, notably civic 
education, received more attention and dedicated meetings on the roles of the Military Academy and Defence College were held by the 
PCDMV. Limited questions related to training and education were posed by MPs. 
Gender and racial 
equality 
Significant focus on race and gender equality by the JSCD with several dedicated meetings on the matter. Transformation at lower level (in the 
various arms of service of the SANDF) were also reviewed during committee meetings. Limited parliamentary questions on race/gender 
equality arguably due to frequent committee engagements. 
Defence morale No focus on defence morale by either the JSCD or the PCDMV despite the committees being informed of challenges related to morale in the 
SANDF. 
Defence 
infrastructure 
Significant attention to defence infrastructure and equipment reflected in parliamentary questions. However, limited engagement on 
infrastructure during JSCD and PCDMV meetings.  
 
 
 
 
 
Indicators 
of weak 
oversight 
Constitutional 
and legal powers 
Definitive constitutional and legal powers for parliamentary oversight of defence were established after 1994. 
Customary 
practices 
Oversight tools were used with varying degrees of success. Debates and parliamentary questions were used more frequently. The impact of 
oversight visits limited by the lack of official reports. The utilisation of special defence inquiries and the use of external audit was severely 
underutilised as oversight tools. 
Resources and 
expertise 
Research and administrative support to MPs and committees fell short between 1994 and 2004. This was noted as a major constraint in 
findings by the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament. 
Political will Both positive and negative developments related to the political will to oversee the DOD. Significant input from NGOs and other defence-
related stakeholders can be observed during JSCD and PCDMV meetings. However, very poor utilisation of parliamentary questions as a 
continuous oversight tool by MPs from the governing party are evident. 
Follow-up on 
parliamentary 
recommendations 
Between 1998 and 2004, follow-up meetings were often held where a commitment was made. However, no significant follow up by the JSCD 
and PCDMV on military deployments or by the DOD on recommendations emanating from Committee Reports. Crucially, no structures existed 
between 1994 and 2004 to track follow up by the Defence Committees and the Department of Defence. 
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ADDENDUM C  South African oversight of the military 2004 – 2014: Oversight tools, focus areas and indicators of weak oversight 
 
BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT: 2004 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
tools 
utilised 
Parliamentary 
debates 
Robust plenary debates on defence-related matters limited between 2004 and 2014. Defence matters mostly debated during debates on the 
Appropriations Bill, the Adjusted Appropriations Bill. Only two dedicated defence debates in addition to aforementioned debates.    
JSCD activities continued to remain limited, except for dealing with matters related to military veterans. PCDMV meetings remained at a higher 
level since 2004 and compared favourably to similar committees in the security cluster. However, meetings declined after 2011.  
Parliamentary 
questions 
Parliamentary questions used frequently and cover a wide variety of defence focus areas, including an increased focus on mili tary veterans in 
the Fourth Parliament. An increased focus on written questions as opposed to oral questions. Low number of defence-related questions from 
Members of the NCOP.   
Special defence 
inquiries 
The PCDMV held in-depth meetings on the Defence Review and the JSCD on matters pertaining to military veterans. However, no formal 
reports were drafted in this regard and these inquiries do not conform to Special Defence Inquiries. 
Oversight visits 
and study tours 
Several joined study tours by the PCDMV and JSCD. Increased use of oversight visits by the PCDMV, but limited visits by the JSCD. Formal 
reports on study tours/oversight visits mostly published in Parliament’s ATC, but impact diminished by delays in publishing of reports. 
Use of external 
audit 
Significant increase in the use of the audit opinion of the AGSA. More regular engagements held between the PCDMV and the office of the 
AGSA, notably on discussions of the DOD’s annual reports. The SCOPA also made regular use of the AGSA work on the DOD. 
 
 
 
 
Oversight 
focus areas 
Defence budget Significantly elevated levels of engagement on budgetary aspects. Parliamentary structures through the Budgetary Review Process became 
entrenched throughout the Third Parliament and especially during the Fourth Parliament. This leads to more thorough engagement on the 
budget, both ex ante and ex post. Budgetary oversight role largely fulfilled by the PCDMV; Very limited JSCD engagement on the DOD budget. 
Defence policy Reduced focus on defence policy, but continued focus on defence legislation by the PCDMV. Despite its constitutional mandate to oversee 
defence policy, the JSCD showed very limited engagement on policy. 
Defence 
procurement 
Very limited oversight of procurement. The establishment of and reporting to Parliament by the NCACC ideally laid the foundation for 
parliamentary oversight of procurement. However, the JSCD exercised very little inquiry of the annual and quarterly reports submitted to 
Parliament by the NCACC. 
Human resources Significantly reduced focus on human resources, especially during the Fourth Parliament. HR Policy reviewed by PCDMV in 2004, 2005, and 
2010 while JSCD focused exclusively on HR transformation. Major HR concerns developed in the DOD amid a lack of oversight.  
Deployment of 
the military 
Very poor oversight of defence deployments. Limited engagement by the PCDMV on deployments. The JSCD, despite its mandate to oversee 
deployments, engaged on this to a very limited extent. Several cases exist where the JSCD did not discuss and/or adopt presidential letters of 
deployment of the military. 
 
 
 
Lower-
order 
oversight 
focus areas 
 
 
Annual and 
quarterly 
performance 
Legislative directives established under the Public Finances Management Act (1999) and National Treasury guidelines in 1999 and 2001 
respectively placed specific focus on annual and quarterly reporting. Due to legislative requirements, annual reports were considered every 
year between 2004 and 2014. Quarterly reports were not regularly considered prior to 2012, but consistently reviewed thereafter.  The PCDMV 
thus adhered to institutional developments around the Budgetary Review Process for Parliament. 
Inter-
departmental 
cooperation 
Limited oversight related to interdepartmental cooperation with a limited number of meetings between the JSCD/PCDMV and other 
departments. Of specific concern is the lack of engagement and follow-up with the DPW, despite DOD officials noting the DOD-DPW 
relationship as a significant concern.  
Military training 
and education 
Regular engagement on training matters by the PCDMV. Particular attention was paid to the MSDS launched in 2003. Several oversight visits 
were conducted to training bases. Very limited oversight of training by the JSCD despite its constitutional mandate. 
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BROAD 
INDICATOR 
SPECIFIC 
INDICATOR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT: 2004 to 2014 
 
 
Lower-
order 
oversight 
focus areas 
Gender and racial 
equality 
Reduced focus on racial and gender matters by the PCDMV with limited dedicated meetings in this regard. Several dedicated race and gender 
meetings held by the JSCD. Despite some focus, the impact of oversight in this regard remains questionable given the admitted challenges 
that remain in terms of gender and racial transformation in the SANDF. 
Defence morale No focus on defence morale by the JSCD, but the PCDMV did include discussions on morale as part of some meetings. However, no 
dedicated meetings on morale despite this being highlighted as a concern in the SANDF. 
Defence 
infrastructure 
Regular focus on infrastructure by the PCDMV during the third Parliament, but significant reduction in interest during the Fourth Parliament. 
Long-term infrastructure concerns in the DOD not addressed through Parliamentary oversight.  
 
 
 
 
Indicators 
of weak 
oversight 
Constitutional 
and legal powers 
Constitutional provisions and policy directives on parliamentary oversight of the military established after 1994 remained firmly in place 
between 2004 and 2014. This was further enhanced through subsequent policies such as the 2014 Defence Review. 
Customary 
practices 
Oversight tools were used increasingly effectively with the exception of special defence inquiries. The lack of utilisation of oversight tools by the 
JSCD stifled the broader oversight effort. 
Resources and 
expertise 
Concerns related to research and other support to MPs were incrementally addressed after 1997. Although challenges remained, increased 
research and other support were offered to MPs during the Third Parliament and notably during the Fourth Parliament. 
Political will Significant rise in concerns regarding the political will to hold the executive to account. Very limited utilisation of parliamentary questions as an 
oversight tool by MPs of the governing party. Significant matters raised by MPs of the opposition not included for discussion at committee-level. 
Very limited utilisation of external sector-specialists to brief defence committees and a rising notion of executive dominance, notably in the 
Fourth Parliament. 
Follow-up on 
parliamentary 
recommendations 
The PCDMD did well to follow-up where such commitment was made during the Third Parliament. Follow-up decreased sharply in the Fourth 
Parliament and written responses from the DOD was frequently requested while not distributed to MPs. The JSCD had very limited follow-up, 
largely due to the limited number of meetings held. 
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ADDENDUM D  List of parliamentary defence committee meetings: 1998 - 2014 
 
Unique 
number 
Annual 
meeting 
number 
Date PCDMV and/or 
JSCD 
Main topic of the meeting90 
1998 
1 1 8 Feb PCDMV Deliberations on the Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Bill  
2 2 11 Feb PCDMV Voting on Amendments to the Regulation of 
Foreign Military Assistance Bill  
3 3 16 Feb JSCD DOD Language Policy Briefing 
4 4 22 Feb JSCD British Military and Training Team (BMATT) 
Report 
5 5 23 Feb JSCD Military Disciplinary Code (Defence Act) 
6 6 8 Mar JSCD Defence Acquisition management 
7 7 9 Mar JSCD SANDF Rationalisation process 
8 8 15 Mar JSCD Report on Chapter 12 of the 1998 Defence 
Review 
9 9 18 Mar JSCD Report on Chapter 10 of the 1998 Defence 
Review 
10 10 20 Apr PCDMV Consideration of amendments by NCOP to 
Study tour Report 
11 11 4 May JSCD Report on Chapter 9 of the 1998 Defence 
Review 
12 12 18 May JSCD Report on Chapter 9 of the 1998 Defence 
Review and BMATT Report feedback 
13 13 19 May PCDMV Briefing on 1998/1999 budget 
14 14 31 May JSCD Briefing on the position of the Military Ombud 
15 15 1 Jun JSCD Discussions on the budget cycle and theft of 
arms from SANDF base 
16 16 2 Jun JSCD Weapons theft from Military Bases: Briefing 
By SANDF 
17 17 2 Jun JSCD Briefing on Sweden’s proposal to sell military 
equipment to South Africa 
18 18 7 Jun JSCD Briefing on the Military Veteran's Affairs Bill 
19 19 28 Jul JSCD Armscor Annual Report presentation 
20 20 2 Aug JSCD Hearings on the DOD Language Policy 
21 21 17 Aug JSCD Weapons theft from Military Bases: Briefing 
By SANDF 
22 22 24 Aug JSCD Role of SANDF in Peacekeeping Operation 
23 23 30 Aug JSCD Briefing on DOD Budget 
24 24 31 Aug JSCD Briefing on the Military Veteran's Affairs Bill 
25 25 7 Sep JSCD Military Disciplinary Code (Defence Act) 
26 26 13 Sep PCDMV Discussion on Defence Special Tribunal Bill 
27 27 21 Sep JSCD Response by Minister of Defence on the 
BMATT Report 
28 28 28 Oct JSCD Briefing on the Defence Medium-Term 
Budget 
29 29 1 Nov PCDMV Voting on the Demobilisation Amendment Bill 
30 30 1 Nov JSCD Briefing on the situation in Lesotho 
1999 
31 1 7 Feb JSCD Briefing on the Draft Defence Bill and 
discussion on Military Ombud position 
32 2 9 Feb PCDMV Adoption of Study Tour Report91 
                                                          
90 All information based on data kept by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (www.pmg.co.za). 
91 All tabs highlighted in grey note purely administrative meetings. 
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Unique 
number 
Annual 
meeting 
number 
Date PCDMV and/or 
JSCD 
Main topic of the meeting90 
33 3 15 Feb JSCD Briefing on the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Draft Bill 
34 4 22 Feb JSCD Defence budget for 1999/2000 
35 5 9 Mar JSCD Defence Industry White Paper 
36 6 14 Mar PCDMV Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Bill 
37 7 15 Mar PCDMV Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Bill 
38 8 22 Mar JSCD Transformation in the DOD 
39 9 16 Aug PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
40 10 17 Aug PCDMV SANDF Regulations 
41 11 18 Aug PCDMV PCDMV Programme 
42 12 23 Aug PCDMV Briefing on civil-military relations 
43 13 25 Aug PCDMV Committee Programme for 1999 
44 14 25 Aug JSCD Election of the Chairperson 
45 15 6 Sep PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
46 16 13 Sep PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
47 17 16 Sep JSCD Seminar on civil-military relations 
48 18 20 Sep PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
49 19 21 Sep JSCD Briefing on the Defence Budget Process 
50 20 18 Oct PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
51 21 19 Oct JSCD Briefing on the Defence Budget Process 
52 22 19 Oct PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
53 23 25 Oct PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
54 24 15 Nov PCDMV Draft Defence Bill 
2000 
55 1 28 Feb PCDMV Briefing on the Angolan crisis 
56 2 6 Mar PCDMV Briefing on DOD rationalisation 
57 3 2 Apr PCDMV DOD Budget briefing and  Review of the Draft 
Defence Bill 
58 4 3 Apr PCDMV Amendments to the Armscor Act 
59 5 4 Apr JSCD Armscor Draft Bill 
60 6 8 May PCDMV Police Powers for SANDF when in support of 
SAPS 
61 7 15 May PCDMV Police Powers for SANDF when in support of 
SAPS 
62 8 11 Sep PCDMV Conventional Arms Control Bill 
63 9 12 Sep PCDMV Integration into the SANDF 
64 10 2 Oct JSCD Setai Commission Findings & 
Recommendations 
65 11 3 Oct JSCD Defence medium-term budget briefing 
66 12 31 Oct JSCD Reserve Force transformation 
67 13 31 Oct JSCD State of SANDF Reserves & Military 
Ombudsman 
2001 
68 1 12 Feb PCDMV Armscor briefing on  acquisition, procurement 
and stock sales 
69 2 19 Feb PCDMV Defence-related public-private partnerships 
70 3 26 Feb PCDMV Integration & Demobilisation Update 
71 4 6 Mar JSCD Non-Statutory Forces for Pension Benefits; 
SANDF Response to Interim Report of the 
Setai Commission 
72 5 12 Mar PCDMV Discussion of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Amendment Bill 
73 6 13 Mar JSCD Committee programming 
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Unique 
number 
Annual 
meeting 
number 
Date PCDMV and/or 
JSCD 
Main topic of the meeting90 
74 7 2 Apr JSCD Integration Progress Report and 
Preparedness of SANDF 
75 8 21 May PCDMV Service Corps briefing 
76 9 30 May PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
77 10 31 May PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
78 11 3 Jun JSCD Overview of the Defence Secretariat since 
2004 
79 12 4 Jun PCDMV Status Report on the Service Corps 
80 13 12 Jun JSCD Integration Report 
81 14 27 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
82 15 28 Aug JSCD Military Trade Unions 
83 16 18 Sep JSCD Briefing on the Military Ombud 
84 17 24 Sep PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
85 18 25 Sep JSCD Briefing on the closure of military bases 
86 19 1 Oct PCDMV Demobilisation Amendment Bill; Termination 
of Integration Intake Bill 
87 20 8 Oct PCDMV Defence Bill briefing and voting on the 
Demobilisation and Termination Of 
Integration Intake Bill 
88 21 9 Oct JSCD Military Trade Unions 
89 22 11 Oct JSCD Setai Commission Final Report 
90 23 15 Oct PCDMV Equal opportunities in the SANDF 
91 24 16 Oct JSCD Role of Commandos 
92 25 22 Oct PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
93 26 23 Oct JSCD DOD HIV/AIDS Policy 
94 27 29 Oct PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
95 28 30 Oct JSCD DOD HIV/AIDS Policy; Setai commission 
briefing and briefing on SANDF deployment 
to Burundi 
96 29 5 Nov PCDMV Briefing by the SA Military Academy and 
Defence College 
97 30 13 Nov JSCD SANDF deployment to Burundi 
98 31 14 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
99 32 19 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
100 33 20 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
101 34 21 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
102 35 26 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
103 36 27 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
104 37 28 Nov JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
105 38 3 Dec JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
106 39 4 Dec JSCD/PCDMV Joint Investigation - Strategic Defence 
Procurement 
2002 
107 1 18 Feb PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
108 2 4 Mar PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
109 3 5 Mar JSCD Meeting with US War College Personnel 
110 4 11 Mar PCDMV Burundi deployments 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
280 
 
Unique 
number 
Annual 
meeting 
number 
Date PCDMV and/or 
JSCD 
Main topic of the meeting90 
111 5 12 Mar JSCD Burundi Appropriation Bill 
112 6 22 Apr PCDMV Defence Bill 
113 7 23 Apr PCDMV Defence Bill 
114 8 6 May PCDMV Defence Bill 
115 9 7 May PCDMV VOD Budget 
116 10 20 May PCDMV Defence Bill 
117 11 21 May PCDMV Defence Bill 
118 12 27 May PCDMV Defence Bill 
119 13 28 May PCDMV Civil-military relations Seminar 
120 14 10 Jun PCDMV Defence Bill 
121 15 18 Jun PCDMV Defence Bill 
122 16 24 Jun PCDMV Defence Bill; National Conventional Arms 
Control Bill 
123 17 25 Jun JSCD Election of Chairperson 
124 18 29 Jul PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
125 19 30 Jul PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
126 20 12 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control Bill 
127 21 19 Aug PCDMV Military Justice System 
128 22 20 Oct PCDMV Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
129 23 24 Oct JSCD DOD Budget and Strategic Plan briefing 
130 24 28 Oct PCDMV Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
131 25 29 Oct PCDMV Engagement with British Defence Secretary 
132 26 4 Nov PCDMV Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
2003 
133 1 18 Feb JSCD Status of the Defence Secretariat 
134 2 25 Feb JSCD DOD HR Strategy 
135 3 3 Mar JSCD Transformation and integration in the SA 
Army 
136 4 4 Mar JSCD Transformation and integration in the SA 
Navy 
137 5 12 Mar JSCD DOD Budget briefing 
138 6 17 Mar PCDMV Transformation and integration in the SAMHS 
139 7 18 Mar JSCD SANDF foreign deployments 
140 8 24 Mar PCDMV Armscor Bill 
141 9 25 Mar JSCD White Paper on Peacekeeping 
142 10 31 Mar PCDMV Protocol relating to the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union 
143 11 7 Apr PCDMV Transformation and integration in the SA Air 
Force 
144 12 8 Apr JSCD Department Response to Setai Commission 
Report 
145 13 21 Apr PCDMV Armscor Bill 
146 14 15 Apr JSCD Civic education in the SANDF 
147 15 12 May PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
148 16 26 May PCDMV Discussion on the final Report on Integration 
in the SANDF 
149 17 9 Jun PCDMV Armscor Bill 
150 18 19 Jun PCDMV Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Bill 
151 19 4 Aug PCDMV Armscor Bill 
152 20 5 Aug JSCD Defence Foreign Relations 
153 21 17 Aug JSCD National Conventional Arms Control 
Committee Report 
154 22 18 Aug PCDMV White Paper on Defence Related Industries 
155 23 25 Aug PCDMV Disposal of Excess Military Stock; Follow-Up 
on Department's Annual Report 
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156 24 26 Aug JSCD DOD Equal opportunities directorate briefing 
157 25 1 Sep PCDMV ARMSCOR 2002-2003 Annual Report 
158 26 15 Sep PCDMV Adjustment budget 
159 27 16 Sep PCDMV Service Corps briefing 
160 28 18 Sep PCDMV Visit by Defence College 
161 29 13 Nov JSCD Briefing on the SADC Mutual Defence Pact 
162 30 17 Nov PCDMV Project Phoenix and Phasing out of 
Commandos 
163 31 24 Nov PCDMV Adoption of Committee Annual Report 
2004 
164 1 2 Feb PCDMV Common African Defence and Security 
Policy; Creation of an African Standby Force 
165 2 16 Feb JSCD DOD Strategic Plan and Budget 
166 3 10 May PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
167 4 30 May PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
168 5 31 May PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
169 6 3 Jun PCDMV DOD Budget briefing 
170 7 24 Jun PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
171 8 9 Aug PCDMV DOD HR Strategy and SETA Report 
172 9 16 Aug PCDMV Engagement on the 1998 Defence Review 
173 10 23 Aug PCDMV SANDF Peacekeeping missions 
174 11 6 Sep PCDMV Engagement on the 1998 Defence Review 
175 12 11 Oct PCDMV Engagement on the 1998 Defence Review 
176 13 18 Oct PCDMV Armscor and DOD Annual Reports 
177 14 23 Oct PCDMV Engagement on the 1998 Defence Review 
178 15 25 Oct PCDMV Engagement on the 1998 Defence Review 
179 16 1 Nov PCDMV Overview of public hearings on Defence 
review 
180 17 4 Nov PCDMV DOD Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 
181 18 7 Nov PCDMV Meeting with European Union 
Parliamentarian 
182 19 8 Nov PCDMV SANDF briefing on the Final Integration 
Report 
2005 
183 1 31 Jan PCDMV Adoption of oversight visit reports 
184 2 7 Feb PCDMV Withdrawal of Commandos 
185 3 14 Feb PCDMV SADC Mutual Defence Pact 
186 4 15 Feb PCDMV Defence White Paper and Defence Review 
187 5 21 Feb PCDMV United Nations Mission in Rwanda 
188 6 27 Feb PCDMV SANDF Participation in UN and AU Peace 
Missions 
189 7 7 Mar PCDMV DOD Budget 
190 8 14 Mar PCDMV DOD Strategic Plan; Briefing on Reserves 
191 9 15 Mar PCDMV Small Arms Control 
192 10 4 Apr PCDMV Defence Land And Facility Maintenance 
193 11 11 Apr PCDMV DOD HR Policy 
194 12 16 May PCDMV Armscor Amendment Bill; Special Defence 
Account Amendment Bill; Military 
Ombudsman Draft Bill 
195 13 6 Jun PCDMV Civic Education Evaluation and Advisory 
Board Annual Report 2003 
196 14 13 Jun PCDMV Adoption of the Special Defence Account 
Amendment Bill; discussion on the Armscor 
Amendment Bill 
197 15 20 Jun PCDMV Adoption of the Armscor Amendment Bill 
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198 16 1 Aug PCDMV NCACC Annual Report 
199 17 1 Aug PCDMV Activities of the NCACC 
200 18 2 Aug PCDMV DOD Budget and Procurement Programme 
201 19 9 Aug PCDMV Committee Business Plan and Budget 
202 20 16 Aug PCDMV Defence Unions 
203 21 22 Aug PCDMV Defence Secretariat Report and Department 
Restructuring 
204 22 29 Aug PCDMV Armscor Annual Report and Equal 
Opportunities Board 
205 23 12 Sep PCDMV DOD Quarterly Report, HR Strategy and 
Reserves 
206 24 16 Oct PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
207 25 18 Oct PCDMV AGSA briefing on DOD performance 
208 26 20 Oct PCDMV Armscor Annual Report 
209 27 20 Oct JSCD Election of Chairperson 
210 28 24 Oct PCDMV Oversight Visit Report adoption 
211 29 7 Nov PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill 
212 30 14 Nov PCDMV Committee programme for 2006 
213 31 15 Nov JSCD Letter of deployment of SANDF 
2006 
214 1 13 Mar PCDMV DOD Strategic Plan 
215 2 27 Mar PCDMV Adoption of committee reports 
216 3 3 May PCDMV Meeting with French Senators 
217 4 16 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
218 5 18 May JSCD SANDF Comoros Deployment 
219 6 21 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
220 7 22 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
221 8 23 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
222 9 29 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
223 10 4 Jun PCDMV MSDS system; DOD Budget timelines92 
224 11 5 Jun PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict 
Bill93 
225 12 11 Jun PCDMV Reserve Force activities; Mobility/ Exit 
Mechanisms for the DOD94 
226 13 12 Jun PCDMV Adoption of committee minutes 
227 14 19 Jun PCDMV Briefing by Denel 
228 15 22 Jun JSCD Briefing on the DRC situation 
229 16 31 Jun PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
230 17 1 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
231 18 2 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
232 19 3 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
                                                          
92 This meeting was reflected twice in the PMG database, on both 4 June 2006 and 4 June 2007. Duplication was 
removed in this study. 
93 This meeting was reflected twice in the PMG database, both dated 5 June 2006. 
94 This meeting was reflected twice in the PMG database, on both 11 June 2006 and 11 June 2007. Duplication 
was removed in this study 
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Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
233 20 13 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
234 21 17 Aug JSCD SANDF deployment to DRC 
235 22 21 Aug PCDMV DOD Exit Mechanisms and Special pensions 
236 23 28 Aug PCDMV DOD and Armscor Quarterly Reports 
237 24 7 Sep JSCD Reserve Force Council 
238 25 10 Sep PCDMV Armscor Quarterly Report 
239 26 11 Sep PCDMV Aerospace Maritime and Defence, DOD and 
Armscor Annual Reports 
240 27 16 Oct PCDMV Adoption of Committee Report 
241 28 23 Oct PCDMV Adoption of Committee Report 
242 29 30 Oct PCDMV Disposal of Ammunition Plan; Military 
Ombudsperson 
243 30 2 Nov JSCD SANDF Deployment letter 
244 31 14 Nov PCDMV Committee Annual Report adoption 
2007 
245 1 15 Feb JSCD Committee programme and Annual Report 
adoption; Letters of SANDF deployment 
246 2 22 Feb JSCD Committee programme and Annual Report 
adoption; Letters of SANDF deployment 
247 3 8 Mar JSCD Military veterans’ matters 
248 4 21 Mar PCDMV DOD Budget and Strategic Plan 
249 5 5 Mar PCDMV Ngwane Defence Group and CSIR briefing on 
their capabilities 
250 6 12 Mar PCDMV Armscor Annual Report 
251 7 22 Mar PCDMV DOD Budget 
252 8 3 May JSCD Non–Statutory Forces Pension Fund 
253 9 9 May JSCD Services to military veterans 
254 10 10 May JSCD Services to military veterans 
255 11 14 May PCDMV Armscor and DOD Quarterly Reports 
256 12 17 May JSCD SA Navy transformation 
257 13 21 May PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
258 14 24 May JSCD Transformation Management Developments; 
Letters of SANDF deployment 
259 15 28 May PCDMV Department of Public works briefing on DOD 
maintenance 
260 16 7 Jun JSCD Adoption of committee report (postponement) 
261 17 14 Jun JSCD Briefing by the State Information Technology 
Agency 
262 18 18 Jun PCDMV Psychometric Testing in Defence Forces 
263 19 21 Jun JSCD Adoption of committee report (postponement) 
264 20 25 Jun PCDMV Aerospace, Marine and Defence Industries 
Association briefing 
265 21 29 Jul PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
266 22 6 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
267 23 7 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
268 24 20 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
269 25 21 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
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270 26 23 Aug PCDMV Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Activities in Armed Conflict Bill 
271 27 11 Sep PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
272 28 13 Sep JSCD Election of Chairperson 
273 29 17 Sep JSCD/PCDMV Adoption of committee reports; Letters of 
SANDF deployment 
274 30 8 Oct JSCD/PCDMV Adoption of committee report; Letters of 
SANDF deployment 
275 31 15 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
276 32 29 Oct PCDMV Armscor Annual Report 
277 33 5 Nov PCDMV Adoption of Committee oversight report 
(postponement); Adoption of minutes 
278 34 8 Nov JSCD Adoption of Committee reports and letters of 
SANDF deployment 
279 35 12 Nov PCDMV DOD  Mobility Exit Mechanism 
280 36 19 Nov JSCD Adoption of Committee reports; Letters of 
SANDF deployment 
2008 
281 1 4 Feb PCDMV Committee business (postponement) 
282 2 14 Feb JSCD SANDF deployment in Darfur 
283 3 18 Feb PCDMV Adoption of Committee reports 
284 4 3 Mar PCDMV Castle Management Repeal Bill; Draft 
Defence Amendment Bill 
285 5 4 Mar PCDMV Castle Management Change; SA Army 
Seminar 
286 6 17 Mar PCDMV South African National Defence Union 
grievances 
287 7 18 Mar PCDMV Castle Control Board Annual Report 
288 8 5 May PCDMV Castle Management Repeal Bill ;  Prohibition 
or Restriction of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Bill  
289 9 6 May PCDMV Castle Management Repeal Bill 
290 10 13 May PCDMV Castle Management Repeal Bill 
291 11 18 May PCDMV DOD Budget and Strategic Plan  
292 12 19 May PCDMV Adoption of Committee Report on DOD 
Budget 
293 13 20 May PCDMV Adoption of Committee reports 
294 14 27 May JSCD Defence Amendment Bill 
295 15 2 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
296 16 3 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
297 17 9 Jun PCDMV Updates on military trade unions 
298 18 10 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
299 19 17 Jun JSCD/PCDMV Letters of SANDF deployment 
300 20 23 Jun PCDMV Armscor Management challenges 
301 21 5 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
302 22 11 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
303 23 12 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
304 24 18 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
305 25 19 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
306 26 25 Aug PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
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Amendment Bill 
307 27 26 Aug PCDMV Concerns regarding oversight of defence 
deployments;  National Conventional Arms 
Control Amendment Bill 
308 28 1 Sep PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
309 29 15 Sep PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
310 30 16 Sep PCDMV National Conventional Arms Control 
Amendment Bill 
311 31 23 Oct JSCD Protection of Civilians during Peacekeeping 
Operations; Employment of SANDF 
312 32 16 Nov PCDMV Castle Annual Report and Armscor Annual 
Report 
313 33 17 Nov PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
314 34 18 Nov PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
2009 
315 1 10 Feb JSCD/PCDMV Letters for SANDF deployment and Armscor 
personnel grievance 
316 2 27 May PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
317 3 9 Jun PCDMV Military veterans incorporation into DOD 
318 4 16 Jun PCDMV DOD Budget and Strategic Plan 
319 5 22 Jun PCDMV Committee Budget Report 
320 6 23 Jun PCDMV Defence Budget Vote 
321 7 29 Jun PCDMV Defence Budget Vote Committee Report 
322 8 6 Jul PCDMV Defence combat readiness 
323 9 4 Aug PCDMV PCDMV Strategic workshop and DOD 
briefings 
324 10 11 Aug PCDMV NCACC report on the arms deal 
325 11 1 Sep JSCD Election of Chairperson 
326 12 1 Sep PCDMV NCACC Annual Report 
327 13 7 Sep PCDMV Ministerial briefing on the SANDF strike 
328 14 8 Sep PCDMV The International Hydrographic Organisation 
(IHO) Convention 
329 15 14 Sep PCDMV Defence Force Service Commission and SA 
Air Force report on VVIP aircraft emergency 
landing 
330 16 15 Sep PCDMV Courtesy meeting with visiting 
representatives of the South African Defence 
College 
331 17 12 Oct PCDMV Defence Force Service Commission 
introduction; Procurement processes in the 
SANDF 
332 18 13 Oct PCDMV Armscor Annual Report 
333 19 26 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
334 20 27 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
335 21 3 Nov PCDMV Matters pertaining to military veterans 
336 22 10 Nov PCDMV Armscor Strategic Overview 
337 23 17 Nov PCDMV Interim Defence Force Service Commission 
Report 
2010 
338 1 1 Feb PCDMV Discussion on submissions procedures for 
NCACC reports 
339 2 8 Feb PCDMV Discussions on DOD performance at a 
SCOPA meeting 
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340 3 16 Feb PCDMV Briefing on SANDF border control operations 
341 4 2 Mar PCDMV DOD Budget and Strategic Plan 
342 5 15 Mar PCDMV Interim National Defence Force Service 
Commission briefing 
343 6 16 Mar PCDMV National Treasury input on DOD Budget 
344 7 23 Mar PCDMV DOD Budget and Strategic Plan 
345 8 12 Apr PCDMV Ministerial response to key DOD concerns 
346 9 13 Apr PCDMV Termination of service of Armscor CEO 
347 10 20 Apr PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill; Military veterans 
affairs 
348 11 17 May PCDMV NCACC Meeting (Postponed) 
349 12 8 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
350 13 18 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
351 14 19 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
352 15 27 Jun PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill;  Interim Defence 
Force Service Commission  Report 
353 16 2 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
354 17 3 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
355 18 9 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
356 19 15 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
357 20 16 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
358 21 24 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
359 22 30 Aug PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
360 23 31 Aug PCDMV Report of Ministerial Task Team on Military 
Veterans 
361 24 14 Sep PCDMV Oversight visit report discussion 
362 25 3 Oct PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
363 26 5 Oct PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
364 27 6 Oct PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
365 28 11 Oct PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill 
366 29 11 Oct PCDMV Armscor and Castle Annual Reports 
367 30 18 Oct PCDMV AGSA on DOD Annual Report 
368 31 25 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
369 32 26 Oct PCDMV Committee Draft BRR Report 
370 33 2 Nov PCDMV DOD HR issues; Defence HR policy; Mobility 
Exit Mechanism 
371 34 15 Nov PCDMV DOD Maritime and Landward Defence 
Programmes 
372 35 16 Nov PCDMV SA Air Force capability; Establishing the DMV 
2011 
373 1 17 Jan PCDMV Election of Chairperson 
374 2 17 Jan JSCD Election of Chairperson 
375 3 24 Jan JSCD Committee programme discussion 
376 4 3 Feb JSCD Committee workshop on functions 
377 5 7 Feb PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
378 6 22 Feb PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
379 7 3 Mar JSCD Interim National Defence Force Service 
Commission Report 
380 8 7 Mar PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
381 9 10 Mar JSCD Committee programme discussion 
382 10 22 Mar PCDMV DOD Strategic Plan 
383 11 27 Mar PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
384 12 28 Mar PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
385 13 29 Mar PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
386 14 11 Apr PCDMV DOD Budget 
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387 15 23 May PCDMV Committee programme discussion 
389 16 24 May PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
390 17 25 May JSCD Interim National Defence Force Service 
Commission Report 
391 18 30 May PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
392 19 31 May PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
393 20 1 Jun JSCD Denel restructuring 
394 21 6 Jun PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
395 22 8 Jun JSCD NCACC Annual Report 
396 23 14 Jun PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
397 24 20 Jun PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill; Implementation of 
the Geneva Conventions Bill 
398 25 22 Jun JSCD Transformation and gender equity in the 
SANDF 
399 26 27 Jun PCDMV Military Veterans Bill 
400 27 29 Jun JSCD Armscor Annual Report 
401 28 16 Aug PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
402 29 23 Aug PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
403 30 24 Aug JSCD Letters of SANDF deployment 
404 31 30 Aug PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
405 32 6 Sep PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
406 33 7 Sep JSCD Committee minutes discussion 
407 34 11 Sep PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
408 35 12 Sep PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
409 36 19 Sep PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
410 37 11 Oct PCDMV Committee programme discussion 
411 38 12 Oct PCDMV AGSA on DOD Audit Report 
412 39 17 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
413 40 18 Oct PCDMV Armscor and Castle Annual Reports 
414 41 26 Oct JSCD Transformation in the SA Air Force 
415 42 31 Oct PCDMV Committee Draft BRR Report 
416 43 2 Nov JSCD Special Pensions 
417 44 13 Nov PCDMV Implementation of the Geneva Conventions 
Bill 
418 45 14 Nov PCDMV Implementation of the Geneva Conventions 
Bill 
419 46 16 Nov JSCD Transformation in the Sa Navy 
420 47 21 Nov PCDMV Implementation of the Geneva Conventions 
Bill 
421 48 22 Nov PCDMV Implementation of the Geneva Conventions 
Bill 
422 49 23 Nov JSCD Transformation in the SANDF 
2012 
423 1 6 Mar PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill   
424 2 15 Feb JSCD Committee discussions on programming, 
handling of letters from the President and 
committee reports 
425 3 22 Feb JSCD Adoption of committee minutes 
426 4 29 Feb JSCD Committee programme discussions 
427 5 7 Mar JSCD Discussion on how to handle confidential 
information during committee meetings 
428 6 12 Mar PCDMV DOD Third Quarter performance 
429 7 13 Mar PCDMV Military Ombudsman Bill 
430 8 14 Mar JSCD NCACC Second, Third and Fourth Quarter 
Reports 
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431 9 17 Apr PCDMV Ministerial Defence Review Committee 
briefing 
432 10 24 Apr PCDMV DMV Strategic Plan 
433 11 25 Apr JSCD Defence Review 2012 
434 12 1 May PCDMV DOD Annual Performance Plan 
435 13 8 May PCDMV DOD Strategic Plan 
436 14 9 May JSCD Defence Review 2012 
437 15 14 May PCDMV Minister of Defence response to audit findings 
438 16 15 May PCDMV Consideration of Committee report on 
DODMV budget 
439 17 16 May JSCD Defence Review 2012 
440 18 11 Sep PCDMV DOD First quarter performance 
441 19 12 Sep JSCD Committee administration on minutes and 
possible study tour 
442 20 19 Sep JSCD Committee administration regarding forming a 
quorum; Programme discussion 
443 21 8 Oct PCDMV AGSA briefing on audit findings of DODMV 
444 22 16 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
445 23 22 Oct PCDMV BRR Report adoption (meeting postponed) 
446 24 23 Oct PCDMV Armscor annual Report; BRR Report 
adoption 
447 25 30 Oct PCDMV DMV and Castle Annual Reports 
448 26 15 Nov JSCD Special Pensions 
449 27 27 Nov PCDMV DOD Second Quarter performance; Armscor 
and Castle Strategic Plans 
2013 
450 1 26 Feb PCDMV Implications of the State of the Nation 
Address on Defence: Brief by Parliamentary 
researchers 
451 2 27 Feb JSCD Special Pensions Act 
452 3 5 Mar PCDMV AGSA briefing on the use of consultants by 
the DOD 
453 4 12 Mar PCDMV DOD Third Quarter Report 
454 5 3 Apr JSCD Briefing on the Battle in the Central African 
Republic 
455 6 23 Apr PCDMV Armscor and Castle Annual Performance 
Plans 
456 7 7 May PCDMV DOD Annual Performance Plan 
457 8 14 May PCDMV DMV Strategic Plan; Oversight visit report 
adoption 
458 9 21 May PCDMV Adoption of committee report on DODMV 
budgets  
459 10 12 Jun JSCD Letters for SANDF deployment 
460 11 18 Jun PCDMV DOD Fourth Quarter Report 
461 12 21 Aug JSCD Special Pensions Act 
462 13 11 Sep JSCD NCACC Annual Report 
463 14 7 Oct PCDMV SANDF skills development 
464 15 8 Oct PCDMV AGSA briefing on DOD Audit outcomes 
465 16 9 Oct PCDMV Castle Annual Report 
466 17 14 Oct PCDMV DOD Annual Report 
467 18 15 Oct PCDMV DMV Annual Report; DMV First and Second 
Quarter performance 
468 19 21 Oct PCDMV Discussion on committee BRR Report 
469 20 28 Oct PCDMV Adoption of committee BRR Report 
470 21 5 Nov PCDMV DOD First Quarter performance 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
289 
 
Unique 
number 
Annual 
meeting 
number 
Date PCDMV and/or 
JSCD 
Main topic of the meeting90 
471 22 6 Nov JSCD Special Pensions Act; DMV Regulations 
2014 (prior to elections) 
472 1 4 Feb PCDMV First term programme 
473 2 17 Feb PCDMV Convention on Cluster Munitions; AGSA 
briefing on DOD audit findings; DOD Third 
Quarter Performance 
474 3 18 Feb PCDMV Committee minutes and oversight visit report 
adoption 
475 4 25 Feb PCDMV Defence Amendment Bill; Convention on 
Cluster Munitions; DMV Second Quarter 
Performance 
476 5 26 Feb JSCD Letters for SANDF deployment 
477 6 4 Mar PCDMV State of defence facilities; DMV Regulations 
478 7 11 Mar PCDMV Briefing on the Military Academy and SA Air 
Force Base Langebaanweg; Defence Force 
Service Commission briefing; Military Ombud 
Briefing 
479 8 12 Mar PCDMV Discussion on Private Members Bill and 
Committee legacy report 
480 9 12 Mar JSCD Committee legacy report 
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ADDENDUM E  Guiding questions to semi-structured interviews 
 
1. Approach to the interviews 
In the proposal to the study, it was indicated that qualitative interviews will be used as a means of 
obtaining primary data. The qualitative interview approach (through semi-structured interviews) suits 
the study well as it allows for flexibility (Babbie, 2013, p. 346). Babbie (2013, p. 347) also states that 
in qualitative interviews, “it doesn’t work merely to ask pre-established questions and record the 
answers”. The set of questions provided in this interview plan is therefore merely a guide to the 
interview and further expanded questioning will take place. As such, the interview plan provides for 
the main questions to be asked and some additional questions to aid in the flow of the interview. 
 
2. Basis for interview questions 
The interview questions are rooted in the aim of the study. The primary aim of the study is to 
determine the status of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 
2014. To determine this status, a number of tools and focus areas related to parliamentary oversight 
have been identified by the study. The most significant of these include, inter alia,  (a) parliamentary 
debates on the military, (b) parliamentary questions, (c) special defence inquiries, (d) reviews of the 
defence budget, (e) reviews of defence policy, (f) reviews of defence procurement, (g) reviews of 
human resources, (h) reviews of the deployment of the military, (i) oversight visits and study tours, (j) 
the use of external audit and (k) budget transparency. Through its focus on additional international 
cases of parliamentary oversight of the military, the study also identified some lower-order focus 
areas which further informs the interview questions. These include (a) a focus on annual and quarterly 
departmental reports by parliament, (b) instances of interdepartmental cooperation, (c) military 
training, (d) gender and racial equality, (e) defence morale, and (f) defence infrastructure.  The study 
also identified specific characteristics of weak oversight such as a lack of political will, a lack of the 
necessary oversight resources and expertise, and constitutional or other legal imperatives. These 
matters will be raised during the interviews to determine whether South Africa is affected by such 
weaknesses.  While some of this data can be obtained through research of secondary data, 
interviews with individuals with relevant knowledge will provide significant additional detail and fill 
gaps where secondary research prove insufficient. 
 
The above categories were highlighted in analysis on parliamentary oversight of the defence sector 
by several international institutions. These include, inter alia, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and 
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) (Born, 2003), Transparency 
International (Cover & Meran, 2013a) and the World Bank (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004). The guiding 
questions being utilised in this study were partially informed by the areas of analysis identified by 
these institutions.  
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3. Guiding questions 
The table below highlights primary and secondary questions to aid the flow of the semi-structured 
interviews: 
Table E1: Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews 
                                                          
95 South Africa had four democratic Parliaments since 1994 (1994-1999; 1999-2004; 2004-2009; 2009-2014). 
Category Main Questions Additional Questions 
Introduction/ 
General oversight  
What would you consider the 
strong points of Parliament’s 
Defence Committees for each of 
the four post-1994 
parliaments?95 
 
Participant may not have 
information relevant to each 
Parliament.  
Do you recall any significant 
legislation/policies passed? 
  
Were Committee meetings held 
regularly? 
 
How well were Committee meetings 
attended? 
 
How effective was the Committee in its 
decision-making process? 
Introduction/ 
General oversight 
What would you consider the 
weak points of Parliament’s 
Defence Committees for each of 
the four post-1994 parliaments? 
 
Participant may not have 
information relevant to each 
Parliament. 
Can you expand on factors that inhibited 
Committee effectiveness? 
 
 
Conditions for oversight Do you consider the power of 
Parliament sufficient to 
effectively oversee the defence 
sector? 
 
This should refer to Parliament 
in general and specific 
Committees. 
 
Are there any constitutional and/or other 
legal parameters that inhibit effective 
oversight of the military in South Africa? 
 
Is sufficient Committee-time allocated to 
ensure effective oversight of the defence 
sector by Parliament? 
 
Is sufficient political will reflected in 
Parliament’s obligation to oversee the 
defence sector? 
Budgetary oversight Is the defence budget frequently 
and thoroughly debated? 
Do you believe that South Africa’s 
defence budget is sufficiently 
transparent? 
 
Is there any room for improvement in 
terms of accountability to Parliament of 
the Defence budget? 
 
Without divulging details, are the 
Parliamentary Defence Committees 
afforded the opportunity to scrutinise 
military spending on secret/classified 
projects? How do the Committees 
engage this matter? 
Policy 
oversight 
Is policy regularly reviewed by 
the Parliamentary Defence 
Committees? 
 
What policies that passed through the 
Committees do you consider significant? 
 
Would you consider the Defence 
Committees engagement on the 1998 
and 2014 Defence Reviews appropriate 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
292 
 
and influential? 
 
Do the Defence Committees engage 
effectively on the matter of arms control? 
 
Do the Defence Committees engage 
actively and efficiently on the matters of 
Defence procurement? 
Organisational 
oversight 
In your view, is regular oversight 
of the organisation (South 
African National Defence Force) 
provided by Parliament’s 
Defence Committees? 
Are Human Resources questions related 
to the SANDF regularly addressed? 
 
Is training and development in the military 
regularly reviewed? 
 
Is operational readiness of the SANDF 
regularly reviewed? 
Oversight of the 
SANDF deployment 
Does Parliament engage 
regularly on the deployment of 
the SANDF? 
Are external deployments of the SANDF 
thoroughly debated by the Defence 
Committees? 
 
Are internal deployments of the SANDF 
thoroughly debated by the Defence 
Committees? 
 
In your view, does the legislation provide 
sufficient powers to Parliament to engage 
on the deployment of the SANDF? 
Utilisation of oversight 
mechanisms 
What mechanisms are available 
to Parliament to oversee the 
Department of Defence 
effectively utilised? 
Do MPs make sufficient use of written 
questions to the Department of Defence? 
 
Is ‘Defence’ as a subject matter debated 
sufficiently in Parliament (both in the 
National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces)? 
 
Does Parliament utilise parliamentary 
inquiries effectively to ensure oversight of 
Defence? 
Oversight of lower-
order focus areas 
Do the Defence Committees 
regularly and efficiently review 
departmental performance 
against set targets? 
Are annual reports sufficiently analysed 
and debated? 
 
Are quarterly reports sufficiently analysed 
and debated? 
Oversight of lower-
order focus areas 
Do the Parliamentary 
Committees on Defence pay 
sufficient attention to the day-
today functioning of the South 
African National Defence Force? 
Is military training and education regularly 
considered and debated? 
 
Does the Committees consider matters of 
gender and racial equality? 
 
Has defence morale been discussed? 
Has the state of defence infrastructure 
been debated? 
 
Is cooperation between the Department 
of Defence and other departments 
discussed? 
Transparency and 
accountability 
 
Transparency of the 
Do you consider ‘Defence’ in 
South Africa to be transparent 
and accountable? Please 
explain. 
In your view, what are effective means 
utilised by the Parliamentary Defence 
Committees to ensure accountability and 
transparency of the Department of 
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While the questions above relate specifically to interviews with current and former Members of 
Parliament, as well as other individuals with intrinsic knowledge of the workings of Parliament’s 
DoD and its 
accountability to 
Parliament 
Defence? 
 
Do Parliamentary Defence Committees 
deal sufficiently with all aspects of the 
military or are there specific aspects that 
you feel were inadequately addressed? 
 
International 
comparison 
Were you ever exposed to how 
Defence Committees operate in 
other legislatures? If so, in your 
opinion, how did the South 
African Parliament’s Defence 
Committees compare? 
In what ways was the South African 
Defence Committees more effective than 
their international counterparts? 
 
In what ways were other Defence 
Committees more effective that their 
South African counterparts? 
 
These are perception-based questipons 
Support to the 
Committee 
Is there sufficient institutional 
support offered to the Defence 
Committees and MPs serving on 
the Committee? 
Did the Committees receive adequate 
support from the committee secretary? 
 
Was Research Support provided by 
Parliament? 
 
Do MPs rely mostly on his/her own 
reading, input from party researchers or 
input from Parliamentary researchers? 
 
What additional institutional support 
functions would assist the Committees to 
ensure effectiveness? 
Closing/ General 
oversight 
In your view, are MP’s serving 
on the Defence Committees 
knowledgeable of both the 
defence sector and budget 
work? 
During engagements with the Department 
and other roleplayers, did MPs show a 
thorough understanding of: 
 The oversight process 
 Oversight mechanisms 
 The budget process 
 Institutional knowledge of the 
Department and SANDF 
Closing questions In your view, how did Parliament 
assist in shaping civil-military 
relations since 1994? 
 
Was the level or capacity of civil-
military relations raised? 
Has parliament succeeded in ensuring 
civil oversight over the SANDF? 
 
How would you describe the relationship 
between the SANDF leadership and 
Parliament? 
In your view, do the Parliamentary 
Committees on Defence have sufficient 
expertise to perform oversight of the 
military? 
 
Closing questions Does Parliament manage to 
address the pertinent challenges 
facing the military? 
 
Has Parliament provided effective 
oversight of major incidents affecting the 
military (such as Operation Boleas, the 
Tempe shooting and/or the Battle of 
Bangui) 
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oversight of defence, these are not the only individuals who forms part of the interview process. In 
addition, academics and members providing institutional support to Parliament’s Defence Committees 
are also interview. Additional questions have been developed for these interviews. 
 
 
Table E2: Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews with academics and parliamentary 
support staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional support Point out the development of 
support structures to the 
Parliamentary Defence 
Committees between 1994 and 
2014 
When was the Committee and Research 
Sections established and developed to 
include a Defence Portfolio? 
 
Are sufficiently qualified personnel 
appointed to these positions? 
 
What is the nature of support provided to 
Committees and how did this develop 
since 1994? 
Academic inquiry Is the process of Parliamentary 
oversight of the military 
sufficiently studied in South 
Africa? 
In your view, has sufficient attention been 
paid to Parliamentary oversight of the 
military since 1994? 
 
Have you observed any changes in the 
regularity/intensity of such inquiry since 
1994? 
 
Have you experienced knowledgeable 
experts or analysts assisting with the 
oversight function? 
 
Did or does parliament commission 
research on defence oversight? 
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ADDENDUM F  Sample of interviewee consent form  
 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Twenty Years of Democracy:  
An Analysis of Parliamentary Oversight of the Military in South Africa 
 
You are herewith invited to participate in a data collection activity (interview) for a study on 
Parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa since 1994. The data collection is conducted by 
Mr. Wilhelm Janse van Rensburg for the purposes of a PhD study on the aforementioned title at 
Stellenbosch University’s Faculty of Military Science. 
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The approved study is titled Twenty Years of Democracy: An Analysis of Parliamentary Oversight of 
the Military in South Africa. The primary research problem centres on determining the quality and 
standing of parliamentary oversight of the military during the first twenty years of democracy. This will 
be achieved by providing international comparison, an overview of Parliamentary activities related to 
defence, and an internal perspective based on input from selected participants. It is intended that the 
study be completed by the end of 2018, where after it will be available on the SunScholar of 
Stellenbosch University. 
 
2. PROCEDURES 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Should you agree to participate, an arrangement will be made 
to conduct a semi-structured interview at a suitable time. The semi-structured interview will take 
approximately 40 minutes. The answering of questions is entirely voluntary and you may decide not to 
answer any of the interview questions should you wish. You may also withdraw from the study at any 
time by advising the researcher (see contact details below). During and after the interview, questions 
of clarification may be raised by the researcher, but you are not obliged to respond to these 
questions.  
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study. If you have any questions 
regarding this study or would like additional information please ask the researcher before, during, or 
after the interview. 
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
An analysis of Parliament’s oversight of the military is essential given the important role of the 
institution in ensuring the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations and the optimal functioning of 
the Defence Force. The study may assist in raising the prominence of the debate on parliamentary 
oversight of the military in South Africa. On a more pragmatic level, the study may be of value to 
parliamentary officials in determining factors that contribute to improved parliamentary oversight of the 
military. 
 
5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. No payment will be made for participation in the process of 
data collection.  
 
6. CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will 
remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. The utmost 
effort will be made to ensure confidentiality. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
296 
 
 
Anonymity: Given the nature of a semi-structured interview, the identity of the participant will be 
known to the researcher. In that regard, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. However, where anonymity 
towards the reader of the research is requested, your input will be referenced as ‘anonymous quotes’. 
Should you request anonymity beyond anonymised quotes, information you provide will be treated 
only as a source of background information, alongside literature-based research and interviews with 
others. Your name or any other personal identifying information will not appear in any publications 
resulting from this study, except if documented otherwise with the researcher.  
 
Confidentiality: To ensure confidentiality, the researcher will make use of codes for participants and 
for the location of the research. A separate list only accessible by the researcher will link participants 
with the data. There will thus be no public correlation between the participant and stored data. 
 
All data will be stored digitally and as hard copies. Digital data will be securely password protected. 
Data will be saved on the researcher's private computer and linked cloud service which are all 
password protected. Only the researcher will have access to the data. Hard copies of the data and 
consent forms will be kept in a safe in the office of the researcher where only he has access. All data 
collected will be destroyed by 1 June 2019. 
 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may 
withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any 
questions you are uncomfortable with and still remain in the study. The investigator may exclude you 
or your responses you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.   
 
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the researcher’s 
supervisor, Professor Francois Vrey: 
 
Associate Professor, Military Strategy Department  
Faculty of Military Science 
Private Bag X2, Saldanha, 7395 
Tel: +27 22 702 3106, Fax: +22 702 3060 
Email francois@ma2.sun.ac.za 
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are 
not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact Ms Maléne Fouché 
[mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 4622] at the Division for Research Development. 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
The information above was described to [me/the subject/the participant] by Wilhelm Janse van 
Rensburg in [Afrikaans/English/other] and [I am/the subject is/the participant is] in command of this 
language or it was satisfactorily translated to [me/him/her].  [I/the participant/the subject] was given 
the opportunity to ask questions and these questions were answered to [my/his/her] satisfaction.  
 
[I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study/I hereby consent that the subject/participant 
may participate in this study.] I have been given a copy of this form. 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Name of Subject/Participant 
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________________________________________ 
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable) 
 
________________________________________   ______________ 
Signature of Subject/Participant or Legal Representative  Date 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR  
 
I declare that I explained the information given in this document to __________________ [name of 
the subject/participant] and/or [his/her] representative ____________________ [name of the 
representative]. [He/she] was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions. This 
conversation was conducted in [Afrikaans/*English/*Other] and no translator was used. 
 
________________________________________  ______________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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